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Abstract
This thesis provides a case-study of  the relationship between public memory and
lived  experience  in  the  process  of  transformation  of  national  identity  in  the
aftermath of  'ethnic cleansing'. Once a multiethnic town with a Muslim majority,
since  the  1992-1995  Bosnian  war  the  town  of  Bijeljina  has  been  subjected  to
dynamics that resulted in the imposition of  a narrow interpretation of  Serb national
identity in the public space. In this liminal process, Bijeljina has been transformed
into a 'Serb' town, where Muslims are now tolerated but marginalised. 
'Ethnic  cleansing',  the  ultimate  liminal  experience,  was  central  to  the
transformation of  Bijeljina, and it figures prominently in the recollections of  the local
population, but is virtually absent from official memory, which is submitted to the
demands  of  the  nationalist  agenda  of  the  local  authorities.  An  ethnographic
approach allowed me to go beyond public representations, to explore private aspects
of  social memory and how these interact with official memory, as people try to find
meaning for their wartime experience. I combined my observation of  everyday life
through immersion in the community during one year of  fieldwork with in-depth
interviews focusing  on  the  respondents'  recollections  of  life  before  the  war,  their
wartime experience, how they reorganised their lives once the war was over, how they
see the present and imagine a future for themselves and their families. 
The  thesis  argues  for  a  more  subtle  understanding  of  the  relationship  of
mutual  implication between memory and identity, by focusing on the construction of
collective memory in a context where identity is uncertain, to analyse the dynamics
interplay  between  different  mnemonic  communities  built  on  the  basis  of  lived
experience,  and  between  these  communities  and  the  representations  of  the  past
sponsored or favoured by the political class. 
The thesis will fill a gap in the Memory Studies literature dealing with the
experience  of  war;  post-conflict;  Transitional  Justice;  and  post-war  Bosnia-
Herzegovina,  by going beyond the dominant  trend focusing  on public  aspects  of
ccollective  memory,  such  as  commemorations  and  memorials,  to  place  the
population's lived experience and meaning making processes at the centre.
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Introduction
The 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina resulted in an unprecedented historical shift,
with deep repercussions in the lives of  its population, and in their sense of  belonging and
identity.  This transformation involved the strategic  use of  an extreme level  of  violence
specifically directed against civilian populations; of  a pre-war population of  4.3 million,
about 100.000 died as a direct result of  the war, and about 2.2 million were forcefully
displaced.  Previously  a  multi-ethnic  society  where  the  population  generally  lived  well-
integrated,  and  effective  social  and  political  mechanisms  existed  to  regulate  and
accommodate  ethnic  diversity,  the  war  transformed  Bosnia-Herzegovina  into  a
conglomeration of  mostly ethnically segregated territories where narrow interpretations of
national  identity  according  to  nationalist  perspectives  are  dominant,  and  space  for
alternative expressions of  identity limited.
This  thesis  will  focus  on the case  of  Republika  Srpska,  to  explore how people
remember  the  wartime  violence,  and  how  those  memories  relate  to  the  process(es)  of
reconstruction of  national identity taking place there. In the context of  the disintegration
of  the Socialist Federative Republic of  Yugoslavia (SFRY), Bosnian Serb leaders opposed
the idea of  an independent Bosnia organised as a unitary state. Instead, they favoured the
idea  of  a  union  with  Serbia  as  part  of  a  rump  Yugoslavia;  once  this  possibility  was
excluded, they launched a rebellion to secede and create their own state, based on the
principle of  'separation of  peoples'.  The massive forced population displacement during
the war owe much to the pursuit of  this principle, defined by the Serb leadership as a
strategic goal. Using an ethnographic approach, I  will  analyse the relationship between
public  representations  of  the  past  and  privately  articulated  memories  based  on  lived
experience, focusing especially on the meanings attached to the experience of  persecution
and forced displacement, and its impact on the population's sense of  belonging, to highlight
the relationship of  mutual implication between collective memory and national identity.
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a) The research problem:
The  fundamental  transformation  of  the  territory  brought  about  by  the  war,  and  the
overwhelming absence, in the populations' everyday lives, of  the  'constitutive others' which
resulted  from ethnic  cleansing  and  post-war  segregation,  were  crucial  elements  of  the
transformation  of  ethnic  identity  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  ethnicity  being,  as  Thomas
Hylland Eriksen (2002:12) highlights, “essentially an aspect of  a relationship, not a property
of  a group”. After three and a half  years of  war, the Dayton Peace Agreement resulted in
the  division  of  the  country  into  two  highly  autonomous  'entities',  whose  boundary
corresponded to a slightly modified version of  the frontlines as they stood at the time of  the
cease-fire. Designed as a temporary solution to end the war (Bennet 2016: 85), Dayton
imposed  a  consocional  power-sharing  arrangement  that  made  rigid  ethno-national
identities  the  primary  forms  of  political  identification,  and  embedded  discrimination
against all who did not fit into such categories (Bojičić-Dželilović 2015). Thus, the system
empowered  the  nationalist  ruling  class  that  emerged  from  the  war,  which  actively
demanded individuals' allegiance as a condition for inclusion in the political community
corresponding to one's ethnic group.
But Dayton included also a series of  provisions with the potential to reverse, at least
in part, the effects of  ethnic cleansing and forced displacement more generally 1, and thus
restore  a  certain  degree  of  ethnic  diversity  (Toal  and  Dahlman  2011).  The  Peace
Agreement,  and  the  international  peace-building  efforts  that  followed  towards  its
implementation, reflected a mix – not always consistent – of  pragmatism and idealism,
institutionalising, on the one hand, the 'territorialisation of  ethnicity', while, on the other
hand,  enforcing  liberal  policies  and  imposing  Human  Rights  protection  mechanisms
(Bieber 2006; Bennet 2016). The post-war stage opened up new possibilities to reshape
Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond the will of  its ruling class, which for the most part remained
committed to ethnic homogenisation.
This led to an array of  processes that developed both from the top-down and from
1 These were the provisions for return of  refugees and internally displaced persons to their pre-war homes
(Annex 7); return of  real property (annex 7); and the preservation and restoration of  national monuments
(Annex 8), many of  which had been damaged or destroyed as part of  wider processes of  ethnic cleansing
(Riedlmeyer 2002; Walasek 2015)
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the bottom-up, eventually converging towards the normalisation of  inter-ethnic relations at
the level of  everyday life. Regarding top-down processes, we should highlight the efforts
undertaken by international actors towards the creation of  a stable security situation, the
establishment of  freedom of  movement and the reinforcement of  the state-level institutions
(Bennet  2016).  Measures  enforcing  the  right  to  return  of  property,  and  the  right  of
internally  displaced  persons  and  refugees  to  return  to  their  pre-war  homes,  but  also
decisions with immediate practical implications, such as establishing vehicle licence plates
that did not display the vehicle's place of  registration, and restoring bus lines between the
two entities, had a massive impact, making it easier for people to reorganise their lives.
Such measures contributed to the development of  botom-up normalisation processes, but
were themselves influenced by an intense grassroots  mobilisation, as in the case of  the
return movement to areas where individuals would constitute part of  the minority in terms
of  ethnicity, usually referred to as 'minority return' (Belloni 2006; Sivac-Bryant 2016). 
These converging processes did not challenge the dominant nationalist order, but
they  succeeded  in  pushing  for  some  level  of  accommodation,  which  made  life  more
bearable, and allowed, crucially, for a significant level of  refugee return and resettlement of
displaced persons. In a climate still fraught with tension, most people preferred to live in
areas where their ethnic group formed a majority, but there was also a significant level of
'minority return'. Whatever the case, people usually found the places they were to live in
transformed as a consequence of  the war, but they would also become, through their very
presence,  part  of  this,  still  ongoing,  transformation.  The  radical  political  changes,  the
violence, and the massive movements of  populations, disrupted people's sense of  identity
and especially their sense of  attachment and belonging to a community. 
It was against this backdrop that, in the post-war period, the parallel processes of
reconstruction of  national identity  which originated in the pre-war period, continued to
develop  among  the  three  'constituent  peoples'  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  now  that  the
umbrella of  a larger multi-national state was no longer. In a country now divided along
ethnic  lines,  the  overwhelming  –  but  not  complete  –  absence  of  each  ethnic  group's
'significant other' in the realm of  everyday life was replaced by their conspicuous presence
as political opponents in abstract, if  not enemies, with divergent interests, threatening the
survival of  the  in-group. 
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In Republika Srpska, this reconstruction of  national identity has been paralleled by
an ongoing process of  institution-building (ICG 2009), facilitated by a consensus towards
the protection and reinforcement of  the entity's political autonomy. Since 2006, Republika
Srpska's strongman, current President Milorad Dodik (Prime-Minister between 2006 and
2010),  has  regularly  threatened  to  organise  an  independence  referendum  (Toal  2013;
Majstorović 2013), and repeatedly declared that Bosnia is a “failed idea” (propala ideja) with
“no chance to survive” (BLIN 2013; see also Azinović, Bassuener and Weber 2011:37-40).
In the meantime, the authorities of  RS have been efficiently “building the institutions they
would need for independence, although they are also useful within Bosnia” (ICG  2009:8),
whilst  frequently  obstructing the operation of  the state institutions  (Bennet  2016),  thus
exposing the fragility of  the Dayton order, exploring the fear of  a new war, and inducing a
sense of  uncertainty over the future.
But the incessant repetition of  the desire for independence, as well as the saturation
of  the  landscape  with  symbols  of  statehood,  such  as  flags  at  virtually  every  junction;
'Welcome  to  the  Republic  of  Srpska'  billboards  on the  borders  and on the  roads  in  places
corresponding to the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL); the attempts to add the adjective
'srpski' to the name of  a number of  towns, and to erase the adjective 'bosanski' 2; etc, also
translate a necessity to constantly assert Serb identity, or rather 'Srpska' identity, that can be
interpreted as a sign of  to be interpreted as a sign of  insecurity, or as Ivan  Lovrenović
(2001) has pointed out, as a“symptom of  foreignness, or rootlessness”. 
The extent and depth of  the transformation of  the territory and of  the population's
lives brought with it a certain level of  uncertainty over identity, which nationalists seek to
counter through the construction of  an officially-sponsored public memory based on “a
narrative  of  the  war  that  supports  the  claim  of  the  legitimacy  of  Republika  Srpska's
existence  as  a  separate  politically  organised  community”(Correia  2013:329).  The
construction of  an government-sponsored public memory of  the Bosnian war,  officially
called  the  “Defensive-Fatherland  War”(odbrambeno-otadžbinski  rat')representing  Republika
Srpska as a 'community of  sacrifice'  (Hutchinson 2009) is  an important element of  the
2  For instance Bosanska Kostajnica (Srpska Kostajnica) and Bosanski Brod (Srpski Brod). A decision of  the
Constitutional Court, however, forced the Republika Srpska authorities to drop the 'Srpska' prefix. For 
more on this issue see Correia (2013, pp. 334-335)
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nationalist project of  construction of  nationhood. 
The question of  how to  deal  with  historical  events  of  violence  involved in  the
foundation of  political communities is a critical problem facing national identity projects.
This difficulty has been eloquently highlighted by Ernest Renan (1992[1882]) in his famous
lecture 'What is a Nation?', who suggested that forgetting and historical error were a “a
crucial  factor  in  the  creation  of  the  nation”.  Forgetting,  however,  is  difficult,  if  not
impossible, at least while such historical events are still part of  living memory, if  for nothing
else, because the surviving victims of  such acts, and those who oppose the identity project
at stake will mobilise themselves in ways that will  function as reminders of  that which,
following Renan, should be the object of  oblivion and historical error. 
How the legacy of  ethnic cleansing and genocide is framed and dealt with is indeed
the key question regarding the dynamics of  social remembering and the construction of
collective  memory  in  post-war  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This  question  stands  the  heart  of
nation  building  efforts  as  much  as  it  stands  at  the  centre  of  transitional  justice  and
reconciliation initiatives. In research carried out in 2010, I analysed the politics of  memory
enforced in Republika Srpska by its  leadership and traced the evolution of  the official
approach to the memory of  the war in the context of  evolving international and domestic
constrains  and  internal  power-struggles  among  the  Bosnian  Serb  political  elite
(Correia 2013). Other scholars have focused on the relationship between this politics of
memory and those sponsored by Bosniak and Bosnian Croat political elites and 'memory
entrepreneurs',  which  both  reflect  and  reinforce  the  existing  ethnic  divisions  in
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  undermine  efforts  towards  reconciliation  (Miller  2006;  Moll
2013). 
The  top-down approach  of  these  pieces  of  research  (see  also  Musi  2015),  left
unexplored, however, the role of  lived experience in the construction of  collective memory,
by excluding from their research design an engagement with personal memories(e.g. Musi
2015:262).  On the other  hand,  anthropologists  like  Hariz  Halilovich(2013)  and Sebina
Sivac-Bryant  (2016),  who  adopted  a  bottom-up approach,  left  the  interaction between
different  mnemonic  communities  largely  unexplored  (see,  however  Eastmond  and
Mannergren Selimović (2012), who explore the role of  silence in these interactions at local
level).
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In  their  respective  analysis  of  monuments,  memorials  and  commemorations  in
post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina (Halilovich 2013:Ch.3); and of  the frustrated effort towards
memorialisation of  the the Omarska concentration camp by the victims of  ethnic cleansing
in  Prijedor  in Republika  Srpska  (Sivac-Bryant  2016:Ch5),  Halilovich  and Sivac-Bryant
point  out  to  the  crucial  problem involved  in  any  memorialisation  effort  in  Republika
Srpska,  with regards to ethnic cleansing: the opposition between the experience of  the
victims and the will of  the political class to ignore that same experience. Whilst there is a
clear political dimension, this is not, however, a problem that can be adequately explored
by framing it as a struggle between hegemonic memory and counter-memory – to evoke
the  foucauldian  model  (Misztal  2003:62).  This  would  represent  an  over-simplification,
stressing ethnic divisions and equating the official memory promoted by the authorities
with  the  personal  memories  of  the  Serb  population;  many  of  whom struggle  to  give
meaning  to   their  pre-war attachments,  their  wartime experience,  and their  emotional
attachment and political support towards Republika Srspka, as Ioannis Armakolas' (2007)
ethnographic study of  Sarajevo Serbs who resettled in Pale, the ski resort which became the
wartime capital of  Republika Srpska, suggests.
 Political events in general,  and war and mass violence in particular, are always
experienced collectively, regardless of  each individual's positionally, as shared experiences,
although  they  were  experienced  differently  by  different  categories  of  the  population,
depending on a number factors, among which ethnicity, gender and age stand out. Such
experiences provide the base for an array of  mnemonic communities within a given society,
who  in  the  course  of  their  interaction  influence  each  other,  and  the  dominant
representations,  as  well  as  being  influenced  by  them.  Without  ignoring  it,  but  instead
recognising the pervasiveness of  its presence, we need to go beyond public memory, and
shift  our  attention  from  memory  entrepreneurs  and  political  actors,  towards  ordinary
people, to explore how their wartime experience influences their everyday lives and their
sense of  belonging, and the difficulties that arise from the contrast between individuals's
lived experience and what and how they are told to remember.
We need to provide adequate context, since remembering always happens in a given
place and in a given time, and, with a particular focus on recollections that are kept as
private memories,  we need to combine a top-down analysis  of  official  memory with a
bottom  up  perspective  of  the  dynamics  of  remembering,  to  better  understand  the
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relationship between memory and identity in the aftermath of  war and ethnic cleansing.
 
 The Research Questions
The overall question that has guided this research is thus: how are memories that stem from
the  experience  of  mass  violence  given  meaning,  and  thus  influence  the  dynamics  of
identification processes,  when they are produced in a  political  context characterised by
political uncertainty; deep divisions created or enhanced by conflict; and the dominance of
nationalistic public representations? 
This question implies the following sub-questions:
   Given the diversity of  war-time experiences and political perspectives of  the war
in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  how  do  social  memories  produced  by  different
'communities of  experience' interplay within the post-war process of  reconstruction
of  identity? 
   How do  memories  of  earlier  historical  experiences  of  violence,  but  also  the
memories of  peaceful coexistence and 'life in common' (zajednički život) and among
ethnic groups before 1992, influence the way people remember the recent war and
find meaning to the changes it brought about? 
   Given the public prominence of  nationalist representations of  the past, how is the
division  between  public  and  private  dimensions  of  social  memories  operated,
maintained and challenged? 
b) Research design:
Research for this thesis followed the interpretative tradition of  the social sciences, grounded
on  the  ontological  and  epistemological  foundations  of  phenomenology,  with  its
engagement  with  lived  experience,  and  its  processual  approach  to  the  production  of
meaning as it takes place in the lifeworld (lebenswelt) of  individuals (Schutz 1967; Yanow
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2006;  Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012).  I  have adopted an abductive logic  of  inquiry,
aimed at producing explanations of  puzzling or surprising observations through a process
involving an iterative-recursive relation between theoretical literature and empirical data,
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012: 27-34; Bajc 2012; Timmermans and Tavory 2012). 
An abductive approach allowed me to mobilise my prior knowledge, both in terms
of  experience in the field and study of  the literature, without nevertheless being bound by
it, and to search for theoretical insights as research developed during and beyond fieldwork.
Adopting an abductive approach kept me focused on an effort to remain open to different
analytical  possibilities,  since,  as  Schwartz-Shea  and  Yanow  (2012:34)  highlight,  “the
abductive logic of  inquiry (…) rests on the idea that researchers will learn more about their
research  question  in  the  process  of  conducting  their  research”.  It  is,  for  that  reason,
particularly appropriate for ethnographic research, in which immersion in the community
opens up the possibility of  observing the unexpected, in spontaneous, naturally occurring
interactions.
Methodology:
Ethnography is the methodology I chose to explore the meaning making processes centred
around the experience of  war and ethnicised violence. Involving one year of  fieldwork in
the  city  of  Bijeljina,  the  second largest  of  the  'entity'  o  Republika  Srpska,  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, an ethnographic approach allowed me to go beyond public representations,
to explore private aspects of  social memory and how these interact with official memory, as
people try to find meaning for their wartime experience. I combined my observation of
everyday life through immersion in the community during one year of  fieldwork with in-
depth interviews focusing on the respondents'  recollections of  life  before the war,  their
wartime experience, how they reorganised their lives once the war was over, how they see
the present and imagine a future for themselves and their families. 
To explain why I chose ethnography, rather than other, less time-consuming, forms
of  qualitative research, I need to clarify how I arrived at the research problem that defines
this research. The very choice of  the case-study of  Republika Srpska is intertwined with
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this question. My interest in the dynamics of  memory, and more specifically on the ways
people remember transformative political events was what motivated me in the first place
to pursue postgraduate studies. For my Master's dissertation, I chose to focus on Serbia as a
case-study of  the relation between historical memories and the construction of  national
identity; this was a choice done for purely pragmatic reasons, as a suitable case to develop
my theoretical interests; I did not have any prior connection to the region of  the former
Yugoslavia, but once I made this choice, it opened up a world of  possibilities, research-wise,
and I became particularly interested in the issue of  genocide denial. 
Before joining the LSE to pursue my doctoral studies, I was fortunate to live in
Bosnia-Herzegovina for a period of  fifteen months (June 2010-September 2011), during
which I gained fluency in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, and travelled extensively throughout
the country. I was also able to attend two annual cycles of  commemorations of  wartime
atrocities, in the towns of  Višegrad (June), Srebrenica (July) and Prijedor (May, July, August),
and participated, as a volunteer, in the exhumations that took place in the Lake Peručac, in
the River Drina, in September-October 2010. 
On the basis of  my experiences then, I came to the conclusion that research based
solely  on  the  observation  of  commemorations,  without  further  engagement  with  the
communities where they are performed lacks depth, and risks distorting the complexity of
community life.I understood then that the scholarly focus on commemorations, and, more
generally,  on  public  representations,  leaves  aside  less  obvious,  more  difficult  to  access,
aspects  of  the  dynamics  of  social  remembering.  This  leads  to  the  dominance  of  the
paradigm  of  'divided  memories'  (e.g.  Moll  2013),  with  commemorations  and  counter-
commemorations  often  presented as  a  a  war  of  memories  and a  competition  towards
claims of  victimhood (e.g. Miller 2006). The result is a tendency to flatten lived experience,
and ignore interactions in ethnically divided communities, which may assume forms other
than confrontation.
Some of  the limitations of  approaches solely based on formal interviews or surveys
lie in the very nature of  the phenomenon of  memory. As I argue in more detail in this
thesis's theoretical chapter (Ch. 2), memory's scope goes much beyond representations, and
it is crucial to go beyond explicit narratives in order to understand its dynamics, even if  it is
also crucial to engage with those narratives.  I also felt that research strategies based on
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surveys and semi-structured interviews would not adequately capture the meaning-making
process inherent to social remembering, because, on the one hand, potential respondents
were exposed, sometimes almost to the point of  saturation, to the normative approach of
Transitional Justice practitioners, and, on the other hand, I noticed a 'respondent fatigue'
that many people, including 'memory entrepreneurs', ie, activists engaged in the process of
memorialisation, seemed to share, due to sheer volume of  journalists, scholars, students,
etc, that visited the country in the post-war period. The combined result, as I observed it
during my time in Bosnia in 2010/2011, was the emergence of  conventionalised narratives,
largely  submitted  to  dominant  public  representations.  There  were  clear  gaps  in  the
understanding  of  social  remembering,  which  led  to  the  research  problem  driving  this
research. 
How  and  where  to  look  for  answers?  The  study  of  the  relationship  between
collective  memory  and the  construction  of  nationhood requires  an  in-depth  approach
through immersion in everyday life. Ethnography, with a prolonged presence in a single
location, appeared as the best way to generate data with enough depth so as to go beyond
the  model  of  'divided  memories'.  As  a  style  of  research  and  as  a  methodology,
ethnography allows the researcher to gain insights into a particular problem in a society by
engaging with the perspectives of  its  members,  their  beliefs,  practises  and expectations,
ideally through spontaneous or naturally occurring interactions, which immersion in the
community facilitates. This makes ethnography particularly suitable to 'how' questions and
a focus on informality. 
My research strategy, ahead of  fieldwork, consisted in remaining in the field for a
period of  one year, so as to allow for some degree of  immersion in the community. During
fieldwork, I was to attend commemorations and other events related to memories of  war
and ethnicised violence; perfor a sufficient number of  formal interviews with people willing
to share their wartime experiences and reflect on their memories; and, most importantly,
seek for opportunities to observe and participate in spontaneous interactions and in 'deep
hanging out'.  I was aware that the goal was ambitious, and the time limited, but I did
underestimate the scale of  difficulty involved, given, I believe, the sensitivity of  my research
theme, and, most importantly, a certain environment that seemed not to foster freedom of
speech in my field location, or at least that was how I perceived it at the time. The next
chapter  provides  a  detailed  description  of  the  fieldwork  experience  in  terms  of  data
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collection and data generation. In the next section, I justify  the choice of  the location for
this case-study. 
Selection of  the research site
 In  her  comprehensive  review  of  the  literature  on  the  wars  of  Yugoslav  succession,
Catherine Baker (2015) notes that “there is still no book length history of  organised crime
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, let alone for the war as a whole”(2015:59). The same goes for the
analysis of  the establishment of  Republika Srpska, with Robert Donia's (2015) biography
of  Radovan Karadžić; Adis Maksić analysis of  the creation and development of  the SDS
between  1990  and 1992;  and  Nina  Caspersen's  comparative  study  of  the  relationship
between the Milošević regime, the Serbian Democratic Party in Croatia and its sister party
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, among the few English language monographs specifically focusing
on the creation of  Republika Srpska (see also  Kostovicova 2004).  Despite the volume of
research focusing on post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, there is an obvious gap in scholarly
literature  produced  in  foreign  languages  regarding  Republika  Srpska.  To  make  things
worse, there is a tendency to disregard the specificity of  Bosnian Serb identity, as  Ioannis
Armakolas (2007), and Marko Attila Hoare (2007; 2010) highlight.
Since my focus on lived experience required, for the sake of  depth, fieldwork to be
performed in a single location, I  needed a setting that could be small enough to make
ethnographic  engagement  possible,  but  large  enough  to  encompass  some  degree  of
diversity. How to pass through 'gatekeepers' and get access to potential informants was also
an important  concern.  My initial  plan  was to  do  research in the town of  Prijedor,  in
northwest  Bosnia,  a  region where I  had already done some exploratory  fieldwork  (see
Correia 2010). I changed my mind when I became aware of  the research being carried out
by Sebina Sivac-Bryant (2016), and by Hariz Halilovich (2011), since I felt I would better
contribute to the advancement of  knowledge about the legacies of  the war by focusing on a
location as  yet  unexplored.  The city  of  Bijeljina  appeared,  then,  almost  as  a  'natural'
choice, given that this is the second largest city of  Republika Srpska; the main power-base,
since 2006, of  the Serbian Democratic Party; and a city that experienced substantial return
of  non-Serb population who was forcefully displaced during the war. Bijeljina thus offered
19
good  conditions  for  an  original  empirical  contribution  to  scholarship.  It  had  also  the
advantage of  being a place that I had not visited before. 
With regard to the research questions, Bijeljina did not represent a typical case of
'ethnic cleansing', representing, instead, a case of  protracted ethnic cleansing, which was
completed only sightly before the end of  the war. The fact that Bijeljina is, to some extent,
a deviant case, is not, in itself,  a problem, because the goal of  this thesis is to produce
contextualised  knowledge,  rather  than  to  make  wide  generalisations.  Still,  the  case  of
Bijeljina holds the potential to shed light into the wider dynamics of  ethnic cleansing, that
is useful to understand other cases, in which the whole process of  expulsion of  non-Serbs
happened much faster, because although the pace and the scale of  the violence employed
were different, these different variants converged, by the end of  the war, to the same result,
an ethnically homogenous, 'Serb' territory. 
c) Organisation of  the thesis:
As the thesis explores the transformation of  Bijeljina from a multi-ethnic town regulated by
principle of  'life in common', the macro-structure of  the thesis is inspired by the framework
of  rites of  passage, while the internal structure of  each chapter is intended to highlight the
interactions in the remembering processes (public and private). 
Chapter 1 provides a detailed description of  fieldwork conducted for this thesis, and
a reflexive analysis of  the ethnographic methods used for data generation, with a focus on
the questions of  positionality – mine and that of  my informants – and ethics. 
Chapter 2 provides a discussion of  the theoretical framework and key concepts used
in this thesis, namely, the concepts of  memory; ethnic cleansing; and liminality. 
Chapter 3 presents the historical  background relevant for this thesis,. The chapter
offers  a  brief  historical  overview,  centred around the development of  Bijeljina  through
time, and its strategic importance as a border town. The chapter specifically focuses on the
political context in which ethnic cleansing developed, with emphasis on the creation of
Republika Srpska, and the ideal of  'separation of  peoples'. 
The four empirical chapters that follow are framed according to the different stages
in  the  liminal  process  of  transformation  that  Bijeljina  experienced  since  the  end  of
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communist rule. 
Chapter  4  is  set  on  the  context  of  the  stage  of  separation within  the  stage  of
liminality  itself,  and it  provides  an  analysis  of  the  spatial  dimension of  the process  of
construction of  an official memory in what was to become Republika Srpska. It focuses on
how the physical space changed in Bijeljina during and in the immediate aftermath of  the
Bosnian war, through a dual process of  erasure and reinscription of  public memory.
There is  of  course  some degree  or  arbitrariness  when defining  when liminality
starts, as Yugoslavia lived through a decade of  growing uncertainty since the death of  Tito
to the beginning of  disintegration and war. But here the relevant criterium is the mome nt
when the point  of  no-return is  reached,  and that  was  when the war began.  I  see the
beginning  of  the war,  between April  and August  1992 as  the stage of  separation that
enforced a point of  no-return; in August 1992, after a general mobilisation is declared, and
the basic institutions of  the Serb statelet  became in place,  and with the launch of  t he
International Conference for Bosnia-Herzegovina, we enter the period of  liminality proper,
a  period  of  great  uncertainty  following  the  dismantlement  of  the  previously  existing
structures, when the lack of  new structures opens up possibilities, in this case the possibility
of  shaping Republika Srpska. This period of  liminality did not end with Dayton, which
introduced a number of  constraints but also opened up new possibilities. It ended when the
new structures began to show signs of  consolidation, which in RS was connected to intra-
Serb power struggles. In Bijeljina too there were important changes in leadership, which
introduced a new stage, which I have called the process of  normalisation. This corresponds
to the stage of  reintegration or reaggregation in liminality theory, after new structures have
emerged. It represents the closure of  a period of  uncertainty, thus providing a new stability,
but also closing the realm of  possibilities. The question in the end is whether Bosnia is still
living  in  liminality,  or  whether  it  has  reached  a  new  stability.  This  stability  is  clearly
precarious due to the flaws of  the political system, and to the interest of  ruling elites to
maintain an environment of  uncertainty over the future and latent conflictuality, but at the
level of  everyday life I will claim that on the level of  everyday life a new normality has been
established,  regardless  of  this  normality  being  considered  morally  problematic  by  the
citizens. But this normality informs the way people remember and how they perceive their
choices and constraints.
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Chapters 5 and 6 focus on private aspects  of  social  and collective memory,  to
explore  how  people  reacted  to  and  coped  with  violence,  and  in  particular  with  the
profound transformations defined by the strategic goal of  'separation of  peoples' that was
the  cornerstone  of  the  Bosnian  Serb  nationalist  project.  Together,  the  two  chapters
function  as  counterpoints  to  the  instrumentalist  approach  to  collective  memory.  The
chapters are located in the context of  the period of  liminality proper, and in both chapters
I essentially explore the population's lived experience, as reflected in personal recollections
through  my  interviews  and  informal  conversations,  but  also  as  perceived  through  my
observation of  everyday life. 
Chapter  5  focuses  on  the  non-Serbs'  (mostly  Bosniaks,  previously  known  as
Muslims) experience of  persecution, and how it is remembered through privately shared
memories. It explores coping mechanisms, the flow of  information, and cases of  support
beyond the ethnic divide. Chapter 6 focuses on the resettlement of  Serbs displaced from
other regions of  Bosnia. Their experience is represented in official memory in such a way
that it instrumentalises this experience for the sake of  nation-building, of  which resettled
Serbs become hostages, whilst perceiving the position they are assigned as a second-rate
status. The chapter explores the contradictions and dilemmas that people feel, trapped as
they are by hegemonic narratives framing their suffering as a sacrifice for the nation. 
In a way, the persecution of  non-serbs is part of  the process of  erasure, and the
resettlement of  displaced Serbs is part of  the process of  reinscription, but the results are
not  straightforward.  Bijeljina's  Bosnian  Muslims  have  in  one  way  or  another
accommodated themselves with the reality of  the existence of  RS, either by remaining in
exile,  resettling  in  the  Federation,  or  returning  to  the  municipality,  and  reintegrating
themselves within the constraints the political system imposed. Bosnian Serbs, on the other
hand,  seem to  be  caught  in  a  state  of  permanent  liminality,  as  they  face  obstacles  to
integration, and battle with the idea that they were sacrificed without any reward other
than the very existence of  Republika Srpska. 
Chapter 7 closes the circle, with the idea of  normalisation, bringing the thesis to the
present time, and exploring an array of  rituals of  reaggregation and a few acts of  redress
after ethnic cleansing. Here I explore the process of  return of  Bosniaks (and also Roma);
the reconstruction of  the mosques; initiatives towards 'reconciliation' including the failure
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of  the local Truth and Reconciliation commission; and the continuation of  the process of
erasure  and  reinscription,  fulfilling,  in  this  period,  a  different  function,  not  one  of
separation, but one of  reagreggration.
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Chapter 1
The craft of  ethnography:
Fieldwork in Bijeljina
I conducted fieldwork in Bijeljina between the middle of  March 2014 and the middle of
February 2015, with an additional visit to the field in August-September 2015, which lasted
six  weeks.  I  was  not  familiar  with Bijeljina  before fieldwork.  I  had previously  travelled
extensively throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina (2007; 2008; 2010-2011), mostly in Republika
Srpska, but I had never been in Bijeljina before. The opportunity to immerse myself  in an
environment to which I was alien was an added motivation for my choice of  Bijeljina as the
location for my fieldwork. Indeed, my position as an outsider allowed me to see Bijeljina
with fresh eyes, without the sense of  familiarity that renders invisible certain features of  the
local environment and 'naturalises' the locally-established routines and rituals and takes for
granted the rhythms of  everyday life. 
Once  settled,  I  sought  to  immerse  myself  in  the  local  society,  so  as  to  create
opportunities for observation of  everyday life and for spontaneous interactions with the
population in general, and to open up the possibility to engage in 'deep hanging out' in a
few particular settings. I also attended an array of  war-related public commemorations,
covering not only the 1992-1995 war but also the First and Second World Wars – it was a
fortunate  coincidence  that  my  fieldwork  coincided  with  the  100 th anniversary  of  the
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Sarajevo assassination of  the Archduke Franz-Ferdinand and the beginning of  the First
World War. During fieldwork I conducted in-depth interviews with 34 respondents, mostly,
but not exclusively, focusing on the respondents wartime experience and their perspectives
over Bijeljina's transformation. I established close relations with eight other local residents,
whom I did not formally interview, but whose experiences and reflections in different ways
inform this thesis.The bulk of  the data that informs this thesis was, thus, co-generated with
informants and interview respondents; in 'deep hanging out'  as well  in as serendipitous
encounters; and in interaction with the city itself. 
In order to triangulate information and  ground this study in the adequate historical
context, I also took the opportunity to collect primary and secondary sources of  data, only
available locally, such as official documents local newspaper articles, and locally-produced
books researching the history of  Semberija as well as the wartime experience. These added
to  other  documents  available  remotely,  such  as  ICTY  documents  and  other  court
proceedings;  reports  from  ngo's  and  international  organisations,  media  articles  and
secondary literature.
My presence in the field was marked by two important contingencies: the eruption,
in  February  2014,  of  violent  protests  in  several  towns  in  the  Federation  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina (the majority Muslim and Croat 'entity', henceforth the Federation); and the
catastrophic floods that, in May 2014 devastated large areas of  the country, including the
region of  Semberija  where  Bijeljina  is  located.  The 100 th anniversary  of  the  Sarajevo
assassination and the beginning of  the First World War; the general elections in October
2014; and the 'refugee crisis' in the Summer of  2015, were the other major events with a
relevant impact on fieldwork.
1.1 Entering the field:
My  first  point  of  contact  with  Bijeljina,  during  the  research  design  stage,  and  in
anticipation of  fieldwork,  was the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Republika
Srpska  (Helsinški  odbor  za  ljudska  prava  u  Republici  Srpskoj),  a  locally  based  independent
organisation  dedicated  to  monitoring  Human  Rights,  and  more  broadly  the  political
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situation in Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Committee was also involved
in Transitional Justice approaches to the war legacies, providing expertise, training as well
as education programmes targeting the youth. During fieldwork for my Master dissertation,
I had worked with its sister organisation in Serbia, the Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Serbia;  its  chairperson, Sonja Biserko,  put me in touch with the HORS and
provided  a  recommendation.  When  I  arrived  from  Sarajevo  in  March  2014,  I  had
members of  staff  waiting for me; they helped me settle down, find a place to live and
childcare for my daughter, then twenty months old; Branko Todorović, the President of  the
Helsinki Committee in Republika Srpska, offered me a desk in their office, the possibility to
use one of  their rooms to conduct interviews, and the opportunity to attend events they
organised. 
My earlier experience of  fieldwork in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Serbia had taught
me the importance of  adequate recommendations in getting access to potential informants
and interview respondents.  During the time I  spent  in Sarajevo ahead of  fieldwork in
Bijeljina,  I  mobilised a  few of  my acquaintances there in the search for new points  of
contact that might allow me to broaden my access. I identified a few individuals whom I
would like to speak to in Bijeljina,  and informally approached people who might vouch for
me and put us in touch. The most fruitful outcome of  this initial effort was that it allowed
me to gain access to a local women's organisation, the Lara Foundation (Fondacija Lara),
after a Sarajevo-based journalist accepted to put me in touch with its director, Radmila
Žigić.  Lara dealt primarily with violence against women and human trafficking, but was
also engaged broader activities, including the organisation of  'Women's Courts' initiatives
(O'Reilly 2016: 427) and Transitional Justice workshops. Lara activists were also engaged in
correcting the gender imbalance in the public representations of  the past, which rendered
women's agency invisible (see Lazić 2012; Nezavisne novine 2014). Once in Bijeljina, I was
able to visit their office regularly, speak with their activists and staff, and attend their events.
Taken together, these organisations – Lara and the Helsinki Committee – offered
me an entry point into the field, and helped me recruit some of  my interview respondents.
In the context of  my research, however, they were neither 'gatekeepers' conditioning my
access to the field, nor 'fixers' of  whose portfolio of  contacts I felt entitled to, and I wasn't
specifically researching their activities and respective impacts. I was more interested in the
opportunity to be around and 'hang out', and learn about how they were involved in, and
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contributed to, the public discourse about the presence of  the past in Republika Srpska and
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
The first  month of  fieldwork went  on very fast,  and I  was  busy organising my
routines,  exploring  the  cityscape  and  attending  a  few  public  events,  including  the
commemorations of  the military take-over by Serb forces in 1992. I was able to attend a
few training sessions  and involving  the Committee's  youth group and and a workshop
about Transitional Justice in a local secondary school. But soon I began feeling I was not in
control of  my research, merely following the stream, rather than navigating it. I struggled
especially to recruit respondents for formal interviews. I didn't receive outright rejections at
this stage ( I did later on), but it was simply that everyone I contacted seemed unavailable,
and I was sometimes asked to “call again next week”, only to hear the same the following
week,  until  I  would feel  embarrassed of  insisting.  After  more than twenty years  under
intense scrutiny, many people in Bosnia, both at elite and popular level, had grown tired of
outsiders' attention. I was well aware of  this form of  'respondent fatigue', as this was often
commented upon by friends and acquaintances involved in civic activism in other parts of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I noticed this also in the initial attitude of  the Helsinki Committee
staff, always friendly but detached. 
It  was  also  that  the  timing  was  not  in  my  favour.  Having  arrived  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina on 30 January 2014, I had planned to remain in Sarajevo for a couple of
weeks, and then move to Bijeljina, but one week after I arrived, there was a wave of  violent
protests throughout the Federation; I directly witnessed the eruption of  violence in Sarajevo
on 7 February (see Correia 2014). The protests led to an experiment in direct democracy,
with the creation of  plenary assemblies in Sarajevo and other cities of  the Federation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina3. I could not resist seizing the opportunity to follow this process, thus
delaying by a few weeks entry in the field. I left in the middle of  March, as the Sarajevo
'plenum' was dying out, and just in time to settle down before the commemorative cycle
began in Bijeljina, with the anniversary of  the military take over of  Bijeljina in April 1992.
As I was just beginning to develop my efforts to recruit respondents for interviews, the
Easter holiday (20 April, with Catholic and Orthodox easter coinciding) brought Bijeljina
to a standstill. The same happened one week later, around International Workers' Day, on 1
3 The Federation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina is, along with Republika Srpska, one of  the 'entities'  in which 
Bosnia-Herzegovina is divided. 
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May – a remnant from the communist era which became a celebration of  Spring. The city
suddenly seemed empty, and while everybody seemed to be having a good time enjoying
Spring in the countryside, I felt I was stuck, alone with my daughter, still a toddler, with
nothing  to  do  and  nowhere  to  go.  I  became overwhelmed  by  feelings  of  discomfort,
loneliness  and anxiety.  In hindsight,  I  understand this  is  a common experience among
ethnographers,  somehow  necessary  as  it  brings  with  it  a  more  realistic  grasp  of  the
challenges involved in our effort towards immersion in the community in an urban setting.
On a deeper level, I was struggling to define how to present myself, how to justify
my presence in Bijeljina, and how much to disclose about my research – given that the
topic  of  collective memory was generally  perceived as sensitive –and how to approach
potential  informants.  This  began  to  change  in  early  May,  when,  at  the  Helsinki
Committee's office, I finally expressed my frustration, when one of  the workers asked me
how my research was going. “I cannot go knocking on people's doors and ask them how they remember
the war”, I said. “Sara, you don't need to knock on anyone's doors. Look around, all of  us here [five to six
young women sharing an open-plan office]  none of  us were born in Bijeljina”.  The others
assented; I felt welcome in a way that I hadn't before. My presence seemed to have become
normal. This exchange marked the beginning of  'hanging out'.
On the same day, however, as I was on my way home after leaving the office, I had
an unpleasant encounter with the local police. A patrol car stopped me in the street, for no
apparent reason. They searched my bag and checked my identification; it confused them
that I was a foreign citizen, but could speak their language well, and even more that in my
worn-out rucksack was an expensive laptop computer and what in their eyes looked like a
professional camera. I had registered my stay in the country (boravak), not in Bijeljina, but in
Sarajevo, and that seemed to be a problem. As we were very close to the HORS office, I
had the presence of  mind to tell them they would confirm who I was and what I was doing
in Bijeljina. My colleagues vouched for me and the policemen let me go. My babysitter,
Ana, was furious about this incident. “They thought you were a gipsy”, she said. “I'm sure! They
think they can do whatever they want. They are peasants, that's what they are” She went on to tell me
how  policemen  feel  entitled  to  harass  young  people,  especially  those  with  looks  that
somehow  defy  conventions.  The  'gypsy'  ascription  remained  with  me  throughout  my
fieldwork, and somehow influenced my positionality. With time I learned how to handle
such perceptions,  but  at  that  particular  moment,  the  police  incident  added to  already
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existing feelings of  anxiety, which became overwhelming. I found it hard to cope with what
I felt was a personal failure rather than a difficult fieldwork setting, and only my wounded
pride seemed to sustain me at this point.
I temporarily withdrew from the field. The Helsinki Committee was organising a
one-week long 'Peace School' in the town of  Prijedor, for secondary school students from
the Bosnian Krajina region in the north-west of  the country. I was invited to join, and once
the police incident happened, I decided to anticipate my trip by a few days. Friends in a
village outside Prijedor received me and I was able to rest. One week later, in the last day
of  the 'Peace School',  floods devastated much of  Bosnia. The floods had a particularly
strong impact in Semberija, a plain located in the confluence of  two rivers, the Sava and
the Drina. The roads were cut, and part of  Bijeljina itself  was under water. I was forced to
postpone my return, and secretly glad to do so. My time in the Krajina region, surrounded
by friendly people in the field location that I had decided not to choose, allowed me to
regain my confidence as a  researcher.  The contrast  with the sense of  familiarity I  had
already  with  the  town  of  Prijedor  and  the  surrounding  villages  gave  meaning  to  the
estrangement I felt in Bijeljina. It also validated my choice of  Bijeljina as my fieldwork
location, regardless of  the difficulties. Throughout my fieldwork and beyond, however, the
knowledge acquired in previous fieldwork in the Prijedor region remained in my mind, and
helped me made sense of  my data. 
The  estrangement  I  felt  when  entering  the  field  was  a  necessary  part  of  the
ethnographic process, in terms of  laying the ground for later data generation, as a stage
during which my mind focused on uncovering the unwritten rules of  social interaction in
everyday life and learning about the city rhythm. That I had no access to 'local knowledge'
before entering the field, and no 'privileged informants' receiving me, was crucial in terms
also of  avoiding bias. 
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2.2 Everyday life, positionally. and immersion in the community:
Some of  the most valuable insights during fieldwork were generated in the context of  my
interactions with the local population in everyday life. When I returned to Bijeljina after my
stay in Prijedor, the old problems were waiting for me, that had earlier afflicted me were –
isolation  and  difficulties  in  gaining  access  to  informants  and  interview  respondents.
Everybody seemed to be absorbed by the impact of  the floods. The soil was so saturated
that water sprang in basements, affecting even the homes which water overflown from the
rivers had not reached. I soon noticed, however, that once the water receded and people
cleared their basements, it became easier to approach potential informants, as if  the impact
of  the floods had opened people up to more easily engage. 
Indeed,  the  floods  themselves  provided an initial  talking  point.  The floods  had
blatantly exposed the failures of  the central governments, both at state and entity level, but
had also triggered a level of  solidarity among ordinary people that defied, for a moment,
the dominant narratives about social and ethnic divisions. Asking people how they were
coping, and whether they were getting any aid, and how they had handled the situation was
not  controversial,  and  opened  up  the  possibility  of  conversation.  Such  conversations
revealed a lot, not only about my interlocutors present situation, but also about their past
experiences. For instance, families resettled in Bijeljina after displacement from other areas
of  Bosnia during the war were more harshly hit by the floods, due, in many cases, to their
homes  being  located  in  flooding-prone areas  (see  also  Toal  and  Dahlman 2011:  266).
Whilst not directly focusing on people's memories of  the war, these conversations very often
lead there, as my interlocutors expressed their grievances, and compared life in Bijeljina
with the lives they had before, in their native regions. 
For my neighbours, and people who had noticed my two weeks' absence, realising
that I had returned also offered an opportunity to engage, whereas my presence before had
been largely ignored or at least unacknowledged. Thus, once I allowed myself  to open to
contingency,  and  to  serendipitously  explore  the  city,  things  began  to  change,  and
meaningful interactions began occurring. It all seems to have started when a woman I had
never seen approached me at the bakery saying “Neighbour (komšinica), why do you keep
your daughter naked in the balcony?”. Whilst this felt invasive, it was at least a form of
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interaction, which confronted me with the fact that I was observed, much more than I was
observing, and that, although I felt so isolated, I was the focus of  some curiosity in my
neighbourhood.  I explained to the woman that my flat was unbearably hot (the floods had
been followed by a heat wave – it was 35º C inside the flat during the day). Questions
followed about where I was from, why I spoke 'the language' so well and, finally, what I was
doing in Bijeljina. Much as the expression 'immersion in the community' sounds appealing,
the reality of  fieldwork in an urban environment is very different. To reduce my isolation, I
had to let go of  my privacy, but this allowed me to reach out to people in ways that were
unexpected. 
Becoming aware of  my positionally, as this foreign woman alone with a child in
Bijeljina, and who stood out with her peculiar parenting style, allowed me to rescue my
research which had previously seemed hopelessly doomed. That I was there with a small
child somehow seemed to suggest how committed I was to my research, to the point of
sacrificing in comfort and family support. I came to understand that the contrast with the
way middle-class Bosnian mothers were stereotypically perceived favoured me, as it showed
commitment both to my work and to my child, and people generally saw me as a strong,
even  courageous  woman,  for  leaving  the  comfort  of  my  home  behind  to  pursue  my
research.  Thus  I  began  engaging  in  spontaneous  conversations,  mostly  with  women,
ranging different generations, from early twenties to late eighties, about children at first,
then about life in general, and finally about life in Bijeljina. I spent many hours during
Spring and the Summer, when the days are long, sitting with mothers, grandmothers and
childminders at the playground close to home, chatting while the women smoked, while the
children played. I did find easier to relate to these more modest  women that I met at the
run-down playground  in  the  back  of  the  Orthodox  Church  in  the  neighbourhood  of
Ledince,  where  I  lived,  that  with  the  more  sophisticated,  middle-class  parents  whose
children went to nursery with my daughter – a quite expensive nursery school by local
standards. But whilst with then interactions were generally more superficial, occasionally
they also resulted in more meaningful, deeper interactions. 
I was often asked where I was from (Odakle ste?). My response “From Portugal, but I
live in England” puzzled people, and lead to the assumption was that I was married to
someone connected to local families now living in the diaspora, which would account for
my knowledge of  the local language. I usually explained that I was “doing some work at the
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Helsinki Committee for Human Rights”, without detailing. I especially avoided identifying
myself  as a 'researcher', given the connotation with 'investigator' (istraživateljica), and I was
too old to credibly say I was a student. The fact that I was affiliated with the Committee
nevertheless vouched for me, since the committee's president, Branko Todorović was well-
known and well-respected in Bijeljina. I always kept a low-profile, which often fed people's
curiosity, but allowed me to manage my presence so as not to be perceived as invasive. With
time, everybody in my neighbourhood seemed to know me, and know that I was working
on a PhD, and I knew more and more people, and was able to create some closeness with a
few. 
Taking ownership of  my positionality, not only as a foreign woman and a single
mother, but especially as a scholar was a necessary step towards fruitful immersion. At the
beginning, I felt constrained to say I was researching social memory, since this might be
seen as too political, so I said I was learning about how much Bijeljina had changed since
the disintegration of  Yugoslavia. With time, as I felt more confident, and as some level of
trust emerged from everyday interactions, I was able to be more open about my interest for
social  memories.  In  any  case,  what  most  interested  me  in  these  interactions  was  to
understand how people perceived and framed the changes that the war had brought both
to the city and to their own lives. Memories often arose spontaneously, in glimpses and
fragments, but sometimes also in more structured personal narratives. These interactions
provided a great deal of  insight into the body of  shared knowledge about the past. They
also allowed me to somehow explore the boundaries between public and private memories,
from the way people related to dominant narratives, the erasure and reinscription of  public
space and official commemorations. They opened my mind to issues that I was then able to
more fully explore with a few privileged informants and with my interview respondents. 
Eventually, when people asked me “Where are you from?”, I began asking back the
same question “And you, where are you from?”. Despite my initial fears, the question was
always  well-received,   prompting  responses  that  allowed me to obtain insights  into the
connection people had to the city, and – in the case of  people who resettled in Bijeljina
during or after the  war – into their feelings towards the places they had left behind.
At a certain point, I realised that some of  the women I was in touch with, market
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vendors and shop keepers, mothers, grandmothers and childminders at the park believed I
was  an  ethnic  Roma.  Many  people  seemed  to  assume  I  was  a  gypsy  woman  from
Macedonia,  which  I  believed  was  due  to  my  skin  complexion  and  type  of  hair;  my
'attachment parenting' style; and my strange accent and grammar mistakes – I happened to
make  declination  mistakes  common  among  Macedonian  speakers  when  they  speak  in
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian.  The  assumption  was  so  generalised  that  even  real  Roma
persons seemed to share it, as was the case with a couple I formally interviewed, who, after
two hours of  in-depth interview, openly asked me if  I was “one of  them” – they were not
totally convinced by my denial4. Unlike in my encounter with the police (assuming that
Ana, my babysitter, was right) in this case such ascription of  identity ended up working in
my favour. It made me somehow closer, not a complete stranger, but someone individuals
could categorise, and identified as sharing a regional identity and some cultural traits. By
the time the misunderstanding was cleared (when it was at all), rapport had already been
established. Regardless of  prevalent prejudices against the Roma, such a perception did
play in my favour, if  for nothing else, because it providing a talking point allowing people to
express their curiosity – rather than suspicion – about me. 
'Hanging out':
Whilst  initially I  spent much time at the Helsinki  Committee,  over time, I  was able to
diversify  the set  of  specific places  where I  'hanged out'.  I  have already mentioned the
women's organisation 'Lara'. I also regularly spent time at the city library; unfortunately the
staff  was not forthcoming when I requested to consult the archive of  the local newspaper
4 Fieldnotes, December 2014. This experience, of  people assuming I was of  Roma ethnicity, happened a 
number of  times in other places in Bosnia-Herzegovina not only during my fieldwork time, but also 
during previous visits to the country. This was not unreasonable, given my physical appearance. Among 
these occurrences, one that stands out happened in Kozarac (on Kozarac see Sivac-Bryant 2016), where I
stayed while the bus lines between the north-west and the north-east of  Republika Srpska were suspended
during the floods. I had been there before a few times, and was staying with a local family; I was sitting in 
the cafe with my hostess when I saw a woman whom I had interviewed in 2011, and, with my daughter 
in my arms, I went to greet her. The woman did not recognise me, nor did I expect her to, but what I did 
not expect was the way she turned her face away as I approached her. I realised then she assumed I was a
beggar. A couple of  days later, when she saw me at the local community centre, she became aware of  her 
behaviour, and finally greeted me, but pretended this hadn't happened, by feigning surprise that I was in 
town and did not come to visit her (fieldnotes, May 2014) When I returned to Bijeljina, I changed my 
hair style and bought new clothes, in an effort to at least avoid exposing myself  to a similar situation.
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Semberske novine. I was told that with the basement where such archives were located had
sustained damages during the floods and that, thus, the archive was no longer accessible. I
was  fortunate,  in  the meantime,  to  learn  that  the local  museum also  held  a  complete
collection.  Between October 2014 and the end of  January 2015 I  visited the museum
almost every day to go through the newspaper collection. I got to know much of  the staff
there, from the caretakers to the curators. When the weather turned cold, and given that
the museum did not have central heating, I was offered to use a desk in an office shared by
members of  staff. I learned a lot with them, as they were always ready to clarify any doubts
and offer context to specific articles. More broadly, it was also an opportunity to sense the
environment in one of  Bijeljina's cultural institutions, and as everywhere else, the past was
always looming, and as I gained trust, it emerged often in conversations, usually brief, and
often  leaving  much  unsaid  but  implied.  This  was  a  common  pattern  in  my  informal
exchanges in Bijeljina, pushing me to read through the silences and evasive suggestions.
With time, my relationship with a few key informants allowed me to explore these things
that were suggested but  left  largely  unsaid,  and seek clarification and validation to my
intuitions. 
During the fieldwork period, I lived in the neighbourhood of  Ledince, in the Srpska
dobrovoljačka garda (Serbian Volunteer Guard) Street. I lived alone with my daughter in a
small flat. I was strongly anchored in the neighbourhood, although I regularly circulated
throughout much of  the city,. I did most of  my shopping there, sat at cafes, my daughter
went  to  nursery there,  and we and spent  time everyday in  the small  park  around the
Orthodox church (saborna crkva), where children gathered to play. 
The Catholic church was also located there. I attended Mass at the local Catholic
church every Sunday while on fieldwork. After the mass, which was usually attended by 20-
30 people, the parish priest invited his flock for coffee at the parish house. Going to church
on Sunday was one of  the few things that allowed me to anchor myself  during fieldwork,
since at least during Mass I was not an outsider, but a member of  the (religious) community
on my own right. Coffee at the parish house was a treat, since otherwise I would probably
spend the rest of  the day alone with my daughter. I felt, however, greatly constrained in
engaging with the other persons who attended mass. It was all very tempting, as I could see
the wealth of  ethnographic detail waiting to be picked, but I feared others would doubt the
motives  of  my presence there,  and perhaps  question the sincerity  of  my beliefs.  Only
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around  Christmas,  not  long  before  leaving  the  field  did  I  realise  my  concerns  were
exaggerated, when one of  the older ladies I usually spoke with invited me to have lunch
and spend the day in her house, and openly discussed the recent and distant past with me.
Her attitude reassured me that my presence was welcome and my role in Bijeljina clear
enough. Indeed, before leaving the field I was warmly greeted by the regular church goers. 
When I returned for my field visit in the Summer of  2015, I lived in two different
neighbourhoods:  Tombak, the city's  poorest  neighbourhood, where much of  the Roma
community is concentrated, and where many resettled Serbs built  their homes. I was a
guest  at  the  home of  a  Bosniak  woman I  had become close  to  during  fieldwork;  she
introduced me to her Serb neighbours, some of  whom I happened to already have met,
thanks to my prolonged fieldwork. I was forced, however, to cut short my stay in Tombak,
as relations with my hostess deteriorated and she became abusive. I  then moved to the
neighbourhood of  Bukreš, in the other side of  town, not far from Ledince. I rented a small
flat,  which  was  attached  to  the  landlady's  house.  I  had  a  friend  who  lived  in  the
neighbourhood; it was her who arranged for me to move there, and her mother-in-law
introduced me to some of  the neighbours. Whilst Ledince had a very urban character, and
Tombak felt very suburban – there was a strong stigma attached to it in Bijeljina –  Bukreš
had a village-like atmosphere. This diversity of  urban experiences allowed me to more fully
understand the dynamics of  everyday life as well as some of  the social divisions in Bijeljina.
I also made a few visits to the village of  Janja – effectively a Bosniak enclave, and a
locality with a distinctive identity, albeit closely connected to Bijeljina. I conducted some of
my interviews  there  in  January  2015,  during  which my daughter  attended the Islamic
cultural centre's nursery school. 
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1.3 Observation of  public events:
I sought to attend as many public events as possible, especially if  they had a connection
with memorialisation. I always adopted a very low profile in such events, observing without
seeking to engage with other participants. I wanted to avoid unwelcome attention, least
anyone question the motivations and legitimacy of  my presence – the negative experience I
had with the police remained always in the back of  my mind, but more consciously I
worried  about  being  seen  as  hostile  or  jeopardising  access  to  potential  respondents.  I
attended mainly three types of  public events: commemorations; cultural events generally
open to the public and religious celebrations; and public events more specifically targeting
particular  audiences,  such  as  'public  debates'  (javne  tribine),  talks  or  lectures.  As  for
commemorations, these usually focused on war legacies and the construction of  statehood,
inevitably  consisting in the deposition of  flower wreaths  in  particular  monuments,  and
sometimes followed by speeches or cultural events, such as exhibitions. Cultural events and
'public debates' had a more diverse nature, and were usually organised by local associations,
the library and the museum. I eventually learned how local associations' access to public
spaces  was  strictly  controlled,  in  more or  less  subtle  ways,  and how the deep political
divisions in Republika Srpska, namely intra-Serb divisions played a role in these forms of
control. I was interested mainly in events that somehow related to my research questions,
thus events connected to wartime legacies and enduring divisions, but sought to attend as
many  events  as  possible,  even  when  the  subject  was  more  remotely  connected.  More
broadly, I sought to follow the rhythm of  the city, and to be present in all major gatherings.
My  observation  activities  included  also  a  set  of  events  closed  to  the  public,
specifically workshops and training sessions organised by the Helsinki Committee and by
Lara. The Committee  events  that  I  attended specifically  targeted  the  youth,  and  were
usually attended by secondary school and university students, involving projects related to
peace, inter-ethnic relations, and 'facing the past'. Since I had excluded individuals under
21 years old from my interview sampling (see  infra), such events offered me the possibility
to  listen  to,  and  to  some  extent  interact  with,  the  generation  of    young  adults  and
teenagers, the first generation without a direct experience of  the 1992-1995 war.   
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1.4 Doing interviews:
During fieldwork, I conducted formal interviews with 34 respondents, with most of  whom I
was able to establish relationships that went beyond a single interview, but evolved towards
more informal interactions. I also established relations marked by some degree of  trust and
closeness with eight other individuals, whom I never formally interviewed, but with whom I
had a series of  informal conversations over time which generated insights very similar to
those of  formal interviews.  Albeit  with different levels  of  closeness,  these eight persons
became key informants, as happened also to four of  my interview respondents.
The goal of  the interviews was to collect narratives locating individuals' experiences
in the context of  the transformation of  Bijeljina from a multiethnic town marked by the
principle of  'life in common' (zajednički život) to a town dominated by a narrow, and broadly
exclusive,  interpretation  of  Serb  national  identity  in  the  public  space.  Through  the
recollections my respondents chose to share with me, I sought to explore different versions
of  the  historical  events  that  occurred  since  the  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia,  and  the
different meanings attached to their experiences. The interviews were crucial in order to
understand how the boundaries between public and private dimensions of  social memories
were negotiated, and how social memories produced by different mnemonic communities
interplayed. 
The interviewing process
The interviews occurred in a diversity of  places, but mostly in the office of  the Helsinki
Committee or in the homes or work places of  my respondents. In a few cases, when I felt
that  special  measures  to  protect  the respondent's  privacy  were necessary,  the interview
occurred in my own home, and in a few cases it took place in public, usually in cafes chosen
by  the  respondent.  Interviews  were  always  preceded  by  coffee,  which  in  most  cases  I
prepared  myself.  This  created  a  small  lag  between  the  respondent's  arrival  and  the
interview proper, during which we were able to relax, adjust to the environment, and talk
for a moment. In anticipation of  the interview, I gave respondents a sheet of  paper with my
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name,  contacts  and  institutional  affiliation  as  well  as  a  small  text  in
Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian where I succinctly presented myself  and my research project
and broadly defined the scope of  the interview (Annex A). Once I felt it was appropriate, I
started by discussing how to record the interview, asking whether they would allow me to
use a voice recorder, and offering the alternative of  taking written notes. Then, for the
record, presented myself  again and quickly described my specific interest to speak with the
particular respondent sitting in front  of  me. I  then started the interview by asking the
respondent to present himself  and whether he lived in Bijeljina before the war. 
Most of  the interviews were happy to have it recorded on tape, so I usually used a
voice recorder; my interview with Idris Hujdurović was recorded on video, because I had
forgotten the voice recorder at home, and instead proposed using the video function in my
computer. In a few cases respondents preferred not to have their voice recorded, and took
notes, which I  promptly transcribed. In one case, in which the interview occurred in a
public space, I was unable to take simultaneous notes, so as not to draw attention to us, and
instead had to rely on my memory; as soon as the interview was over, I wrote my notes with
as much detail as I could recall. The interviews usually lasted between one hour and a half
and two hours. Whenever the interview seemed to go beyond two hours I interrupted it,
and suggested that we continue another day, and in all  cases a follow up interview did
occur. All interviews happened in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, with one exception in which
the respondent insisted in speaking in English. 
Respondent recruitment occurred throughout the fieldwork period. Most interviews
took place in the last six months months of  fieldwork, and my activities peaked during the
last two months, when gaining access to new respondents became more straightforward,
whilst   I  was  also  engaged  in  meeting  again  previously  interviewed  respondents,  as  I
prepared to leave the field. Whilst it was much harder to recruit respondents when I was
new in the field, and it became easier as time went by, there seems to have been also an
element of  seasonality at stake. Respondents seemed more available, and more motivated
to take the time during the winter period, when there was less going on. 
In the six week period of  my following field visit, which occurred six months after I
had left the field, I was able to perform four interviews with new respondents. By then,
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however, my focus had shifted, as I felt more confident in the quality of  the data generated
in the original period of  fieldwork, and my priority was to meet again some of  my old
respondents and informants, and to expose myself  to spontaneous interactions. 
Types of  interviews
I conducted two different types of  formal interviews. With fourteen of  my respondents, the
primary goal of  the interview was to learn about their public engagement with the war
legacies and their memorialisation. In this sense, these interviews were closer to the 'expert
interview'  format than they were to  ethnographic interviews.  Sampling for this  type of
interview  followed  a  purposive  logic.  Respondents  for  this  type  of  interview  were
individuals  involved  in  civic  activism;  politics;  and  local  structures  of  the  Islamic
Community and the Serbian Orthodox Church. I was interested in four specific topics: 
• the question of  the military take-over of  Bijeljina by Serbian special forces;
• the destruction of  the city mosques and the efforts  towards their  reconstruction
after the war; 
• public initiatives towards under the banner of  'reconciliation' and in particular the
creation of  a local Commission for Truth and Reconciliation and its subsequent
collapse;
• the efforts by local women to push for a more balanced representation of  Bijeljina's
past in the public space in terms of  gender.                
These interviews  were loosely structured, to focus on their activism in general, and on the
particular topic that motivated the interview, contextualised by their perspectives about the
country's political dynamics, and the city's position within, rather than focusing on their
personal experiences and memories. In five cases, however, the dynamics of  the interview
was  such  that  it  ended up focusing  also  in  the  respondent's  personal  experiences  and
memories. Three of  these respondents would become important informants, who over time
established with me a more informal relationship. 
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The  second  type  of  interview  focused  eminently  on  the  respondents  personal
experiences,  inspired  by  the  'life  histories'  interview  model.  These  were  unstructured
interviews,  because  I  was  primarily  seeking  for  memories  that  emerged  spontaneously,
rather than directly triggered by my questions. After introducing myself  and explaining
what my research was about, I began my interviews by asking the respondents to tell me a
bit  about  their  lives  before  the  war,  and  whether  they  lived  in  Bijeljina  then.  This
established  a  chronological  progression  to  the  interview  and  signalled  my  interest  in
learning about the respondents' relation to the city. I used questions only to steered the
respondent's narrative forward, rather than immediately seek for clarifications, or to further
explore  any  particular  topic.  Only  once the  bulk  of  the interview was  done,  with  the
respondent  seeming to  conclude his  narrative,  did I  ask  follow up questions  or  sought
clarifications.  When  a  particular  topic  I  was  interested  in,  such  as,  for  instance,  the
destruction of  the city  mosques,  failed to  be mentioned spontaneously,  I  usually  asked
about it, always framing the question  as “Do you remember how it was when [a certain
event happened]?”. 
1.5  Interview sampling: 
Having  conducted  two  distinctive  types  of  interviews,  I  also  applied  two  distinctive
sampling approaches:  purposeful,  or judgemental  (Brewer 2000: 79;  81)  for  the 'expert
interviews';  and  snowballing  for  the  'life  stories'  interviews.  The  term   'sampling',  as
Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012:87) highlight, “originates in the probability requirements
of  inferential statistical science”. Adopting, for the purposes of  qualitative research, a type
of  language  modelled  by  quantitative  research  creates  undue  expectations  of
representativeness that qualitative, small-n research cannot deliver, and should not seek to
deliver, entailing the risk of  undermining the authority, credibility, and value of  qualitative
research as providing in-depth analysis about phenomena that quantitative analysis cannot
adequately capture (see Small 2009). Schwartz-Shea and Yanow thus prefer to speak of
“mapping for exposure and intertextuality”(2012:87), and making choices accordingly. This
way of  framing the decisions of  who and what to include, “focuses more on the dynamic,
processual  character of  research”, as Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012:88)  convincingly
40
argue. The term 'sample', however, does retain its essential meaning in the present thesis, as
a set of  research participants that are a small part of  a much larger universe. 
The  types  of  sampling  adopted  for  this  research  were  non-probabilistic,
theoretically driven by the thesis' research questions, and seeking to capture a diversity of
experiences  and  perspectives,  which  were  to  some  extent  influenced  by  the  specific
positionality of  the research participants. In this sense, even if  sampling was not expected
to  be proportional  to  the local  demographic  structures,  it  was  crucial  that  the  sample
included a range of  categories of  Bijeljina's population. Researching a diversity of  social
memories stemming from different mnemonic communities  involved recruiting research
participants including, namely, individuals identified as 'Serbs' and 'Bosniaks', or 'Bosnian
Muslims';  displaced  persons  who  resettled  in  Bijeljina;  returnees  (individuals  forcefully
displaced from Bijeljina  during  the  war  who subsequently  returned to  live  there);  and
members of  the domicile population. 
Recruitment for the 'expert interviews' followed the logic of  judgemental sampling
(Brewer 2000: 79; 81). I identified a number of  individuals with a substantial degree of
public involvement with these topics, and  sought to find ways to get in touch and request
an interview. All my attempts to directly contact the potential respondents I had identified
were fruitless. Instead, I had to resort to recommendations. I was able to gain access to
some of  these respondents  through the Helsinki  Committee and Lara;  others I  gained
access to through the recommendation of  persons I  knew from Sarajevo. I  would have
conducted more of  this type of  interview, had I obtained access to other individuals who
played a role in the processes at stake. There was also an element of  'snowballing' present
in the recruitment efforts, insofar as I gained access to some respondents in this category of
interview because I was introduced to them by other respondents already interviewed on
the same topic, or by individuals who previously knew me from outside of  the field. Where
it differs from a traditional snowballing recruitment technique is that I already specifically
knew which individuals I wanted to speak with, rather than having their names suggested
to me.  In a  few cases,  respondents did suggest  names I  was  not  already aware of,  but
unfortunately in all cases the persons they suggested were unavailable or unwilling to speak
to me.
Recruitment  for  the  'life  histories'  type  of  interview  mostly  happened  through
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'snowballing', in close connection to this thesis' research questions. In order to control for
selection bias, I sought to diversify the origin of  the 'snowball'. Some of  my 'life histories'
respondents were recruited through the Helsinki Committee and the women's organisation
Lara; others were suggested by individuals I knew before entering the field, and who had
connections to Bijeljina, and who were able to recommend me and vouch for me. At the
end  of  each  interview,  I  asked  respondents  whether  they  knew,  and  might  consider
recommending me to, individuals willing to share their personal stories. Ten of  my 'expert
interview' respondents thus helped me obtain 'life stories' interviews. It is well-known that
the 'snowballing'  recruitment  method does  entail  a  considerable risk  of  bias,  given the
likelihood that the original informants will bring into the sample individuals who shared
their perspectives, experiences, and characteristics such as age, class, and ethnicity. I was
mindful of  this risk, as I sought for a a diverse sample. Interestingly, and in itself  telling of
the  social  dynamics  between  the  circle  of  activists  and  publicly  engaged  persons  in
Bijeljina, some of  my informants'  recommendations brough into my sample individuals
very  different  to  themselves,  from  different  ethnicities  and  different,  even  opposing,
ideological leanings. My 'life histories' respondents, however, were very reluctant to assist
me in this endeavour, most likely due to privacy concerns. I never received outright refusals,
but I never insisted either. Snowballing stemming from 'life histories' respondents occurred
only in three cases (involving five new recruitments); in three other cases my respondents
did develop efforts towards recruiment, but were unsuccessful. 
Besides snowballing, there was also a component of  convenience recruitment for my
'life histories'  interviews, which occurred in a few situations when I had the intuition a
particular person whom I knew thanks to 'hanging out', might be open to engage with me
in a formal interview setting. This happened only  in three cases, given that I  was not
willing to take the risk to alienate, with my proposal, a relationship that functioned well in a
context of  informality. In these three cases, my informants felt it would be useful for me
and interesting for them to generate a more focused and comprehensive narrative about
their experience, rather than transmitting it through fragments as had been the case until
the point I proposed to interview them. 
There  were  also  three  cases  of  'accidental  sampling',  in  which  recruitment
happened thanks to fortunate coincidences.  In one of  the cases,  I  was interviewing an
'expert'  respondent in a public place,  when another person approached us to greet my
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respondent, who introduced us. This was I promptly seized the opportunity, as I had heard
this person speak in a public event, but had not yet found anyone who might recommend
me. Because there was no prior connection between me and this person, I had nothing to
lose in suggesting an interview, and my offer was accepted. In the other two cases,  an
'accidental  respondents'  joined  in  when  I  was  interviewing  a  family  member,  and  the
interview  evolved  to  fully  include  the  second person  –  in  one  of  the  cases  my  initial
respondent was being interviewed for the second time; in the other case they were a couple.
Sampling inclusion criteria:
Whilst I engaged in judgemental sampling in what regarded my 'expert interviews', I cast
the net widely when it came to recruiting respondents for 'life histories' interviews. The first
basic criterion determining inclusion in my sample was that the respondent had a lived
experience of  the wartime period and the immediate post-war. This automatically excluded
individuals bellow a certain age threshold, which I defined at the time as 23 years old (who
would be four years old in 1995, and thus conceivably had early personal memories). 
This exclusion was motivated, on the one hand, to keep my research focused on
lived experience, rather than transmission and vicarious memories, and, on the other hand,
by  self-imposed  limitations  based  on  ethical  concerns.  The  following  vignette offers  an
illustration of  the ethical pitfalls of  engaging with this generation. This is an observation
that took place in a workshop for students aged 18 to 22. This was a training session in the
context of  an initiative about 'Facing the Past' (suočavanje sa prošlošću) to prepare a student-led
research  project  in  Oral  History,  in  which  the  students  were  to  interview  survivors  of
wartime violence: 
The  teacher  conducting  the  workshop  asked  the  students:  “What  about  family
narratives?”. A moment of  silence, then Rade [one of  the students pseudonym] says:
“At home, people only speak when they drink.” The teacher comments on alcohol...
“And what do people speak about?” The student awsers. There is some tension in the
air, and the teacher keeps asking questions, and says: “And you, do you feel the need to
43
drink?”.  Nobody  anwsers.  Another  student  intervenes,  offers  a  compassionate
approach: “We have to give them [their parents] time, so they realise we are no longer
children, that it is important for us to know”5
My ethical concerns related to issues of  informed consent, privacy and intrusion in the
realm  of  their  family  life,  but,  most  fundamentally,  I  believe  that  whilst  children  and
younger people have their own perceptions about the past, and to some extent the right to
learn about their families' place on it, a young person, let alone a child, has not yet had the
time to comprehensively reflect on these issues,  to make informed decisions on how to
navigate the boundaries between privately-kept social memories and public representations,
and how much should  be  open to  outsiders'  scrutiny;  and that  such a  process  should
happen as freely and spontaneously as possible, without outsiders triggering it, tempting as
it may be for many scholars to explore their memories, as resources useful, for instance, to
understand the dynamics of  memory transmission. 
Excluding under 23 years old individuals from my interview sample did not mean
overlooking this particular category of  the population. Instead, it meant that my data about
them was generated in other, less intrusive ways. Indeed, I was able to observe and interact
with young people and children, and to become aware of  some of  the ways in which they
remembered and framed the recent past as well as the country's historical legacies, thanks
to other research activities, such as 'hanging out' and observation of  workshops and other
events,  as  well  as  in  spontaneous interactions in  everyday life.  I  was  thus  able to have
informal  conversations  with  young  people,  and,  in  a  few  cases,  I  had  university  and
secondary school students soliciting me for advice on studying abroad. Our conversations
were  always  focused  on  the  present,  and  I  particularly  sought  to  understand  their
perception of  the the political and economic situation in the country, and the impact in
their lives of  enduring social divisions brought about by the war – not only or necessarily
ethnic divisions, but also intra-ethnic and trans-ethnic, such as the divisions between those
belonging to domicile families, and those forcibly displaced and then resettled in Bijeljina
(raseljene lice). Whenever the past was brought into the conversations, which happened often,
it was through the initiative of  my interlocutors. 
The other basic criterion was that the respondent should be a permanent resident
in Bijeljina both at the time of  the interview and somewhere between the period of  1991
5 Fieldnotes, October 2014
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and 2004, corresponding to the time that immediately preceded the war and the initial
post-war period, when refugee return and resettlement of  displaced persons was fully in
motion. This excluded both individuals who  left or were expelled from Bijeljina and did
not return on a permanent basis, as well as later arrivals to the area, usually primarily for
economic  reasons,  as  Bijeljina  had offered better  employment  opportunities  than most
places  in  Republika  Srpska.  Whilst  the  ways  those  now  living  in  the  diaspora,  either
because  they  left  as  refugees  during  the  war,  or  later  as  economic  migrants;  and  the
economic attraction Bijeljina exercises to the populations of  other, less developed areas of
Republika Srpska, such as the Drina Valley (podrinje) are in themselves important research
topics, I ought to remain focused on my specific research questions. 
In  the  following section,  I  provide some details  about  my  respondents  and key
informants.  I  present   this  data according to three categories:  'expert  respondents',  'life
histories' respondents, and key informants not formally interviewed. The division into these
categories does not signal a hierarchy of  importance, but merely the type of  interaction.
The  reality  of  fieldwork  was,  however,  much  more  fluid  than  this  categorisation  may
convey; I spoke regularly with ten of  the fourteen 'expert respondents', and the dynamics
between myself  and five of  them ' was very similar to that I had with my 'life histories'
respondents. Of  these five, three became also key informants. Among the 'life histories'
interviews, three also became key informants, perhaps the most important among all my
research  participants.  I  remained  in  regular  contact  with  half  of  my  'life  histories'
respondents, including, in some cases, after leaving the field. With five of  the 'life histories'
respondents my contact was restricted to the interview, and, in some of  these cases, I soon
noticed that when present in the same event, or if  they saw me on the street by chance,
they avoided me, most likely due to privacy concerns. This was not, in any way, a sign of
hostility, and whenever possible, they discreetly acknowledged my presence with a quick
glance. With one of  my key informants (not formally interviewed), relations broke down,
sadly. This occurred during my field visit in the Summer of  2015. I cannot unlearn the
things I learned with my informant, and so I am, precisely, informed by what I learned with
her and from her. I have decided to exclude most of  the data co-generated in interaction
with her, because I am not entirely sure her tacit and explicit consent remains valid – I
believe it does, because later on she tried to 'befriend' me on social media, although she
never sought to write me or call me ever again. I did include as part of  my data, however,
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situations and interactions in which she was present, but not primarily involved. 
Respondents profile:
All my interviewees and informants were permanently residing in Semberija, most of  them
in the city of  Bijeljina. I conducted four interviews in the village of  Janja, two of  which
were primarily 'expert interviews', but due to the intersubjective dynamics of  the interview
process, delved  into the respondents personal experiences and memories, which granted
them with a  greater depth,  more akin to the 'life  histories'  model.  Three of  my other
respondents lived in other villages in Semberija, but worked everyday in the city. 
With one important exception, my respondents and key informants seemed to take
their ethnic identity as a given, rather than in any way problematic, including in two cases
of  respondents whose respective parents belonged to different ethnic groups. They usually
assumed I was aware of  their ethnicity, and spoke of  themselves as part of  an ethnic group,
even in those cases where they did not agree that ethnicity should have primacy over other
dimensions of  personal identity. In some cases, they even mobilised their ethnic identity to
highlight  the  specificity  of  their  personal  perspective,  as  was  the  case,  for  instance,  of
former Primary School Headteacher Lazar Manojlović, who openly presented himself  as a
Serb, to explain why his detractors – whom he sarcastically labelled 'Great Serbs' (veliki
srbi)  treated  him  as  a  'traitor'  to  be  marginalised,  if  not  excluded,  from  the  ethnic
community.  The  exceptional  was  Saša  Pazarac,  who  presented  himself  primarily  as  a
socially engaged citizen, a social-democrat, and an atheist, albeit one that respects other
people's beliefs and traditions. For the sake of  context during our (first) interview, he then
let me know he was the son of  a mixed marriage, with a Catholic mother and a Muslim
father.  He  explained  how  the  ascription  of  ethnic  identity  to  him  determined  his
persecution by  Serb nationalists.  In a  way,  and in contrast  to  most  other  respondents,
Pazarac sought to preserve the fluidity over identification that was prevalent during his
formative years  in  socialist  Yugoslavia.  Although he did not  openly  identify  himself  as
Bosniak, he did not seek to separate himself  from the Bosniak community in Bijeljina, and
implicitly placed himself  as part of  it.
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Of  the  35  formal  interviews,  17  were  with  Serbs,  15  with  Bosniaks  (Bosnian
Muslims; bearing in mind his experience of  persecution, I include) and three with members
of  minority groups,  namely a Roma couple and a woman from the German minority.
Among the key informants not formally interviewed, six were Serbs and two Bosniaks. 
Ethnicity by type of  informant
'Expert'
interviews 'Life 
histories'
Other key
informants* Total
Serbs 10 7 6 23
Bosniaks 4 11 2 17
Others 0 3 0 3
Total 14 21 8 43
Table 1: Ethnicity by type of  informant
The thesis explores both the wartime experience of  persecution of  non-Serbs (Ch. 4) and
the process  of  resettlement  in Bijeljina  of  Serbs  forcibly  displaced from other  areas  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ch.5). 
Residence status by ethnicity
Serbs Bosniaks Others
(ostali)
Total
Dom
icile
Reset
tled
Rem
ained
Retur
nees
Rem
ained
Retur
nees
'Expert' 5 5 1 3 0 0 14
'Life histories' 4 3 6 5 2 1 21
'Key informants' 1 5 2 0 0 0 8
Total 23 17 3 43
Table 2: Residence by ethnicity
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Table  2  provides  detailed  information  about  which  category  my  respondents  and  key
informants belonged to, in relation to whether they belong to families already established in
Bijeljina  before  the  war,  were  expelled  during  the  war  and  subsequently  returned;  or
resettled in Bijeljina during the war or in the immediate post-war period.
In terms  of  class  and occupation,  two respondents,  both  Bosniaks,  belonged to
prestigious,  old  families  (ugledne  porodice),  descending  from  the  local  aristocracy  from
Ottoman times. Four respondents can be categorised as somehow belonging to the local
elite, and nine, seven of  whom in the 'expert interview' type, were involved in civic activism.
The  other  informants  had  a  diversity  of  occupations,  some  more  stable  others  more
precarious,  and  different  positions  in  the  social  scale,  with  only  three  informants
unemployed. Only two respondents were close to poverty, but the overwhelming majority
lived somehow modesty, even when clearly belonging to the middle class, and only three
seemed to be wealthy by local standards. Eighteen of  the 43 informants analysed in this
section had high education degrees,  and seven worked,  or  had worked in the past,  as
teachers. 
In terms of  age, the interview sample comprises respondents aged between 25 and
90 years old at the time of  the interviews (see table 1). Respondents aged between 50 and
70 form the majority of  the sample. They were already mature adults, many with young
children.  I  was  particularly  interested  in  subset  of  this  age  interval  that  formed  the
generation (broadly defined), whom some authors call “the last Yugoslavs” (e.g. Palmberger
2016; Spasovska 2017), who lived the last days of  the communist regime already as adults.
This does not mean, however, that I particularly targeted this generation. It was, instead,
fortunate that more of  them seemed to be willing and available to engage with me. By
contrast, the generation that I found the hardest to recruit was my own (I was 39 at the
time): those who were either teenagers or in their early twenties during the war. The lack of
respondents in this generation, despite my best efforts, stands out as a limitation in this
thesis, and one that I hope to eventually compensate for in the future, when I return to
Bijeljina for further research. I did have, however, a good deal of  interactions in everyday
life with individuals of  this generation, which allowed me for some level of  insight. My
youngest 'life histories' respondent was 25, a young man from Janja, who had among his
earliest  recollections the Muslims' massive expulsion from the village in the Summer of
1994. As stated, I limited my interview sample to individuals over 23. 
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Age distribution, by type of  informant
'Expert'
interviews 'Life
histories'
Other key
informants Total
90 + 0 1 0 1
80-89 0 1 0 1
70-79 0 3 0 3
60-69 3 8 0 11
50-59 7 3 3 13
40-49 3 1 0 4
30-39 1 3 2 6
23-29 0 1 3 4
Total 14 21 8 43
        Table 3: Age distribution by type of  informant
Men figure disproportionately in the sample of  respondents (26 men to 17 women), mostly
due to the fact that eleven of  the fourteen 'expert interviews' happened to be men. Among
the  key  informants  not  formally  interviewed there  was  an equal  number  of  men  and
women, and two of  these informants were a couple. Beyond the 43 individuals listed as
respondents and key informants,  most  of  the interactions  and informal conversations  I
relied on for my thesis happened with women.
Gender by ethnicity 
Serbs 
men/women
Bosniaks
men/women
Others
men/women
Total
men/women
'Expert' 7 3 4 0 0 0 11 3
'Life histories' 4 3 6 5 1 2 11 10
'Key informants' 3 3 1 1 0 0 4 4
Subtotal 14 9 11 6 1 2 26 17
Total 23 17 3 43
Table 4: Gender by ethnicity
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The sample also reflects a diversity of  political opinions and ideologies, and I engaged both
with  highly  nationalistic  individuals  and with  individuals  with  a  cosmopolitan  outlook;
genocide deniers and activists  towards reconciliation;  etc.  Five of  my respondents were
politically active, all of  them in different parties. Among the remaining informants, there
was a full spectrum of  political engagement, most of  them being somehow alienated from
politics. Among those under 50, regardless of  ethnicity, gender or class,  there was a strong
desire to leave the country, and a few were making effective plans to emigrate. 
1.6 Research ethics:
As  an  ethnographer,  I  saw it  as  my  ethic  duty  to  show commitment  to  my  research,
appreciation for the society I was seeking to immerse myself  in, and respect towards my
respondents and informants, regardless of  whether I was comfortable with their political
views, for taking the time to engage with me and sharing with me memories, insights and
opinions. I always tried to be as well prepared as possible when interviewing, as a matter of
professionalism,  respect  towards  the respondents,  and also to  come up in their  eyes  as
knowledgeable, and thus be credible as an interlocutor.  Some of  my respondents were
keen to test how much I remained myself, and how much I was embodying the persona of
the 'neutral' researcher, by asking for my opinion about controversial issues. I always kept a
low profile, but when solicited I was as sincere as possible in my responses. 
Anonymity was negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Most interviews and informal
conversations used in this thesis were anonymised, either at the request of  the respondent,
or to preserve his or her privacy. Anonymising is much more than changing names, and the
debate  on  how  far  it  should  go  has  a  long  history  in  ethnographic  research.  Whilst
anonymising, we often have to sacrifice so much in terms of  context, that an interview risks
losing  its  meaning.  In other  cases,  anonymising is  the only  ethically  acceptable way of
making use of  interview material. But anonymity and confidentiality also impact on the
transparency of  the research, and thus in its trustworthiness. Although anonymity is the
default option in the social sciences, it does not necessarily have to be so – Oral History, for
instance, often presents respondents with their own names and context details.  In some
cases, anonymity may even, paradoxically, result in a higher degree of  exposure of  the
person(s) whose privacy anonymity is supposed to protect (see Farrimond 2013: 131), for
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instance when quoting verbatim (as such quotes may be traced back to the respondent, for
instance through the use of  internet search engines), and when enough contextual details
remained that allow those familiar with the research setting to recognise the informant's
profile. 
On a more fundamental level, I feel that anonymity may give cover for extractive
behaviour on the part of  the researcher, which objectifies and disempowers the informants.
I  felt  this  in my own skin when another researcher sought to recruit  me as a research
participant, after I published a text on my blog describing my participation in an event in
Eastern Bosnia, called 'the march for peace' (marš mira) (see Correia 2011). I felt she was
trying to appropriate my experience and my stories, without even giving me credit.  
For the sake of  preserving the richness of  context, I chose, with the explicit consent
of  the persons involved, to use the real names of  some of  my informants/respondents. The
criterion was the fact that they have, to some extent, a public profile in Bijeljina, and have
previously  been object  of  media  reports  and interviews.  In doing  so,  I  refrained from
disclosing  more  intimate  thoughts  and  experiences,  but  focused  instead  on  their
participation in  the public  space,  and in their  reflections  and insights.  Thus  I  did not
anonimise the materials stemming from 'expert interviews' – and I never promised them
anonimity  in the first  place,  since the rationale  for  those interviews was the first  hand
knowledge of  and active participation in politically and socially significant processes. As for
my  life  histories  interviews,  I  use  my  respondents'  real  names  in  the  case  of  Idris
Hujdurović, Lazar Manojlović, Saša Pazarac, and Sead Vidinlić. All of  them were well-
known figures in Bijeljina, and aspects of  their life stories have previously been published in
the media, including autobiographic references. I was mindful, at all times, to nevertheless
protect their privacy with regards to aspects that are not publicly known. 
I offered my respondents guarantees that the data generated, in the form of  voice
and video records, transcripts and notes, would remain in my possession, to be used only by
myself,  and in the context of  this  research project.  I  was always careful  to explain the
purpose and the focus of  my research before beginning an interview, and in those cases
when  the  interview  was  recorded  in  audio  this  explanation  is  usually  audible  at  the
beginning of  the record. I did not seek, however, for written informed consent statements
because I felt that in that particular context they not only were not necessary, given the
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value of  the spoken word once trust has been established, but they might also distort the
dynamics of  the relationship between interviewee and interviewer. 
The  issue  of  informed  consent  becomes  trickier  when  it  comes  to  informal
conversations  and spontaneous  interaction,  which,  much  more  than  formal  interviews,
form the bulk of  ethnographic data (Duizings 2018:4). Whether I might deceit or induce
people in error was a concern that to some extent constrained me during fieldwork, and
often faced dilemmas about the legitimacy of  my observations. The case of  my regular
attendance of  Sunday mass offers an illustration. Were the church goers tacitly consenting
to be observed,  when we had coffee together  at  the parish house after  mass? Could I
separate myself  from what brought me to Bijeljina in the first place – my research interests
– when I had upon me a wealth of  ethnographic detail? What about the woman who
rejected my request to interview her, but was happy to go with me for coffee and cake? Was
that a form of  'hanging out'? And what about the persons who invited me to their homes
for coffee or a meal? Were they aware enough of  why I was doing fieldwork in Bijeljina to
tacitly consent on being observed? How I dealt with these dilemmas evolved throughout
fieldwork, as I gained confidence and built trust. Later on, during the writing stage, such
dilemmas came once again to the forefront. In case of  doubt, I decided not to include a
particular interaction, or to explicitly seek for consent, as in the case of  Jelena, whom I
describe in Chapter 6. 
1.7 Data analysis and the writing-up process
Once out of  the field, I chose not to use data analysis software, but I spent a lot of
time analysing my materials, reading my notes and transcripts, looking at my photographs,
and  reflecting  about  how  different  stories  intersected,  about  shared  experiences  and
contrasting  perspectives.  Even though  processing  my  data  was  a  long,  time-consuming
process,  the overall  structure of  this  thesis  emerged relatively swiftly.  Between February
2015, when I first left the field, and August 2015, when I returned for a shorter visit, I
worked on a conference paper that was to become the backbone of  this thesis. By the time
I went back to Bijeljina, the thesis' macro-structure was pretty much defined, although the
idea of  using the concept of  liminality and the framework of  rites of  passage (see Ch. 1)
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only came to me one year later. Choosing the particular life histories that I would like to use
was also relatively straightforward. Adopting the concept of  liminality and the framework
of  rites of  passage as heuristic devices to channel the narrative flow of  the thesis allowed
for the leap from description to analysis to happen, by framing each chapter as focusing on
a particular process within the wider process of  liminal transformation of  identity. This
framework  renewed  my  engagement  with  the  empirical  data,  allowing  me  to  further
elaborate on the nature of  ethnic cleansing, the dynamics of  remembering, and the moving
boundaries between public and private aspects of  social and collective memory. 
But  the leap from description to analysis  was  hampered for a long time by my
emotional proximity to the data. When I returned home after my Summer 2015 field visit,
for instance, I was feeling so overwhelmed that I was unable to significantly engage with the
thesis for at least three months. The field visit was crucial to this research, as it made me
aware  of  how  much  I  had,  by  the  end  of  my  fieldwork,  become  sensitised  to  the
environment in Bijeljina, so much that I had began to take certain things as natural. Whilst
prolonged immersion involved a certain level of  accomodation from my side, of  which I
was not fully conscious, the field visit offered me a more blunt vision, in which the things
that were pleasant about everyday life paled in comparison with the burdens that afflicted
many  of  my  informants,  and  the  alienation  some  of  them  felt.  The  duty  to  portray
individuals and society more generally, in a manner that was fair and nuanced clashed with
the pervasive negativity I felt in that field trip, which occurred during the peak of  the 2015
so-called 'refugee crisis', with thousands of  people coming mostly from places like Syria,
Iraq and Afghanistan were using the 'Balkan route'  to reach Germany. Whilst after my
initial fieldwork I was able to immediately dive into the writing process, after my field visit it
took me at least three months before I was able to engage with my data, and more broadly
with my experience.  Throughout  the data  analysis  and writing  up process,  I  often felt
daunted by the negativity of  the theme and the bleak political situation in the country, to
the point of  becoming overwhelmed with stress. I did not return to the field again until I
completed  the  thesis,  although  I  did  remain  in  regular  contact  with  some of  my  key
informants, and closely followed the news about Bosnia-Herzegovina and Bijeljina. 
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Chapter 2
Memory, violence, liminality:
framing 'ethnic cleansing'
The present chapter will provide a theoretical frame to the thesis, through an exploration
of  three key concepts engaged in this research, memory, liminality and ethnic cleansing.  I
conceptualise memory as a multidimensional human capacity, stretching in a continuum
between  individual,  social  and  collective  memories;  a  capacity  always  exercised
intersubjectively, through which past experiences are rendered meaningful in the light of
both the present circumstances and the expectations and hopes for the future.  This thesis
conceives  memory  and  identity  as  engaged  in  a  dynamic  relationship  of  mutual
constitution, rather than in a causal relationship, and frames experience as the source of
both memory and identity. Based both on living and historical experience, and exercised
through a dual process of  remembering and forgetting, memory tends to give particular
salience to transformative events, which often define the boundary between different stages
in the life of  individuals and communities, introducing a sense of  'before and after' though
which people  acknowledge that  their  identity  has  been affected.  Amidst  transformative
events, those that are marked by violence assume specific traits as people remember them,
assessing their impact in both their livelihoods and sense of  community, and seeking to
render them meaningful. Such events generate an array of  memories, which may become
the object of  public memory, providing a community with a master narrative of  the past;
but  memory  is  more  than  mere  representations  and  publicly  articulated  recollections.
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Perhaps most  of  what  we remember will  remain private,  shared only  within a  narrow
'community of  experience', and often protected from the gaze of  outsiders. This chapter
will  thus  introduce  the  concept  of  'difficult  memories'  to  explore  the relation between
dominant  public  representations  and memories  that  somehow contradict  the narratives
such representations convey. The memory of  'ethnic cleansing' offers a compelling example
of  an experience that generates 'difficult memories' withholding the potential to disrupt the
very identities such acts sought to 'purify'. 
The thesis explores the concept of  liminality and the sequential scheme of  rites of
passage first proposed by Arnold van Gennep (1981[1909]) and later developed by Victor
Turner  (1967;1969;1974)  as  a  heuristic  device  framing  transformative  events,  which  it
applies  to  the  experience  of  ethnic  cleansing.  Rather  than  dismissing  the  term as  an
euphemism, we engage with the meanings the word 'cleansing' conveys, to discuss the use
of  violence in the quest for categorical purity in a context of  deep uncertainty over identity.
2.1  Conceptualising memory as intersubjective and multi-dimensional
The  increasing  presence  of  memory  in  popular  and  political  discourse  has  been
accompanied by the spectacular development of  the field of  memory studies over the last
three decades. And yet, there is no consensus about how to define the concept of  collective
memory and its scope of  application (Olick 2007; Misztal 2003; Kansteiner 2002). Critics
have denounced  its  use in a metaphoric sense and the over-extension of  the notion of
collective memory in ways  “leading to the entanglement between culture and memory”
(Berliner 2005:198), to the point of  becoming “'almost indistinguishable' from the concept
of  culture  itself ”  (Berliner  2005:203).The problem of  conceptualisation is  to  a  certain
extent due to the non-paradigmatic and inter-disciplinary character of  memory studies, but
above all to the polysemous character of  the notion of  memory (Lavabre 2000). Memory is
at  once  a  human  ability,  a  social  process,  a  medium,  and  a  product  or  an  object.
Acknowledging this polysemy is essential to understand memory in its complexity, but it
also reveals the difficulties involving its study as a research object. 
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Jay  Winter,  one of  the most  prominent  scholars  of  war  memory,  points  to  the
limitations of  the concepts of  memory and history, and proposes the idea of  historical
remembrance as a discursive field, in order to “avoid the pitfalls of  referring to memory as
some vague cloud that exists without agency, and to history as an objective story that exists
outside of  the peoples it describes” (2006:11). Another solution would be to narrow down
the  concept  to  its  dimension  of  representation,  as  in  Barbara  Misztal´s  definition  of
collective memory as “the representation of  the past, both that shared by a group and that
which is collectively commemorated, that enacts and gives substance to the group's identity,
its present conditions and its vision of  the future” (2003:7).  However, discursive approaches
such as these excessively limit  the concept,  as  they equate recalling with remembering,
under the assumption that “while remembering we deliberately and consciously recover the
past”  (Misztal  2003:10).  By reducing memory to the dimension of  representation,  one
leaves  unanswered the question of  the status of  those aspects  of  the past  that are not
included in a given set of  representations.  Are they hidden under a veil of  silence, or have
they been forgotten? And if  so, can they be retrieved? The narrowing down of  the concept
of  memory to the dimension of  representation leaves aside other, more elusive aspects, such
as tacit knowledge, or 'what goes without saying', and the role of  silence (Passerini 2003;
Eastmond and Mannergren Selimovic: 2012). 
But 'collective memory' is a useful analytical concept, wider than  representation,
and distinct  from remembrance.  Given the need for clarity,  and despite the limitations
inherent to spelling out a complex concept like memory in operational terms, in this thesis I
will  define  memory  –  as  a  general  concept  –  as  the  capacity  to  store  and  retrieve
information about  past  events,  ideas  and experiences.  Memory is,  above all,  a  human
ability;  it  is  embodied in the individual as well  as  emplaced externally,  and it  develops
mostly,  although  not  exclusively,  in  interaction  with  others  and  with  the  environment.
Remembering and forgetting are the processes through which this capacity is exercised, and
memories, in the plural, are the product these two processes combined. One could say that
remembering is what gives people the feeling of  knowing the past, while recalling is just one
of   many  mnemonic  modes  (Casey  2000[1987]),  consisting  in  the  act  of  consciously
bringing the past to the present, an act always performed in a discrete social and political
context,  in  a  particular  moment  and  a  particular  place.  Maurice  Bloch,  a  leading
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proponent of  a cognitive approach to the anthropological study of  memory, highlights the
importance  of  the  distinction  between  remembering  and  recalling.  Based  on  his
ethnographic study of  memory in Madagascar, Bloch notes that “individuals may not be
aware  of  what  they  remember”  but  have  nevertheless  the  “ability  to  recall  an
extraordinarily  rich  variety  of  memories”  (1998:119).  Bloch  therefore  confers  great
significance to the distinction between recalling and remembering, “since it means that the
presence of  the past in the present is much more complex, much less explicit but perhaps
much more powerful than the presence of  explicit narratives would ever have us believe”
(1998:118-119). 
Memory and intersubjectivity
For Maurice Halbwachs (1925; 1950) individual memories are always socially framed, and
“it  is  to  the  extent  that  our  individual  thoughts  are  placed in  those  frames  and  and
participate in this memory, that our mind is able to remember” (2002[1925]:6). Halbwachs,
considered to be the founder of  the sociological study of  collective memory, has rightly
been criticised for devaluing individual agency due to his Durkheimean approach (Misztal
2007:32), to the point of  believing that “memories that are not shared are soon forgotten”
(cit. Bloch 1998:117). 
The idea that memories are socially framed is, nevertheless, the basis upon which
the concept of  collective memory stands, but the existence of  a collective dimension to
memory has been contested (e.g. Klein 2000; Gedi and Elam:1996), under the argument
that since remembering is essentially a cognitive process, only individuals can remember.
The application of  the concept of  intersubjectivity to the study of  memory challenges such
argument,  by  offering  a  solution  to  the  conceptual  problem  of  how  to  define  the
relationship between the collective and the individual. Resulting from the experience of  the
other, intersubjectivity can be broadly defined as 
“the  variety  of  relations  between  perspectives.  Those  perspectives  can  belong  to
individuals, groups, or traditions and discourses, and they can manifest as both implicit
(or taken for granted) and explicit (or reflected upon).” (Gillespie and Cornish 2009:19).
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The concept  of  intersubjectivity  deals  with  the problem of  the orientation of  subjects
towards  others.  It  refers  to  shared  meanings,  but  also  to  shared  or  partially  shared
divergences  of  meaning,  as  a  form  of  mutual  awareness  between  different  subjects.
Memory is exercised intersubjectively because, as Barbara Misztal highlights, “while it is an
individual who remembers, his or her memory exists, and is shaped by, their relations with
what  has  been  shared  with  others  and  that  it  is,  moreover,  always  memory  of  an
intersubjective past” (Misztal 2003:6). Applying the concept of  intersubjectivity to the study
of  collective  memory  resolves  what  Olick  (2007)  has  called  the  problem of  “choosing
between individualistic and collectivistic procedures”. Such a problem, Olick argues, is  due
to  the  clash  between two opposing  approaches  to  culture,  “one  that  sees  culture  as  a
subjective category of  meanings contained in people's minds versus one that sees culture as
patterns of  publicly available symbols objectified in society”(2007:21).
The  idea  of  the  intersubjective  character  of  memory  is  consistent  both  with
phenomenological perspectives and with findings from cognitive science (Sutton, Harris,
and  Barnier  2010),  which  also  point  to  cognition  itself  as  intersubjective  (Allen  and
Williams 2011). Thus the main objection to the use of  the concept of  collective memory
should be dismissed, in the light of  the contribution of  cognitive science.  Developments in
research over  the  past  three  decades  have contributed towards  a  constructive dialogue
between  cognitive  and  phenomenological  approaches  to  knowledge  (Depraz  and
Gallagher: 2002), as cognitive science sought to overcome its traditional individualistic bias
(Michaelian and Sutton: 2013),  and phenomenologists  sought a stronger empirical base
regarding the study of  collective memory (Depraz and Gallagher: 2002), thus transcending
what was, as Maurice Bloch(1998:100-113) contends, an excessive reliance on the primacy
of  narratives in accounting for the experience of  time and space, under the influence of
hermeneutics. As the phenomenologist Edward Casey (2004) has highlighted, the person is
“the always unique rememberer”, but “however idiosyncratic and personal a given act of
remembering may be (…) still each such act has certain formal dimensions that exceed any
individual's contribution”(2004:20).
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Remembering beyond the mind
It is important to insist on how memory is, as the phenomenologist Edward Casey has
stressed in his  seminal  study Remembering (2000[1987]:85)  “more than a mater of  mind
alone”. Casey analysed three mnemonic modes – reminding; reminiscing; and recognising
– “situated midway between mind and the environing world”(2000:144) and triggered or
facilitated by things that are external to the mind, to argue that memory occupies a stance
“on the borderline of  self  and other”(2000:144). Moving away from what he called the
“mentalist  bias”(e.g.2000:144)  that  led  to  the  “[presumption]  that  the paradigm for  all
remembering is recollecting”(200:144), Casey focused also on three dimensions of  memory
clearly beyond the realm of  the mind: body memory; place memory; and commemoration.
The  concept  of  body  memory  draws  from  Merleau-Ponty's  Phenomenology  of
Perception, through the notion of  'operative intentionality'(Casey 2000:145): “Body memory
alludes to memory that is intrinsic to the body, to its own ways of  remembering: how we
remember in and by and through the body”(Casey 2000:145;emphasis added). Body memory
is immediately connected with lived experience, resulting in the ability to revisit a given
situation “and feeling it  through our body”(2000:147).  Body memory is  also intimately
connected to place memory:  it  is  through body memory that “we find ourselves to  be
familiar with a particular place in which we are located”(Casey 2000:190). 
With his analysis of  place memory and commemoration, “both of  which bring us
still more radically into the very heart of  world emplacement”(2000:145) Casey took the
phenomenology  of  memory  one  step  further.  Casey  insists  on  the  “insufficiency  of
recollection” as opposed to remembrance, since remembering is always emplaced, but in
recollecting, place becomes “at best a mere setting for the object or episode that is being
remembered”(2000:213). For Casey, “place serves to situate one's memorial life, to give it a
name and a local habitation”(2000:184). Memory and place hold a close relationship; it is
“the stabilising of  place as a container of  experiences that contributes so powerfully to its
intrinsic memorability”(2000:188). 
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Whilst  situating  memories,  place  performs  a  containing  function  in  the  process  of
remembering, providing memory with a spatiality: 
“On the one hand, place is selective for memories: that is to say, a given place will invite
certain  memories  while  discouraging  others.  (…)  Place  is  always  definite,  and
regarding a given place only some memories, indeed only certain kinds of  memory,
will be pertinent. (…) 
On the  other  hand,  memories  are  selective  for  place:  they  seek out  particular
places as their natural habitats. Why this propensity? Partly because places furnish
convenient  points  of  attachment  for  memories;  but  also  because  places  provide
situations in which remembered actions can deploy themselves. Or more precisely,
places are congealed scenes for remembered contents; and as such they serve to situate
what we remember.” (Casey 2000: 188; italics in the original)
As for commemorating,  Casey highlights  its  communal nature:  “Commemorating is  an
essentially interpersonal action. It is undertaken not only in relation to others and for them,
but also  with them in a  common action of  communalising”(2000:225;  emphasis  in  the
original).  Casey  evokes  Arnold  van  Gennep's(1909)  'Rites  of  Passage',  and  Victor
Turner's(1967) analysis of  the intermediate stage in rites of  passage – the liminal stage – as
generating a sense of  communitas among initiands, an insight which Casey applies to rituals
of  commemoration. Commemorations are enacted in public rituals solemnly honouring
the  past,  and  aiming  towards  the  perdurance  of  that  which  they  memorialise,  by
connecting past (that which the commemoration pays tribute to), present (the moment the
commemoration is enacted) and future (through the commemoration's regular recurrence,
but  also  through  the  exhortation  to  remember).  Casey  defines  participation  as  “the
functional  essence  of  commemoration”  (2000:247):  “Commemorating,  by  its  very
structure,  encourages  and enhances  participation on the  part  of  those  who  engage  in
it”(2000:247).  Participation is  also  a  crucial  element  for  a  commemoration's  efficacious
enactment;  without it,  it  would amount to  no more than a representation of  the past.
Although commemorations indeed represent the past, they go much beyond it; they have
the potential to “create new forms of  sociality, new modes of  interconnection: between past
and present, self  and other, one group and another, one form of  thinking or acting or
speaking and another, one sex and another, one art form and another”(Casey 2000:251). 
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Individual, social, collective, and public memory
Casey's outstanding contribution to our understanding of  the characteristics and dynamics
of  remembering  has  inspired  this  thesis;  for  operational  purposes,  I  have  adopted  his
typology of  the three different formal levels that memory comprises, beyond the individual:
social  memory;  collective  memory  and  public  memory  (Casey  2004).  The  distinction
between social and collective is crucial for this thesis' conceptual framework. 
Casey defines social memory as:
 “the  memory  held  in  common  by  those  who  are  affiliated  by  kinship  ties,  the
geographical proximity in neighbourhoods, cities and other regions, or by engagement
in a common project. In other words, it is memory shared by those who are already
related to each other, whether by way of  family or friendship or civic acquaintance or
'just an alliance between people for a specific purpose' ”(2004:21). 
Social memory is, in this definition, based on shared experience and co-reminiscing is its
main mnemonic mode, which does not necessarily imply remembering the same way, but
instead means “remembering something that others in one's kin or place-based group are
also remembering at the same time or could do so” (2004:22). An important feature of
social memories is that they are often private, known only to the group, and “prized as
such”  (2004:22),  as  they  may  provide  an  element  of  proximity  and  bounding  that
contribute to the preservation of  the group.
Collective memory is distinct from social memory because the element of  proximity
is absent or otherwise irrelevant. Memory becomes collective in “the circumstance in which
different persons, not necessarily known to each other at all, nevertheless recall the same
event – again, each in her own way”(2004:23). In collective memory, Casey argues, “all that
matters  is  commonality  of  content”(2004:23).  We  remember  collectively  when  we
remember the same event:  “not the experience,  but the focus (…) is  what is  shared in
collective memory”(2004:23). In contrast with social memory, in collective memory people
remember together but  remain “comparatively  anonymous in their  very plurality,  their
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extended severalness, their manyness in the midst of  their oneness of  attention”(2000:24).
As is the case with social memories, albeit for different reasons, collective memories are not
necessarily public either; they may be repressed, silenced, rendered invisible, or they may
simply escape articulation, without being, nevertheless, forgotten. 
Together, individual, social and collective memories contribute to the formation of
public memory, the set of  representations that find their expression in the public realm, and
are  recognised  by  the  public  as  somehow resonant  with  their  own personal,  social  or
collective memories. Casey defines individual and social memory as “the two inner circles
of  public memory”, while collective memory marks the limits of  public memory, its “outer
perimeter” (2004:25). Public memory is characterised by a particular form of  temporality,
which further distinguishes it from the other levels of  memory. Publ ic memory is Janus
faced, “both attached to a past (typically an originating event of  some sort) and [acting] to
ensure  a  future  of  further  remembering  of  that  same  event”  (2004:17).  This  forward
looking temporal dimension implies a mnemonic intention that goes beyond the attempt to
shape the way the past will be remembered in the future. This mnemonic intention also
targets the sense of  identity of  those who, in the future, will remember that which is the
object of  memorialisation, as memory can confer identity with a sense of  continuity over
time.
The  construction  of  public  memory  develops  through  time,  connecting  past,
present and future. It takes shape in interaction with existing mnemonic traditions, which
provide templates that help shape new memories; as well as with available representations
of  earlier memories. Earlier memories often become palimpsests where the memories of
more recent  events  are  inscribed,  resulting  in the “retroactive interference” (Sivan and
Winter  2000:34)  of  later  events  in  the  memory  of  earlier  ones;  while,  more  recent
memories  offer  the  potential  to  reframe  the  memories  of  earlier  events,  as  Michael
Rothberg (2009) has convincingly argued with his idea of  'multidirectional memory', which
he developed through the case-study of  the 'intersections'  between the memory of  the
Holocaust and the memory of  colonial oppression. 
Representations  emerging  from  these  processes  are  further  subjected  to
interpretation, as they are exposed to audiences, that feedback their reactions, which can be
of  recognition, familiarity, discomfort, estrangement, indifference, etc, depending on how
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those representations relate with the audiences' lived experience and beliefs, but also their
perceived needs in the present and goals for the future. Public memory is thus constructed
through communicative processes, developed intersubjectively, and path-dependent (Olick
2007:56-57). Present circumstances fundamentally influence the way we recall the past, but
memory's access to the past offers the possibility of  remembering in different ways under
different circumstances. As Bloch (1998:126) highlights: “what is not expressed need not be
forgotten and have social significance thereby since it is a stored resource for future social
representations”. 
Mnemonic communities of  experience, connection and identification
The possibility of  remembering in different ways under different circumstances, in turn,
raises  the  question  of  how  the  boundaries  between  what  enters  the  realm  of  public
memory  and  what  remains  within  the  realm  of  private  memories  are  formed  and
maintained. To tackle this crucial issue for the present thesis, I have adopted the typology
developed by the historian Mary Fulbrook (2013), which distinguished between three basic
types  of  mnemonic  communities  –  communities  of  experience,  connection  and
identification.  Fulbrook  is  critical  of  the  way  many  scholars  leave  personal  memories
under-explored  when  focusing  “on  public  rituals  and  topographies  of  remembrance,
cultural and political representations of  the past”, and advocating for the need to combine
such  an approach  “with  a  more  thorough  exploration  of  the  ways  in  which different
groups variously  interacted with,  sustained,  and were affected by dominant  narratives”
(2013:51);  her  typology  represents  an  important  analytical  tool  to  facilitate  such
exploration.  Fulbrook(2013:34)  defines  these  mnemonic  communities  in  the  following
terms:
 “The term 'communities of  experience' designates those who lived through a particular
significant historical event or period and shared certain experiences – even if  what they shared were
common challenges rather than individual responses, as they faced divergent twists and turns of
faith”(2013:34). Communities of  connection' “are made up of  those people who did not themselves
consciously experience this 'salient past', but who nevertheless, and not necessarily by choice, were
in some way linked to the people who did. (…). Choice is, however, a greater component of  the
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final category – though with qualifications, since the availability and desirability of  particular forms
of  identification depend on the social, political and cultural context of  'choosing'. 'Communities of
identification are those who by identifying or empathising with the fate of  others, find a particular
past to be one of  heightened personal significance”(2013:34).
Difficult memories':
On the basis of  Casey's typology of  social, collective and public memory, and Fulbrook's
concept  of  communities  of  experience,  connection and identification,  my research has
identified a particular type of  recollections, which I have defined as 'difficult memories'.
These were memories which a given community of  experience sought to preserve from the
gaze  of  outsiders,  and  keep  within  the  intimacy  of  the  group,  not  so  much  because
recalling them was emotionally demanding, if  not painful – which it often was, since these
were memories associated with the experience of  ethnicised violence, political persecution
and forced displacement – but because they did not fit easily into a larger public narrative
that the rememberers, to some extent shared, and which they did not wish to undermine.
To better understand the phenomenon of  'difficult memories', and before exploring it the
thesis' empirical chapters, we need now to turn our attention to the relationship between
memory  and  identity,  and,  in  particular  between  social  and  collective  memories  and
national identity. 
The mutual implication of  memory and identity
I have stated that, as a capacity, memory is not solely embodied, but also embedded in an
external environment. Whether in its individual, social or collective dimensions, memory is
influenced by a set of  resources located in this environment, and formed by tangible and
intangible elements. Archives and libraries, where information is stored and organised, but
also physical environments like buildings and landscapes, which connect memory with the
experience of  place,  are examples  of  tangible elements that  provide content  to acts  of
remembrance. Intangible elements such as traditions and myths work as cultural vehicles
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for the expression of  memories, providing templates for mnemonic practices, while shared
beliefs influence the meaning to be assigned to whatever is to be remembered. This set of
resources,  which correspond broadly to  Pierre  Nora's  (1989)   “lieux  de  mémoire”(see also
Schwartz 2010:49) and Yosef  Yerushalmi (1989) “vehicles of  memory”, is in permanent
transformation.  Resources  are  constructed,  preserved,  maintained,  transformed  and
transmitted throughout time; they are subjected to decay, prone to damage or destruction,
appropriated, changed upon the impact of  new events, ideas and experiences. The way this
set  of  resources  is  organised  and  managed  in  the  dual  process  of  remembering  and
forgetting reveals what Maurice Bloch(1998, pp. 67-84) has called “different ways of  being
in History”, and depends largely upon the mnemonic traditions specific to each culture, as
well as upon how a mnemonic community can access these resources. 
Thinking specifically about the boundaries between public and private aspects of
memory, and if  we consider that public memory depends on a composite set of  resources,
then the  question that  follows  is  who has  the  capacity  to  control  and mobilise  them?
Borrowing from Pierre Bourdieu(1977[1972]), we can think of  these resources as a forming
a  symbolic  capital,  whose  successful  mobilisation  may  contribute  to  reshape  collective
identities  and social relations and inspire political action. It is in this  potential that the
political value of  collective memory lies, as a source of  symbolic power. 
The nature of  the relationship between memory and identity is treated in academic
literature in mainly two, contrasting ways. The approach prevalent in the field of  memory
studies is to inquire how identity influences the construction of  collective memory, which
assumes that identity precedes memory. This stems from the centrality of  memory as  a
research theme, and follows, to a great extent, Halbwaschs' model, which assumes the pre-
existence  of  the  group  and  presents  memory  as  a  basic  mechanism of  preserving  its
identity:  “the  group,  when  facing  its  past,  feels  it  has  remained  the  same  and  gains
awareness of  its identity through time” (Halbwaschs 1950:50). This assumption reveals the
limitations  of  Halbwaschs'  approach,  which,  as  Megill  (2007:47)  highlights,  focuses
primarily on the construction of  memory by an identity that is already well-established.
This  stands  in contrast  with a  constructivist  approach to  identity  that,  while  assuming
identity's dynamic nature, takes a largely instrumentalist perspective over memory. This is
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prevalent in the literature on nationalism and national identity, concerned, as Olick stresses,
with  “what  memory  can  do  for  identity”(2007,  p.87).  Both  approaches  assume  a
relationship of  causality between memory and identity, an assumption that works as an
heuristic device for focusing in one of  the processes, be that the construction of  memory or
the construction of  identity,  but  introduces  a  somehow static  element  to  what  are  two
dynamic  processes  involved  in  a  relationship  of  mutual  implication.  Such  research
strategies work reasonably well in top-down approaches focusing on the politics of  memory,
or in cases in which identity is rather stable, but are harder to apply in cases where a major
shift in identity has taken place, and the new forms of  identity are not yet clear. 
Memory is an active element in the dynamic process of  construction of  identity, but
memory's  actual  level  of  involvement  in the  process  of  identification can vary  greatly.
Memory's role tends to become more visible in times of  crisis, which expose the inherently
fragile character of  collective identity. By offering the possibility to access the past, memory
contributes to responding to the problem of  how to sustain identity through time, bearing
in  mind  “the  difficulty  of  being  able  to  deal  with  changes”  which,  is,  following  Paul
Ricoeur, “one reason why identity is so fragile”(1999:8). Memory can grant identity with
the sense of  continuity through time, conferring a sense of  stability to what is essentially a
dynamic process; but memory can also provide an understanding to shifts in identity, by
offering the possibility to revisit the events in the past that disrupted it, and retrospectively
render  them  meaningful  in  the  light  of  their  consequences  as  well  as  the  present
circumstances.
Hence memory can render identity more fluid and able to accommodate change.
This does not mean, however, that memory causes identity. Rather than a relationship of
causality,  the  relationship  between memory  and identity  is  one  of  mutual  implication.
Memory, as a capacity, is engaged in the process of  identification, but memory cannot, by
itself, generate identity. The process of  construction of  identity is triggered by action and
based  on  experience,  rather  than  on  memory.  Whilst  experience  can  result  in  the
production of  identity, for that identity to persist it needs to be sustained through time.
Memory is the capacity that allows the founding and formative experiences to be revisited,
and that can happen both in ways that reproduce identity and in ways that undermine it.
In the process of  remembering, experience is given meaning, based on the assessment, both
on the level of  cognition and the level of  affect, of  the significance of  that experience in the
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light of  subsequent developments. Moreover, the content of  our memories and the way we
remember are certainly influenced by the cultural frames that also inform our sense of
identity. 
As the historian Allan Megill has stressed, the public relevance of  memory seems to
be directly connected with “an insecurity about identity” (Megill: 2007, p.43), one of  the
traits  of  late  modernity,  which may be the reason why collective  memory tends to  be
considered  so  important  in  contemporary  societies.  Indeed,  public  memory  is  often
mobilised  to  support  claims  over  identity,  thus  playing  a  role  in  the  legitimation  or
otherwise contestation of  the  statu quo, and in the justification of  programmes of  action
proposed by  ideological  identity  projects.  But  the subordination of  memory to identity
projects require significant effort which is likely to be met with resistance. 
Remembering violence between public and private memory
Memories  of  violence  and war  figure  prominently  in  the  public  realm and there  is  a
widespread idea, both in political and popular discourse, that individuals and societies are
bound  by  a  'duty  of  memory'  towards  past  experiences  of  suffering,  oppression  and
injustice.  And  yet  societies  often  have  a  tense  relationship  with  the  past,  with  certain
historical experiences either absent or assigned a marginal presence in the public memory.
In his  lecture 'What  is  a  Nation',  Ernest  Renan(1882)  famously  elaborated around the
tendency  to  exclude  inconvenient  historical  experiences  from  public  memory,  when,
evoking  the  place  of  the  Saint-Barthélemy  massacre  in  French  memory  he  claimed
that“Forgetting, I would go on as far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of  the
nation”. Noting the fact that Renan's speech carried the assumption that his audience need
no explanation about the facts surrounding the massacre, Benedict Anderson (1991:200)
pointed out that “In effect, Renan's readers were being told to 'have already forgotten' what Renan's own
words assumed that they naturally remembered!”
Anderson  contends  that  the  way  these  memories  of  'forgotten'  tragedies  are
retrieved, often but not exclusively, by the state itself  through the education system, reflect a
“deep reshaping of  the imagination” in society in what he considers to be a “characteristic
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device  in  the  later  construction  of  national  genealogies”(1991:201).  This  device  is,
according to Anderson, triggered only once those memories have become distant enough to
have become “reassuring fratricides”, when “to serve the narrative purpose” that informs
the  'biography  of  nations',  “these  violent  deaths  must  be  remembered  as  'our
own'”(1991:206). The problem with Anderson's otherwise insightful remark about Renan's
assumptions over forgotten memories is  that he interprets the paradox he identified on
Renan's lecture through a largely top-down approach, with the state as the main agent in
the retrieval of these 'difficult memories' once they are deemed to no longer threaten the
identity of  the nation. Once again what we have is an already well-established identity
constructing a suitable past. 
But what kind of  dynamics is at play when, rather than “reassuring fratricides” that
took place somewhere in a more or less distant past, memories of  violence are produced in
a  political  environment  still  marked  by  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  over  identity?  To
investigate such a question, we need, first of  all, to explore the connection between this
violence that is the object of  remembrance, and the climate of  uncertainty in which such
memories  are  produced,  to  understand  their  “reassuring”,  or  otherwise  subversive
potential, which we will do through the framework of  liminality. 
2.2  Understanding violence through the lens of  liminality
The concept of  liminality, created by Arnold van Gennep(1981[1909]), and  developed by
Victor Turner (1967;1969), provides a useful heuristic device to explore this relationship
between  violence  and  uncertainty  over  identity  in  periods  of  political  transformation,
allowing  for  a  processual  approach  aimed  at  capturing  its  dynamics,  whilst  avoiding
teleological  assumptions.  Literally  referring  to  'threshold'  situations  in  the  transition
between  different  states,  “liminality  captures  in-between  situations  and  conditions
characterised by the dislocation of  established structures, the reversal of  hierarchies, and
uncertainty about the continuity of  tradition and future outcomes”(Horvath, Thomassen
and Wydra 2015:2).
Based on the recognition of  “an ordering principle inherent in the various rites
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accompanying the individual life cycle or the periodicity of  seasons”(Szakolczai 2014:33),
van Gennep(1981[1909]:20) identified “a scheme of  ceremonial sequences involved in the
passage from one situation to another and from one (cosmic or social) world to another”.
The scheme consist in rites of  separation; margin; and aggregation, each corresponding to
a specific stage in a transition process:
• the preliminary stage “comprises symbolic behaviours signifying the detachment of
the individual or group from an earlier fixed point in the social structure or a set of
cultural conditions”(Turner 1967:94);
• the liminal stage, located in the threshold between the old and the new, the subject,
already deprived of  its former status, is subjected to particular challenges, whose
successful  performance has  a  transformative  effect  in  the  subject's  identity  and
future social position;
• and  finally  the  postliminal  stage,  through  which,  having  gone  through  a
fundamental transformation, the subject acquires a new identity, and is integrated
in the corresponding social position.
In some cases, van Gennep highlights, “the scheme is duplicated: this happens when the
margin is developed enough to constitute an autonomous stage”(1981[1909]:20), in which
case  the  liminal  stage  will  comprise  its  own  set  of  rites  of  separation,  margin  and
aggregation.
It  was  through  the  work  of  Victor  Turner  that  the  idea  of  liminality  gained
currency. Turner analysed the middle stage of  rites of  passage, to explore its paradoxical
character:  “Liminality  may  perhaps  be  regarded  as  the  Nay  to  all  positive  structural
assertions, but is in some sense the source of  them all, as a realm of  pure possibility whence
novel configurations of  ideas and relations may arise”(1967:97). The liminal experience,
Turner argued, was marked by ambiguity; neutrality; and structural invisibility(1967:99).
The  initiands'  ambiguous  character  stemmed  from  the  fact  that,  because  they  are
undergoing a transformation, they “elude or slip through the network of  classifications that
normally locate states and positions in cultural space”(1969:94); their neutrality resulted
from being dispossessed of  status, rights, and property,  pushing the liminal beings to adopt
a “passive and humble” behaviour (1969:94). As for structural invisibility, it was imposed on
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them because they were perceived as polluting by those outside their liminal realm, given
their position “betwixt and between, no longer classified and not yet classified”(1967:98).
Turner  cites  Mary  Douglas'(1966)  Purity  and  Danger, on  the  concept  of  pollution as  “a
reaction  to  protect  cherished principles  and  categories  from contradiction”,  since  “the
unclear is the unclean”(Turner 1967:99 cit. Douglas) to highlight how the liminal beings'
ambiguous  and  paradoxical  character  made  them  ritually  polluting,  and  therefore
dangerous in the eyes of  others.
Turner  points  also  to  the  positive  aspects  of  liminality,  highlighting  how  the
experience of  liminality is generative of  identity. In relation to the outside world the liminal
beings  are  dispossessed,  vulnerable,  and  therefore  contrived  to  submit  and  accept  the
suffering  liminal  rituals  often involve;  hence they  submit  to  their  fate,  obeying  to the
'master of  ceremonies', who previously went through the same transformative rituals, and
who  provides  them  with  some  form  of  guidance  for  performing  the  rituals  they  are
subjected  to.  Within  the  group,  however,  this  dispossession  generates  a  situation  of
complete equality, and enables a degree of  freedom unknown in normal circumstances,
since, Turner notes, “people can 'be themselves', it is frequently said, when they are not
acting  institutionalised roles”(1967:101).  These positive  aspects  give rise  to  a  particular
sense of  community – Turner (1969) would call it communitas – among the initiands, which
would transcend the liminal period, and last beyond their reintegration. 
Although  Turner  “repeatedly  identified  parallels  with  non-tribal  or  'modern'
societies”(Thomassen 2009:14),  he rejected extending the scope of  the concept  beyond
traditional  or  small  scale  societies,  other  than  as  a  metaphor(Turner  1974:62),  and,
Thomassen(2009:15) notes, “his work remained largely a-political in character”. Perhaps
for  that  reason,  the  concept  of  liminality  has  been  neglected  as  an  analytical  tool  to
understand situations of  break of  order and radical political change, even though Turner's
insights on liminality – along with his concept of  'social drama' – found a wide scope of
application within and beyond Turner's own discipline, Anthropology. 
Thomassen (2009:16)  proposes  the application of  the concept  of  liminality  “far
beyond that which Turner himself  had suggested”. He highlights the diversity of  liminal
experiences,  affecting  a  range of  subjects,  from single  individuals  and social  groups  to
whole societies;  varying in temporal scope, from short moments to more or less prolonged
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periods, and possibly to epochs. Liminality has also a spatial dimension, varying in scope,
from specific places, to particular areas, such as borders, aeroports, prisons, but also theme
parks and holiday resorts (providing what Turner(1974) defined as liminoid experiences), to
whole countries  or larger regions marked by their  in-betweenness.  The combination of
these  different  dimensions  results  in  different  degrees  of  liminality,  depending  “on the
extent  to  which  the  liminal  experience  can  be  weighted  against  persisting  structures”
(Thomassen2009:18). Thus the concept of  liminality holds a great potential, to offer, as
Arpad Szakolczai stresses “a novel, non-evolutionary, and non-dualistic understanding of
the relationship between social  order  and change,  introducing  the vital  third term 'in-
between'” (2014:33). 
Authors such as  Arpad Szakolczai  (2009; 2014);  Bjorn Thomassen (2008;  2009;
2015);  Agnes  Horvath  (2008:  2015);  Harald  Wydra(2015);  Maria  Malksoo(2012),  and
others converging around the journal International Political Anthropology have been proposing
the  extension  of  the  concept  to  the  analysis  of  large-scale  social  and  political  events,
highlighting how it may shed light to the role of  agency as well as the structuring, long-
term effects of  what are fundamentally unstructured experiences: “During liminal periods,
characterised by a wholesale collapse of  order and a loss of  background structure, agency is
pushed to the forefront and reorientations in modes of  conduct and thought are produced
within larger societies”(Thomassen2009:20); once liminality comes to an end “the ideas
and practices  that  have become established therein will  tend to take on the quality  of
structure”(Thomassen2009:20). 
One crucial aspect to bear in mind whilst applying the 'lens' of  liminality to the
study of  political change is that, “if  a society, a culture or a civilisation enters a major
period of  transition, a crisis that implies the collapse of  the previously taken for granted
order of  things, nothing assures in advance the outcome” (Szakolczai 2014:34). Liminality
avoids the teleological trap; highlighting how uncertainty is key, offering various, and often
contended ways of  imagining the future through an expanded sense of  possibility, with
danger as its reverse. A second aspect is that, unlike in rites of  passage, and since liminality
engulfs the whole of  society in a unique historical experience, there is nobody to guide
through this process, no 'master of  ceremonies' who is 'outside liminality', having already
gone through the same type of  transition. Political leaders are themselves in a stage of
liminality;  their  liminal  condition  endows  them  to  exercise  their  fuelled  imagination,
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seeking  for  a  desirable  outcome,  but  their  power  is  contested,  and although they  may
appear as invested with charisma, they are navigating uncharted waters. Liminality is, in
the  context  of  such  processes,  a  stage  of  unbounded  possibility  and  extreme  danger.
Liminality involves the destruction of  pre-existing structures, thus boosting creativity, but
entails the risk that this creative surge will fail to deliver new structures which are solid
enough to sustain a new order, leaving societies stuck in a prolonged liminal stage, which,
Szakolczai (2009; 2014) contends, may indeed become permanent.
 War represents a quintessential liminal experience, and a case in which the risk of
liminality  becoming permanent  is  striking.  We need only  to  think,  for  instance,  of  the
failure of  international intervention in countries like Afghanistan or Iraq, while in cases
such as  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and Kosovo,  the success  in  ending mass  violence  was not
followed by a successful post-liminal reaggregation, but instead by a precarious stability,
which some label as a 'frozen conflict' (e.g. Perry 2009); an 'unfinished war'(e.g. Lovrenović
and Jergović 2010); or a 'paralysed peace' (Bennet2016). But liminality is more than merely
a label to describe situations of  political transition.  Advocating for the application of  the
concept  of  liminality  to  the  study  of  war,  Maria  Malksoo  (2012:490)  criticised  “the
tendency in most International Relations theoretical traditions to reduce war to terms of
analysis derived from peacetime society”(see also Shaw(1988) for a sociological critique of
this  tendency),  while “understanding war through the lens of  liminality  underscores its
unique nature among other social activities”(Malksoo2012:490). 
Political liminality leaves an enduring legacy, in the form of  the structures which it
shaped, and in the way it affected peoples lives. Memory retrospectively gives meaning to
the liminal experience, in such a way that the sacrifices made and the price individuals had
to pay when going through the liminal stage, is measured against how the new structures
that emerged enabled, or otherwise constrained them to recover. The sense of  future and
the sense of  the past come together in such exercises, in which the question of  whether it
was worth it is pervasive, whether publicly articulated or only tacitly present. This is even
more so, when violence is the strongest defining feature of  the liminal experience, as in the
present case-study, of  how people remember ethnic cleansing in the context of  the Bosnian
war and the creation of  Republika Srpska.
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We will now turn to the particular case of  ethnic cleansing, the memories of  which
are the core object of  this thesis, and analyse the concept as a category of  practice in the
context of  liminality.
2.3  What is ethnic cleansing?
This  thesis  adopts,  for  operational  purposes,  the basic  definition provided by the Final
Report of  the Commission of  Experts established by the UN Security Council(UNSC Res.
780/1992) to investigate allegations that serious breaches of  International Humanitarian
Law were taking place in the territory of  the former Yugoslavia. As defined by the Report
(henceforth referred to as the Bassiouni Report, after the Commission's chairman), “'ethnic
cleansing' means rendering an area ethnically homogenous by using force or intimidation
to remove from a  given area  persons  from another  ethnic  or  religious  group” (UNSG
1994:33,  par.129).  The  work  of  the  Commission  was  the  basis  for  the  UN  Security
Council's  decision,  in  May  1993,  to  create  the  International  Tribunal  for  the  former
Yugoslavia(UNSC Res. 827/93).
It seems consensual that ethnic cleansing is associated with modern state practices,
and in particular with the model of  the nation-state (Nairmak 2001; Carmichael 2002;
Mann 2005; Ther 2014);. In his general theory of  ethnic cleansing, Michael Mann(2005)
goes as far as calling it “the dark side of  democracy”, likely to occur where the  demos is
confused with the  ethnos, giving rise to organic conceptions of  the nation (Mann 2004:3).
The term gained currency  during  the wars  in  Croatia  and Bosnia-Herzegovina,  when
journalists and diplomats following the wars introduced it to the English language, literally
translating  from the  Serbo-Croatian  'etničko  čišćenje'  to  describe  acts  of  violence  against
civilian populations resulting in their forced displacement (Shaw 2007:49). In fact, the term
'cleansing', and the equivalent term 'purification' have long been used in Europe to refer to
the expulsion of  unwanted populations, with documents recording it as far back as the 19 th
Century (Ther 2014:4); the 'ethnic' prefix began appearing only much more recently, but,
Ther(2014:4) notes, “it was without saying that, in the context of  discourses on nation, the
term 'cleansing' referred to national minorities”. 
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Ethnic cleansing and genocide
Ethnic  cleansing is  closely related to the concept of  genocide.  The term genocide is  a
sociological and juridical term, coined by the lawyer Raphael Lemkin. 'Ethnic cleansing',
by contrast is “a term borrowed from the language of  the perpetrators and their mentors”,
as Philipp Ther(2014:4) put it, devoid of  intrinsic juridical meaning, albeit encompassing
an array of  acts  contrary to International  Humanitarian Law(UNSG1994:33, par.130).
While  the term genocide refers to a category of  analysis, 'ethnic cleansing' refers essentially
to  a  category  of  practice,  even  if  many  scholars  use  it  “as  a  point  od  departure  for
analysis”(Toal and Dahlman 2011:xii). The use of  the term 'ethnic cleansing' in scholarly
literature is controversial, with some scholars arguing against its use (e.g. Shaw 2007:48-62;
Bećirević  2014:ix;  Donia  2015:18;  Gordy 2013:9),  on  the grounds  that  it  consists  in  a
euphemism that obfuscates the ugly reality of  mass atrocity; on the other hand, given the
juridical  dimension  of  the  concept  of  genocide,  some  scholars  also  seem  wary  of
employing the term for cases where a judicial decision classifying an act of  violence as
genocide does not exist (e.g. Donia 2015), in which case the term ethnic cleansing appears
as an alternative, in part because, Shaw (2007:48) notes, the concept of  genocide “has been
narrowed down to Nazi-like extermination policies”. 
The debate about what precisely distinguishes ethnic cleansing from genocide, and
how far they coincide in content, or whether they refer, instead, to different phenomena,
has  proved  divisive  within  the  scholarly  community(see  Hoare  2014).  The  debate  is
connected to a broader problem of  how to define the scope of  genocide, with authors who
favour a broader approach to genocide (e.g. Shaw 2007; Hoare 2014) more critical of  the
term ethnic cleansing.  The controversies around how to classify mass atrocity spill over
from the  realm of  academia,  into  public  discourse  and popular  culture,  exposing  and
perhaps deepening divising perspectives over a common past of  violence. The case of  the
Armenian  genocide  offers  a  particularly  insightful  illustration  of  how  enduring  such
divisions can be (Suny2009),  and how they often correlate with ethnicity,  ideology,  and
states' ontological insecurity (Zarakol 2010), with important lessons for the Bosnian case.
The question of  whether mass violence against Bosnian Muslims constitutes genocide, and
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whether the term should be restricted to the particular case of  the Massacre of  Srebrenica,
or whether it should qualify the wider strategy of  the Bosnian Serb leadership (see Hoare
2014) is certainly contentious political issue in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Karćić 2015).  This
thesis takes note of  these controversies; due to space constraints, however, we are unable to
fully explore them, other than in relation to the specific case-study of  Bijeljina. 
What matters, in the context of  this research, is that the term 'ethnic cleansing' is
widely used in Bosnia-Herzegovina to describe wartime violence, including by many of  its
victims. My focus, therefore is not on the term as a category of  analysis, but as a category
of  practice. In the context of  the ethnographic approach adopted in this thesis, we aim to
explore the meanings attached both to the idea of  ethnic cleansing in abstract and to its
experience in concrete. Understanding ethnic cleansing as a category of  practice requires a
processual approach, focusing on agency, but correlating it with the overall dynamics of  a
country's political and military situation and its impact locally. For that purpose, the  thesis
frames  ethnic  cleansing  as  a  liminal  process,  enabled  by  the  radical  opening  of  new
possibilities  for reordering the environment brought about  by war –  as in the case of
Bosnia-Herzegovina – but also, more generally, by substantial changes in the international
system and in domestic politics.
Ethnic cleansing and categorical purity
Rather than dismissing the 'ethnic cleansing' term as euphemistic, this thesis explores the
meanings the term itself  encompasses. The idea of 'cleansing' directly evokes the presence
of  a  polluting  element  and  a  source  of  contamination(Shaw  2007:49).  Whilst  the
connection is  obvious  and consensually  acknowledged,  among scholars  studying  ethnic
cleansing from a political perspective the idea of  pollution to which the term cleansing
alludes has hardly been explored. In Mann's(2004) general theory of  ethnic cleansing, for
instance, the word pollution appears only three times, always in reference to perpetrators'
racial  prejudices.  The term purity  appears  more often,  also  in relation to perpetrators
beliefs, but its meanings are never explored, merely assumed. But several  anthropologists,
most notably by Liisa Malkki (1995) on her study of  Hutu refugees from Burundi exiled in
Tanzania,  and Arjun Appadurai  (1998),   have  made the  idea  of  purity  and pollution
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central to their analysis of  ethnic violence, relying on Mary Douglas' seminal work Purity
and Danger: an analysis of  concepts of  pollution and taboo(1966). 
Defining dirt  essentially  as  “matter  out  of  place”  implying  “a  set  of  ordered
relations  and a  contravention  to  that  order”(1966:36),  Douglas  argued that  notions  of
pollution are “the by-product of  a systematic ordering and classification of  matter, in so far
as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements”(1966:35). The concepts of  power
and danger are key in Douglas' framing of  pollution and purification. Forms of  pollution
pose danger to the social order,  but,  far from representing “a negative movement”(p.2)
driven  by  anxiety  (1966:40),  acts  of  cleansing  or  purification  consist  in  “a  creative
movement” and “a positive effort to organise the environment”(1966:2). Douglas highlights
the opening of  possibilities brought about by disorder:
Granted that disorder spoils pattern, it also provides the material of  pattern. Order
implies restriction; from all possible materials, a limited selection has been made and
from all possible relations a limited set has been used. So disorder by implication is
unlimited,  no  pattern  has  been  realised  in  it,  but  its  potential  for  patterning  is
indefinite. This is why, though we seek to create order, we do not simply condemn
disorder.  We recognise  that  it  is  destructive  to  existing  patterns;  also  that  it  has
potentiality. It symbolises both danger and power. (Douglas 1966: 95)
In  his  analysis  of  liminality,  Victor  Turner  (1964:97-98)  explored  Douglas'
connection  between  pollution  and  categorical  confusion,  to  take  Douglas  analytical
framework one step further, highlighting the need to distinguish between static situations, in
which notions of  pollution relate to structural contradictions, and dynamic processes, in
which pollution derives from the unstructured nature of  transitions. 
Malkki (1995) applied Douglas and Turner's theoretical insights about  purity and
categorical confusion to analyse the impact of  the experience of  extreme ethnic violence in
the  construction of  national  identity,  to  highlight  the  contingency  of  the  very  idea  of
categorical purity, constructed in the interaction between living conditions in the present
and  the  memories  of  the  violent  past.  Relying  on  Malkki's  theoretical  and  empirical
contribution, and focusing in the particular case of  atrocities  committed between people
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who were socially intimate,  Arjun Appadurai also explores idea of  categorical purity and
the  role  it  plays  in  ethnic  violence,  correlating  it  with  the  notion of  uncertainty.  The
analysis  of  ethnic  violence,  Appadurai(1998:231)  argues,  reveals  “cosmologies  in  flux,
categories under stress, and ideas striving for the logic of  self-evidence”. For Appadurai,
“ethnocidal violence is not simply a matter of  eliminating the ethnic other”(1998: 233), but
of  “establish[ing]  the  parameters  of  this  otherness”,  so  as  to  counter  the  'categorical
uncertainty' about the self.  Whilst ignoring Turner's framework of  liminality, Appadurai
nevertheless suggests that acts of  ethnic violence “arise in circumstances where the lived
experience of  large labels becomes unstable, indeterminate, and socially volatile, so that
violent action can become one means of  satisfying one's sense of  one's categorical self ”,
stressing however, that such violence “is never truly cathartic, satisfying, or final”(244).
In  situations  of  political  liminality  –  such  as  that  experienced  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina with the dissolution of  Yugoslavia – the collapse of  the old order opens new
realms of  possibilities. Violence becomes instrumental in channeling the creative potential
in ways that converge with and reinforce the model of  social organisation and the ideals of
national identity favoured by those who possessed the means of  violence, and assign for
themselves the role of  'masters of  ceremonies' steering the liminal process. For them, the
liminal period represents a creative moment towards the re-ordering of  the environment
according  to  new principles.  But  the  expansion of  their  sense  of  possibility  entails  its
curtailment,  and  an  increased  danger,  for  those  subjected  to  that  violence.  For  those
targeted or threatened by violence, survival becomes their primary goal, followed by an
effort to preserve their dignity in such adverse conditions. 
From this perspective, 'cleansing' as in 'ethnic cleansing' appears not so much as  an
euphemism, but as an analogy for the elimination of  the elements that are not consistent
with the envisioned order to be created, in the search for categorical purity. In his analysis
of  population exchange and ethnic cleansing in nazi-allied Romania during the Second
World War, the historian Vladimir Solinari (2010) highlights this point, stressing how the
expressions “ethnic cleansing”, and “ethnic purification” were candidly employed by the
Antonescu regime, whose leadership saw the nazi invasion of  the Soviet Union as opening
an  “historical  moment”(p.149)  to  restore  Greater  Romania  and  purify  the  Romanian
nation, “both ideologically and racially, or 'biologically'”(p.150). The same spirit can be said
to have animated the mind of  the leaders of  the Second World War Chetnik Movement in
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Yugoslavia, who engaged in so-called “cleansing actions” against Muslim populations in
Bosnia and Sandjak (Tomasevitch 1975: 258; Bećirević 2014: 22). 
Due to the growing importance of  the idea of  Human Rights after the Second
World War, when the term 'ethnic cleansing' emerged in public discourse, in the context of
the wars of  Yugoslav succession, its use was no longer as a statement of  intention on the
part  of  perpetrators,  who seem to have lost  the candour displayed before the dawn of
international criminal justice. In public discourse, the expression 'ethnic cleansing' has now
been appropriated as a term of  accusation backing claims of  victimhood. The expression
was used in this sense as early as the 1980s,  when Serbian intellectuals  denounced the
emigration of  Serbs from Kosovo as the result of  “a policy of  'ethnic cleansing'” pursued
by Albanian nationalists (Dragović-Soso 2002:130, cit. Bogdanović 1985). Croatian officials
used the term in a similar way in 1991, when denouncing the violence perpetrated against
Croatian civilians by Serb paramilitaries and the JNA (Toal and Dahlman 2011:1); since
then the expression has been used countless times as a term of  accusation, most recently by
the  UN  in  denunciation  of  the  mass  atrocities  committed  in  Myanmar  against  the
Rohingya people (UN News 2018).
The Bassiouni Report played a crucial role in this shift from “from a rationalising
euphemism into  an  incriminating  metaphor”(Hagan  and  Haug  2011:180),  by  framing
ethnic  cleansing  as  “a  purposeful  policy”,  “contrary  to  International  Law”,  since  its
implementation involved  “violent and terror-inspiring means” against civilian populations,
“to a large extent, (...) carried out in the name of  misguided nationalism, historic grievances
and a powerful driving sense of  revenge.”(UNSC 1994:33) Somehow subverting the spirit
of  the Bassiouni Report, however, the term 'ethnic cleansing' was since widely adopted by
diplomats and political leaders as a way to avoid framing as genocide the crimes ethnic
cleansing  involves,  since  the  1948  International  Convention  for  the  Prevention  and
Punishment  of  the  Crime  of  Genocide  imposed  on  states  a  legal  duty  to  act  (Gratz
2011:410-411; see also Power 2002). 
These  shifts  in  the  use  of  the  term 'ethnic  cleansing'  nevertheless  preserve  the
essential  connection  with  the  idea  of  pollution  and  purity,  which  locates  the  violence
against  the  ethnic  'other'  in  a  wider  process  of  regeneration  of  the  ethnic  'self',  with
'cleansing' as a dehumanising metaphor through the evocation of  pollution. 
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Having presented this thesis' key concepts, we will now turn our attention to the
particular  case  of  the  process  of  ethnic  cleansing  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  more
specifically to ethnic cleansing as a strategy employed by the Bosnian Serb leadership to
create an ethnically homogenous territory that could sustain a viable new state, Republika
Srpska.
79
Chapter 3
Historical background:
Framing the creation of  Republika Srpska
The present  chapter will  begin by framing the empirical  research within the historical
context of  the disintegration of  Yugoslavia and the creation of  Republika Srpska, with a
particular focus  on the idea of  'separation of  peoples'  which was to become the main
strategic goal of  the Bosnian Serb leadership. The chapter sets this idea in contrast with the
principles that previously regulated ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to highlight the
role  of  agency  in  seizing  upon  a  moment  of  crisis  to  open  up  a  liminal  space  to
fundamentally transform Bosnian and Serb identity. 
In  the  second  part  of  the  chapter,  I  provide  an  historical  overview  of  the
development of  Bijeljina and the surrounding region of  Semberija, focusing, on the one
hand, on its strategic position, and, on the other hand, on the impact different periods of
state breakdown and war had in its population. The chapter ends with a description of  the
military  take-over  of  Bijeljina  in  April  1992,  and  how  an  official  narrative  about  it
emerged. 
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3.1  Ethnic cleansing and the creation of  Republika Srpska
Given the historical precedents of  extreme violence in the Balkans since the 19 th Century
(Carmichael 2002), including the Ustasha genocide against Serbs in the territory of  the
fascist puppet state of  NDH and the Chetnik genocide against Muslims during the Second
World War – events still within living memory, which were the focus of  intense debate in
the period preceding the disintegration of  the SFRY (Bogosavljević 2000) – it was tempting,
back in the 1990s, to accept the flawed 'ancient hatreds' thesis (e.g. Kaplan 1993), which
tapped into the stereotype of  the Balkans as the 'powder keg' of  Europe, (see Bakić-Hayden
1995;  Todorova  1997).  Such  theses  have  been  consistently  rejected  by  the  scholarly
community,  but  alternative  theses  presenting  inter-ethnic  relations  in  Bosnia  as
fundamentally harmonious (e.g Donia and Fine 1994; Sells 1996) and framing Bosnian
Serb  nationalism  as  a  'betrayal'  of  enduring  traditions  of  tolerance  and  peaceful
coexistence have also been criticised as somehow flattening the complexity of  historical
experiences and communal relations (see Baker 2015:58-59), marked by the coexistence of
integrative and fragmenting dynamics (Hoare 2007:416).
Inter-ethnic relations in pre-war Bosnia-Herzegovina
Ethnic relations in Bosnia-Herzegovina under communist rule rested on a delicate balance,
in which historical legacies, politics, and everyday life experiences all played a role. In his
study of  communal violence in the municipality of  Kulen Vakuf  in Northwest  Bosnia,
where in 1941 a series of  massacres occurred, Max Bergholz (2016) identified “three main
mental schemas that structured people's thinking”(2016: 273) during the communist period,
in what regarded interethnic relations, which the author directly correlates with the legacies
of  wartime violence dating back to the Second World War: the first, labeled “harmony”,
was based on “deep feelings of  admiration and gratitude” for individuals who risked their
lives to save their neighbours, which proved in the eyes of  those rescued that “a person's
character and behaviour (...)mattered most, not his or her ethnicity”(2016:273). 
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The  second  was  “state-enforced  'Brotherhood  and  Unity'.  The  concept  of
Brotherhood and Unity (bratstvo I jedinstvo), was, Dejan Jović (2009:54) notes, a “constitutive
concept regarding the main questions of  coexistence between Yugoslav nations”, resulting
in the organisation of  the Yugoslav state as  a  federation of  equal  nations  through the
establishment of  republics. A basic concept for the organisation of  the state, Brotherhood
and Unity entailed, in practice, “a dialectical balancing act between separate national and
supranational cultures” (Wachtel 1998:134) pushing for the creation of  a supranational
cultural space, a space which was to exist in parallel with the different national cultures.
Brotherhood and Unity had a particular meaning in the context of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, as
the  homeland  of  three  different  nations,  Serbs,  Croats  and  Muslims  (once  they  were
recognised as a national group), and with its  experience of  the civil war and genocide
during  the  Second  World  War.  The  'state  enforcement'  of  Brotherhood  and  Unity,
Bergholz notes, involved a calendar of  events celebrating  the communist regime, which
provided  “citizens  considered  to  be  of  different  ethnicities  with  common
holidays”(2016:274);  commemorations  selectively  remembering  the  war   dead  in  non-
ethnic ways; and 'work actions' (radne akcije) building infrastructure, which were designed to
encourage  people  “to  work  together  toward  common  objectives”(2016:274).  The
surveillance of  inter-communal relations through active monitoring was also central. Forms
of  behaviour contrary to 'Brotherhood and Unity', and in particular expressions of  what
the authorities considered to be 'chauvinism' were sanctioned and repressed, both through
social  censorship  and  through  judicial  means  (2016:275-277),  which,  Bergholz  argues,
“may have paradoxically increased the salience of  ethnic categories”(2016:276). 
Bergholz  presents  the  third  mental  scheme  as  “discord”,  referring  to  cases  of
antagonism between individuals, when erupting in situations of  confrontation, involved the
evocation of   the lived experience of  wartime violence, and were thus easily be labeled as
“ethnically  based”,  resulting  in  what  the  author  calls  the  eruption  of  “sudden
nationhood”(2016:281), in which ethnicity gained salience, which individuals mobilised, to
seek support within the community for their respective positions. While the 'Brotherhood
and Unity' mental scheme stemmed from the regime's policy, the first and third mental
schemes,  “harmony”,  and “discord”  stemmed from the local  historical  experience,  still
within living memory,  which in turn fed back  into how 'Brotherhood and Unity'  was
policed  and  enforced  on  the  ground.  Bergholz's  case-study  sheds  some  light  into  the
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complexity of  the relationship between living memory and political identity, and how a top-
down  effort  to  manage  the  legacies  of  violence  entailed  the  risk  of  unintended
consequences that perpetuated those legacies. It represents, thus, a compelling critique of
the communist regime politics of  memory that avoids groupist assumptions.
But  state  policies  and  legacies  of  violence  were  far  from  the  only  factors
determining communal relations. Highlighting the lack of  salience of  ethnic identity in
everyday life in Bosnia-Herzegovina – and in particular in urban areas – in the period that
immediately preceded the disintegration of  Yugoslavia, Adis Maksić (2017) points both to
the pervasiveness of  feelings of  belonging to Yugoslavia, in which 'Brotherhood and Unity'
were more than a slogan,  but  a  generative factor  of  an inclusive,  non-ethnic  Yugoslav
identity (jugosloventstvo); and to the  importance of  the Bosnian tradition of  life in common
(zajednički  život),  “in  which  personal  relations  and  everyday  lived  experiences  routinely
transgressed, reinscribed, and blurred ethnic boundaries”(2017:1). On the basis of  an array
of  sociological surveys and demographic data, Gagnon (2004) has also pointed to the lack
of  salience of  ethnic identity in everyday, invoking, for instance, the significant number of
marriages  between persons belonging to different ethnicities (usually referred to as 'mixed
marriages), and children born from parents who did not share the same ethnic background,
to stress  that  in  surveys  of  'ethnic  distance'  Bosnia  had one of  the lowest  levels  in  all
Yugoslavia (Gagnon 2004:40; see also Hodson, Sekulić and Massey 1994). 
Noting how, in Yugoslavia, everyday life in multi-ethnic areas was marked by low
levels of  ethnic distance and high levels of  tolerance and trust, Gagnon (2004) rejected the
'ethnic conflict'  label usually employed to characterise the wars of  Yugoslav succession,
calling it a “myth” created by “conservative elites in Serbia and Croatia”, who triggered a
spiral of  violence as part of  a broader “strategy to silence, marginalise, and demobilise
challengers  and  their  supporters  in  order  to  create  political  homogeneity  at  home” 6.
Converging with Gagnon in dismissing the label of  'ethnic conflict', Maksić nevertheless
rejects  the demobilisation thesis.  Instead,  Maksić  uses  discourse  analysis  to  explore the
processes of  'politicisation of  ethnicity' through which Bosnian Serb nationalists succeeded
in mobilising  the Serb masses  to  support  their  political  goals.  Maksić  characterises  the
6 It must be noted that The Myth of  Ethnic War, Gagnon's book, did not specifically focus on Bosnia-
Herzegovina, but had the former Yugoslavia as its unit of  analysis, focusing on elites in Serbia and 
Croatia, disregarding, thus, the agency of  Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb leaderships (see Caspersen 
(2010), and Glaurdić (2009) for analysis of  the relation between the Milošević regime and the Bosnian 
Serb leaderships). 
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Bosnian war as  an 'ethnicised conflict',  exposing  “the role  of  nationalist  agency in the
politicisation  of  ethnicity  and the  homogenisation of  people  around an ethnic  axis  of
collective identification”(2017:4) through a radical 'othering' process in a moment of  deep
uncertainty about the future.
The nationalist principle of  'separation of  peoples'
The acts  of  ethnic cleansing perpetrated by Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina were a
corollary of  the principle of  'separation of  peoples'  proposed by the leadership of  the
Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) and eventually validated by the Assembly of  the Serb
People  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  (later  the  Assembly  of  Republika  Srpska).  The  idea  of
'separation of  peoples' did not correspond to a perceived need of  the bulk of  the Bosnian
Serb population, but instead emerged from a background of  deep resentment among Serb
nationalists against what they saw as an unfair balance of  power among national groups in
the  framework  of  socialist  Yugoslavia.  First  openly  articulated  by  intellectuals  and
Orthodox  clerics  in  Serbia  in  the  early  1980s,  this  resentment  was  expressed  in  an
increasingly  loud tone throughout  the decade (Dragović-Soso 2002;  Wachtel  1998:197-
230), as an enduring economic crisis intensified the sense of  uncertainty created by the
death of  Tito in 1980. This resentment appeared as a reaction against the decentralisation
of  power in favour of  the republics and autonomous regions, with the Constitution of  1974
usually  pointed  at  as  particularly  detrimental  to  the  interests  of  the  Serb  people
(Dimitrijević 2000: 414). Indeed, during the first two decades after the Second World War,
and thanks,  to some extent, to the disproportionate Serb participation in the partisans,
Serbs  occupied  most  of  the  dominant  positions  in  the  political  structures  of  socialist
Yugoslavia, both at federal level, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hoare 2014:523, 525). From
the  late  1960s  onwards,  the  balance  of  power  shifted,  with  a  higher  participation  of
members  of  other  national  groups,  and  decisions  such  as  the  recognition  of  Bosnian
Muslims as a national,  rather than merely religious, group; the move of  the Orthodox
Church in Macedonia towards autocefaly; and the expansion of  Kosovo and Vojvodina's
political autonomy within Serbia. The 1974 Constitution appeared as the culmination of
this shift.
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Slobodan Milošević  seized upon this  resentment,  to present himself  as  the right
man  to  push  for  the  necessary  correction  to  the  'unjust'  position  of  the  Serb  people,
through a project of  recentralisation of  power away from the republics towards the federal
structures, which would ensure Serbian dominance under his leadership (Dimitrijević 2000:
414). Recentralisation was, however, resolutely opposed by the republican leaderships of
Slovenia and Croatia, who themselves sought further decentralisation and devolution of
power to the republics  (Ramet 2006:338) The conflict  between clashing visions for the
future  of  Yugoslavia,  at  a  time  when  communist  regimes  were  crumbling  in  Eastern
Europe, and after ten years of  economic crisis and delayed political reforms, opened up a
period of  liminality calling into question the institutional and ideological structures that
had  sustained  the  communist  regime.  The  political  confrontation  between  the
representatives  of  Slovenia  and  Croatia  and  Milošević  resulted  in  the  collapse  of  the
Communist Party of  Yugoslavia in January 1990 (Silber and Little 1995:84), and opened
the way for multi-party elections at the level of  the republics, and eventually, to the very
dissolution of  SFRY.
Once Milošević's attempt to dominate within the framework of  socialist Yugoslavia
failed, and with growing popular support for independence in Slovenia and Croatia, the
question of  whether the right to self-determination should belong to ethnic groups, rather
than to territorial units  came to dominate the concerns of  Serb nationalists  (Burg and
Shoup 1999: 86). Events were unfolding fast,  adding urgency to such concerns. In July
1990, Slovenia and Croatia organised multi-party elections, after which the two republics'
new leaderships announced their respective bids for independence. In the Summer of  1990
Croatian  Serbs  organised  around  the  Serbian  Democratic  Party  (SDS),  and  with  the
support  of  Milošević  regime and the JNA, launched a  rebellion that,  within  one year,
escalated into a war of  secession from Croatia, which Croatian Serb nationalists legitimised
by  invoking  their  own  right  to  self-determination  in  the  context  of  Croatia's  bid  for
independence, and the wish of  the Serb population not to have borders separating them
from Serbia, but instead to remain as part of  Yugoslavia. 
Whilst  Slovenia  and  Croatia  sought  independence,  the  situation  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina  was  different.  The  introduction  of  a  multi-party  system gave  rise  to  the
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creation of  nationalist parties invested above all in defeating the communists in the ballots
and replacing them. The biggest  parties,  the Muslim nationalist  'Party  for  Democratic
Action (SDA); the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), sister party to the new ruling party
in Croatia, led by Franjo Tuđman; and the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), sister party to
the Croatian namesake, went on to win the elections, in which voting largely mirrored the
demographic weight of  Bosnia's three constituent peoples, Bosnian Muslims, Croats and
Serbs. The three 'national' parties, SDA, HDZ and SDS, came to power, quickly taking
over the republican institutions and dividing among themselves all key positions (Anđelić
2003:192).  In  the  meantime,  the  prospect  of  Yugoslavia's  dissolution  was  becoming
increasingly  likely,  with  the  Serbian  leadership,  and  that  of  Croatia  and  Slovenia
articulating exclusive visions of  Yugoslavia's future. The leader of  the SDA and President
of  the  Bosnian  collective  presidency,  Alija  Izetbegović  proposed,  along  with  his
Macedonian counterpart Kiro Gligorov, a compromise in the form of  an 'asymmetrical
confederation', which would include also Slovenia and Croatia (Burg and Shoup 1999:70;
Silber and Little 1995:162). The determination of  both Slovenian and Croatian leaderships
in  seeking  for  independence,  and  Serbia's  recentralisation  goals,  however,  made  this
compromise  unfeasible.  Both  republics  moved  to  declare  independence  in  July  1991,
backed by the results  of  referenda which determined the support of  the overwhelming
majority of  the population.  This placed Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia in a difficult
situation, due to fears of  Serbian hegemony over a rump Yugoslavia.
The SDS's electoral platform ahead of  the 1990 elections was not the  'separation
of  peoples' (see Anđelić 2002: 170; Hoare 2007:343). In the Serbian national imaginary,
Bosnia-Herzegovina was traditionally viewed as a Serb land (Hajdarpašić 2015; Stojančević
2007), so that such a goal  of  keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina as a political unit in a common
state  with  Serbia  was  consistent  with  the  party's  “organic  vision  of  the  Serb  nation”
(Maksić 2017:127, see also 171-175). Keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina in a common state with
Serbia  entailed,  as  Adis  Maksić  (2017:95)  points  out,  “a  reactive  strategy”.  Since
Bosnia-Herzegovina was at the time part of  Yugoslavia, the party's goal was to preserve the
statu  quo.  In  fact,  none  of  the  three  major  nationalist  parties,  SDS,  SDA  and  HDZ
campaigned  for  the  disintegration  of  Yugoslavia  or  the  partition  of  Bosnia-
HerzegovinaHoare  2007:  344).  Instead,  they  presented  themselves  to  voters  as  allies,
seeking to rule the country in coalition. The three parties often sent representatives to each
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other's  political  events,  and organised joint political  rallies  (Hoare 2007: 343-4;  Maksić
2017:204) 
In his study of  the process of  ethnic mobilisation of  Bosnian Serbs around the SDS,
Maksi reveals how the party presented itself  as moderate, only radicalising its discourse
after it came to power:
“much of  the SDS's discourse during the election campaign was structured to diffuse
the  fear  that  the  three  ethno-national  parties  would produce ethnic  conflict  [...]
SDS's self-frame included the claim that the party was the harbinger of  genuine
peace,  in  opposition  to  the  fake  and  artificial  peace  of  the  communist  era”
(2017:203)
Always presenting itself  as a moderate party, the SDS engaged, from its onset, in a
process of  'othering', seeking to ethnicise social relations, and politicise ethnicity, in order to
mobilise  Serbs  and  generate  loyalty,  by  exploiting  uncertainty  in  a  fast-changing
environment (Maksić  2017:  76-78;  180).  This  othering process  adapted to the Bosnian
context the pattern already developed by nationalists in Serbia. With regard to Croats, the
main othering tactics was the equation of  the new HDZ government under the leadership
of  Franjo Tuđman, with the Second World War Independent State of  Croatia, and the
evocation of  the traumatic memory of  persecution and genocide against the Serb people
by the ustasha regime. As the Serb rebellion in parts of  Croatia grew into war, and with the
JNA using Bosnian territory to launch attacks against Croatian territory, the 'othering' of
Bosnian Croats by Bosnian Serb nationalists would become increasingy radical. Regarding
the 'othering' of  Bosnian Muslims, for years already, nationalist intelectuals and Belgrade-
based media  had been veiculating  “broad claims  of  generalised processes  and obscure
essentialist traits” insinuating the existence of  an 'Islamic threat' (Maksić 2017:78). Against
this  backdrop,   and  with  the  SDA advocating  for  the  preservation  of  Yugoslavia  and
opposing the independence of  Slovenia and Croatia, SDS leaders began by portraying the
Muslim people as “good natured and benign” (Maksić 2017:180), thus asserting the party's
moderation  and  the  coherence  of  their  electoral  platform.  As  Maksić  highlights,“the
Muslim national essence quickly changed from good natured to malicious”(2017:181), as
the  SDA's  position  evolved,  from  supporting  a  reformed  Yugoslavia  towards  seeking
independence, in the context of  the dissolution of  the SFRY. 
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Adopting a 'nation as discourse' approach to ethnic mobilisation among Bosnian
Serbs, Maksić identifies the moment when “the Islamic threat frame suddenly emerged as
one of  the principal themes”(2017: 211) in SDS discourse. Following Alija Izetbegović's
proposal  to  transform  Yugoslavia  into  a  confederal  state,  in  February  1991  the  SDA
submitted to the Bosnian Assembly a proposal for the declaration of  sovereignty, to which
the SDS objected, leading the SDA to withdraw it. SDS activists nevertheless framed the
proposal as amounting to “the formation of  an Islamic republic”(Maksić 2017:215). From
this moment on, the  'othering' of  Bosnian Muslims became increasingly radical, fostering
the “suspicion that behind all SDA policies was a Muslim desire for domination”(Maksić
2017:216). The past and the future were mobilised in this process, with the evocation of
Islamic domination under Ottoman rule, Muslim collaboration with the Ustasha regime on
the one hand, and predictions of  Muslim demographic growth due to higher birthrates
(Maksić 2017: 216) as evidence of  the vulnerability of  the Serb people in Bosnia. 
Very  soon  after  the  general  elections,  the  SDS  began  advocating  for  the
'cantonisation'  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina within Yugoslavia,  pointing to Switzerland as the
model to emulate (Gow 1997:81). The expression 'separation of  peoples'  seems to have
been publicly articulated only when it became clear that the dissolution of  Yugoslavia was
inexorable, with the independence of  Bosnia-Herzegovina as a probable outcome, forcing,
Glaurdić (2009) argues, a shift from the initial “maximalist” goal of  the President of  Serbia,
Slobodan  Milošević,  to  dominate  the  whole  of  Bosnia  –  as  happened  already  with
Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina –  to more “reduced demands” implying the partition
of  the territory (Glaurdić 2009:93). The case of  ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina
thus confirms Michael Mann's thesis that “murderous cleansing7 is rarely the initial intent
of  the perpetrators”, but “typically emerges as a kind of  Plan C”(2005:7), after the failure
of  Plan A triggered a spiral of  radicalisation, leading to an escalation that may involve
decisions  logically  stemming  from the  ideology  of  the  perpetrators,  but  also  decisions
contingent to the dynamics meanwhile set in motion. It is also the case, however, that the
contours of  this Plan C began to be unveiled much before the collapse of  Plan A, as a form
of  pressure towards compliance. Thus to understand ethnic cleansing, we must place it in
the evolving historical context from which it stemmed. 
7 Mann(2005)  conceptualises  ethnic  cleansing  as  a  spectrum of  activities  and  processes,  ranging  from
peaceful to violent, including assimilation on one end of  the spectrum and genocide on the other end.
His category of  'murderous cleansing' broadly corresponds to the narrower conceptualisation of  ethnic
cleansing, as defined, for instance, in the Bassiouni Report. 
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With Yugoslavia  disintegrating,  a  sense  of  deep  uncertainty  became  pervasive,
setting the conditions for the liminal transformation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the SDA
and the Bosnian HDZ leaning towards independence, a political conflict developed over
the future of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, in which the Bosnian Serb political leadership, which
opposed the establishment of  borders 'dividing' the Serb people, mobilised the population,
not  by  openly  instilling  ethnic  hatred,  but  through a highly  successful  appeal  to  affect
(Maksić  2017).  The tension  between  the  coalition  partners   provided material  for  the
reinterpretation of  the past, which an efficient propaganda machine mobilised to instil fear,
with Bosnian Serb leaders actively questioning the communist ideal of  'brotherhood and
unity', and systematically but insidiously casting doubt over the behaviour and intentions of
their  political  opponents  and  respective  supporters.  Such  mobilisation,  Maksić  (2017)
convincingly  argues,  undermined the principle  of  'life  in  common'  (zajednički  život)  that
regulated everyday life in Bosnia-Herzegovina, instilling mistrust and damaging the bonds
of  solidarity between individuals across ethnic boundaries. 
It was in this context, amidst growing tensions, with war raging in Croatia, and the
prospects of  Yugoslavia's survival weakening, that the 'separation of  peoples' began to take
shape.  On  the  ground,  the  principle  was  implemented  through  ethno-territorial
demarcation  and  the  creation  of  paralel,  exclusively  Serb  political  structures.
Regionalisation was the first step towards ethno-territorial demarcation. It consisted on the
creation of  associations of  municipalities, bringing together municipalities where the SDS
had won the local elections, which were later upgraded into Serbian Autonomous regions
(Srpski  autonomski  oblast,  SAO),  the  first  of  which,  the  SAO  Romanija,  was  created  in
September  1991(Maksić  2017:225).  Radovan  Karadžić  justified  the  initiative  on  the
grounds that “At this moment, BiH is divided in the cultural, spiritual and economic sense,
and this needs to assume territorial contours”(Maksić 2017:225).
The  increasingly  strained  relations  between  the  SDS  and  the  SDA  and  HDZ
reached a critical point in 15 October 1991, when the Bosnian Parliament finally approved
the  'Memorandum  on  Sovereignty',  opening  up  the  possibility  of  a  move  towards
independence, against the will of  the SDS, with its leader, Radovan Karadžić warning, in a
dramatic  speech,  that  independence  would  ignite  a  civil  war,  and  “ lead  Bosnia  and
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Herzegovina into hell and the Muslim nation perhaps to extinction” (Maksić 2017:226, citing TV
footage).  The  SDS  deputies  walked  out  but  were  unable  to  prevent  the  declaration's
approval. On 24 October, the SDS launched the  Assembly of  the Serb People in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, open to the participation of  deputies of  Serb nationality from other political
parties, and which was to function in parallel with the Bosnian Parliament.  Eventually, the
SAOs  would  constitute  the  basis  for  the  creation of  the  Serbian  Republic  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Srpska republika Bosna I Hercegovina), proclaimed by the Serb Assembly on 9
January 1992. At this point, partition on an ethnic basis had become the SDS's goal, for
which it already created favourable 'facts on the ground'. 
Fig. 1: The Serbian Autonomous Regions (map by 'Panonian', Wikimedia Commons)
Despite the early proposals for cantonisation, it is not clear precisely when the SDS's goal
shifted from bringing the whole of  Bosnia-Herzegovina into a state union with Serbia to
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partition. Josip Glaurdić(2009; 2011) argues that until late in 1991 Slobodan Milošević and
his  Bosnian  Serb  allies  “worked  to  secure  the  whole  of  BiH  for  the  new  Serbian
state”(Glaurdić  2009: 93), using threats to co-opt the SDA leadership. It seems that the
'separation of  peoples' first developed as a plan B, whose implementation was meant to
secure the success of  plan A. The framing of  the plebescite on Bosnia's status, organised by
the SDS and held in 9-10 November 1991, supports this hypothesis (Maksić 2017:228-230).
Two goals  thus  coexisted for a  while:  on the one hand the SDS advocated the
preservation of  Yugoslavia as a common state, regardless of  Croatia and Slovenia's move
for independence;  and on the other hand, the party threatened, both in discourse and
through the  creation of  parallel  structures  on  the  ground,  to  move towards  secession,
should their claims be left unanswered. The former goal implied a fundamentally reactive
strategy, keeping what was already there, even though the statu quo was obviously untenable,
whilst the latter involved an proactive strategy with the mobilisation of  organisational and
logistical resources on the ground. 
The  organisation,  on  8-9  November  1991,  of  a  plebiscite  about  the  future  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina  reveals  how  the  two  goals  were  brought  together  despite  their
contradictory implications. A tribute to the SDS's logistical capacity,  the plebiscite took
place  in  most  of  the  Bosnian  territory.  In  municipalities  ruled  by  the  SDS,  the  local
authorities were in charge of  organising it, while in the remaining territory it was held in
private  premises  like  restaurants  and  even  militants'  homes  (Maksić  2017:228).  Serbs
received a blue ballot asking:
 “Do you agree with the decision of  the Assembly of  the Serb People from October 24th that the
Serb people  should  remain  in  the  common state  of  Yugoslavia with  Serbia,  Montenegro,  SAO
Krajina, SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Smyrnium[both in Croatia, then occupied by Serb
forces and run by the Croatian SDS], and others who declared the same?”(Maksić 2017:228)
The idea behind the plebescite, and effort to organise it also where Serbs did not form a
majority, was that wherever Serbs lived should be seen as a Serb territory, but the question
itself  implied  that  the  implementation  of  the  plebescite's  decision  might  follow  the
precedent of  the Croatian SAOs, at the time already in a war of  secession against Croatia.
Significantly, non-Serbs were ostensibly invited to participate in the plebescite, but asked to
answer a different question.  For non-Serbs, the ballot was yellow, and asked:
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 “Do you agree  that  Bosnia-Herzegovina remain in the  joint  state  of  Yugoslavia as  an equal
republic, with all others who choose so?”(Maksić 2017:228)
Regardless of  the plebescite, the failure of  the SDS 'reactive strategy' seeking to
keep Bosnia-Herzegovina in Yugoslavia became evident when on 29 November 1991 the
International  Arbitration  Commission  led  by  Joseph  Badinter(henceforth  the  Badinter
Commussion)  determined  that  Yugoslavia  was  in  process  of  dissolution  (Glaurdić
2011:260). According to Glaurdić, the Badinter Commission legal opinion was “a terrible
surprise  for  Milošević  and  for  many  in  the  International  Community”(2011:260),  and
represented a significant defeat for Serb nationalists. 
Ethnic partition became thus the primary goal, mimetising the dynamics already in
place in Croatia,  where the Serb rebellion began in the Summer of  1990 had already
escalated into full-blown war. Partitioning the country, however, required departing from
the traditional nationalist view of  Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Serb land, and abandoning part
of  the territory to the other constituent nations, the Croats and the Muslims (Hoare 2007:
27).  Reaping the fruits of  a radical 'othering' process (Maksić 2017:211.), 'separation' was
presented by  the SDS leadership as  a  basic  premise  for  the establishment  of  peaceful
interethnic relations, and set in contrast with the 'false coexistence' encompassed by the
principle of  'life in common'  (zajednički život). Speaking at the Assembly of  the Serb People
in  December  1991,  Nikola  Koljević,  at  the  time  one  of  the  members  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina's collegial Presidency, elaborated on the idea:
“Peace  requires  secure  foundations.  Peace  can  be  built  through  continuing
pacification  and  separation,  and  not  through  a  false  coexistence  (lažno
zajedništvo).  That  is  precisely  what  we,  as  your  representatives  have  been
advocating with the idea of  a tripartite Bosnia and Herzegovina from the very
start” (Donia, 2012: 49, citing Nikola Koljević at the 4th session of  the Assembly
of  the Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 21 Dec 1991)
'Separation' stemmed from the conviction shared by SDS ideologues that in the past
Serbs  had generously  but  naively  sacrificed their  own national  interest  in supporting a
multi-ethnic society(Hoare 2007:354), and was presented as a necessity imposed on the
Serb people due to the treacherous character of  the Croat and Muslim peoples(Maksić
2017: 231).The 'separation of  peoples', it was becoming increasingly clear – as the Bosnian
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government, backed by the SDA and HDZ, moved towards independence –  should result
in the creation of  a homogenous ethnic state for the Bosnian Serbs. In 9 January 1992,
eight weeks before the Bosnian independence referendum, the Serb Assembly declared the
creation of  the  Republic of  the Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina, thus pushing for the ethnic
partition of  the territory, albeit restraining from expressing the wish for secession. 
The move would soon pay dividends. In January 1992 the Badinter Commission
determined that Croatian and Bosnian Serbs did not have the right to self-determination in
terms of  a right to secession from their home republics (Opinion #2) and that republican
borders were frontiers in terms of  International Public Law (Opinion #3) (Check original
document) (Glaurdić 2011: 287). This denied the possibility of  international recognition to
any attempt to unify with Serbia any areas under Serb control  in Croatia and Bosnia.
Declaring the SFRY in the process of  dissolution, the Commission stipulated the conditions
for international recognition of  independence of  the Yugoslav republics, recommending
the realisation of  an independence referendum in Bosnia-Herzegovina. With the Bosnian
Serb leadership opposing such a move, one week before the referendum was to take place
the international negotiators leading the diplomatic efforts to avoid war in Bosnia, Lord
Carrington and the  Ambassador  José  Cutileiro,  presented their  draft  plan  for  Bosnia's
constitutional reform.  The plan accepted the ethnic principle for the reorganisation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  proposing  the  creation  of  three  constituent  units  defined  by  the
principle  of  ethnicity  (Gow  1997:80),  effectively  adopting  the  'cantonisation'  model
proposed by the SDS as a basis for negotiation. Evoking the idea of  'appeasement', Gow
argues  that  “admitting  the  principle  of  ethnically  determined  territorial  units  was  a
cardinal mistakesince it bestowed approval on Serbian ambition and was in effect a charter
for 'ethnic cleansing'.”(1997:81).
Amidst ongoing international negotiations, the Bosnian referendum took place in 29
February and 1 march 1992, with a 64.4% participation rate, resulting in a 99.7 % support
for Independence. The bulk of  the Serb population boycotted it, under the instructions of
the  SDS.  (Gow  1997:84).  It  took  no  more  than  five  weeks  until  Bosnia-Herzegovina
descended into war, in early April 1992.
With the war already ongoing, Radovan Karadžić announced in the Serb Assembly
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the 'Six Strategic Goals for the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina'. Presented as a requisite
for statehood, 'separation of  peoples' appeared as the fundamental goal, with the following
five goals defined to give territorial expression to the homogenous Serb state8. 
“The first such goal is separation from the other two national communities –
separation of  states. Separation from those who are our enemies and who have
used every opportunity, especially in this century, to attack us, and who would
continue with such practices if  we were to stay together in the same state”
(Radovan Karadžić, 16th Session of  the Assembly of  the Serb people in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 12 May 1992, page 11).
It is important to highlight that the goals of  the Bosnian Serb leadership were not
as clear cut and consensual at the time as they appear retrospectively (see also Malešević
and Ó Dochartaigh 2018:311). The exchange, in the same session, between deputies and
the President of  the Assembly, Momčilo Krajšnik, provides an illustration to this point.
Krajšnik implicitly acknowledged that this represented a departure from their earlier goal
of  keeping Bosnia-Herzegovina as  a  whole in  a  common state with Serbia,  and urged
deputies to put national interest above their own personal sense of  belonging to particular
places. With their sense of  possibility heightened by their military superiority and initial
success, deputies had to be brought back to the reality of  constraints and costs involved in
the creation of  a Serb state in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
“Have  we  finally  decided  to  separate  from  the  two  remaining  national
communities? We can part from them if  Bosnia-Herzegovina is to be torn into
three parts. (…) That is why it would be good, dear gentlemen, to take care to
leave enough space for division. (...) We just don't seem to be able to make a
partition [in the sense of  being unwilling to restrain their territorial claims].
Therefore, if  we want to have a partition, Tuzla cannot end up as ours (…) We
8 Announced in the 16th Session  of  the Assembly of  the Serb people of  12 May 1992, the “Six Strategic
Goals of  the Serb People in Bosnia-Herzegovina” were published in the official gazette only in November
1993. They consisted in 1) “the state delineation from the other two national communities”; 2) “ corridor
between Semberija and Krajina”; 3) “establishment of  a corridor in the area of  the River Drina, relative
to the elimination of  the Drina as a border between the two Serb states”; 4) “establishment of  a border in
the rivers  Una and Neretva; 5)  “division of  the city  of  Sarajevo into Serb and Muslim sectors and
establishment in each sector of  an effective state government”; and, 6) “access of  Republika Srpska to the
sea” (Službeni glasnik Republike Srpske, No 22, p. 866, 26/11/1993)
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cannot  get  Zenica.  Allow me,  please.  Why  did  we  not  discuss  this  earlier?
Saying  that  whenever  there  were  Serbs,  it  was  Serbian  territory,  that
represented  the  mobilisation  of  the  entire  Serbian  people.  We shall,  in  an
organised manner, provide our people with a roof  over their heads. Resettle
them if  need be,  we shall  not put  them in a  genocidal  position” (Momčilo
Krajšnik,   16th Session  of  the  Assembly  of  the  Serb  people  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 12 May 1992, page 50).9
The proclamation of  the Six Strategic Goals of  the Serb people corresponded to
the official validation of  what was already taking place on the ground: ethnic cleansing on a
massive scale, not as a by-product of  fighting, but, as an essential element of  the  strategy
towards the 'separation of  peoples' and the creation of  an ethnically homogenous territory
contiguous to Serbia. At this time, the town of  Zvornik, and many other settlements in the
Drina Valley,  were already being emptied of  their Muslim populations,  with thousands
killed, and the ethnic cleansing of  the municipality of  Prijedor was about to begin10.
Ethnic cleansing as policy and strategy:
In his  study of  the conduct of  war by Serb forces,  James Gow(2003) argues that “the
committing of  war crimes was the essence of  the Serbian strategy in the war”(2003:3), with
ethnic cleansing at the core of  this strategy, given “the political aim [of] complete control
over  territory”,  which  required  the  “use  of  largely  unrestrained  coercive  violence  to
eliminate any potentially hostile population”(2003:118). Consistent with the findings of  the
Bassiouni Report, Gow's thesis has since been validated by numerous convictions at the
ICTY, including those of  the entire Republika Srpska leadership team: Radovan Karadžić,
9 The transcript does not include the comments by deputies who interrupted Krajšnik, but it is fair to infer
from his intervention as well as others in the same session, that there was considerable resistance from
those  who  had  to  give  up  claims  to  their  own  home  regions.  Krajšnik  set  himself  as  an  example,
highlighting  that  his  own  home  in  the  suburbs  of  Sarajevo  would  probably  become  part  of
“Muslimania”, and added: “But I  have no regrets.  We must not put our individual goals before this
goal”(RS Assembly 1992a:50).
10 In what regards the other strategic goals, fighting was already ongoing towards the creation of  a corridor
linking Semberija and the Bosnian Krajina, most of  the Drina valley was already under control of  Serb
forces, and Sarajevo was already under siege.
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President  of  Republika  Srpska,  Ratko  Mladić,  Commandant  of  the  VRS,  Momčilo
Krajšnik,  Assembly  Speaker,  and  Biljana  Plavšić,  Vice-President.  We  should  highlight,
however,  that  whilst  Gow  made  no  clear  distinction  between  the  leadership  of  the
Milošević  regime and the Yugoslav Army,  on the one hand, and the leadership of  the
Bosnian Serb party-state, the SDS, and the Army of  Republika Srpska, assuming there was
a unified strategy, the ICTY has failed to convict any officials from Serbia or the Yugoslav
Army. As Ioannis Armakolas  (2007:79) has noted, “most analysts have viewed  Republika
Srpska merely as a tool of  territorial expansion and mask for the nationalist project to build
a Greater Serbia, thereby failing to capture the constitutive effects of  this statelet in the
identities of  the population residing there”. Ten years on, the situation has hardly changed,
in what regards academic research. 
James Gow (2003) nevertheless offers a useful typification of  the implementation of
ethnic cleansing on the ground, which reveals the consistency of  patterns in the distinct
cases  of  Croatia,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  and  Kosovo.  Gow identifies  four  distinct phases
through which the process of  ethnic cleansing typically developed during the 1990s wars in
the former Yugoslavia (2003:118):
• preparation and provocation; 
• take-over and the use of  force; 
• establishment of  concentration camps; 
• and elimination through expulsion and execution. 
Framing ethnic cleansing as “a function of  state-building and state-consolidation
policies”, Emir Suljagić (2009:16) converges with Gow's typification, with two additional
elements (or phases):
• the systematic concealment and/or contamination of  evidence(2009:107); 
• and the post-facto justification of  criminal actions (2009:142-144)11.  
All the six elements were present in the case of  Bijeljina, the location chosen for the
present study. Before we go on to describe how this pattern applied in Bijeljina's particular
11 Both Gow(2003) and Suljagić(2009) offer a thematic analysis of  ethnic cleansing by Serb forces in the
whole of  the former Yugoslavia, involving three distinct wars, in Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Their focus
is on Milošević regime, and they make no clear distinction between the direct actions of  the Serbian
regime and that of  the Croatia and Bosnian SDS in the Croatian Serb and Bosnian Serb secessionist
rebellions.  
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case, we need to provide the wider picture, correlating the process of  ethnic cleansing with
the development of  the structures of  Republika Srpska and the prospects for resolution of
the armed conflict. 
Within the pattern described by Gow (2003) and Suljagić  (2009). there seems to
have been some degree of  variation in each particular location, resulting from a specific
combination of  three factors: 
• the ideological zeal towards the implementation of  the political goal of  'separation
of  peoples'; 
• strategic imperatives determining the elimination of  imagined, potential or actual
resistance (Gow 2003; Kostić and Dulić 2010); 
• and the opening up of  possibilities for the “fundamental reorganisation of  a local
political economy”(Toal and Dahlman 2011:116) through the disposession of  the
undesired population and the appropriation and redistribution of  their assets (see
also Akçam and  Kurt 2015: Ch.7). 
Before being expelled by Serb forces, victims were always plundered of  their wealth
and livelihoods. Their assets were used to fund the war effort, as much as to enrich the new
ruling elite, but ordinary people were sometimes allowed to plunder whatever remained, so
that ethnic cleansing also fostered a web of  complicity between the autorities who planned
and executed it and the larger in-group, a phenomenon that Slavenka Drakulić mentions as
the 'tv set syndrome”(2004:26). But plunder was only one aspect of  the wider process of
disposession. Although the bulk of  expulsions occurred in the earler stage of  the war, the
protracted  presence  of  a  subdued non-Serb population in  some parts  of  the  territory
controled by Serb forces allowed for their prolonged exploitation, not only through plunder,
but also as human resources coerced into contributing with their work to the Serb war
effort  (see  Ch.  4).  Given  Republika  Srpska's  acute  lack  of  human  resources,  a  more
prolonged presence of  non-Serbs fulfilled important gaps, either through the continuation
of  their economic activities, subject to evidence of  loyalty; through forced labour in the
form of  'work duties'; and even through conscription in the Army of  Republika Srpska.
Thus ideological and strategic factors pushing towards mass expulsions were sometimes
countered by the opportunity for a more prolonged exploitation of  non-Serbs. 
97
Ethnic  cleansing  developed  across  time  in  three  different  stages.  Although  it  is
difficult,  and somehow arbitrarious to state exactly when one stage ended and another
began,  there are nevertheless  specific connections  with  the wider  political  and military
context in each stage.  The first  stage of  ethnic  cleansing corresponded with the initial
military assault to the areas not yet under control of  the SDS, and was particularly intense
in areas with a Muslim majority that were deemed of  special strategic value, specifically in
eastern Bosnia along the River Drina (Podrinje region), in the Posavina region in the north
(Bećirević 2014; Boltzmann 1994); and in municipality of  Prijedor in the Bosnian Krajina,
in the northwest (UNSC 1994: Annex IV;  Wesselingh and Vaulerin 2005).  At this stage,
achieving a solid demographic majority was crucial in order to claim a territory as 'Serb',
but eliminating potentially or effectively hostile  populations was also a  crucial concern.
Serb forces responded with overwelming brutality to any form of  resistance on the ground,
as was the case after the take-over of  the municipality Prijedor 12. Even where the local
population showed no resistance and instead offered their alliegence, as was the case in the
village of  Kozluk, in Zvornik municipality, the proximity to front lines was enough of  a
motive to justify the total removal of  non-Serbs(Toal and  Dahlman 2011:116). 
The  second  stage  began  once  the  basic  state  structures  were  in  place,  and
corresponded with the beginning of  diplomatic negotiations towards a peace settlement,
with initial International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia, with took place in London
on 26 August 1992. This stage was essentially about consolidating already established Serb
majorities  in  the  territory,  and  involved  both  the  expulsion  of  non-Serbs  and  the
resettlement of  Serbs displaced from areas beyond the control of  the Army of  Republika
Srpska (Helsinki Watch 1993; Humanitarian law Fund 1993; 1993a;1994; Amnesty 1994). 
It was during the last stage of  the process of  ethnic cleansing that the Army of
Republika Srpska took over of  the enclaves of  Srebrenica and Žepa in the Podrinje region,
which  had  been,  since  March  1993,  under  the  protection  of  the  UNPROFOR
peacekeeping mission, after the UN Security Council declared them 'safe areas'. After the
take over of  Srebrenica, Bosnian Serb forced killed than eight thousand men and boys, in
the  worst  episode of  mass  atrocity  during  the  war,  and the only  one  which has  been
12 This is not to say that the ethnic cleansing of  the Prijedor municipality was a response or a retaliation to 
the episodes of  armed resistance by non-Serbs. According to the Prijedor Report (UNSG 1994a: Annex IV) 
the plans towards the take-over of  the municipality by Serb forces and subsequent mass imprisonment 
and expulsion of  the non-Serb population were drawn at least six months in advance. 
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recognised as an instance of  genocide by international courts.
The conquest  of  the enclaves of  Srebrenica and Žepa stand out as  exceptional
victories in a stage of  that war corresponding to the reversal of  fortunes of  the Bosnian
Serb Army. Serb forces became the target of  NATO air strikes, and suffered significant
territorial  losses  against  the combined forces  of  the Bosnian government (ARBiH),  the
Bosnian Croat army (HVO) and the Croatian army  (Burg and Shoup 1999:350; Hoare
2014:527;  Sivac-Bryant  2016:51).  This  reversal  of  fortunes  would  be  a  crucial  factor
pushing  the  Serbian  leadership  of  Slobodan  Milošević,  fearing  for  new  international
sanctions and the collapse of  the Army  of  Republika Srpska, to negotiate, in the name of
the  Bosnian  Serb  leadership,  a  peace  settlement,  which  was  eventually  reached  in
November 1995 after negotiations helf  in in a US military base in Dayton, Ohio (Burg and
Shoup 1999:407; Holbrook 1998; Silber and Little 1996).
The beginning of  the war marked the point of  no return to the old structures and
the  old  social  order,  but  the  new  order  was,  at  best,  embryonic.  Along  with  the
consolidation of  territorial gains, the absolute priority was to create the basic structures to
support the bid for statehood. Besides the Assembly itself, the only state institution already
established at this point was the Ministry of  Interior (MUP), formed on 1 April ( or 31
March?) 1992, the same day of  the take-over of  Bijeljina by Arkan's forces. The Army of
the  Serb  People  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was  officially  created on 12 May,  in  the  same
Assembly  Session  analysed  above,  and the  basic  legislation  and  government  structures
would  soon  follow.  Over  the  following  months,  until  the  end  of  Summer,  the  SDS
leadership would develop the matrix and the essential structures of  what was to become
Republika Srpska. 
There was a great sense of  urgency, induced by the conviction that the war might
be short due to the weakness of  the Bosnian government (Burg and Shoup 1999:130), and
that  the  international  environment  was  favourable  to  the  partition  of  Bosnia,  with
international peace negotiators accepting the principle of  division of  the territory on an
ethnic  basis  (Glaurdić  2011:290;  Burg  and  Shoup  1999:108).  The  transcripts  of  the
Assembly of  the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina over this period offer us some level
of  insight into the mood of  the Bosnian Serb nationalist  elite (see Donia 2012).  Their
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agency was crucial in bringing about the liminal condition in which the whole of   Bosnia-
Herzegovina was now immersed. The tone of  the discussions and the direction of  the
decisions  taken  suggests  how  the  the  dynamics  of  liminality  affected  also  the  SDS
leadership. The uncertainty that characterises moments of  radical transformation fostered,
among deputies, a heightened sense of  possibility fuelled by early success, military as well as
diplomatic, while the danger that violent conflict always entails seemed, in this early stage
of  the war, almost like an afterthought, given the overwhelming asymmetry of  military
might between Serb forces and their opponents.
By August 1992 all the essential structures for state-building were in place, and the
Bosnian Serb Army controlled close to 70% of  the Bosnian territory. But this apparent
success was countered by the realisation that the war might drag on, due to the persisting
difficulty in achieving the six strategic goals:
• The attempt to divide Sarajevo in early May had failed;
• in  Mostar,  the  JNA/VRS,  which  had  besieged  and  shelled  the  city  since  the
beginning  of  the war,  was  forced to  withdraw in mid-June 1992,  after  intense
resistance by local  Muslims an Croats,  organised around the Croatian Defence
Council (HVO: Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane) (CIA 2002, Vol. I, p.154),  jeopardising
the trategic goal of  creating a border on the River Neretva, that crosses the city;
• the goal of  establishing a defensible corridor linking Semberija in the north-east to
the Bosnian Krajina in the north-west of  Bosnia, was successful, but required a
sustained effort, and this theatre remained a potential choking point;
• and in the region of  the Drina valley three Muslim enclaves, Srebrenica, Žepa, and
Goražde resisted the onslaught of  the Serb forces.
Already in July, the Serb leadership was forced to declare the general mobilisation of  men
of  military age, a measure that they were aware to be unpopular and likely to be met with
resistance. In the meantime, the Bosnian Serb authorities began making moves to  transfer
the parallel structures created by the SDS before the war into the new state apparatus,
which included bringing paramilitary groups under unified control under the new army, in
a move to centralise power and (Nielsen 2011:110).
It was at this point that the Serb Assembly moved to change the name of  their para-
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state, in a session dedicated to the definition of  state symbols, including also the anthem,
coat of  arms, and official  language.  The urgency in defining the symbolic dimension of
statehood seems to have been justified by the beginning of  the International Conference for
the Former Yugoslavia, in London two weeks later (26 August 1992).  Deputies proposed
and  discussed  half  a  dozen  names,  reaching  a  consensus  when  one  of  the  deputies
proposed to simply drop the name Bosnia-Herzegovina from the existing name of  'Serb
Republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina',  a proposal  ostensibly justified with the argument that
“Bosnia is now another country” (RS Assembly 1992b:34). I should stress the importance of  this
decision. The introduction of  the name 'Republika Srpska'  signalled the definitive shift
from the goal  of  defending  the Serb people in  Bosnia-Herzegovina  from the threat  of
'extremists',  to the creation of  a new homeland for the Bosnian Serbs. The creation of
Republika Srpska as the homeland of  Bosnian Serbs required to an important extent the
abandonment of  previous forms of  attachment, sense of  belonging to place, and regional
identities. The adoption of  the name 'Republika Srpska' marked the definitive departure
from the traditional view of  Bosnia-Herzegovina as the homeland of  Bosnian Serbs (Garde
2004:218).
Embittered – despite controlling 70% of  Bosnia's territory (Klemenčić 1994:46) –
by the resistance Serb forces were facing on the ground (Hoare 2004:70-73), and with the
reputation of  their  cause in international  public  opinion damaged by the discovery by
foreign  journalists  of  concentration  camps  with  conditions  reminiscent  of  the  Second
World War Nazi camps (Gutman1993; Campbell 1999), from then on Bosnian Serb leaders
referred to Bosnia-Herzegovina only as 'former Bosnia' (bivša Bosna)  or 'so-called Bosnia'
(takozvana Bosna), as if  Bosnia no longer existed. This was a statement against the  shared
past, which corresponded to the culmination of  the 'othering process' that had begun two
years  earlier  with  the  portrayal  of  Muslims  as  good  neighbours  and  essentially  'good
natured' (Maksić 2017:181). Whilst on the ground cultural heritage pertaining to Islam and
Catholicism, and to the historical presence of  Muslims and Croats was being destroyed
(Riedlemeyer 2002; Walasek 2015), Bosnian Serb leaders systematically degraded Bosnian
Muslim identity in public statements, rejecting the idea that they formed a proper nation.
Karadžić and Mladić began referring to them as 'Turks' (Maksić 2017: 246), thus as alien
usurpers and oppressors; and Vice-President Biljana Plavšić mobilised her authority as a
geneticist and biology professor, to add an eugenistic overtone to the widespread belief,
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among Serb nationalists, that Muslims were in fact the descendants of  Serbs who converted
into Islam, reportedly insinuating that “it was genetically deformed material that embraced
Islam”(Svet, 6/09/1993, cited by Inić1997; see also Subotić 2012 ). 
It was also around this time, with the expulsion of  non-Serbs from the Drina Valley
and the Prijedor area largely concluded, that the idea that Republika Srpska should include
no more than five percent of  non-Serbs began to be publicly articulated (Donia 2012:39).
In the earlier phase, between April and August 1992, the question of  non-Serbs living in
majority Serb areas safely under SDS control since the 1990 elections, had been left open,
to  be  tackled  by  the  local  SDS structures.  The importance  of  the  local  expression of
ideological factors in determining the particular ways this question was dealt with is clear.
On the one hand, in places like the Romanija region, a rural area dotted with small towns,
local SDS activists saw the expulsion of  non-Serbs, overwhelmingly Muslim, as a priority
(Vuksanović 2004). On the other hand, significant numbers of  non-Serbs continued to live
in urban centres like Trebinje (Helsinki Watch 1994, Bijeljina (Humanitarian Law Fund
1993; 1993a; Amnesty 1994; HR W2000)  and Banja Luka  (Galijaš 2009; Humanitarian
Law Fund 1993). In this liminal stage of  transformation of  Serb identity, they became a
source of  pollution threatening the purity of  Serb identity, but remained useful as human
resources to be exploited as part of  the war effort (see Ch.5). Their fate was eventually
determined by the prospect of  a peace settlement, which motivated the SDS party-state to
create 'facts on the ground' so as to make it as hard as possible to reverse in peacetime what
had  been  achieved  during  the  war;  the  ethnic  homogeneisation  of  the  territory  of
Republika Srpska. 
3.2 The city of  Bijeljina: historical development and ethnic relations
Strategically located on the border with Serbia, along the corridor linking to northwest
Bosnia and the  'Republic of  the Serbian Krajina' – the Serb held territories in Croatia –
the city of  Bijeljina was the first to be militarily taken over by Serb forces, on 1 April 1992.
It was also the stage of  the first episode of  mass atrocity on Bosnian territory after the
disintegration of  Yugoslavia. So as to provide a contextual background for the following
chapters, in this section I will briefly describe Bijeljina's historical development until the eve
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of  the war, and its urban environment, as conveyed to me by some of  my informants,
before proceding to describe the massacre of  Bijeljina on 1-3 April 1992.
Bijeljina through History
Now the second largest  city in Republika Srpska,  and the fifth in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bijeljina's  historical  development  was  mostly  determined  by  two  factors:  its  strategic
position as a border town; and the quality of  the land in the plain of  Semberija.  The two
factors,  which  throughout  history  influenced  successive  waves  of  migration,  were  also
decisive in shaping the process of  ethnic cleansing in 1992-1995.
References to Bijeljina date as far back as the 15 th century13; in 1521, Bijeljina came
under Ottoman rule, and was Islamised over the following three decades. The first mosque,
named after the ruling Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent opened in 1566, and in 1580
Bijeljina gained the status of  'kasaba', which under Ottomon law defined it as an urban
settlement. A long period of  peace followed, but as the Ottoman Empire began reciding, in
1688 the  town was  occupied by  the Austrian  Empire,  until  1699.  A second period of
occupation occurred between 1716 and 1739, when it returned to Ottoman rule. In 1716,
the Austrian offensive resulted in the destruction of  Bijeljina, which the Austrians began
rebuilding  a  few  years  later.  It  was  at  this  time,  according  to  the  historian  Mustafa
Grabčanović (2006:35), that the first Orthodox Christian families began settling in town,
where  some  Muslim  families  who  had  survived  the  1716  destruction  still  lived.  After
Bijeljina returned once again to Ottoman rule, several Muslim families also ressetled there,
coming  from  Hungary  (Grabčanović  (2006:36).  Thanks  to  the  fertility  of  the  land,
Grabčanović  (2006:37)  notes,  “the  town  progressively  became  known  as  one  of  the
strongest centres of  the feudal aristocracy in Bosnia”. 
The dawn of  the Serbian state in the 19th century had a strong impact in Semberija.
The emerging model of  the nation-state influenced the crystallisation of  difference as based
on ethnicity or nationality, where before they were based on religion, under the Ottoman
millet  system,  and  on  class  (see  Hoare  2007:  50-76;  Bieber  2000).  In  Semberija,  the
13 This historical background is based mostly on the historian Mustafa Grabčanović (2006) posthumous 
book, Bijeljina I bijeljinci. The author died in 1990. 
103
overwhelming majority of  peasants were Orthodox Christians, while Muslims comprised
the  bulk  of  the  urban population,  including  wealthy  land owners,  but  also  craftsmen.
During the Serbian Uprisings of  1804-1813, and 1815-1817, a number of  local  villagers
became engaged on the Serbian side, while Ottoman forces used Bijeljina as a bridgehead
to fight the uprising, mobilising also local Muslims (Grabčanović 2006:43). The same trend
occurred during  the 1875-1878 Bosnian Uprising,  which resulted in  the  occupation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, following the 1878 Congress of  Berlin.
The 19th Century witnessed significant population movements in Semberija. Even
before the Austrian occupation, the development of  the town began attracting Christians
and Muslims from other regions of  Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro (Grabčanović 1986)
and, from the mid-century onwards, also Sefardic Jews, arriving via Skopje and Sarajevo
(Lukić  2012:98).  Most  significant  in  terms  of  numbers  was  the  mass  resettlement  in
Semberija of  Muslims from Serbia, mostly in two waves, the first in 1833, and the second
in  1868.  They  resettled  mostly  in  the  village  of  Janja,  which  thus  grew exponentially
(Nurkić 2010:30-32; Grabčanović 2006:41), and developed as a separate community, with
its  own administration.  With  Austrian  rule,  there  was  a  significant  exodus  of  Bosnian
Muslims towards  Anatolia,  offset  by  the arrival  of  Germans,  Slovaks,  Hungarians  and
Askenazi Jews, adding to Bijeljina's diversity, both in ethnic terms and in social-economic
terms (Grabčanović 2006:46). The proportion of  Serbs in town also grew, benefiting from
the  expansion  of  education,  with  the  opening  of  new  schools,  and  the  employment
opportunities  it  opened  up.  Urbanism  greatly  developed  during  Austrian  rule,  with
Bijeljina's population expanding, and the construction of  modern infrastructure; schools;
churches catering for the different Christian confessions, Orthodoxes, Catholics, Lutherans,
and  Baptists;  a  sinagogue  and  new  mosques  (Grabčanović  2006).  There  was  also  an
explosion of  cultural activism, with the foundation of  cultural societies, usually on the basis
of  ethnicity (Trbić 2015). Thus Bijeljina gained a somehow cosmopolitan character, while
the population developed a sense of  ethnicity on the basis of  religious distinction (Bieber
2000:21). But much of  the ethnic and religious diversity that characterised Bijeljina since
the ninetheen century was destroyed in the Second World War, during which Bijeljina's
Jews were arrested and sent to extermination camps (Grabčanović 2006), and the German
community of  Franz Josefsfeld (now called Novo Selo) was forcefully transferred by the
Nazis to colonise their eastern 'lebensraum' in occupied Poland; most of  the few Germans
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that remained were executed by the partisans in 1945 after the liberation (Komisija za
očuvanje nacionalnih spomenika 2014:12).  
Among  Muslims,  the  emergence  of  ethnicity  as  a  factor  of  identity  created  a
dilemma as, on the one hand, Muslim identity was traditionally based on the feeling of
belonging to a universal community of  believers, the umma; and on the other hand Bosnian
Muslims shared with the other confessions a sense of  belonging to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a
discrete  territory.  Nineteenth  century  Serbian and  Croatian  nationalists  were   keen  to
'recruit' the Bosnian Muslims into their respective nations (Hajdarpašić 2015:121), while
the Austrian occupiers developed a nationhood policy towards the development of  an all-
encompassing  notion  of  Bosnian  national  identity  known  as  'Bošnjaštvo'  (Bosnianism14).
Based a common sense of  belonging, the idea of  'Bošnjaštvo'  sought to transcend religious
differences, but it was abandoned around 1909, some twenty years after it first emerged,
and  one  year  after  Austria-Hungary  annexed  Bosnia-Herzegovina  (see  Imamović
1997:373-383; Bougarel 2008: 4). 
The  political  circumstances  introduced  an  element  of  liminality  into  Bosnian
Muslim identity.  In  his  study  of  nationalism in  19 th century  Bosnia,  Edin  Hajdarpašić
(2015:16)  describes  the Serb nationalist  perspective over  Bosnian Muslims as  that  of  a
“(br)other”,  “neither  brother  nor  other”,  capturing  with  this  game  of  words  the
incongruence of  a perspective which simultaneously portrayed Muslims in 'othering' terms,
and recognised a certain closeness, an intimacy based on largely shared lived experiences.
Many Bosnian Muslims responded to the loss of  their priviledged position by emigrating to
Anatolia, but after some initial resistance, the Bosnian Muslim elite accepted Austrian rule,
and accommodated themselves to it, thus seeking shelter in a large multinational empire
against the pressure of  the nation-state model. The collapse of  the Austrian-Hungarian
empire in the end of  the First World War, and the creation of  the Kingdom of  the Serbs,
Croats  and  Slovenes  led,  according  to  Xavier  Bougarel  (2003:102)  to  strong  pressures
towards  the assimilation of  Bosnian Muslims either  to  the Serbian or  to  the Croatian
nation. This coincided with an identity crisis among the Muslim elite, deepened a few years
later with the  abolition of  the Caliphate, in 1924 (see Karić 2002). Among secularised
14 As translated by Xavier Bougarel (2003:103).
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Muslims,  this  pressure  resulted  in  a  division  between  pro-Serb and  pro-Croat  factions
(Bougarel  2003:102),  but  the  Bosnian  Muslim  elite  nevertheless  found  in  the  idea  of
Yugoslavism a way of  countering this dual pressure. The approach of  its main political
party,  the  Yugoslav  Muslim  Organisation  (JMO:  Jugoslovenska  muslimanska  organizacija),
towards  the  national  question  was  marked,  Bougarel  (2003:103)  argues,  by  “tactical
Yugoslavism  and  a  lack  of  national  determination  as  two  complementary  ways  of
“preserving  a  Bosnian  Muslim  identity”.  Its  political  strategy  was  thus  one  of
“accomodation with the new order” (Hoare 2007:107) given their vulnerable position, so as
to preserve some level of  autonomy for Bosnia-Herzegovina.
A crucial aspect in the Muslims' vulnerability was the pressure from Serb peasants
towards agrarian reform. This pressure was keenly felt in Bijeljina, where the first Serb
forces entering town after the collapse of  the Austrian-Hungarian army “were received as
liberators”,  Grabčanović(2006:50)  notes,  “but  only  by  the  Orthodox  population”.  The
prospect  of  agrarian  reform led  to  great  unrest  in  Semberija,  with  many  episodes  of
violence in Semberija, where the peasants now refused to pay their landlords, and often
attacked them and their  property,  spreading fear  among Muslims (Užičanin 2012:180),
both among wealthy landowners and modest farmers. The agrarian reform resulted, Hoare
argues (2007:108) “in a massive transfer of  economic power away from the Muslims and in
favour of  the Serbs”. Grabčanović notes, however, that in Semberija the expectations of
prosperity  of  the  Serb  peasants  quickly  turned into  disappointment  (2006:52-53).  The
difficult  economic  conditions  of  the  inter-war  period  severely  affected  Semberija's
peasantry,  while  Bijeljina  prospered  as  a  commercial  centre,  dealing  with  agricultural
produce, above all cereals. This led to the disinfranchisement of  the peasantry from the
regime, and, Grabčanović argues, was an important factor in the sucess of  the Communist
party in the region, and in the mobilisation towards the partisan movement in the Second
World War. It  wasn't only the peasant masses that became alienated from the interwar
regime. The Bosnian Muslim elite abandoned the tactical commitment to Yugoslavism in
1939, when the  Cvetković-Maček Agreement15 handed parts of  Bosnia-Herzegovina to the
newly  created  Croatian  banovina.  Leaving  behind  pro-Serb  or  pro-Croat  leanings,  the
Muslim elite went on to found the Movement for the Autonomy of  Bosnia-Herzegovina;
15 Named after the Prime-Minister of  Yugoslavia Dragiša Cvetković and the leader  of  the Croatian Peasant
Party, Vlado Maček, the Agreement created a Croatian autonomous territory, named banovina, which 
was to include part of  Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hoare 2007:131)
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Bougarel(2003:104) marks this initiative as “the first organised manifestation of  a nascent
Muslim nationalism”.
During the Second World War, after Bosnia-Herzegovina became part of  the fascist
'Independent  State  of  Croatia',  the  Ustasha  regime sought  to  coopt  Bosnian Muslims,
whilst  engaging in a  genocidal  persecution of  Serbs,  Jews and Roma. In Bijeljina,  “all
notable  Serbs,  especially  priests  and well-known patriots  were  arrested  and deported”,
(Grabčanović 2006:58), which pushed many people to join the Uprising of  27 th July 1941,
which marked the  beginning  of  the  partisan  movement.  The Ustasha  regime and the
German  occupiers,  meanwhile,  were  able  to  mobilise  part  of  the  Muslim  elite  to
collaborate. The most notorious aspect of  this collaboration, which became imprinted in
the collective memory of  the Second World War in Bosnia, was the creation, in 1943, of
the  13th SS  Volunteer  Bosnian-Herzegovinian  Division  (Croatia),  known  as  'Handžar'
division (lit.  sabre)  (see Hoare 2013:53-54).  The Handžar division was deployed in the
operation to take back Bijeljina, in April 1944, after the partisans first liberated the city in
25 September 1943 (Grabčanović 2006:67).
While during the interwar period, Bijeljina's Muslims seemed to lean towards Serb
identity16, the local elite collaborated with the Ustasha in the administration. Collaboration
was motivated, Hoare (2013) argues, by the autonomist stance of  the Bosnian Muslim elite.
The  will  to  preserve  Bosnia's  autonomy  was  explicit  in  the  Bijeljina  Resolution  of  2
December 1941,  in  which,  following similar  initiatives  in  other  cities17,  an assembly of
seventy five local Muslim notables, including the leader of  the council, Muratbeg Pašić,
and the  local  Imams,  approved and undersigned a  document  demanding the  Ustasha
regime to stop the persecution and bloodshed against  Serbs (Grabčanović  1989; Hoare
2013:44-45), which was then sent to the leader of  the Independent State of  Croatia, Ante
Pavelić.  The  persecution  of  Serbs  by  the  Ustasha  had  started  immediately  after  the
occupation,  with  the arrest  and deportation of  “all  respected (viđeni)  Serbs,  especially
priests  and notable  patriots  (rodoljubi)”  (Grabčanović  2006:58).  Grabčanović  notes  the
timing of  the Resolution, describing it as a reaction to the Chetnik massacre of  the Muslim
inhabitants of  the village of  Koraj, in the Mount Majevica, and in opposition to possible
16 As inferred by the creation, in 1905 of  a local section of  the Muslim cultural society Gajret(Trbić 2015),  
which Bougarel (2003:103) and Hoare (2013: 41 refer to be pro-Serb; the pro-Croat counterpart Narodna 
uzaladnica, was not present in Bijeljina, where Croat presence was not significant.
17 These were Prijedor (23/09/1941); Sarajevo(12/10/1941),  Mostar(21/10/1941), Banja Luka(12/11/1941),
and Tuzla(11/12/1941).
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reprisals against the Serb population by Ustasha forces; indeed, Grabčanović adds, Pavelić's
commisioner for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the pro-Croat Muslim politician Hakija Hadžić was
pushing for such reprisals,  proposing the execution of  ten Serbs for each Muslim killed
(Grabčanović 2006: 65; see also Hoare 2013: 43). Grabčanović attributes the fact that the
local  Orthodox  church  was  spared  destruction  to  Muslim  notables'  opposition;  the
Sinagogue, however, was razed to the ground. Muslim notables were particularly successful
in protecting the community of  nominally Muslim Roma, known at the time as 'white
gipsies',  which  the  Ustasha  regime  had  targetted  for  extermination  (Hoare  2013:45).
Thanks to it Bijeljina retained a significant Roma population, considered to be one of  the
largest in Yugoslavia; but the small Jewish community was completely wiped out, and very
little trace of  them was left. 
The Partisans had a solid base in the region, attracting to its ranks not only Serb
peasants, but also Muslims, mostly but not exclusively from the working class. The history
of  the Partisan movement in Semberija  was  marked by the attempts,  led by Rodoljub
Čolaković and Dr. Vojislav Kecmanović 'Đedo' to bring together Chetniks and partisans
(Hoare 2006: 113; Grabčanović  2006:230).  The two movements initially cooperated, to
more effectively fight the Ustasha (Grabčanović 2006:59), but this came to an abrupt end
when Chetnik forces attacked the First Majevička partisan division in Mount Majevica,  on
20 February 1942, in which two of  the most prominent local partisan leaders, Fadil Jahić
'Španac' and Ivan Marković 'Irac' were killed (Grabčanović 2006:59). The partisans and
the  Chetniks  fought  each  other  in  an  intense  civil  war,  whose  legacy  many  of  my
informants during fieldwork described as enduring up until the present day (see also Ch. 3).
After the partisans liberated the city in 1943, local Chetnik forces actively collaborated with
the German Army to take the city back. Bijeljina was finally liberated in 25 September
1944; Čolaković became the first prime-minister of  the newly-created People's Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kecmanović 'Đedo' the first President of  the Bosnian Presidency
(Hoare 2007:317). 
Post-war Bijeljina quickly recovered its prosperity, and the city grew, in line with the
wider  urbanisation  process  taking  place  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The  region  greatly
developed, due, on the one hand, to advances in agriculture towards greater productivity,
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and  the  introduction  of  new  species  of  vegetables;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  to
industrialisation (see Grabčanović 2006:77-130). As the urbanisation process gained pace,
the proportion of  Serbs from the surrounding villages moving to Bijeljina increased further;
the influx of  rural  population also included Muslims from other regions,  especially the
Drina valley, as many villages were flooded due to the construction of  a large dam further
south. Bijeljina's  prosperity  also  attracted  a  number  of  Albanians  from  Kosovo,  who
immigrated to the region.
The  general  sense  of  optimism  that  characterised  the  post-war  stimulated  the
flourishing of  a distinctively urban environment, marked by easy access to culture. The
relative proximity with the cities of  Belgrade and Novi Sad in Serbia countered a certain
provinciality, while the integration between rural Semberija and urban Bijeljina gave its
residents a confortable quality of  life. Many families retained some connection with the
surrounding villages, and industrialisation, which generated thousands of  jobs, brought to
town workers from the villages every day, thus reinforcing the complementarity between
rural and urban life. 
My informants remember a town where, before 1992, it was pleasant to live, and
where ethnicity was not a salient factor of  identity. While such memories are tinged with a
certain level of  nostalgia, this portrayal appears to be consensual, and is in line with the
wider characterisation of  life in Bosnian cities during communist rule (see Gagnon 2004).
Marriage between persons pertaining to different religions and ethnic groups – so
called  mixed  marriages  –  were  common,  as  secularisation  reduced  the  significance  of
religion based differences. Among my informants four who were in mixed marriages. One
was a young couple, one a couple already in their early seventies, and two were in their
fifties. While the young couple paid a heavy price for their relationship, when they became
a couple a few years ago – they were largely ostracised by their respective families – nothing
of  the sort happened to any of  the other couples when they married decades ago.
Regardless of  the secular character of  the communist regime, religion maintained
an important  role  in  the  Bosnian  traditions  of  'life  in  common'.  The commemorative
calendars  of  each  confession  offered  an  opportunity  for  expressions  of  tolerance  and
peaceful coexistence. Thus, one of  my informants noted, the feast of  the Orthodox saint
Pantelejmon – Pantelino, on 9 August was the occasion of  Bijeljina's annual feast, even
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though the town had a Muslim majority18:
“It is important that I tell you – Sanela, another of  my informants in a mixed marriage,
told me – that even before the war Bijeljina had its  slava, Pantelino, on 9 August.  It  was our
tradition, it didn't matter that the majority of  the inhabitants were Muslims; we all went out, without
any distinction. People got together, they mixed, and there were lots of  mixed couples; we acted as
kumovi to each other, members of  one group and the other. And the youth got together. In the korzo you
couldn't feel any tension, national, etc”19
 Another important occasion was the celebration of  Christmas according to the Catholic
calendar.  The Catholic  community  in  Bijeljina  was  small,  perhaps  no  more  than  one
thousand people,  but ethnically diverse,  with Croats,  Albanians,  a  few Hungarians and
Germans and there was only one church, built  in the 19 th century by Hungarians. But
Christimas was nevertheless an important ritual in the tradition of  'life in common': 
“It was a big event – Saša Pazarac told me – I told you my mother was a catholic. The
church was full, and the courtyard, and the street outside. And in the front row, there
was the  Imams and the Orthodox priests.  Many non-Catholics,  including atheists,
attended the ponoćka ( the Midnight Mass on 25th December)”20
The relative proximity to Belgrade generated a great deal of  attraction. Political
events  in  Serbian territory  never  failed to  engage local  people  in  Semberija,  from the
Serbian uprisings in the 19th century to the rise and fall of  Miloševič in the late 20th century.
The dynamism of  social and cultural life was a magnet to the most educated throughout
the  generations.  But  despite  this  attraction,  Semberians  retained  a  distinctive  sense  of
regional identity, beyond ethnicity, often describing themselves as 'mild people' ( blagi). The
perception  of  the  possibility  of  a  good  life  there  contributed  to  a  particular  sense  of
attachment,  even when, since the early 1980s,  the effects  of  economic crisis  and, later,
18 This was in line with a tradition of  syncretism in Bosnian Islam, which incorporated many elements of  
the people's pre-Islamic heritage. certain Christian holidays were traditionally celebrated by rural Muslim
communities,  since the Islamic calendar is unsuitable to mark the passage of  the seasons, given that it is a
lunar, rather than solar calendar (Lockwood 1975; Hadžijahić 1978; Bringa 1995:189-195)
19 Interviewed in June 2014
20 Interviewed in September 2014
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political turmoil, became harder to ignore. 
Bijeljina after communism, 1990-1992
In  1990,  when Bosnia  abandoned the single  party  system,  the Serb  Democratic  Party
(Srpska Demokratska Stranka:SDS) won the elections and came to dominate Semberija,
where  Serbs  comprised  an  absolute  majority.  The  party  was  strongly  implanted  in
Semberija,  where  local  Serbs  had  previously  founded  their  own  party,  the  Party  for
Democratic Unity in May 1990 (Simić 2013:1), two months before the creation of  the SDS.
The party  was  then absorbed by the SDS, but  local  politicians  retained their  sense of
autonomy, aware as they were of  representing an important asset to the Serb nationalist
cause in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
My informants recalled how they noticed that the dynamics was changing,  with
regard  to  inter-ethnic  relations,  in  the  eve  of  the  1990  elections,  while  previously
individuals' ethnic identity was not an important issue in social relations. Ethnicity seems to
have suddenly become salient, as the main political parties, the SDA and the SDS (Croats
being in very small number, the HDZ played no role in Semberija) sucessfully mobilised a
politicised sense of  ethnicity (see Maksić 2017). Avoiding confrontations, the two parties
presented  themselves  as  like-minded  in  the  goal  of  'destroying  communism'  (sru šiti
komunizam). When the elections gave the SDS absolute control over local government, the
party gave SDA members a few posts in the local administration (Simić 2013:2), as part of
an  understanding  between  both  parties  to  work  together.  As  the  general  environment
deteriorated  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  tensions  began  to  arise  in  Bijeljina.  SDS  activists
blame the SDA, and Muslims more generally for this, evoking the case of  the strike at the
metal factory Mensur Mujkić (renamed Elvako), and the fact that once the war in Croatia
started, many Muslims refused the JNA mobilisation orders, or later abandoned their units
(see the Witness statements of  Cvijetin Simić (2013) and Svetozar Mihajlović (2013) at the
ICTY trial of  Radovan Karadžić, which both attended as defence witnesses). 
The  newspaper  'Semberske  novine',  which  during  this  period  maintained  an
independent editorial line, offers a few glimpses of  how the environment was changing. An
issue that seems to have caused great concern was that of  'regionalisation' (e.g. Vučković
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1991)  as  the  SDS  moved  to  create  a  'community  of  municipalities'  bringing  together
Bijeljina, Ugljevik and Lopare, and which corresponded to the party's tactic of  creating
paralel  structures  on  the  ground  (see  Maksić  2017:139).  On  19  September  1991  this
community  of  municipalities  became  the  Serbian  Autonomous  Region  (SAO:  Srpski
autonomski  oblast)  of  Northeast  Bosnia  (later  renamed  SAO  Semberija  and  Majevica),
stretching  southwards from the plains of  Semberija along the river Drina and to the west
towards  the  Majevica  mountain  range.  The  SDA,  in  turn,  reacted  by  demanding  a
referendum to create a separate municipality (opština) covering the town of  Bijeljina and
Janja, where Muslims formed a majority (Nikolić 1991b). Both political parties, thus, were
fully invested in the ethnicisation of  the territory, at a time when the war in Croatia was
already in full swing. 
In formal interviews, I always asked when was it that they first felt the environment
was changing, and when did they realise, if  they ever did, that there was going to be a war.
Usually, my respondents were unable to pinpoint one particular moment, noting instead
that  people  were  changing,  that  ethnicity  had  become  salient  and  that  mistrust  was
insidiously setting in. 
As for whether there was going to be a war, a few of  my respondents stated that
they clearly saw what was coming, and decided to leave the country, or to send their sons
away, bearing in mind that since the beginning of  the war in Croatia the JNA and the local
autorities were drafting men of  military age to join the war effort. This was the case with
Branko Todorović, the President of  the Helsinki Committee:
“I could see it coming, and I started telling people about my fears – he worked
as a teacher then – and nobody seemed to take me seriously” 
Todorović left Bosnia before the war. He was engaged in civic activism throughout the war
years, and returned to Bijeljina in 1996 to establish, along with Duško Kondor and Saša
Pazarac – neither of  whom had participated in the military – the Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights in Republika Srpska.
Most, however, reported how they were caught in a state of  denial and refused to
consider such a possibility. Saša Pazarac was particularly emphatic: 
“We could hear  the  explosions  in  Vukovar,  and feel  the  earth  trembling when JNA bombed  [the
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Croatian town of  Vukovar, located 80 km North of  Bijeljina, was practically razed to
the ground as the besieging JNA bombed it; its destruction was retrospectively seen as
a warning of  things to come in Bosnia]. And still, we refused to believe”
Me: “When did you think there was going to be a war?”
Saša: “Never. I could see things we're not going well, but I never thought there was going to be a war”
Eventually,  rumours  began  to  spread  in  Bijeljina  about  armed  militias  being
formed, adding to the tensions. Such rumours found their way into the Serbian media,
some of  my  informants  pointed  out,  referring  in  specific  to  the  case  of  the  Belgrade
newspaper  Politika  ekspres,  which,  they  said,  published  an  article  claiming  that  a  new
'Handžar  division'  of  Islamic  fundamentalists  was  being  formed  in  Semberija21.  Idris
Hujdurović,  a partisan veteran whose father had been executed by the Ustasha regime,
described  to  me  how he  brought  the  subject  to  discussion  in  a  meeting  of  the  local
SUBNOR22, the veterans' association:
“I stood up and said: 'we are hearing these rumours about a new Handžar division. As
veterans  of  the  NOB, is  is  our  duty to  investigate  these  rumours.  I  would  like  to
propose that the SUBNOR creates a commission to investigate this'.  But the Serb
veterans remained in silence.”
 Hujdurović  thus realised then how far nationalism had already penetrated23.  Once the
local media outlets, the newspaper 'Semberske novine' and Radio Bijeljina, were brought
into  the  control  of  the  SDS  in  February  1992,  similar  rumours  gained  much  wider
resonance. The new director, Pero Simić,  is  said to have twice interviewed the Serbian
warlord Željko Ražnatović, known as 'Arkan', who became notorious for the involvement
of  his paramilitary unit, the 'Serbian Volunteer Guard' (Srpska dobrovoljačka garda) in the war
in Croatia (see ICTY 2016:233-5; Čolović  2000; Thomas 1999:94-95). Arkan's  visits  to
Bijeljina, some informants said, caused apprehension even among those who refused to
believe anything bad could happen. 
21 As referred in interviews and informal conversations.
22 SUBNOR is the acronym of  Savez udruženja boraca Narodnooslobodilačkog rata, literally the Council 
of  Fighters of  the People's Liberation War.
23 Interview, November 2014
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The military takeover, April 1992
Bijeljina was the first town to be taken over by Serb military forces, on the 1 st of  April 1992,
one week before the events in Sarajevo that came to define the beginning of  the Bosnian
war. Bijeljina then became a bridgehead to military expansion towards southeast Bosnia
through the  Drina  Valley,  as  well  as  to  the attack  against  the  town of  Brcko and the
'Operation corridor',  which connected Semberija and eastern Bosnia to Serb-controlled
territory in the Bosnian Krajina region, in the northwest of  Bosnia (CIA 2002:140; 145).
Relatively far from the front lines, and just a few kilometres from Serbia, Bijeljina became
the major centre of  Republika Srpska's wartime economy, a safe haven to Serb refugees
displaced from other areas, and an important supplier of  personnel for the army. 
The take-over of  Bijeljina represented the prelude to the Bosnian war. Action was
triggered by an incident that occurred in the town's centre on the 31st of  March, between
activists of  the SDA and members of  the Chetnik Movement, the paramilitary force of  the
Serb Radical  Party (Srpska radikalna stranka:  SRS).  I  have heard the story from different
sources with very little variation, and some of  its participants have told it themselves at the
trials of  Slobodan Milošević Vojislav Šešelj, and Radovan Karadžić, among others, at the
ICTY. On Tito's Street (now Karadjordje street), near the central bus station, there were
two cafés (kafane) within fifty meters of  each other. The café 'Srbija'(Serbia) was owned by
Mirko Blagojević, an ex-boxer who had become the local leader of  the Serbian Radical
Party  (Srpska  radikalna  stranka:  SRS)  of  Vojislav  Šešelj.  Blagojević  was  also  the
commandant of  the local branch of  the SRS's para-military force, the 'Chetniks', which
claimed direct continuity with the Second World War movement. The café was a gathering
point for members and sympathisers of  the party, and it was common to see armed men in
camouflage uniforms there. The other café, called 'Istanbul', was frequented by Muslims,
and had become a gathering point for sympathisers of  the SDA. In the late afternoon, Alija
Gušalić, a Muslim man, set off  on a horse from the Café Istanbul to the café Serbia with
the intention to throw a hand grenade there. Mirko Blagojević shot at Gušalić, wounding
him on the leg. A confrontation followed between the two groups but nobody else was
reportedly  wounded.  Amidst  the  confusion,  Gušalić  was  taken  to  hospital,  where  he
remained interned (see ICTY 2016:232; Simić 2013; Mihajlović 2013). 
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The timing of  this particular incident was such that it provided the perfect trigger
for the military takeover. Bosniaks attach great significance to the coincidence of  the take-
over with the first day of  Bajram (Eid), the most important religious festival in the Muslim
calendar,  but, regardless  of  the importance of  the date's  symbolism, there was another
coincidence with greater practical implications. A similar incident had happened some days
earlier, when a Serb man,  Aleksandar Zekić, threw a grenade against the Café Istanbul.
The police had dealt with it adequately, arresting the man, then sending him to detention
in Tuzla,  following the normal  judicial  procedures  (Simić  2013;  ICTY 2016:232).  The
incident that triggered the take-over, however, happened on the very day when the creation
of  a  Bosnian Serb Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  was  announced (Nielsen 2011:3)  –  an
important step towards the Serb rebellion that would soon engulf  Bosnia in war. The local
police immediately severed its contact with the Security Service Centre of  Tuzla, to which
it had been subordinate (Nielsen 2011:62-63). The police seems not to have intervened in
the incident involving Gušalić and Blagojević.
In the morning following the incident,  just  before dawn, the 'Serbian Volunteer
Guard', better known as 'Arkan's men' (arkanovci), or 'Arkan's Tigers', were taking over the
town of  Bijeljina, having earlier crossed the River Drina from Serbia. Working with the
arkanovci were also the local Chetniks of  Mirko Blagojević, and the Territorial Defence unit,
let by the SDS member Ljubiša Savić, who was to become known as Major Mauzer. JNA
units  surrounded the town,  but  did not  play an active  role in the takeover  (see ICTY
2016:232-234).
Radio Bijeljina,  already under control of  the SDS, broadcasted that the town was
under attack by Islamic extremists, creating a wave of  panic. Many people, regardless of
ethnicity,  immediately  fled to  the  surrounding  villages,  whilst  others  hid  in  basements.
Some residents erected  barricades blocking access to their neighbourhoods, which were
later shown as evidence of  the Muslim extremists' alleged plot. In our interview, Cvijetin
Simić, President of  the Municipal Assembly at the time,  placed great emphasis on this
point: “I came from Velika Obarska [a village in the outskirts of  Bijeljina to the north] early in
the morning, and there was a barricade”. “Were they Muslims or Serbs?”, I asked. “Muslims”. He
went on to enumerate other locations where Muslims had erected barricades. 
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There were indeed barricades in Bijeljina, other informants confirm, “but they were
improvised, with rubbish bins, things like that, because people didn't know what was going on, and they
were scared”, told me Siniša24, who, by virtue of  his job, was able to gain a deeper level of
insight about what was going on in town than most people. “And there were both Serbs and
Muslims in those barricades, because they shared the same fears”. It is not clear how much or how
little resistance those behind the barricades offered.
Broadcasting live, Radio Bijeljina described intense fighting between the  arkanovci
and the 'Islamic extremists'; the reports' credibility was reinforced by the sound of  shooting
and explosions in the streets. “It was all a lie, a pure lie (čista laž)”, said one my respondents,
Lazar Manojlović. One of  my informants, Saša Pazarac, lived on the eight floor of  one of
the 'skyscrapers' (neboderi) in front of  the main square. “I heard Pero Simić [the director of
Radio Bijeljina, who was broadcasting live] describing violent combats on the square, but I could see
the 'arkanovci' from my window, sunbathing on the terrace of  the department store (robna kuća)”. Siniša
was similarly graphic, appealing to my sense of  observation: “When you go around Bosnia, you
see  buildings damaged by combat, bomb shells, bullet holes. In Bijeljina, you see none of  it, because not
even a window glass was broken, because there were no combats”.
The reports highlighted a particularly fierce fight around the town's hospital, where
allegedly a pocket of  resistance took a few days to defeat. “My husband was a doctor at the
hospital,  and  he  was  working  on  that  day  –  one  of  my  informants  told  me  –  I  can
guarantee you, there were no combats whatsoever”. Jusuf  Trbić, the former director of
Radio Semberija and the newspaper Semberske novine, passed in front of  the hospital on
the way to the centre in the first day of  the take-over. Mirko Blagojević, commandant of
the local Chetnik paramilitary group, had arrested him in his house, and was taking him to
the Crisis Staff.  He saw no signs of  confrontation, but in front of  the hospital, on the
opposite side of  the road, Trbić saw the dead bodies of  the butcher Redjep Šabanović and
his wife Tifa, who appear in one of  the most well known photographs of  the Bosnian war,
taken by the american photographer Ron Haviv.   25. 
The ICTY, however, accepted that some level of  fighting may have taken place. It is
24 Interviewed in January 2015
25 Most of  my interview respondents who were present in Bijeljina in this period took shelter in safe places, 
and thus saw very little of  what was going on. 
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unlikely, however, that they posed much resistance to Arkan's forces, since nobody from
their ranks was reported wonded or killed. On the contrary, the overwhelming majority of
the fatalities were old people and women, as Bosniak activists from Bijeljina, such as Jusuf
Trbić and Emir Musli, who have researched the events are keen to highlight. The ICTY
concurred with this assertion, noting that the wounds did not indicate they were killed in an
exchange of  fire (ICTY 2016: 238, par. 622).
The man Serb nationalists accuse of  being the leader of  the alledged Islamic plot,
Hasan Tirić, soon turned up in Tuzla, where he pleaded for other Semberians to join him
in an effort to liberate Bijeljina; he went on to found a Special Unit within the Patriotic
League, the 'Black Swans' (Crni labudovi), which was eventually integrated in the Army of
the Republic of  Bosnia-Herzegovina(ARBiH) as the 120 th Liberation Brigade 'Black Swans'
(CIA 2002; Hoare 2004: 107). After the takeover, the Public Security Centre of  Bijeljina,
part  of  Republika Srpska's  Interior Ministry, investigated the events of  1-3 April  1992.
Their report focused mostly on the combats that alledgedly took place in the barricade set
in the access to the city's hospital, on the road towards Janja. The report mentioned 31
individuals as killed in combat in that barricade, and presented Tirić as the mastermind
behind the  Muslim plot  (RS MUP 1995).  This  report  was  submitted to  the  ICTY as
evidence by the legal  defence team of  Radovan Karadžić;  in their  veridict,  the judges
dismissed the report as lacking credibility. Since “most of  the dead had been shot in the
chest,  mouth,  temple,  or  back  of  the  head,  some  at  close  range  andthat  the  victims
included women and children and were not wearing uniform”, the Chamber concluded
that “that these individuals were not killed during armed clashes”  (ICTY 2016: 238, par.
622).
The  process  of  ethnic  cleansing  in  Bijeljina  corresponds  to  the  typification
presented earlier in this chapter, based on Gow (2003:18) and Suljagić (2009:107; 142-4)
(see supra).  As for the first step, “preparation and provocation” the takeover was preceded
by an escalation in  ethnic  tensions  and the  distribution of  weapons  to  the population
(including, according to the ICTY Karadžić verdict (2016: 229:606), to Muslims), and an
array of  logistical preparations on the part of  the SDS and Bijeljina's delegation of  the
Ministry of  Interior, with support from Serbia  (2016: 230:607. Following the takeover, a
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number of  detention sites were established, including a large concentration camp in the
village of  Batković (ICTY 2016: 247-258). In what regards “elimination through expulsion
and execution”(Gow 2002:18), this was, as I have previously stated a protracted process,
which the thesis analises in Chapter 5. The 'Criminal Report against Hasan Tirić et.al'(RS
MUP 1995) is part of  what Suljagić (2009:107) has typified as the systematic concealment
and/or  contamination  of  evidence.  The  report  contributed  also  to  “the  post-facto
justification  of  criminal  actions”  (Suljagić  2009:142-144).  by  presenting  the  official
narrative of  Arkan's takeover of  Bijeljina as an act of  liberation. This narrative was first
articulated live by Pero Simić, the new director of  Semberske novine and Radio Bijeljina,
and  elaborated  in  graphic  detail  in  the  first  edition  of  Semberske  novine,  meanwhile
renamed 'SIM novine' (SIM being the acronym of  Semberija i Majevica). The hegemony
of  this  narrative  was  reinforced  with  a  photographic  exhibition  in  the  Museum  of
Semberija in August 1992, with the title “Three days of  war in Bijeljina”(Lazić 2010:8).
Concluding remarks:
Ethnic cleansing was more than a strategy – or a policy – rationally employed towards a
discrete goal, ie, the creation of  an ethnically homogenous territory. As an instrument for
the  transformation of  identity,  ethnic  cleansing  was  an  element  in  a  wider  process  of
regeneration of  Serb identity according to the interpretation of  SDS leadership and its
closest allies. This regeneration of  identity entailed the 'purification' of  society as a whole
during the liminal period through the exclusion of  the 'polluting' elements. 
In the case of  Republika Srpska, while ethnic cleansing targetted non-Serbs, other
purification processes aiming at the regeneration of  identity during the liminal stage of
political transformation were directed towards Serbs themselves, who were prescribed the
new codes of  behaviour to follow in order to become 'proper'  Serbs.  In Chapter 3 we
describe one of  such processes, the erasure and reinscription of  the urban landscape; the
definition of  Republika Srpska's official language provides another example of  this quest
for purity.  Looking towards Serbia as the model to emulate,  and rejecting the Bosnian
component of  their own identity, the Bosnian Serb leadership abandoned the ijekavian
dialect spoken in Bosnia, to adopt the ekavian variant spoken in Serbia proper. Soon after
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the beginning of  the war, all official documents, media reports and political speeches were
using the ekavian variant. Speaking in the ekavian dialect was thus imposed as a patriotic
duty and as a marker of  compliance, to which individuals were to submit. The quest for
purify  Serb identity  can also be inferred from the decision,  taken by the Assembly,  to
abandon the term 'Serbo-Croatian' and officially call the language 'Serbian'. Here, for the
sake of  purity, the Assembly accepted to diverge from Serbia, where the Milošević regime
ostensibly preserved some of  the symbolism of  the SFRY, including its flag and anthem,
and where 'Serbo-Croatian' remained the official name26.
 The  Serbian  Orthodox  Church  was  a  key  actor  in  this  endeavour  for  purity,
especially in the assignment of  new codes of  behaviour people should follow in order to
become 'proper' Serbs, as part of  its engagement in the regeneration of  Serb identity. An
article on the local newspaper SIM novine offers a powerful illustration of  how purification
was  a  crucial  concern.  Entitled  “Guardians  of  Semberija  and  Majevica” 27,  the  article
covers a public ceremony that took place in May 1992, in which Semberija's Territorial
Defense unit, renamed 'Serbian National Guard' (Srpska nacionalna garda) took the oath of
allegiance to  what  was  then the Serb Republic  in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  As part  of  the
ceremony, the  proto Nedeljko Pajić, Bijeljina's parish priest, not only blessed the unit, but
also  its members who had not yet undergone the Holy Sacrament. Relieved of  its 'original
sin', the unit symbolically rejected its previous identity connecting it with the communist
regime,  and embraced its  new identity  as  a  Serb force guided by traditional  Christian
values.  The  unit's  commandant,  Major  Ljubiša  Savić  'Mauzer',  who  the  propaganda
machine glorified as having god-like qualities of  extraordinary courage, vision and self-
righteousness, was the soldiers' godfather (kum), and the model to emulate. 
In  the  minds  of  nationalists,  thus,  Bosnian  Serbs  were  at  the  forefront  of  the
regeneration  of  Serb  identity  after  communism  and  multiethnic  coexistence,  with
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a laboratory where their ideals would gain concrete shape, in the
form of  the creation of  Republika Srpska. In this sense, ethnic cleansing was but one of  the
elements in wider process of  purification through the removal of  'poluting' elements during
the liminal stage, as a necessary pre-condition for regeneration.
26 Stenographs of  the 12th Session of  the Assembly of  the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina Pale 
24/03/1992, English translation, p. 3-7 (check ICTY reference)
27 SIM novine: “Čuvari Semberije I Majevice”, 15/05/92, p. 17
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Chapter 4
The making of  a 'Serb' town: 
Erasure and Reinscription in Bijeljina's Urban Landscape
The war brought deep changes to Bijeljina. What used to be a Muslim-majority town with
a strong tradition of  common life (zajednički život) now fundamentally appears as a 'Serb' town in
which non-Serbs are tolerated but assigned a position of  marginality. This transformation operated at
three different levels: changes in the shared space; persecution of  the Muslim population,
leading eventually  to  mass  expulsions;  and the resettlement  of  a  significant  number of
Serbs displaced from areas of  Bosnia-Herzegovina beyond the control of  Serb forces. 
This  chapter  will  offer  an  analysis  of  the  spatial  dimension  of  the  process  of
construction of  an official memory in what was to become Republika Srpska. It focuses on
how the physical space changed in Bijeljina during and in the immediate aftermath of  the
Bosnian war, through a dual process of  erasure and reinscription of  public memory, in
which  almost  all  mnemonic  elements  in  the  urban  landscape  referring  to  the  town's
multiethnic  past  were replaced by references  that  exclusively relate to  the history and
culture of  the Serb people. This was a top-down process, set in motion, immediately after
the military take-over of  Bijeljina, by the municipal authorities, through the adoption of  a
new  policy  with  regard  to  toponymy  and  monuments.  Most  street  names  and  public
monuments now commemorate what appears as a series of  episodes in a long struggle
towards national liberation of  the Serb people,  with tributes to their respective heroes.
Through this dual process of  erasure and reinscription of  the urban landscape, for which
the local authorities were directly responsible, Bijeljina acquired the appearance of  a 'Serb'
town, with a significant impact in the population's experience of  place.
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Regime changes, whether through revolution, war, or peaceful transition, usually
bring  about  changes  in  official  memory,  which  in  turn  result  on  the  erasure  and
reinscription of  mnemonic elements in the landscape. The past against which the regime
change was made is revised, while the episode of  change itself  becomes object of  memory.
Extensive  research has  been dedicated  to  this  issue,  with  different  studies  consensually
identifying the urban landscape as an obvious stage for the assertion of  power by the new
ruling  classes  as  part  of  a  political  transition(Rose-Redwood,  Alderman and Azaryahu
2010).  Changes in  the urban landscape may be imposed or negotiated,  and may have
different  functions  within  a  process  of  political  transition.  Interventions  in  the  urban
landscape may carry different intentions, and provoke different effects, whether intended or
unintended. They may, for instance,  enforce divisions (e.g.  Palmberger 2012) or on the
contrary promote reconciliation (e.g. Duminy 2014). How power is asserted varies greatly,
and thus the analysis of  its expressions in the landscape may provide important insights
into the nature of  a political regime as well as the constraints it faces in the exercise of
power (e.g. Palonen 2008; Azaryahu 2011). Research into the policies and processes behind
the transformation of  public space will thus shed light into the balance of  power between
different sectors of  society,  by revealing how much are the ruling classes in position to
project into public space their own vision of  both local and national identity, and how far
are  they  willing  to  compromise  in  order  to  accommodate  divergent  perspectives  and
traditions. 
I will explore how, once the Bosnian war began, Serb nationalists sought to  give
physical expression to the new identity they wished to ascribe to Bijeljina. This new identity
should be consistent with their vision for the newly-created Republika Srpska, characterised
by the drive  to  make  it  the  exclusive homeland of  Bosnian  Serbs;  by  the  rejection of
Bosnian  identity  and  its  traditions  of  zajednički  život (common  life) beyond  ethnic
boundaries; and by the retraditionalisation of  society, under the influence of  the Serbian
Orthodox Church.  The dynamics analysed in this chapter was a crucial element in the
liminal  transformation  of  Bijeljina  triggered  by  the  creation  of  Republika  Srpska.  By
analysing  erasure  and reinscription as  a  top-down process  aimed at  embedding  in  the
landscape one particular version of  Serb national identity, we are setting the stage for a
deeper understanding of  how the population experienced the shift from zajednički život (life
in  common) to  exclusive  nationalism,  by  focusing  on  where they  experienced this  shift,
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before focusing, in the following chapters, on how the shift was experienced. By applying the
theoretical framework of  liminality (van Gennep 1908; Turner 1967; Thomassen 2009;
Horvath,  Thomassen  and  Wydra  2015),  to  locate  the  dual  process  of  erasure  and
reinscription in the context of  a wider, liminal transformation of  society, we seek to bring
together the top down approach inherent to the analysis of  politics of  memory with the
bottom up approach focusing on changes in the experience of  place, through an emphasis
of  the role of  erasure and reinscription as rites of  passage steering the transformation of
identity.  Whilst acts of  erasure necessarily foster uncertainty, the process of  reinscription
aims at curbing that same uncertainty by offering a new set of  references which would
provide guidance for society to navigate through a process of  transition. 
The chapter begins with an exploration of  the process of  erasure, defined as part of
the stage of  separation through which society entered a condition of  liminality, in which
the old order that had guided society no longer existed, but a new normality was yet to be
established. If  liminality represents, in the context of  rites of  passage (van Gennep 1909;
Turner 1967), a period of  great uncertainty, that is even more so in the case of  political
change and war in particular, in which uncertainty brings with it great danger (Thomassen
2009: 22; Malksoo 2012: 490). During the stage of  liminality, the social order is suspended.
The normality that existed before is no longer, and the new order is yet to be defined. This
is a period 'betwixt and between'(Turner 1967),  in which the liminal subjects are deprived
of  their habitual references, which in turn opens up a realm of  possibilities to imagine the
future. The process of  erasure is aimed precisely against that familiar set of  references,
which needs to be disrupted and dislodged to make room for a new imaginary. In Bijeljina,
the erasure of  mnemonic references  from the urban landscape completed the stage of
separation which began, as we suggested in the first chapter, with the decision to organise
multi-party elections, thus putting an end to Communist, one-party rule, and opening up
the space for the emergence of  nationalist political parties. As a set of  rituals, the essential
function of  the process of  erasure was to symbolically mark the point of  no return. The
chapter describes how the process of  erasure evolved, and how it initially targeted only the
Partisan legacy, one of  the pillars of  legitimacy upon which the Communist regime had
stood, to eventually make the multi-ethnic fabric of  society and its traditions of  zajednički
život the main target.
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Once the break with the past was asserted beyond this point of  no return, it opened
up new possibilities to imagine the future. In Bijeljina, the essential function of  the process
of  reinscription was to subordinate these possibilities to the particular aspects favoured by
the ideology of  those who had the power to reinscribe, in this case, the SDS.  I explore this
imaginary through the analysis of  the process of  reinscription, focusing in particular on
how the Chetnik legacy was rehabilitated to replace the space left void by the erasure of
mnemonic references  to  the Partisan legacy,  and on the role of  the Serbian Orthodox
Church in replacing the experience of  zajednički život  in a multi-ethnic society with the
model of  an idealised Serb tradition. 
The dual process of  erasure and reinscription transformed the urban landscape,
which crucially contributed, this chapter argues, to the transformation of  Bijeljina's identity.
The  'Monument to  Fallen Soldiers and Civilian Victims of  Semberija in the Defensive-
Fatherland War' paradigmatically represents that change.  While appearance  per se is not
enough to define a place's identity, but merely reveals an ascriptive intention, it nevertheless
conveys a strong message, one that creates constraints on how individuals perceive their
community  and  their  own  place  within.  Ascription  therefore  has  generative  potential,
especially when contestation is highly constrained, as was the case in Bijeljina. But this
ascription may as well foster a new sense of  belonging, or, on the contrary, a feeling of
alienation.  The  chapter  concludes  with  a  reflexion  about  the  effects  of  erasure  and
reinscription in the sense of  attachment the population nurtured towards Bijeljina as their
hometown (domovina).
4.1: Erasure
The process of  erasure and reinscription of  official memory in the urban landscape began
immediately after the military take-over, with changes in Bijeljina's toponymy. On the 10 th
of   April  1992,  the  President  of  the  Municipal  Assembly,  Cvijetin  Simić,  signed  the
decision assigning new names to forty two streets in the town of  Bijeljina and in the villages
of  Janja  and  Dvorovi  (Službeni  glasnik  Opštine  Bijeljina 1992).  This  corresponded  to
around one fifth of  the total number of  streets in Bijeljina, including all main streets. 
123
The timing of  the decision is  revealing  of  the importance  the local  authorities
assigned to the symbolic value of  toponymy. The decision was taken ten days after the take-
over  of  Bijeljina,  and four days  after  the  international  recognition  of  the  Republic  of
Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state. In the meantime, military and paramilitary
forces had moved from Bijeljina southwards along the River Drina and were engaged in
taking over the town of  Zvornik. The war was now well under way. The establishment of
Republika Srpska, however, was still in its early stage.  . Once municipal authorities severed
ties with the government in Sarajevo and the institutions of  the Bosnian state 28, they were,
for a while, on their own, in charge of  tasks that would otherwise be the responsibility of
the central state. Cvijetin Simić himself  highlighted this point, when I interviewed him. He
spoke of  the pioneering role of  the local administration in the beginning of  the war29:
Me: How were the relations between the local structures of  the SDS and the party leadership [at that
time]? Because I believe I read that the local SDS sought to preserve its local autonomy... 
Simić: “Well, in that first period, Republika Srpska was not functional. There was nothing. We, in
Bijeljina, we wrote the first [legislative] acts, about health; pensions; schooling; the police; customs...
The Presidency of  the municipality wrote those decisions, and organised those services, etc. There was
no organisation at republic level. Later, when the Republika Srpska was created, and then when it
became  functional,  then  they  took  over  these  [legal]  competences  (nadležnosti)  from  the  local
community. But the local community (zajednica), at a certain moment [previously] took over those state
competences, because there was nothing. Our phone lines had been cut off, electricity supplies from
Tuzla had been cut off... We were the first in Republika Srpska to organise these things, and then when
the institutions in Pale  [the wartime capital of  RS]  became functional, the central government
took over these  competences,  and others more  [in a centralising effort].  It  was then that  those
conflicts [between local and central SDS structures] began, and later the central leadership abused
(zloupotrebali) their power  [Simić went on to give a few examples of  abuse of  power] , and
Bijeljina did not even defend itself  as strongly as it needed .”
The priority assigned to renaming streets is therefore significant, as it took precedence over
other  urgent  tasks.  It  is  also  significant  that,  while  Serb nationalists  were in control  of
Bijeljina's municipality since the November 1990 elections that gave a victory to the SDS
(Serbian  Democratic  Party),  only  once  the  war  began  did  they  decide  to  change  the
toponymy. The timing reveals the intention to mark a clear break with the past, conveying
28 About this, see SIM Novine (1992f): “Odluka Predsestniva SO Bijeljina: Porezi I doprinosi ostaju 
u Semberiji”15/05/1992, p.22
29 Interview, January 2015
124
the message that Bosnia-Herzegovina had reached a point of  no return. 
The decision to rename Bijeljina's streets was a statement against the past, but it
also revealed a great deal of  uncertainty about what that break with the past meant in what
regarded inter-ethnic relations. Despite the violence already exercised against non-Serbs,
and Bosnian Muslims in particular, the local authorities were, at first, cautious about their
own position towards Bosnia's multiethnic character. In the initial phase after the take-over,
the SDS wanted above all to assert its identity against the communist regime, in a way
consistent with their electoral platform (Andjelić  2003:169). During the 1990 campaign,
nationalist parties collaborated closely, even as they fomented ethnic divisions and rousing
tensions. They were then united in the goal of  defeating the former communists and other
multiethnic  parties,  and  in  the  tactics  of  “paying  lip-service  to  mutual  tolerance  and
coexistence” (Hoare 2007:343). Although Bosnia-Herzegovina was already at war when the
changes in the toponymy were decided, it was not immediately that in Bijeljina the local
authorities openly rejected the town's multiethnic matrix.
The erasure of  the partisan legacy
The priority, as inferred by the changes made on 10 April 1992, was to eliminate from the
toponymy all references to the partisan legacy and to Tito's regime. Thus Bijeljina's main
street, called Marshal Tito Street, became  Karadjordje Street, after the leader of  the First
Serbian Uprising against the Ottomans in 1804; Edvard Kardelj Street, named after the
regime's ideologue and Tito's right hand, became Jevrejska ulica (Jewish Street), ostensibly in
tribute to the vanished Jewish community, exterminated in the Holocaust; Narodne Revolucije
Street (People's Revolution) was renamed after Nikola Tesla, the famous inventor, who was
an ethnic  Serb  born in  the  Croatian  region of  Lika,  at  the  time part  of  the  Austro-
Hungarian Empire;  Omladinska Street (literally 'youth', the word  omladinska had a distinct
communist connotation) became Vuk Karadžić Street, after the 19th Century linguist and
reformer of  the Serbian language;  Majevičke brigade Street, named after the Second World
War partisan brigade recruited from the Mount Majevica bordering Semberija, became
simply Majevička Street. 
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The  decision  also  eliminated  references  to  partisan  figures  that  were  native  to
Semberija. It was the case, most notably, of  the 'people's heroes' (narodni heroji) Fadil Jahić
'Španac',  a veteran of  the Spanish civil war, killed in 1942 in Vukosavci, in the Mount
Majevica, in the first military confrontation between the partisans and the Chetniks in the
Second World War (Kovačević 1990:74); Radojka Lakić, executed in Sarajevo in 1941 by
the Ustasha regime (Narodni Heroji Jugoslavije 1975: Vol.  1,  445);  Dimitrije Lopandić,
killed in 1941 in combat in Vojvodina (Jelić1986: 280); Vojin Bobar, who survived the war
to become a prominent member of  the communist establishment; and Rodoljub Čolaković,
one of  the most influential Bosnian communist leaders during the Second World War and
subsequently,  whose  street  became  Gavrilo  Princip  Street,  after  the  assassin  of  the
Archduke Franz Ferdinand of  Austria. 
Eventually all references to the Communists and the Partisan legacy disappeared
from Bijeljina's toponymy, with one notable exception, the Street of  the Victims of  Fascistic
Terror (Ulica žrtve fašističkog terora). This denomination encompassed the civilians killed by
the  German and  Italian  armies  as  well  as  by  factions  the  communist  regime labelled
'domestic traitors' (domaći izdajnici), including for instance Chetniks and Ustasha (Bergholz
2010:427,  n.3).  Despite  the  ideological/non-ethnic  designation  typical  of  communist
regimes' politics of  memory, the denomination remained meaningful, as it made implicit
reference to the genocide against Serbs perpetrated by the Croatian Ustasha during the
Second  World  War,  and  had,  therefore,  an  implied  national  connotation 30.  The
preservation of  this  historical  reference in  the toponymy thus  reinforced  the claims  of
equivalence, pervasive in nationalistic propaganda, between the genocidal persecution of
Bosnian and Croatian Serbs by the fascist regime of  the Independent State of  Croatia
during the Second World War and the existential threat Serbs allegedly faced with the
disintegration of  Yugoslavia. I should add, however, that while the toponymic reference was
preserved, the location of  the reference changed. This street, located between the city park
and the Atik neighbourhood, was renamed as Street of  the Victims of  Fascistic Terror once
the old  Square of  the Victims of  Fascistic Terror  was renamed  Square General Draža Mihajlović,
after the leader of  the Chetnik movement (see infra).
30 See Byford (2007) for a similar point. In other towns under control of  the SDS the 'Victims of  Fascistic 
Terror' denomination was replaced by toponymic references that openly referred to Serb victims.  Maksić
(2017:214) refers the case of  Bugojno, where the SDS replaced an inscription in a monument from 
'Victims of  Fascistic Terror' to 'Serbs, Jews and the Roma people', and in the village of  Drakulić a street 
was renamed as 'victims of  genocide against Serbs'. In the two cases, the changes took place in 1991
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In the early phase following the take-over, the SDS sought to send a message of
reassurance to the Muslim population, consistent with the statements it had made in the
wake of  the take-over, that non-Serbs had nothing to fear31.  They were careful, therefore,
when eliminating specific references to the partisan struggle that were identified with the
Bosnian Muslim nationality, that these were replaced by names similarly connected to the
Muslims. Thus, Fadil Jahić  'Španac' Street was renamed after Muhamed Mehmedbašić,
one  of  Gavrilo  Princip's  companions  in  the  Sarajevo  Assassination  plot;  the  Muslim
Brigades Street (Muslimanskih brigada) became simply 'Muslimanska'; Hamza Hamzić street
became  Mehmed  Spaho  street,  after  the  inter-war  leader  of  the  Yugoslav  Muslim
Organisation(JMO); and the street named after Alija Alijagić, member of  the communist
terrorist organisation 'Red Justice'(crvena pravda)32 became Meša Selimović Street. 
References  to  the  Croatian  nationality  were  dealt  differently,  in  a  way  that
contradicted the message of  accommodation to non-Serbs. The war in Croatia had an
important impact in Bijeljina,  and many of  its inhabitants experienced some degree of
involvement  there,  be  that  as  JNA's  conscripted  soldiers;  objectors  from  conscription,
usually non-Serbs; or volunteer fighters in paramilitary units. The new toponymy included
two  notorious  references  to  the  Croatian  war;  Vojin  Bobar  street  became Vukovarska
Street, in reference to the city of  Vukovar, which the JNA conquered in November 1991,
after  intense  fighting  that  virtually  turned  the  city  into  rubble;  and  the  18 th Croatian
Brigade Street, referring to a Partisan unit, was renamed after the Major Milan Tepić, a
member of  the JNA who during the Croatian war in July 1991, during the siege of  the
barracks of  Bijelovar by the Croatian National Guard, triggered the explosion of  one of
the barrack's ammunition storage depots, therefore preventing the ammunitions to fall into
Croatian  hands.  Killed  in  the  explosion  alongside  eleven  Croatian  soldiers,  Tepić  was
posthumously awarded the title of  'Narodni heroj', the last person to receive this distinction,
and  became  immediately  the  object  of  popular  cult,  promoted  by  Serb  nationalist
propaganda. 
The message of  accommodation to non-Serbs was contradicted also by the decision
31 A striking example was an article published on SIM novine (15/06/1992,p.22) entitled  “There are no 
restraints on freedom of  religion” ('Nema Sputavanja Vijerskih sloboda' ).
32 About Alijagić and the organisation Red Justice, see infra.
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to grant the name of  'Serbian Volunteer Guard' (Srpske dobrovoljačke garde) to the access road
that connects Bijeljina to the eastwards village of  Popovi, through which the special unit led
by  the  notorious  warlord  Zeljko  Ražnatović  'Arkan' entered  Bijeljina,  to  take  military
control over the town, where it committed the first of  many wartime massacres against the
civilian Bosnian Muslim population. The new liberators of  Bijeljina symbolically displaced
the  Partisan  liberators;  the  street  was  previously  named  'Vojvodina  Brigades'  Street
(Vojvodjanskih brigada),  in tribute to the Partisan brigades which in August  1943 liberated
Bijeljina from the Axis forces. 
The climax of  the process of  erasure of  the partisan legacy was the seizure of  the
House-Museum 'Red Justice' (Spomen kuća Crvene pravde). This was part of  a wider effort, not
only to erase the partisan legacy from public memory, but also towards to bring all cultural
institutions  firmly under the grip of  the new regime,  and to eliminate  any space with
enough autonomy to provide a forum for criticism and dissent. This resulted also in the
destruction of  the amateur theatre group 'Scena'. Highly regarded during the apogee of
the  Communist  regime,  the  group  had  already  been  severely  affected  by  the  regime's
decadence  and  the  prolonged  economic  crisis  in  the  late  period  of  Communist  rule.
Displaced from the theatre, a temporary wooden construction in the centre of  Bijeljina, the
group disintegrated, never again to reassemble. Where the theatre used to stand there is
now  a  five  floors  apartment  block,  with  a  bank  agency  on  the  ground  floor.  Most
importantly, this effort resulted in the control over the Museum of  Semberija, which, along
with  Radio  Bijeljina and the  Semberske  novine newspaper (renamed  SIM novine:  List  SAO
Semberije I  Majevice),  would become one of  the pillars  of  the nationalist  propaganda
machine.
The House-Museum 'Red Justice'  was  the family  home of  Rodoljub Čolaković;
descending from a wealthy family of  traders, Čolaković was a prominent Communist and
close associate of  Tito throughout his life.  One of  the most important Bosnian Partisan
leaders  during  the  Second  World  War  (Hoare  2007:337),  he  became  the  first  Prime-
Minister  (officially  'President  of  the Government')  of  the People's  Republic  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina  after  the  liberation(Hoare  2007:311).  Čolaković  later  moved  to  Belgrade,
where he occupied different  posts  in  the  federal  institutions,  but  he remained strongly
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connected to his native town, which he visited often. Also a writer, Čolaković greatly valued
culture, and was, along his nephew, the ethnologist Dimitrije Čolaković, the main driving
force behind the creation of  the Museum of  Semberija(Lazić 2010:3). Upon his death, he
donated his personal library to the local public library Filip Višnjić, and his family home to
the Museum of  Semberija, to become a house-museum (Lazić 2010:3; Nezavisne novine
2013). 
The house-museum, which contained Čolaković's personal archive, was dedicated
to the terrorist group 'Red Justice' (crvena pravda), of  which Čolaković had been a member,
along with  Dimitrije Lopandić and Alija Alijagić, also natives of  Bijeljina. The group was
formed in 1921 to retaliate against the decision of  the government of  the Kingdom of  the
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes to ban the Communist Party. Acting on their own, without the
party's support, the group prepared an attempt on the life of  Prince Regent Aleksandar
Karadjordjević; the regent escaped the attempt, but the Minister of  the Interior, Milorad
Drašković, was killed. Alija Alijagić, the assassin, was sentenced to death and executed, and
Čolaković  was  condemned  to  12  years  in  prison,  during  which  time  he  met  other
prominent  members  of  the  Communist  Party,  provided  education  to  other  political
prisoners, and translated, with Moša Pijade, Karl Marx's The Capital. He continued to work
for  the Communist  Party  upon his  release,  and eventually  contributed to  organise  the
partisan uprising against the Axis forces (Narodni heroji Jugoslavije 1975: 154-156). 
Fig. 1: The premises of  the veterans' organisation BORS, previously the house-museum 'Red Justice'
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The house was at once a museum, an archive, and a venue for cultural activities.
Located near the city park in the neighbourhood of  Galac, the house museum was part of
the  Museum  of  Semberija.  Shortly  after  the  take-over  of  Bijeljina,  the  house  was
confiscated from the Museum; the place was initially assigned to the 'Society Knez Ivo of
Semberija' (Udruženje Knez Ive od Semberije), then reassigned to the  Fighters' Organisation of
Republika  Srpska  (Boračka  organizacija  Republike  Srpske:  BORS),  which  has  occupied  the
premises since. The archive was transferred to the Museum's depot in the main building,
but most of  the remaining content of  the Museum was lost. 
A  self-ascribed  Bosnian  Serb,  Čolaković  had  a  crucial  role  in  persuading  the
Communist  leadership  to  grant  statehood  status  to  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  was
considered a strong defender of  its multiethnic character (Hoare 2007:285); he was also a
highly regarded figure in Bijeljina. Attacking his memory was an efficient way to assert the
political identity of  the new regime: anti-communist and anti-Bosnian. But communism
had already collapsed, and once its most visible traces were removed, it was the attachment
by  Bosnian  Serbs  to  Bosnia  as  a  multicultural  country  with  its  own  identity,  which
Čolaković embodied, that required elimination, and that later became the main focus of
the process of  erasure and reinscription of  the urban landscape.  
The erasure of  Muslim heritage
Eventually, any pretence of  accommodation of  ethnic diversity and tolerance towards the
Muslim population was abandoned. While during the take-over 'Islamic extremists' were
the  enemy,  by  the  Summer  1992,  the  enemy  was  clearly  identified  as  the  Bosnian
government led by Alija Izetbegović, and by extension, the Muslim people as a whole. This
shift followed the consolidation of  the SDS's political project and its transformation in a
party-state. In the period leading to the war and its initial phase the party's stated goal was
the  defence  of  the  Serbian people  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Emboldened by  their  early
victories, and no longer able to claim the goal of  'remaining in Yugoslavia', the goal shifted
to  the  creation  of  their  own  state,  which  entailed  also  the  destruction  of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina. The shift is visible in the change of  name through the adoption, in August
1992, of  the name 'Republika Srpska'. Since then, its leaders as well as the propaganda
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machine referred to the territory under control of  the Bosnian government as 'so-called
Bosnia-Herzegovina', or 'former Bosnia-Herzegovina'.
In August 1992, the Municipal Assembly issued a second decision  introducing new
changes to Bijeljina's toponymy (Službeni glasnik Opštine Bijeljina, No 6, 25/09/1992), which
eliminated  mentions  to  notable  Bosnian  Muslims.  The  only  exception  was  the  Meša
Selimović Street, which paid tribute to the great Bosnian writer of  Muslim origin. This
was,  in  all  likelihood,  because  Selimović  had  chosen  to  declare  himself  a  'Serb'  by
nationality, and to establish himself  in Belgrade, even though Bosnia remained the focus of
his literary production. Selimović's ethnic self-ascription resonated with the now dominant
Serb  nationalist  narrative,  which  denied  that  Muslims  were  genuinely  a  nation,  and
presented them instead as the descendants of  Serbs who converted to Islam during the
period of  Ottoman rule.
The denial of  Bosnian Muslim identity as a national group stemmed at the root of
a  form of  erasure with much deeper implications  that  the mere change of  toponymic
inscriptions.  The systematic  erasure of  undesired elements  of  public  memory in Serb-
controlled territory involved also the physical destruction of  cultural heritage pertaining to
religions other than the Orthodox Serb Church, as well as libraries, archives and other
mnemonic resources relevant to nationalities other than the Serbs, as well as for those that
nurtured  feelings  of  attachment  towards  the  idea  as  well  as  the  historical  reality  of
multiethnic Bosnia.  The erasure of  all traces of  Islamic and Catholic heritage from the
public space (Riedmayer: 2002; Walasek: 2015) was part of  a process that the ethnologist
Ivan Čolović called the “ethnic cleansing of  time”, in pursuit of  “the most homogeneous
and exclusive  possible  space,  but  also  homogeneous  and  exclusive  ethnic  time”  (2002,
p.130).  
The logistics involved in the destruction of  cultural and religious property have not
been adequately researched so far, but the pattern of  destruction and the technical means
involved, particularly in what regards demolitions, suggests that the erasure of  Islamic and
Catholic  heritage  from  the  public  space  was  carried  out  systematically(UNSC  1994:
Annexes,  p.17; Annex IV, p. 28;  Riedlemayer 2007; Walasek 2015:23-24),  although the
local authorities did have some degree of  leverage over the process 33. The outcome of  this
33 For instance, in the area of  Prijedor, all mosques were demolished in the early stage of  the war, but the 
town's Catholic church was only demolished much later, in July 1995 (fieldnotes, May 2014: informal 
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endeavour was such that by the end of  the war there was only one Mosque known to be
standing in all the territory of  Republika Srpska34. 
In Bijeljina the demolition of  the city mosques began in the morning of  13 th March
1993; in the afternoon of  the following day the job was concluded. All of  Bijeljina's five
mosques were destroyed, and two in the nearby village of  Janja. Property belonging to the
Islamic community had been confiscated in the beginning of  the war,  so other buildings
were  spared  as  they  had  already  been  reassigned  to  other  uses.  The  houses  where
Bijeljina's Imams lived were confiscated to house displaced Serbs from other areas, and the
main office of  the Islamic community became the local office of  the Association of  Chetnik
Veterans of  the Second World War. Some of  the documents that the Chetnik veterans
threw away when they moved in were rescued by members of  the Museum of  Semberija,
located nearby. Some important documents were preserved thanks to the foresight of  the
main Imam, who placed them in safety just before the beginning of  the war. Many of  the
archives, however, documenting centuries of  Muslim presence in Bijeljina were lost. 35 As for
the interior of  the mosques, they had already been emptied of  anything deemed valuable.
More than twenty years later, many in Bijeljina still wonder where the rich tapestries that
covered the prayer rooms ended up. 
A  few days  later,  a  television  crew from the  British  ITV broadcasting  network
managed to get  to  Bijeljina,  and filmed the diggers  clearing the debris  where the Atik
Mosque, located in the central square, had stood. They interviewed the President of  the
Municipal Council (načelnik opštine), Jovan Vojnović, who stated that he had tried to prevent
it  from  happening,  and  expressed  his  sadness  for  the  destruction  of  the  mosques.
Regardless of  the sincerity of  his words, the local media outlets, Radio Bijeljina and the
magazine SIM novine promptly articulated a justification. 
conversation with Bijeljina's Catholic parish priest). In Bijeljina, the Catholic Church was spared.
34 This was a mosque in the village of  Balvinje, near Mrkonjić grad, where local Serbs protected their 
Muslim neighbours (Arnautović 2010).
35 Interview with Emir Musli, Secretary of  the Islamic Community in Bijeljina, November 2014. Musli was 
providing me with details about the reconstruction of  the mosques after the war. We were sitting in his 
office and the Medzlis, going through document after document, when I asked him, wih regard to an old 
document: “ How did the Islamic Community managed to preserve these documents?”. “The Islamic 
Community is a proper organisation (ozbiljna) [in the sense of  effective]. Our Imams placed them in 
safety. However, we were not able to save  all documents.Many remained in this office (…). We don't 
knowwhat happened to those documents. But it is interesting, when we returned to the office – I told you 
this was the Association of  Chetnik Veterans – part of  the documents, which was kept at the Museum of  
Semberija, when we returned, the Museum gave us back those documents, so we have all records of  
births and obits since 1910, but not before that date”
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In the magazine, Pero Simić, director of  both outlets, justified the destruction by
stating that the mosques had ceased to be religious objects because, he falsely alleged, they
had been used in April 1992 as weapons depots and the minarets as snipers positions from
which a number of  innocent civilians, had been shot and killed, after which they were
closed down. He stated also that the perpetrators of  the demolition were unknown, and
denied that the local authorities might be in any way involved, asserting, on the contrary,
that  they  were committed to uncovering who were the perpetrators.  Most  importantly,
Simić felt the need to portray the expression of  outrage people may have felt about the
demolition  of  the  mosques  as  unpatriotic,  while  accusing  the  Bosnian  President,  Alija
Izetbegović, of  misusing this incident to accuse the Bosnian Serbs of  ethnic cleansing in
order to strengthen its negotiating position, eventually causing the break-down of  ongoing
conversations:
“It is no secret at all that the demolition of  the mosques provoked significant unrest among
the Muslims of  Semberija, after which rumour spread about ethnic cleansing and mass displacement.
All those stories, that have no connection with the truth, made the position of  the Serb delegation in the
conversations in New York harder(Simić 1993).”
The Roman Catholic Church escaped demolition, one of  the very few in Republika
Srpska that was spared from destruction. Why it was spared remains unclear. The church
was more associated with the Hungarian minority that had built it in the 19 th Century, than
with the Croat nationality, and that was what some people believe may have saved the
building36 37. The  parish priest, Father Marko Jukić, was last heard of  in town in June
1992,  when  he  gave  SIM  novine an  interview  reassuring  the  public  that  freedom  of
confession remained intact in Bijeljina (SIM novine 1992). Shortly afterwards he left town.
Versions vary on whether he fled or was expelled, with a popular account  stating he was
hijacked from the Parish house still in his pyjamas.  The church was subsequently looted
36 Why the church was spared was a question I asked most of  the informants that I formally interviewed 
who were present in Bijeljina at the time and old enough for the question to be pertinent.
37 Practising Catholics were less than a thousand before the war, but the Catholic community of  Bijeljina 
was ethnically diverse. Semberija has never had a significant Croat presence, and in the 1991 census only 
600 individuals had declared themselves as Croats, mostly families established in the region during 
communism. Among the catholics there were Albanians from Kosovo; some ethnic Hungarians and a few
descendants of  ethnic Germans who escaped deportation in 1944, when  the Nazis decided to transfer 
the whole village of  Novo Selo in the outskirts of  Bijeljina to Eastern Europe to colonise areas where the 
Jewish population had been exterminated. After the Second World War these few families converted from
Evangelical protestantism into Catholicism. Source: Interview with a Catholic woman of  German 
descent, January 2015; See also Musli (2012).
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and vandalised. One of  my informants, himself  a Catholic, later found a statue of  the
Virgin Mary and other saints in a rubbish dump close to the Catholic cemetery 38. He did
not dare rescue them, and the statues were eventually lost. 
Resistance to the erasure process: 
The  acts  that  formed  part  of  the  process  of  erasure  of  mnemonic  references  to  the
Communist regime, the partisan legacy, Muslim culture and zajednički život from the urban
landscape  were   not  negotiated  or  subject  to  any  debate.  They  were  imposed  as
accomplished facts, which, in a moment of  great uncertainty about the future, few would
dare  openly  challenge.  Fear  was,  my  informants  told  me,  pervasive,  especially  but  not
exclusively  among  non-Serbs,  while  Serb  nationalists  were  emboldened  by  their  early
success, albeit prudent about how far they should go. It is, however, difficult to assess, more
than twenty two years later, how much opposition the erasure process faced, given that the
only local newspaper, SIM novine, was at the time a propaganda tool at the service of  SDS
and the nationalist cause.
There was, however, one situation in which resistance to erasure was effective, in
relation to the decision to remove the busts of  partisan heroes from the streets of  Bijeljina.
Throughout Bijeljina's streets there were, before the war, 19 busts of  partisan heroes and
communist leaders , including that of  Tito, Rodoljub Čolaković, and nine 'heroes of  the
people' (narodni heroji) who were were native to or residents of  Semberija. Most of  the busts
were,  according  to  my  informants,  removed  between  April  and  May  1992,  but  four
remained  in  their  places.  These  were  the  busts  of  Dr.  Vojislav  Kecmanović  'Đedo';
Dimitrije Lopandić; Veselin Gavrić; and Radojka Lakić. Each represents a particular case,
and together they reveal the potential as well as the limits to civic mobilisation in wartime
Bijeljina. 
A medical doctor, Vojislav Kecmanović fought on the Serbian side in the Balkan
wars (1912-1913),  for which he was arrested by the Austrian authorities  in Bosnia and
condemned to five years in prison for treason. He remained in prison until the end of  the
38 Informal conversation in January 2015
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First World War, after which he established himself  in Bijeljina (Grabčanović 2006:232).
When  the  popular  uprising  against  the  Axis  occupation  began  in  1941,  Kecmanović
mobilised  his  moral  authority  in  the  eyes  of  the  local  population  and  tried  to  bring
Partisans  and  Chetniks  together  (Grabčanović  2006:230). After  the  initial  cooperation
between the two movements broke down, Kecmanović joined the Partisan movement. He
was the President of  the Country Anti-fascist Council for the People's Liberation of  Bosnia-
Herzegovina (Zemaljsko antifašističko vijeće narodnog oslobođenja Bosne i Hercegovine, ZAVNOBiH),
the highest governing body of  the anti-fascist movement. After the liberation, he became
President  of  the  National  Assembly  of  the  Popular  Republic  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina
(Hoare 2007:288). But he was never a communist,  and in 1946 withdrew from politics.
There was no attempt to remove his bust.
 Dimitrije  Lopandić,  whose  bust  remains  in  the  city  park  (gradski  park),  was  a
member of  the communist party since 1919, and one of  Čolaković's companions in the
terrorist organisation 'Red Justice'. He was arrested in Bijeljina by Ustasha forces in June
1941  and  detained  in  Kerestinec,  near  Zagreb,  a  concentration  camp  for  political
opponents.  In July,  after  the Ustasha  regime began executing  communists  there,  a  riot
broke out and the prisoners escaped. The breakthrough was poorly organised, and Ustasha
forces  went  on to  capture  and execute  most  of  the  detainees.  Lopandić  was  killed  in
combat at the nearby village of  Obrež (Jelić 1986). Being known as a victim of  the Ustasha
regime who many mistakenly believed to have died in the infamous concentration camp of
Jasenovac, seems to have been the reason why his bust remained in place, or at least that
was how at the time people in Bijeljina gave meaning to the exception made to him by the
local  authorities,  according  to  some  of  my  informants.  The  theme  of  the  genocide
perpetrated by the Ustasha regime of  the Independent State of  Croatia against the Serb
people was central to arguments justifying the Serb rebellion in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
Jasenovac was the main lieu de mémoire (Nora 1989) associated with it.
The case of  Veselin Gavrić, whose bust stood among others in the Square of  the
Victims of  Fascistic Terror (Trg žrtve fašističkog terora) was different. Still a student, he joined
the Communist Party in 1939, and was among the organisers in Semberija of  the popular
uprising against the Axis occupation in July 1941. In February 1942, on a mission as a
courier,  he was  captured by  Chetnik  forces,  subjected to torture and killed (Mićanović
1983).  According to my informants,  when the authorities  began removing the Partisan
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busts  from  the  square,  family  members  pulled  their  connections  to  lobby  the  local
authorities, and succeeded in preventing the removal. The other busts were removed, and
his has,  since then, stood alone in the square,  which in the meantime was renamed as
Square General Draža Mihajlović, after the leader of  the Chetnik movement. 
The  cases  of  Dr.  Kecmanović,  Lopandić  and  Gavrić  suggest  that  the  local
authorities were keen to avoid an openly adverse reaction to their endeavour to erase the
communist  past  and  the  Partisan  legacy  from  public  space,  and  thus  willing  to
accommodate some level  of  resistance,  when this  was  exercised discretely  or  expressed
tacitly.  Accommodation  was  possible  as  long  as  it  wasn't  seen  as  weakening  the  new
nationalist order. The case of  the bust of  Radojka Lakić, located in the school bearing her
name, stands out in contrast, as a case of  open and active resistance to nationalism, and for
such a challenge there was a price to be paid. 
Lazar Manojlović was the director of  the Primary School Radojka Lakić, which in
April 1992 was renamed 'Saint Sava'. After the war began, Nedeljko Pajić, the parish priest
of  St. George's Church, just across the road,  was the first to order that the bust be removed
from the schoolyard, but Manojlović considered his moral duty to oppose its removal, as it
would amount to an act of  violence against the memory of   Radojka Lakić  and a bad
example for his pupils. He remained firm in his resolution, taken as a matter of  allegiance
to the partisan legacy, and as part of  his struggle to preserve his autonomy as headteacher,
but most of  all, as part of  his effort to remain honourable (pošten). 
A Serb from a poor peasant family from the village of  Velika Obarska, north of
Bijeljina,  Lazar Manojlović  made most of  his  career as a  school teacher in the city of
Tuzla. He returned to Bijeljina in 1991, to become the director of  the Primary School
Radojka  Lakič.  He  was  perceived  by  the  local  authorities  as  a  loyal  Serb,  after  his
nomination was vetted by Ljubiša Savić39.  A social worker by profession, and a founding
member of  the SDS in Bijeljina, Ljubiša Savić, also known as 'Mauzer', would emerge as
one of  the most powerful individuals in Semberija. After the 1990 elections, he became
President  of  the  Municipal  Commission  for  Recruitment  and  Nominations  (predsjednik
opštinske komisije za izbor i imenovanje)(Nikolić 1991), a strategic position, at a time when the
39 Interview with Lazar Manojlović, October 2014.  Manojlović described how his nomination was vetted 
by 'Mauzer'.
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SDS was replacing all cadres for their own people40. 
Mauzer's  endorsement  granted Manojlović  his  job,  but  not  his  loyalty.  He soon
became a nuisance to the local authorities, as he found himself  in conflict with the Serbian
Orthodox Church. His confrontation with Nedeljko Pajić, who had become responsible for
mandatory religious instruction in the school, soon escalated to the higher echelons of  the
Church, bringing him into direct conflict also with the Bishop of  Zvornik-Tuzla, Vasilije
Kačavenda, one of  the most powerful men in Bijeljina and indeed in Republika Srpska.
Besides opposing the removal of  the bust of  Radojka Lakić, Manojlović also refused to
dismiss Muslim workers, and ensured that the Muslim children who remained there were
not discriminated against by staff  or students. 
Manojlović  stands  out  as  an  exceptional  example  of  opposition  to  power  in
Bijeljina. Besides his role as headteacher, and private acts of  assistance to non-Serbs facing
duress of  persecution, he also took the initiative to write to the Patriarchate of  the Serbian
Orthodox Church in Belgrade, denouncing the abuses taking place in Bijeljina (Manojlović
2009:  29;32),  which  may  have  influenced  the  Patriarchate's  decision  forbidding  the
conversion of  Muslims to Orthodox Christianity (see. Ch.3). He also collaborated with the
Belgrade  independent  newspaper  'Republika',  which  would  be  the  first  to  report  the
destruction of  the local mosques, and he spoke  on the record to foreign journalists visiting
town (Manojlović 2009), including the above mentioned ITV crew. 
The case of  Lazar Manojlović, while important for its own sake, is also revealing of
the level of  constraint anyone opposing nationalism in everyday life faced. He received
numerous threats and had to deal with the insubordination of  some of  his  staff;  as  he
refused to submit or to resign, he was sacked from his post in 1994, when he turned 60
years  old.  He was forced to leave the school  premises  at  gunpoint,  and deprived of  a
pension. Manojlović  remained, until his death in 2016, an outspoken critic of  the Serb
Orthodox Church, the SDS and Serb nationalism, and one of  a few Serbs who always
spoke openly about the persecution of  Bosniaks. 
The bust of  Radojka Lakić remained in its place in the school yard, until it was
40 During the take-over of  Bijeljina, Ljubiša Savić, also known as Major 'Mauzer' appeared as the 
Commandant of  the Territorial Defence (Teritorijalna odbrana, TO) of  the SAO of  Semberija and 
Majevica, and leader of  the the local 'Crisis Staff' (SIM novine 1992b). The TO forces would soon morph
into this own para-military unit, the Serbian National Guard (Srpska nacionalna garda), itself  later integrated
in the newly-formed Army of  Republika Srpska as an elite infantry unit (Simić 1992a)
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stolen in August 2011, possibly by metal thieves (Lazić 2012:140). 
4.2: Reinscription
Reinscription was a prolonged process, which started simultaneously with the process of
erasure, but endured for much longer, and continues to take place in the present. A matrix
was  nevertheless  established  relatively  quickly,  and  preserved  since,  which  made  Serb
national identity and Orthodox Christianity the central themes of  official representations.
To say that Bijeljina's urban landscape now solely reflects the history and culture of  the
Serb people, however, is merely the starting point to the analysis of  the identity statement
that official memory conveys. 
Most of  the name-places make reference to war-related episodes and (male)figures,
and the military feats they commemorate are associated with a long history of  struggles of
the Serb people for their liberation. The main access roads to Bijeljina all bear names with
military significance. To the East, besides the already mentioned Serbian Volunteer Guard
street, there is also, parallel to it, the Street Knez Ivo of  Semberija, a native of  the village
of  Popovi, where the road leads, and who was one of  the leaders of  the First Serbian
Uprising, which he joined in 1806; to the south towards the village of  Janja and the town
of  Zvornik lies the Serb Army street (Ulica Srpske vojske), previously the Yugoslav National
Army  (JNA)  street;  to  the  West  towards  Tuzla  is  the  27 th of  March  Street,  that
commemorates the coup d'état of  1941 against the Yugoslav government's decision to join
the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan; and Northwards towards the village
of  Velika Obarska now lies the Bajo Banjičić street, named after the Second World War
Chetnik commander in Semberija. Throughout Bijeljina and in the villages of  Semberija,
many other references to Serb heroism and military feats exist, either in the toponymy, in
monuments or other forms of  public memory.
Given the zeal with which mnemonic references to the Partisan legacy were erased,
it is ironic that, in what regards their efforts towards the construction of  a new official
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memory,  Bijeljina's local authorities adopted the template previously established by the
Communist regime. The Communists' own politics of  memory was based on the evocation
of  the partisan struggle against fascism during the Second World War, known as the NOB
(narodnooslobodilačka  borba  –  People's  Liberation  Struggle).  The  Partisan  Struggle  was
officially represented as the regime's founding act, and systematically evoked to reassert the
regime's political legitimacy (Perica 2002: 96). For that reason, as the regime's legitimacy
appeared to be in erosion in the 1970s and 1980s, acts of  inscription in the landscape
intensified,  resulting  in  the  construction  of  monuments  throughout  Yugoslavia  (Karge
2009), many of  which in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Musi 2015: 126). Whilst different in content,
the parallels  in  form are striking.  While  the communist  regime framed the NOB as  a
popular  struggle  against  fascism,  the  new regime framed the present  war  as  a  war  of
national liberation, itself  the culmination of  a much longer history of  struggles against
foreign  oppression.  The  content  changed,  as  all  name-places  evoking  the  NOB  were
replaced,  but  the  template,  characterised  by  the  glorification  of  war  as  a  collective
endeavour, and the cult of  individual heroism, remained. 
In  Bijeljina,  official  memory,  essentially  formed  during  the  war  and  in  the
immediate post-war period, contained a statement of  rupture with the past encompassed in
the process of  erasure, at the same time that it sought to offer the population a sense of
stability, based on the assumption of  permanence of  the new inscriptions. 
But erasure is seldom complete; instead, the public space, with the superposition of
the new inscriptions on the old ones, usually resembles a palimpsest, where the traces of
what was there before remain present even if  not clearly visible, and from which the erased
inscriptions may eventually be retrieved. Most importantly, the acts of  erasure may become
itself  object of  remembrance, and thus the assumption of  permanence in which the new
official memory is based is inherently fragile. 
Conversely, the new inscriptions may also become object of  erasure. The desire to
influence how the future  of  remembering should take shape is a common feature in any
mnemonic intervention in the public space (Casey 2004). This same desire seems to have
been shared by the different political forces that since the 19 th century ruled over Semberija,
so that throughout time the erasure and reinscription of  mnemonic references in the public
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space became a ritual that all new regimes performed. But each new performance was in
itself  a reminder of  how transient the regimes of  the past were as much as a warning that
those doing the erasing and reinscribing might become themselves, in the future, object of
erasure. Indeed, by its very nature as part of  “the symbolic infrastructure of  power and
authority”(Azaryahu1996:317) elements of  official memory inscribed in the landscape are
inherently vulnerable to political change. 
A good example of  the transient character of  official memory is the case of  the
monument  to  King  Petar  I  Karadjordjević  'the  Liberator',  an  equestrian  statue  that
represents the King about  to  behead a three-headed human figure that  symbolises  the
Emperor of  Austrian-Hungary, the German Kaiser and the Ottoman Sultan, in allusion to
the enemies of  the First World War. The statue was installed in the main square in 1929,
but in April  1941, when Bijeljina came under occupation of  the Independent State of
Croatia, it was removed and destroyed (Lukić 2012:172). The base of  the statue remained
in place, though, and in 1945 the Communists built a small plint with a five-pointed star on
the top. In April 1992, during the take-over of  Bijeljina, the star was removed. Along with
the decision to rename Bijeljina's streets, the Municipal Assembly decided also to have the
statue  rebuilt,  and  the  sculptor  Zoran  Jezdimirović  immediately  began  to  work  on  a
replica41. 
On 8 November 1993, coinciding with the religious holiday of  'Mitrovdan', the day
BORS, the Fighter's Association adopted as their krsna slava, the statue was reinstated to the
original  place,  in  a  high-profile ceremony attended,  among others,  by the President  of
Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadžić and the leader of  the Serbian Orthodox Church,
Patriarch Pavle42. On the base of  the statue, in one of  the sides was written 'The thankful
Serbs of  Semberija' (Zahvalni Srbi Semberije). In the other, a longer inscription was added to
the original  model,  stating that “the conditions  for the renewal  of  he monument were
achieved through the victory of  SDS in the 1990 multi-party elections”. By reinstating the
monument  to  King  Petar  I  Karadjordjević,  the  initiators  unintentionally  revealed  how
public memory can always be retrieved after erasure, if  the political conditions so allow it.
41 SIM novine, 15/05/1992, p. 22. A public subscription towards the construction of  the statue had been 
initiated in October 1991.
42 SIM novine, n. 20, December 1993, p. 1 (cover).
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Fig. 2: The statue of  King Petar I Karadjordjević, in front of  the Town Hall (Opština)
Some of  my informants, Serbs who were critical of  the local ruling class, referred to
the dual process of  erasure and reinscription that took place in Bijeljina as a sign of  the
new rulers' self-aggrandisement, which betrayed a lack of  confidence on their own identity
project.  For that reason, my informants claimed, those in power needed to dismiss  the
common past  as  if  they  were  not  themselves  a  product  of  that  very  same  past.  The
underlying statement was, in the words of  my informants, that 'from us History begins' ( od
nas  počinje  istorija).  The  likely  awareness  of  the  limits  of  the  instrumental  approach  to
collective memory did not deter those in power in Bijeljina,  as elsewhere in Republika
Srpska, from insisting in manipulating memory at the service of  their identity project. On
the contrary, the awareness of  the fragility of  official memory, and of  the possibility of
retrieval of  the past may have pushed the wartime Bosnian Serb leadership towards more
brutal  forms  of  erasure,  in  which  the  term  gained  literal  meaning,  rather  than
metaphorical,  as  was  the  case  with  the  demolition  of  Bijeljina's  mosques,  and  the
destruction of  cultural heritage more generally. 
After the mosques' demolitions, the spaces where they had once stood were given
new uses. In the main square, the Atik Mosque gave way to an amusement park, with a
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carrousel and other devices; the Salihbegova Mosque became a flea market, where, among
other things traded, goods stolen in other areas, mainly Brčko, were sold; the site of  the
mosque near the hospital became a car park; and the Dašnica Mosque was replaced by a
hardware shop, whose owner has since become known as 'Pero Džamija'. The jokeful tone
of  the nickname, which has endured even after the hardware shop had to move to a new
location  in  the  post-war  period,  demeans  the  owner,  as  it  associates  him  with  war
profiteering,  but it  is  also revealing of  the changes in the atmosphere in Bijeljina.  The
refinement that the mosques offered to the urban environment was replaced by the noise
and chaos of  improvised market places. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the idea of  urban culture
is closely associated with politeness and elegance, so that in the eyes of  many residents, the
new uses assigned to the pieces of  land where the mosques used to stand degraded the city,
and translated a fundamental hostility to urban culture. 
The rehabilitation of  the Chetnik legacy
One aspect that stands out in the analysis of  Bijeljina's official memory, as inscribed in the
urban space, is how prominently it pays tribute to the Chetnik tradition. The Chetniks were
a Serb nationalist movement formed in the wake of  the German invasion of  Yugoslavia in
April 1941, initially by members of  the Yugoslav army who refused to surrender when the
army collapsed. Led by Colonel Dragoljub 'Draža' Mihajlović, the Chetnik movement was
endorsed by the government in exile; the movement was officially named 'Yugoslav Army
in the Fatherland', and Mihajlović promoted to general. The Chetniks quickly evolved from
a resistance movement to a collaborationist force. Convinced “that outright resistance to
the Germans was futile prior to a virtual Axis defeat”, Mihajlović sought “a modus vivendi
with the Germans, while concentrating his efforts on destroying the  internal enemies of  his
Great Serbian goals: the Ustashas, the Muslims of  Sandjak and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
ultimately the Communists”(Hoare 2006:94). The communists, who launched a popular
uprising in June 1941 in the wake of  Operation Barbarossa, posed a major threat to the
Chetniks  ambitions  for  the  post-war  order,  and  thus  Chetniks  and  partisans  became
enemies, and fought a civil war against each other (Tomasevich 1975; Hoare 2006). 
Chetnik literally means 'member of  an armed band' or četa. The Chetnik movement
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stemmed from a popular tradition of  armed resistance by Orthodox Christians against the
Ottomans in the 19th century, itself  drawing from the older 'Hajduk' tradition of  social
banditry (Tomasevich 1975: 115; Žanić 2007:448). Chetnik fighters consciously drew upon
such traditions by adopting an iconic appearance. The active involvement of  armed bands
of  Serbian volunteers  in  the 1912-1913 Balkan Wars  and during  the First  World War
elevated the Chetniks to cult figures during the interwar period , a cult actively promoted
by  Serbian  political  parties,  namely  the  Democratic  Party  and  the  Radical
Party(Tomasevich 1975:  118),  through the establishment of  Veterans'  Associations  with
local branches throughout Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Hoare 2007:116). During the
Second  World  War,  Chetniks  once  again  tapped  into  the  Hajduk  iconography,  thus
establishing a connection with the mass of  peasants that would constitute their base of
recruitment.  Many  of  its  leaders,  including  Mihajlović,  decided  to  grow long  beards,
traditionally associated with mourning,  and often dressed in a  particularly  recognisable
style, in a peasant dress, old fashioned even by the standards of  the time (Carmichael 2002:
44).  Chetniks were recorded in collective memory for their brutality, an image that they
established  during  the  Balkan  Wars  and  reinforced  during  the  Second  World  War  by
perpetrating  a  number  of  genocidal  attacks  against  non-Serb  populations (Carmichael
2002: 46). In Bosnia, such massacres were, on the one hand, motivated by the will  for
retribution after Ustasha massacres of  Serb populations, and, on the other hand, by their
own exclusive nationalist ideology, which sought for a Greater Serbia as a state covering all
territories with Serb populations, and in which Serbs would be the dominant ethnic group.
In contrast, the partisan movement was anti-nationalist and multiethnic, engaged in active
resistance and guerrilla warfare against the occupying forces, and aimed at establishing a
federal political system in Yugoslavia, through which the country's national question should
be solved. (Hoare 2006: 95)
The experience of  the Second World War resulted in the establishment of  two
opposing legacies with an enduring influence in Serb national  identity.  The ideological
contrast between both legacies is striking, but they also have much in common in terms of
political imaginary (Castoriadis 1987; Taylor 2004). First of  all, both traditions drew from
the  older  'Hajduk'  tradition  of  social  banditry  of  ottoman times  (Žanić  2007:449).  In
addition, while Chetniks  were almost  exclusively Serb,  and the Partisans  were a  multi-
ethnic movement, the majority of  its rank and file were Serbs as well. Joining the Chetniks
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or the partisans wasn't always a decision ideologically motivated, but depended also on
particular circumstances in each local setting, in which resisting Ustasha persecution might
mean joining whatever armed groups were available(Hoare 2006:3). Armed groups often
changed allegiances, so that Chetnik forces would sometimes defect to the Partisans and
vice-versa. Thus, Marko Attila Hoare suggests, “the boundary between the Chetnik and
the Partisan movements remained at all  times fluid; they resembled not the contrasting
black and white so much as the yin and yang- opposites that nevertheless flow into and to
some  extent  resemble  one  another”(2006:10).  The  Partisan  leadership  eventually
established a policy seeking to attract and absorb Chetnik fighters into its own ranks (Hoare
2006:352), so that by the end of  the war, there was a significant number of  partisans who
had come originally from Chetnik ranks, and who reaped the benefits of  shifting sides.
Hoare (2007: 318) cites Rodoljub Čolaković to highlight how communist leaders offered an
alternative articulation of  Serb national identity. On a pamphlet entitled On False and True
Serbdom43, Čolaković “counterposed what he portrayed as the true Serbdom of  the Partisans
and the true unity of  the Serb people arising from the NOP, with the false Serbdom of  the
Nedićites [supporters of  the quisling wartime regime in Serbia, led by Milan Nedić] and
Chetniks,  based  on  chauvinism  towards  other  Yugoslavs  and  collaboration  with  the
occupiers”,  thus  seeking  to  “claim  for  the  Partisans  the  mantle  of  the  Serb  patriotic
tradition” (Hoare 2007:318). Thanks to their massive participation in the NOB, in Bosnia-
Herzegovina  Serbs  became  over-represented  in  the  ruling  class  and  in  administration
during the first two post-war decades (Shoup1968:121; Hoare2007:318,328). Thus after
defeating  the  exclusive  nationalist  vision  promoted  by  the  Chetnik  movement,  the
communists established a regime that, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, did confer a certain level of
privilege to Serbs as an ethnic group, especially in the first two decades (Pešić 1996:12).
The communist  regime sought  to  overcome ethnic  divisions  and simultaneously
assert  its  own legitimacy by promoting the ideal  of  'Brotherhood and Unity'  (bratstvo  i
jedinstvo),  and  cultivating  the  memory  of  the  Partisans'  heroic  struggle  against  fascism
during the NOB. The ideal of  'Brotherhood and Unity'  implied the acceptance of  the
43 Rodoljub Čolaković (1945) O lažnom i pravom srpstvu Sarajevo: Svjetlost, cited by Hoare (2007:318)
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specific character of  each national group (narod) and nationality (narodnost), as well as the
development of  a supra-national, Yugoslav culture, which aimed to add a new layer to
individuals'  social  identity  without  nevertheless  seeking  to  compete  with  any  existing
attachment to their ethnic identities (Wachtel 1998:134). The communists actively sought
to make ethnic identity less salient, and their approach to the wartime legacy reflected this
commitment,  with the war being framed as a  struggle against  fascism (Dragojević  and
Pavlaković 2016: 72; Bergholz 2016: 270). After the war, the communist regime arrested the
leader of  the Chetniks, Draža Mihajlović, who was put on trial, convicted for war crimes
and executed  (Dulić  2012:  626).  The massacres  against  non-Serbs,  however,  were  not
object of  further judicial investigation, and the ethnicity of  the victims was symbolically
erased, under the generic label of  'victims of  fascistic terror'(Bergholz 2010). 
The NOB became the regime's founding myth, designed in such a way as “to unify
the multiethnic population” (Bergholz 2013: 686), but its cult preserved also the memory of
the war as an ethnic conflict rather than simply ideological, as the division of  warring sides
between fascists and anti-fascists seemed to imply (Bergholz 2010). While fallen partisan
fighters were commemorated in memorials containing comprehensive lists of  names, which
allowed  for  their  ethnicity  to  be  recognised,  victims  were  often  commemorated
anonymously, and selectively, depending on who had killed them. Those killed in massacres
perpetrated by Serb groups who later joined the partisans were often not commemorated at
all; instead, a veil of  silence was placed over the circumstances of  their deaths (Bergholz
2010; Duizings 2007), the investigation of  which risked tainting the aura of  the partisan
fighter; thus the magnitude of  Chetnik crimes was  diminished. On the other hand, the
figure of  the Chetnik fighter, representing the opposite of  what the partisans stood for, was
an important element in the memorialisation of  the Second World War in communist
Yugoslavia.  Cathie Carmichael(2002:44) refers,  for instance,  to the role of  partisan war
movies in crystallising the iconic image of  the Chetnik fighter – the quintessential 'bad guy'
– and transmitting it to the new generations, who had no lived experience of  the war. 
Under communism, any display of  Chetnik identity was strongly repressed, as were
also any public accusations that particular individuals, let alone entire communities, were
'Chetnik', accusations that could land the accuser in court for libel under laws forbidding
expressions  of  chauvinism  (Bergholz,  2013:688).  Repression,  thus,  did  play  a  role  in
curtailing ethnically motivated animosity, but a more important factor was that, up until a
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certain moment, the regime managed to improve life conditions, contributing to a certain
degree of  satisfaction on the part  of  the population, which in turn fostered a sense of
loyalty to the regime. In everyday life, ethnicity was not salient in urban settings, and the
regime largely succeeded in creating a sense of  attachment to Yugoslavia as a common
homeland  (Maksić  2017:  ix;  Gagnon  2004:41).  In  such  circumstances,  the  ideal  of
Brotherhood and Unity and the cult of  the NOB, did seem to provide a frame for overcoming
past experiences of  interethnic violence. 
In the late 1970s and 1980, with the regime increasingly unable to stem economic
decay, the evocation of   the partisan founding myth acquired a quasi-religious tone . But
since  the  regime  could  no  longer  foster  an  optimistic  sense  of  future  based  on  lived
experience, the appeal to the past through the intensification of  commemorative initiatives
– including a new wave of  construction of  memorials, such as the Vraca memorial park in
Sarajevo in 1980 (Musi 2015: 126), or the 'Revolution' monument at the Vukosavci partisan
cemetery  in the  Mount  Majevica  in 1986  (Semberske novine  1986:  1;  2)  –  could  not
compensate for the solutions that the regime increasingly failed to provide. While some
people  continued  to  adhere  to  the  cult  of  the  memory  of  the  NOB,  among  others,
particularly younger people, it seemed to foster cynicism and detachment44. Eventually, the
official memory of  the NOB began to be contested (Gagnon 2004: 95), by intellectuals, by
the religious organisations, and by individuals throughout the country who remembered
mass killings perpetrated by Partisans themselves or by Chetnik groups that were eventually
incorporated in the Partisan movement (Hayden 1994; Bergholz 2016). The quasi -religious
character of  official memory did not allow for a critical, distant questioning of  the past, but
did  facilitate  the  emergence  of  alternative  perspectives,  themselves  immune  to  critical
questioning
With  Yugoslavia  in  process  of  dissolution,  these  alternative  perspectives  fully
emerged, promoted by different political forces. Nationalists consciously evoked different
traditions, and the social imaginary of  the Chetniks and Ustashas was resurrected (Žanić
2007[1998];  Carmichael  2002),  while  the  Partisan  social  imaginary  acquired  a  new,
“ethnicised” meaning (Maksić 2017: 200; see also Žanić 2007[1998]). In Serbia, the new
regime of  Slobodan Milošević  claimed to  be  a  continuation of  Tito's  Yugoslavia,  and
44 Informal conversations during fieldwork in 2014 and 2015; see also Spasovska 2017:88, on the 
commemorations of  Youth Day (marking the birthday of  Marshall Tito), and Spasovska 2017a on wider 
feelings of  disillusion among the 'last yugoslavs'.
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ostensibly  retained an allegiance to  the Partisan legacy,  but  nationalised it,  so  that  the
Partisans were now treated essentially as a Serb movement, on the basis of  the fact that
most  Partisan  fighters  were  Serb,  and  regardless  of  their  anti-nationalist  ideology  and
multi-ethnic leadership and membership. The nationalist and anti-communist opposition,
on the other hand, rejected the Partisan legacy and, in the case of  parties such as the
Serbian Radical Party of  Vojislav Šešelj, or the Serbian Renewal Party of  Vuk Drašković,
drew heavily on the Chetnik tradition (Thomas 1999:53). Both parties created sections in
Bosnia-Herzegovina and run for the 1990 elections there, but with poor results (Arnautović
1996: 55). 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the SDS, which would win the bulk of  the Serb votes, had
very close links with Milošević regime, but it fundamentally differed from Milošević's own
party in what regarded the relationship with the communist past. The SDS presented itself
as a traditionalist, national party; it rejected the communist regime, its policies of  multi-
ethnic  coexistence,  and  its  modernising  approach;  and  accused  the  communists  of
discriminating against Serbs and repressing their national traditions (Maksić 2017:201). Its
leadership seemed close to the Chetnik legacy, and Radovan Karadžić himself  came from a
Chetnik family from Montenegro (Donia 2015:24). Initially, however, the party's leadership
threaded carefully in what regarded the Chetnik-Partisan divide, aware as it was of  the
emotional connection to the Partisan tradition among significant sections of  the Bosnian
Serb population. In forming its  electoral  strategy,  the Bosnian SDS benefited from the
hindsight of  the experience of  their sister party in Croatia, where elections had taken place
in May 1990 (Maksić 2017:201). The Croatian SDS had failed to attract the votes of  the
majority of  the Croatian Serbs, who instead chose to vote for the Social Democratic Party,
the  reformed  successor  of  the  communist  party  (Gagnon  2004:139).  In  Bosnia-
Herzegovina, too, the Communists were the SDSs main rival, with whom they needed to
compete for votes (Maksić 2017: 199-204). The SDS electoral campaign was marked by
systematic appeals for Serb unity and renewal (Toal and Maksić: 2014, 272-273). Appeals
to unity aimed to overcome the Chetnik-Partisan divide without alienating potential voters
close  to  each  tradition.  This  was  done  by  reclaiming  the  Partisan  struggle  as  a  Serb
struggle,  and  accusing  the  communists  of  betraying  their  own  partisan  fighters  and
humiliating the Serb people by equating Serb national traditions with the Chetnik tradition
(Maksić 2017:201). Having had their national identity repressed by the communist regime,
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SDS leaders claimed, Serbs now needed to engage in a movement of  'national awakening'
(Maksić  2017:176).  The  call  for  unity  and  renewal  marked  the  beginning  of  the
rehabilitation of  the Chetnik  legacy,  but  at  this  time the party  also presented itself  as
tolerant to other ethnic groups and supportive and in favour of  multi-ethnic coexistence, a
claim that the ostensibly good relations with the other main national parties,  the croat
HDZ and the Muslim SDA, gave credit to (Maksić 2017:204).
In Bijeljina, once the communist regime became open to challenge, the division
between  those  displaying  an  attachment  to  the  partisan  legacy  and  those  claiming
allegiance to the retrieved Chetnik legacy became visible, and still remains so. The plains
of  Semberija  and the  Mount Majevica had staged a series  of  military confrontations
between both forces. Some villages became strongholds for either of  the two forces, and
remained  popularly  known  as  either  'Chetnik  villages'  or  'partisan  villages'.  With  the
creation of  national parties in 1990, Chetnik iconography began to be visibly displayed as
an  ideological  statement,  and  local  Chetnik  traditions  were  retrieved  (Trbić  1991),  a
tendency that increased once the war in Croatia started in 1991, with some local Serbs
actively involved in fighting not far from Semberija in Eastern Slavonia, either as volunteers
or as conscripts in the JNA (Nikolić 1991a).
Still, once the Serbian Democratic Party won the elections, and gained control over
Bijeljina's municipality, the new local authorities were initially cautious in what regarded
the Chetnik legacy, an attitude in which they converged with the SDS central leadership.
Thus as we previously saw, while the Partisan legacy was now unambiguously rejected, no
longer associated with the Serb people but only with the Communist regime, the initial
reinscription of  the toponymy did not include names that referred to the Second World
War Chetniks.  How much was this  a  calculated move,  or  one that  reflected a  natural
evolution within the local ruling class remains unclear. Initially, in Bijeljina, the Chetnik
legacy was openly claimed only, among political parties, by the members and supporters of
the Serbian Radical  Party.  The Radicals  established a  local  branch,  and its  own local
paramilitary force, both led by Mirko Blagojević,  who in 1993 was granted by Vojislav
Šešelj, the leader of  the Serbian Radical Party, the title of  Vojvoda, traditionally assigned to
Chetnik  leaders.  In contrast,  the paramilitary force locally  affiliated with the SDS, the
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'Panthers', led by Ljubiša Savić 'Mauzer' never displayed any particular attachment to the
Chetnik legacy, as assessed by their iconography45.
While the erasure of  references to the Partisans and the communist regime marked
a point of  no return, it was the inscription of  the Chetnik legacy in Bijeljina's toponymy
that truly defined the nature of  the new regime. This took place in the context of  a crucial
stage for Republika Srpska's state-building process, the creation of  the Army of  Republika
Srpska, in May 1992, followed, in July, by the general mobilisation of  men of  military age.
Once this  shift  occurred, the local  propaganda machine quickly  began to promote the
Chetnik  legacy.  The  newspaper  SIM novine gave  ample  coverage  to  initiatives  in  local
villages, to replace the busts of  partisan heroes by those, in similar style, of  local Second
World War Chetnik fighters(e.g. SIM novine Aug.1994); the newspaper also published a
series of  articles(feljton;  fifteen, published between July 1994 and August 1995)  about the
history of  the Chetnik movement in Semberija and the Majevica, authored by the historian
Mirko Babić, director of  the Museum of  Semberija.
The  Chetnik  legacy  soon  made  its  way  into  Bijeljina's  official  memory.  Just  as
Semberija's  notable partisans  had been erased from Bijeljina's  toponymy,  local  Chetnik
figures, now elevated to the status of  legends, were commemorated with street names. One
section of  the Miloš Obilić Street, previously Narodni heroj Radojka Lakić street, was again
renamed, after Baja Banjičić, Bijeljina's Chetnik commander and later commander of  the
Second  Chetnik  Semberija  Brigade(Babić  1994b);  streets  were  named  also  after  Leke
Damjanović, Commander of  the Majevički Četnik Korpus (Babić 1994a); and Professor
Bakaljić,  a  school  teacher  in  Bijeljina's  gymnasium,  who  had  a  crucial  role  in  the
indoctrination  of  local  Chetnik  leaders  (Babić  1995).  Other  streets  were  named  after
individuals commemorated in the Chetnik tradition, such as military leaders of  the Balkan
wars and First World War. Most importantly, the Square of  the Victims of  Fascistic Terror,
in  the  neighbourhood  of  Ledince,  where  the  Meša  Selimović  Street  and  the  Serbian
Volunteer Guard street meet, received the name of  Square General Draža Mihajlović, in
tribute to the historical leader of  the Chetnik movement.  The geographical continuity
between Draža Mihajlović Square and Serbian Volunteer Guard street suggested a sense of
45 Both forces were eventually integrated in the Army of  Republika Srpska.  After the war, 'Mauzer' left the 
SDS and founded his own party, the Democratic Party, much closer ideologically to the 'nationalised' 
partisan legacy. He became an important ally to Biljana Plavšić and Milorad Dodik in the struggle with 
the SDS for political supremacy in post-Dayton Srpska, and was killed in 2000 by a car bomb. Blagojević 
became a lawyer and continues to live and work in Bijeljina. 
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historical continuity between the Second World War Chetniks and the 1992 'liberators' of
Bijeljina. 
The role of  the Orthodox Church in the nationalist reinscription of  space
The Church played a crucial role in creating an emotional environment conductive to the
emergence of  nationalism, through the evocation of  the founding myth of  the Battle of
Kosovo and the exploitation of  the traumatic memories of  the Second World War (Perica
2002:145-158) . It was through the Serbian Orthodox Church that nationalistic claims were
first  publicly articulated,  in 1982, when a group of  clergymen, including a few highly-
regarded theologians,  wrote a petition denouncing the persecution of  Serbs in Kosovo,
who, the petitioners claimed, were facing extinction as a result of  a premeditated genocide
that was being carried out against them (Dragović-Soso 2003:125; Perica 2002:123-132).
The Church had a crucial role in connecting the issue of  Serb persecution in Kosovo to
what it presented as a wider historical trend towards Serb victimisation at the hands of
other ethnic groups. The question of  the Serbs in Kosovo became the key issue around
which contestation to the communist regime was articulated in Serbia, in which the Church
was joined by a number of  intellectuals, gathered around cultural organisations like the
Association of  Writers of  Serbia and the Serbian Academy for Science and Arts (SANU)
(Gojković 2000; Dragović-Soso 2003). The issue of  Serb victimisation in Kosovo eventually
became the trigger of  Slobodan Milošević's  ascent to power (Silber and Little 1995:36;
Cohen  2002:43),  and  the  Church  seized  the  opportunity  opened  up  by  Milo šević's
nationalistic agenda to firmly occupy a prominent role in public affairs, of  which it had
previously been deprived by the communist regime (Aleksov 2010; Radić 2000). 
On  Vidovdan 1988  (St.  Vitus  Day:  28  of  July  in  the  Gregorian  calendar),  the
anniversary of  the 1389 Battle of  Kosovo polje, the remains the saint-martyr Prince Lazar,
who had been killed in the battle, were taken on a journey across Serbia, to bring the
Saint's relics back to the the Monastery of  Ravanica, in Kosovo, where his body had been
between 1390 and 1690. The journey started in the Patriarchate of  Belgrade, where the
relics were brought to in 1942, and had its initial stop in the monastery Nova Ravanica, in
Vrdnik, Vojvodina, where the relics had remained since they were brought from Kosovo in
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1690, until 1942, when fears that the Ustasha regime of  the Independent State of  Croatia
might desecrate them led to their removal to Belgrade. From Vrdnik, in September 1988
the  procession  travelled  to  the  Monastery  of  St.  Nikola  in  Ozren,  near  Doboj  in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, before returning to Serbia via Zvornik, and then slowly proceeding
southwards to Kosovo, finally arriving to the Monastery of  Ravanica on 9 September 1989,
more than one year after the procession began(Srpski pravoslavni manastir Ravanica: n.d.).
The procession of  Lazar's  relics marked the Church's  new public role,  seizing upon its
newly acquired position to enforce a decision its  Sabor (the highest organ of  the Church,
literally, Assembly) took, back in 1954, to return the relics to Ravanica.
The  procession  replicated  in  opposite  direction  the  “First  Great  Migration”  of
1690, when, in the wake of  the Austro-Turkish war of  1683-1699, the Patriarch of  Peć,
Arsenije III Čarnojević, led a column of  tens of  thousands of  families out of  Kosovo and
into territory newly conquered by Austria, which was to become Vojvodina. With him the
Patriarch  had  brought  the  remains  of  Prince  Lazar  remains  from  the  Monastery  of
Ravanica (Zirojević 2000:190). Olga Zirojević (2000: 209, n.1) notes the parallels between
the narrative of  the First Great Migration, with the biblical narrative of  the exodus of  the
Israeli people across the Sinai desert, to highlight the importance of  the idea of  'chosen
people' in the context of  the myth of  Kosovo. 
Sociologists of  religion identify the procession of  Lazar's relics as an indicator of  the
commitment of  the Church towards nationalism, as well as an element that contributed to
mobilise  the  population  accordingly  (e.g.  Radić  2000:254;  Perica  2002:128;  Velikonja
2003:242).  The  impact  seems  to  have  been  significative;  according  to  Radmila  Radić
(2000:254), “everywhere they passed, the remains were solemnly welcomed by masses of
people”. The political context during which the procession took place was one of  deep
transformation  in  Serbia,  as  the  'anti-bureaucratic  revolution',  or  'happenings  of  the
people', a series of  mass protests against the communist establishment and in support of
Slobodan Milošević was under way, and which contributed to strengthen his grip on power
and resulted in his control of  the autonomous regions of  Vojvodina and Kosovo (Thomas
1999:  44-51;  Silber  and Little:  60-73;  Vladisavljević  2008).  In Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the
communist authorities prevented similar rallies from taking place (Andjelić 2003:71), but
the 'anti-bureaucratic  revolution'  was  nevertheless  closely  followed there,  particularly  in
Semberija, where, due to its location on the border with Serbia, people easily circulated
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between both republics, and where Belgrade and Novi Sad, the major urban centres closest
to the region, exercised a great deal of  attraction 46.
It is highly significant that the procession of  Lazar's relics visited the North-East of
Bosnia, covering in its path much of  the territory of  the Episcopate of  Zvornik-Tuzla, to
which Semberija belongs. The funeral procession entered Bosnia from Vrdnik inVojvodina
and crossed Semberija to the monastery of  Ozren near Doboj, where in September 1988
the  remains  of  the  Saint  were  exposed,  before  the  procession  returned  to  Serbia  via
Zvornik(Srpski  pravoslavni  manastir  Ravanica:  n.d.).  It  is  difficult  to  assess  how much
impact the procession of  Prince Lazar's remains had in Semberija, as the local media, then
still dominated by the communist party, did not report on it, and none of  my interviewees
mentioned having personally engaged with it, but its political implications are nevertheless
significant.
In  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  thus,  the  procession  covered  only  the  episcopate  of
Zvornik-Tuzla47, whose Bishop, the Vladika Vasilije Kačavenda, would soon become one
of  the most prominent figures of  Bosnian Serb nationalism, and a close associate with the
Serbian Democratic Party from its creation in July 1990. Ordinated bishop in 1978, aged
40,  he  led what  would later  become known as  the Bosnian lobby within the Church
(Buchenan 2014 :71;  Đorđević  2010),  and was close to  the conservative faction of  the
Church, who would become the driving force behind the Church's move towards a more
prominent role in public affairs and the main instigators of  exclusive nationalism within its
ranks(Dragović-Soso 2002:125; Aleksov 2010:12; Maksić 2017:129). The passage of  Prince
Lazar's funeral procession through Kačavenda's episcopate of  Zvornik-Tuzla was both a
46 According to some of  my interviewees, as seen from Bijeljina, the nationalistic element in the 
'anti-bureaucratic revolution' was not always evident, so that among disillusioned communists who 
resented the so-called 'foteljaši'(armchair politicians), there was some enthusiasm for it, including among 
Muslims. As my informants recalled it, it was only after the 600th anniversary commemorations of  the 
battle of  Kosovo polje that the nationalistic element became obvious. The events were openly discussed 
among friends, with Milošević dividing opinions (interview in January 2015
47 In her widely cited Political Lives of  Dead Bodies, Katherine Verdery(1999) states that Prince Lazar's 
procession of  Prince Lazar “carried through monasteries in all regions Serbs claim for their new state, 
including parts of  Bosnia and Croatia” (p.18). This factually incorrect. Lazar's relics were not taken to 
Croatia at all, and in Bosnia-Herzegovina they only visited the Monastery of  Ozren. In Balkan Idols: 
Religion and Nationalism in Yugoslav States Vjekoslav Perica(2002:128), makes only a brief  mention to Lazar's 
procession, undoubtedly due to lack of  reliable data. Still, Perica crucially provides a wider context, 
placing the procession as part of  a “dynamic program of  pilgrimages, jubilees, and church-national 
festivals” stretching from 1983 until 1990.
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consequence of  his influence within the Church and a booster to his power in Bosnian
politics. The procession was followed eventually by the exhumation of  mass graves dating
from the Second World War in the Majevica area (Radić 2000:260), which locally played
an important role in the rehabilitation of  the Chetnik legacy. 
As  signs  that  Yugoslavia  could  disintegrate  emerged,  the  Church  increasingly
presented the Serb people as a people under existential threat, not only in Kosovo, but also
in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Radić 2000: 260-261). The Church was particularly
involved in the controversies around the  genocidal persecution of  Serbs during the Second
World War by the Ustasha regime of  the Independent State of  Croatia (Radić 2000:255),
following new publications that revised upwards the officially accepted figure of  victims
(Dragović-Soso 2003:100-114).  The evocation by the Church of   the historical experience
of  victimisation during the Second World War was soon connected to the political changes
in both republics, in a way that would eventually offer legitimation to the Serb rebellions in
Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, by accepting the necessity of  Serbs to defend themselves
(Perica 2002:147). In 1990, mass graves began to be reopened in Bosnia-Herzegovina to
exhume victims of  the Ustasha regime, a process in which the Serbian Orthodox Church
was  instrumental  (Radić  2000:259).  The  following  year,  coinciding  with  the  50th
anniversary of  the beginning of  the Second World War in funerals,  these bodies were
reburied in accordance with the rituals of  the Church. The exhumations and reburials,
which coincided also with the beginning of  the war in Croatia, contributed to create a
sensation of  'time compression' (Verdery 2000:115) that conveyed the idea that the present
war was a continuation, or a re-enactment of  the Second World War48. 
By this time, the Church was openly advocating for the Greater Serbia idea. In a
letter to Lord Carrington, President of  the international Conference for Yugoslavia, the
Patriarch Pavle head of  the Serbian Orthodox Church, defended the necessity of  keeping
all Serbs in one single state, stating that 'the time has come to recognise that the victims of
48 To some extent, the Serbian Orthodox Church anticipated the military conflict in Croatia, by engaging 
in a prolonged conflict with the Catholic Church over the role of  the Catholic Church in Yugoslavia 
during the Second World War, namely its relationship with the Ustasha regime of  the Independent State 
of  Croatia and its position regarding the genocidal persecution of  the Serb people by the Ustasha. The 
conflict, opened after the Catholic diocese of  Zagreb submitted to the Vatican, in 1981, a candidacy for 
martyrdom of  Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac (Perica 2002:178), whom had been condemned by the 
communists for collaboration with the Ustasha regime, eventually dying under house arrest of  a disease 
contracted in prison. The deterioration of  the relation between both churches eventually led to the 
collapse of  interfaith dialogue, which occurred in 1990, just as the war in Croatia was looming (Perica 
2002:155).
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genocide  cannot  live  together  with  their  past  and perhaps  future  executioners’  (Radić
2000:362). The Serbian Orthodox Church quickly established close links with the Bosnian
Serb nationalists gathered around the SDS (Radić 2000: 266); as Adis Maksić(2017:128)
highlights, “the relationship between SDS's agenda of  'national awakening' and that of  the
Serbian Orthodox Church was structurally that of  mutual reinforcement”. Cooperation
with Milošević regime was limited by the regime's claims of  continuity with the communist
regime and the Church's anti-communism, as well as by Milošević's interest to “mobilise
religious resources and symbolism only to serve his political purposes”(Aleksov 2010:181).
With  the  Bosnian  Serb  nationalists,  by  contrast,  the  Church  was  able  to  establish  a
relationship of  symbiosis.  The Serbian Orthodox Church claimed for itself  the role of
protector of  the Serb minorities outside Serbia, and the SDS's leadership embraced as key
ideological features the themes of  unity and renewal, so dear to the Church. As Maksić
(2017:128) notes, “the Serbian orthodox Church representatives frequently sat in the first
rows  of  SDS  meetings  in  religious  garb.  Conversely,  SDS  officials  attended  religious
ceremonies,  spoke at  commemorations  and held meetings  in  church premises”(see also
Anđelić 2002: 170).
The Serbian Orthodox Church became the main driver in the retraditionalisation
of  society  in  the  territories  under  control  of  Serb  nationalists,  defined  by  the  SDS
leadership as the renewal of  the Serb traditions which had been repressed and undermined
during communism. In a moment of  great uncertainty, the Church was the only stable
institution  left  that  could  provide  any  clear  guidance  and  emotional  comfort  to  the
population, and it eagerly took up its role.
Kačavenda and the SDS became close allies, and the bishop was not shy to use his
pulpit to exploit the anxiety of  the Orthodox population and instil fear (Manojlović 2009:
35). In the beginning of  the war, on 15 May 1992, after the 'Tuzlanska kolona' incident, in
which a JNA military convoy was attacked by forces loyal to the Bosnian government (see
Ch.4),   Kačavenda  immediately  abandoned  his  see  in  Tuzla  and  moved  to  Bijeljina,
prompting a sizeable proportion of  the Serb population there to follow him. He became
one of  the most powerful figures in Bijeljina, and an important actor in the reinscription of
the urban space. 
The first concrete measure involving the Serbian Orthodox Church towards the
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reinscription  of  the  urban space  in  Bijeljina  targeted  the  field  of  education,  with  the
renaming of  two schools in tribute to two medieval saints whose cult had deep political
connotations. Primary school 'Lazo Stojanović Lazić' became 'Stefan Nemanja', in tribute
to the medieval ruler considered to be the founder of  the medieval kingdom of  Serbia; and
the  primary  school  'Radojka  Lakić'  became  'Sveti  Sava'  (Saint  Sava),  in  tribute  to
Nemanja's son, who was the first Archbishop of  the Serbian Orthodox Church and thus
considered to be its founder as an autocephalous church. Compulsory religious education
was soon introduced, and orthodox priests became a normal presence in schools, much
beyond their newly-acquired role as religion teachers. Many streets were also renamed after
saints and historical figures of  the Orthodox Church, and eventually all aspects of  public
life became permeated by Orthodox iconography, as politicians were keen to be associated
with the Church. It was the case, for instance, of  Bijeljina's new coat of  arms, in which the
cross figures prominently. 
Fig 3. Bijeljina's coat of  arms, originally adopted in 199449 
49 Image  retrieved  from  the  official  website  of  the  Municipality  of  Bijeljina,  at
https://www.gradbijeljina.org/lat/1587.grb-i-zastava-grada-bijeljina.html (last  access  01/05/2019).
There are slight differences with the coat of  arms originally adopted in 1994, consisting in the flag at the
left, which was orginally the wartime flag of  Republika Srpska. The coat of  arms' design was amended to
represent the current flag, in line with the Decision of  the Constitutional Court of  Bosnia Herzegovina of
2006 (Case U 4/04) (about this Decision see Correia 2013: 338).
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The  coat  of  arms  deserves  more  detailed  analysis.  The  Commission  set  up  by  the
Municipal Assembly tdefine the criteria for its design included the Mayor (načelnik) Jovan
Vojnović and a number of  experts, including the Director of  the Museum of  Semberija,
Mirko Babić. The design was then assigned to the Serbian Heraldic Society, responsible
also  for  the  design  of  the  coat  of  arms  of  Republika  Srpska  and  of  many  other
municipalities. The coat of  arms is an example of  how local identities are mobilised so as
to  converge  with  centrally-defined  policies,  so  that  local  elements  reveal  the  regional
diversity of  Republika Srpska whilst affirming its (desired) ethnic homogeneity.
The characters represented in the coat of  arms are Filip Višnjić, the epic poet and
guslar native of  Trnovo in Semberija, who chronicled the First Serbian Uprising of  1804,
and, Knez Ivo of  Semberija, the village leader of  Popovi, near Bijeljina, who fought in the
First Serbian Uprising. In an article in the local newspaper SIM Novine, Babić highlighted
the originality and historical significance of  such a choice, which he placed in contrast with
the European tradition of  using animals, which evoked a mythical past. The vitality of  the
Serb nation was asserted through the evocation of  real people, who played a role it national
liberation (Babić 1994). The origins of  the municipality of  Bijeljina were, thus, associated
with the liberation of  Serb lands of  which the Uprising was the first episode; and with its
rural communities, which produced not only the cereals that made Semberija wealthy, but
also figures like Filip Višnjić and the Knez Ivo. Any mention to the town's Ottoman origins
and Islamic presence were absent, and instead, a Church with a distinctively Orthodox
dome figured prominently in the central shield. Thus officially, Bijeljina was represented as
a Serb town in which Orthodox Christianity was an eminent feature. 
The adoption by public institutions of  a patron-saint, and the annual performance
of  the  corresponding  'krsna  slava'  was  another  important  element  towards
retraditionalisation of  the public space. An adaptation of  the pagan cult of  ancestors, the
slava is  a  tradition  particular  of  the  Serbian  Orthodox  Church,  which   belonged
fundamentally to the realm of  the family. Each Serbian orthodox family has its own patron-
saint,  transmitted patrilinearly.  The annual  celebration of  the patron-saint's  day,  called
'krsna slava' is an important family event, in which the family gathers together in the house
of  its patriarch and perform the ritual of  sharing of  the  slavski kolač, the liturgic bread,
blessed by the parish priest, after which up to three days of  feast may follow. In Bijeljina, as
elsewhere in territories under Serb control, schools, hospitals, museums and libraries, fire
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stations, professional and even recreational associations soon adopted their own patron-
saints, as did also all political institutions, the police and the army. As each organisation
started organising its own  slava, it  extended to the public realm a religious tradition that
previously belonged to the realm of  the family. 
The process of  retraditionalisation through the reinscription of  the urban space
proceeded  after  the  war  with  the  construction  of  new  churches  and  monasteries  in
conservatively traditionalist style (Manić et al. 2016: 10)50. Until 1992, there were only two
churches in Bijeljina. There are now five, built since 1998. There are also two monasteries
in Bijeljina. The monastery of  Saint Vasilije Ostroški, located in the centre, close to the city
hall, was built between 1996 and 2001 to serve as episcopal palace, and the Saint Petka
monastery,  a  female  monastery  built  between  2005  and  2009  just  outside  town  (see
Djedović 2012:222-227). Built in Russian style, with golden domes, and a large park with
artificial lakes, the Monastery of  Saint Petka was also  used by Kačavenda as his secondary
residence.  The  timeline  is  revealing.  The  construction  of  the  monasteries,  assigned  to
Kačavenda's  personal  use,  took  precedence  over  the  construction  of  churches,  which
catered for an expanded Orthodox population, as Bijeljina received thousands of  displaced
Serbs. 
The monastery of  Saint  Vasilije  Ostroški  was built  in  land adjacent to the plot
where the Atik mosque had once stood, so that its tower replaced the minaret in the skyline.
To make room for the Monastery, a whole block of  the Atik mahala was expropriated.
Eleven  houses  in  that  block  belonged  to  Muslim  families,  while  the  remaining  four,
belonged “to some of  the most highly regarded families  in Bijeljina”(Musli 2009), with
important  connections  to  the Communist  regime.  These included personalities  such as
Dimitrije  Čolaković,  the  founder  of  the  Museum  of  Semberija,  and  Boro  Djurković,
former  President  of  the  Municipal  Council.  Symbolically,  thus,  the  expropriations
represented, at once, an attack against the Partisan legacy which these families embodied,
and Bijeljina's multiethnic fabric and tradition of  zajednički život. The eviction of  Muslim
families was a systematic practice throughout the war, but this expropriation took place
already in the post-war period, at a time when Muslims who had left or been deported
from Bijeljina during the war were already trying to return, and filing legal processes to
50 In their analysis of  contemporary Serbian Orthodox Church architecture, Manić, Vasiljević-Tomić and 
Nikolić (2016: 10) provide a basic typology of  post-1990 trends in religious architecture, classifying it into 
three main categories: conservatively traditionalist; radically modernising; and compromising.
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claim their property back. Building this monastery was thus both a sign of  defiance against
the  Dayton  Peace  Agreement  and  the  international  presence  in  the  country,  and  an
indicator of  how powerful Bishop Kačavenda had become.
The monument to the Fallen Soldiers
Erasure and Reinscription are continuous processes  that form part  of  the dynamics  of
urban development. Setting a cut-off  moment may thus seem arbitrary, but is nevertheless
useful  for  analytical  purposes.  The April  1992 decision  by  the  Municipal  Assembly  to
rename forty  two streets  was  the first  step towards  the establishment of  a  new official
memory, through a systematic intervention in the public space. The feature that completed
the redefinition of  Bijeljina's mnemonic matrix in the urban space was the monument for
the 'Fallen Soldiers and Civilian Victims of  Semberija in the Defensive-Fatherland War',
which  would  become  the  main  location  of  all  official  commemorations,  related  or
unrelated to the recent war. 
The construction of  the monument represented an important step in the political
career of  Mićo Mićić, who would become Bijeljina's most powerful politician in the post-
war period, and one of  the most  important  leaders  of  the SDS. A physical  education
teacher, in 1996  Mićić became the head of  the Department for Veteran Affairs (načelnik
odjeljenja za boračka i invalidska pitanja) in the Municipal Council of  Bijeljina. Mićić was not a
war  veteran himself.  According  to some of  my informants,  Mićić  spent  the war years
working as a physical education teacher in the town of  Vlasenica.  Avoiding mobilisation
would prove to be an important advantage in his political career. Although he could not
share the veterans' experience, he  was nevertheless able to build a relationship with the
Fighters Association, BORS. This provided him with an important base of  supporters,
which he used to advance his political career.  The intense power struggles between Serb
parties in the aftermath of  the Dayton Agreement, and within his own party, the SDS,
opened up space for new leaders to emerge, which favoured those who, like himself, were
clearly untainted by war crimes, and therefore less liable to the threat of  dismissal from
office that in this period hanged over Serb politicians. Mićić went on to become Minister
for Refugees and Displaced persons (2000-2003),  and Minister for Labour and Veteran
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Affairs(2003-2005) in RS government, and returned to the municipality of  Bijeljina again
in  2004,  now as  Mayor  in  the  aftermath  of  the  local  elections;  he  has  since  become
Bijeljina's strongman, and one of  the most important figures in the SDS.
In 1997, Mićo Mićić launched the process of  creation of  a monument for the fallen
soldiers, a demand from the Fighters Organisation. The whole process developed smoothly.
The monument was commissioned, after a competition with five other proposals, to the
Belgrade-based  sculptor  Miodrag  Živković  (Semberske  novine 1999).  Mićo  Mićić secured
funding  from  the  municipality  budget  as  well  as  contributions  from  Bijeljina  based
companies to build the monument, and it was inaugurated in August 1999 on the occasion
of  the Municipality's krsna slava, of  Saint Pantejlimon – Pantelino.
Fig. 4: The Monument to the Fallen Soldiers and Civilian Victims of  Semberija
in the Defensive-Fatherland War
The  monument  explores  the  theme  of  death  and  rebirth,  to  express  the  intimate
relationship between religion and national  identity.  A Holy Cross in bronze,  six meters
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high, from which a mass of  male figures emerges, the monument evokes the sacrifice made
in the liberation of  the Serb people, a sacrifice whose sacred character  the use of  Christian
iconography evokes. The monument commemorates the past but also celebrates the future,
as male figures represent both the fallen soldiers and the new nation emerging from the
destruction, a nation regenerated by holy sacrifice and ready to enjoy their newly acquired
freedom.
The  monument's  features  were  not  unique  to  Bijeljina.  Miodrag  Živković,  the
sculptor, repeated the same pattern in the other monuments he authored across Republika
Srpska, in Brčko, Prijedor, and Modrica. The repetition creates a sense of  the unity of  the
war experience across regions, as a war of  liberation requiring the highest sacrifice, like the
Crucifixion preceded the Resurrection
Miodrag  Živković  was  a  prestigious  sculptor,  with  great  experience  in  the
conception of  war-related memorials. During the communist period, he was the author of
some  of  the  most  significant  examples  of  memorial  architecture  and  sculpture  in
Yugoslavia,  such  as  the   Memorial  Complex  of  Kadinjača,  in  Serbia,  which
commemorated the 'Republic of  Užice' and the  Battle of  Kadinjača of  1941 between the
partisans and German forces; the “Broken Wings” Monument in the Memorial Complex
of  Kragujevac,  paying  tribute  to  the  schoolchildren  murdered  by  German  forces  in
retribution for partisan action; amongst many others. In Bosnia, Živković was the author of
the Valley of  Heroes, in Tjentište, not far from Foča, on the exact place where the Battle of
the Sutjeska – one of  the most important battles fought by the partisans during the Second
World War, which the memorial complex commemorated – occurred.
The successful conversion of  the socialist-era sculptor to the new conditions dictated
by the disintegration of  Yugoslavia and the dominance of  nationalist politics both in Serbia
and in Republika Srpska suggests that the boundaries between the aforementioned partisan
and Chetnik legacies are more fluid than many would like to admit, and reveals the easiness
with which many people shifted from their publicly displayed attachment to communist
Yugoslavia to publicly embracing nationalism. The style of  Živković's  work in this  new
phase  reveals  very  different  aesthetic  influences,  with  the  sculptor  leaving  abstraction
behind, to deliver forms of  more accessible and immediate interpretation; but it also reveals
much  in  common  between  both  phases,.  Indeed,  the  monuments  in  Bijeljina  and  in
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Tjentište  similarly  explore  the  theme of  death  and  rebirth,  thus  sharing  a  mnemonic
intention in which the audience is induced a feeling of  debt for the overwhelming scale of
the sacrifice on which the foundations of  the new state laid. 
 The monument to the fallen soldiers has become the main locus for all war-related
commemorations. The commemorative season opens on 9th January, the anniversary of  the
creation of  Republika Srpska in 1991; reaches its peak with the commemoration of  the
'liberation of  Bijeljina' on the 1st of  April 1992; and closes on the 25 th September, the day
of  the Municipality, marking the first liberation of  Bijeljina from occupation by the Ustasha
and the Nazi forces in 194351, a commemoration that had been abandoned in 1992, and
which  Mićo  Mićić  reintroduced  in  2005.  In  between  these  three  dates,  other,  minor
commemorations,  take  place,  most  of  them  organised  by  BORS,  the  Fighters'
Organisation, marking significant dates such as the creation of  different military units or
important battles those units were involved in. Commemorations related to the First World
War  were  also  held  during  my  fieldwork,  which  marked  the  100 th anniversary  of  the
beginning of  the war. These were divided between the monument to the fallen soldiers as
primary location, and the equestrian statue of  King Petar Karadjordjević. None of  these
commemorations attract many people, but they are all widely reported by the local media,
and often local television channels will organise special programmes dedicated to the dates
these commemorations refer to. 
Concluding remarks
Erasure and reinscription of  the public space were, in practice, largely simultaneous top
down processes. They had, however, different functions in the transformation of  society. If
we think of  the wartime experience as a liminal experience, then the erasure of  public
space, symbolically rejecting the previously existing political order, marked the closing of
the stage of  separation. By erasing references to the partisan legacy and to the Muslim
historical presence, Bijeljina's authorities erased references to a competing ideology, one
that offered a vision for Bosnia-Herzegovina as the common homeland of  different ethnic
51 Bijeljina was again conquered by German forces in November 1943, to be finally liberated only in April 
1945 (Lukić 2012:178)
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groups.  This  vision offered an alternative to  what  it  meant  to  be Serb in the Bosnian
context. 
Erasure vacated the space which the new order that was about to emerge would
then occupy through acts of  reinscription. This new order was, at the time, a goal or an
aspiration  rather  than a  reality.  But  the  local  authorities  publicly  expressed  it  through
inscription  in  the  public  space,  however,  as  if  it  was  already  a  reality,  simultaneously
projecting  itself  into  the  future  and  into  the  past.  In  this  sense,  reinscription  had  a
generative effect, and as such, was part of  the stage of  liminality proper, during which the
new structures which would support that new order began to emerge. 
The political impact of  the dual process of  erasure and reinscription cannot be
dissociated  from how the population experienced in everyday life. In Bijeljina, one of  the
immediate effects of  the dual process of  erasure and reinscription was to enforce a break
with the past at the level of  the everyday experience of  space. This caused a disruption in
the  sense  of  belonging,  provoked by  the  sudden loss  of  comfort  and intimacy usually
conveyed by familiarity  with space.  As  geographer Maoz Azaryahu highlights,  “a rude
intervention in routinised practices and and traditional relations between ordinary people
and  their  habitat  effects  a  cognitive  dissonance  and  mental  and  communication
disarray”(1996:317). 
Against this loss of  comfort and intimacy, one form of  passive resistance available in
principle to the population would be simply to ignore the new official toponymy and carry
on using the old names in everyday life (Light and Young 2014). This did happen to some
extent, if  not as an act of  resistance, then at least out of  habit. The problem, however, was
that some streets had their names changed more than once, and some streets were renamed
after personalities that had previously given their name to different streets, as was the case
with Vuk Karadžić, Gavrilo Princip and Nikola Tesla. Using the old names reinforced the
sense  of  confusion  and disorientation,  as  it  would  be  unclear  whether  they  would  be
referring to the old or the new street.
This loss of  intimacy was reinforced by the the profound changes in an important
element  in  the  experience  of  everyday  life  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the  experience  of
neighbourliness, or  komšiluk.  While good neighbourliness is an important element in the
experience of  everyday life in any community, in Bosnia-Herzegovina it was elevated to the
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category of  a social institution, a source of  solidarity which people consciously cultivated,
and which transcended ethnic boundaries. While the experience of   komšiluk was not always
positive  (Sorabiji  2008),  since  it  placed  constraints  on privacy,  the  negative  sides  were
generally accepted as minor, in comparison with the sense of  solidarity it fostered. With the
emergence  of  nationalism,  komšiluk  was  often  idealised,  either  positively  as  a  form  of
resistance to ethnic divisions, or in negative terms as undermining ethnic identity.  Nikola
Koljević, one of  the main leaders of  SDS, and later member of  the collective presidency of
Republika Srpska, demeaned the idea of  komšiluk in these terms, in an interview with the
Serbian magazine NIN in 1991: “there is no return to the ‘neighbourly Bosnia’ in which
everyone kindly  asks  one  another  about  one’s  health,  but  all  work  against  each  other
behind their backs as much as they can” (cited by Maksić 2017: 225). 
Serb nationalists, and the SDS, were particularly hostile to the value of   komšiluk,
which stood in the way of  their strategic goal of  'separation of  peoples'. This hostility was
not without a reason. Indeed, the institution of   komšiluk  was crucial in protecting the
population during Arkan's take-over, with many Serbs actively protecting their endangered
Muslim 'komšije' (neighbours) (see Ch.3). But as  Muslim and other non-Serb families were
evicted from their homes after the take-over, these were subsequently occupied by Serbs,
either local Serbs with important connections to power, who occupied the best houses, or
by people displaced from other regions. The forced displacement of  neighbours reinforced
the feeling of  alienation induced by the changes in the toponymy, as people no longer knew
who lived where, and who were their neighbours. The newly arrived inhabitants did not
know the old names, and as they quickly became a sizeable proportion of  the population,
the  old  names  and  the  old  urban  environment  soon  fell  into  oblivion.  For  its  native
residents, Bijeljina no longer felt like home. 
In a wider sense, the persecution of  the Muslim population was itself  part of  the
process of  erasure.  Conversely,  the resettlement of  Bosnian Serbs  displaced from areas
outside  the  control  of  the  Army  of  Republika  Srpska  was  part  of  the  process  of
reinscription through which Republika Srpska was to become a fatherland (otadžbina) to a
homogenised Serb population. If  the process of  erasure succeeded in undermining the
traditional sense of  attachment its residents felt to Bijeljina, the process of  reinscription
aimed at fostering, among the Serb population, a sense of  belonging to Bijeljina's  new
identity as a 'Serb' town. The following two chapters we will explore how the residents of
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Bijeljina, old and new, lived through the liminal experiences of  persecution of  Muslims(ch.
3) and resettlement of  displaced Serbs (ch.4), and how these experiences affected the sense
of  attachment to Bijeljina, and its very identity. 
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 Chapter 5
Enforcing the 'separation of  peoples':  
Bijeljina's experience of  ethnic cleansing
The violence to which Bijeljina's Muslim population was subjected during the war was a
crucial element in the transformation of  Bijeljina. This violence was the main  instrument
for the enforcement of  the nationalist principle of  'separation of  peoples', the principle that
most fundamentally characterised the vision of  the SDS  leadership for the future of  the
Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Donia 2015: 184)52. The Muslims, who before the war
constituted the majority  of  Bijeljina's  urban population,  became the undesired 'others',
standing in the way of  the ideal of  an exclusive ethnic nation for whom the creation of
Republika Srpska would provide a homeland.  Deprived of   status, the undesired 'others'
were first  rendered – physically as well  as  symbolically– invisible;  relentlessly exploited;
induced by fear to flee; and finally massively expelled, in a protracted process of  ethnic
cleansing. Around  90% of  Bijeljina's Muslim population was victim of  forced displacement
(Tableau 2009:741, Table 2M) –  either forcefully expelled or coerced into leaving –  and at
least 224 persons of  Muslim ethnic background were killed (Trbić 2007a:243-250)53. This
chapter will offer an account of  how people endured the violence that was imposed on
them, and organised themselves  to  survive and preserve their  dignity  in such a hostile
environment, with a particular focus on the development of  coping strategies in the face of
systematic discrimination and persecution.
52 Chapter 2 elaborates on the idea of  'separation of  peoples' as well as on the idea of  'life in common' in a 
multiethnic society.
53 Citing data from the Sarajevo-based Research and Documentation Centre (2007)
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In order to understand how the 'separation of  peoples' was enforced on the ground,
in this chapter I move beyond official memory, as inscribed in space (see Ch.2), to focus on
the lived experience of  Bijeljina's population during the war, as reflected in the personal
recollections of  some of  its residents. Many of  the events described are part of  an archive
of  shared knowledge, widely known beyond the mnemonic community of  experience that
the victims of  ethnic cleansing encompass. Some were the subjects of  news reports and
Human Rights reports, and some were scrutinised by the ICTY and domestic courts, which
provided useful sources of  information for the present chapter. But the events related to the
ethnic  cleansing,  ie,  the  persecution  and  expulstion  of  the  Muslim  population,  are
conspiculously  absent  from  official  memory  and  are  rarely  the  object  of  public
representations. They nevertheless figure prominently in privately-kept social and collective
memories.  Thanks  to  Ethnographic  engagement,  focusing  on  the  particular  ways
individuals experienced, reacted to, and reflect about, the violence that surrounded them
and/or  targetted  them,  some  of  these  memories  usually  protected  from  the  gaze  of
outsiders, were to some extent open to me. Many of  these private memories, shared in
interviews and informal  conversations,  belong to  the category of  'difficult  memories'  –
memories  that  somehow  contradict  or  at  least  add  complexity  to  dominant  public
narratives, themselves heavily influenced by nationalism. 
The way ethnic cleansing was conducted in Bijeljina makes this a particularly useful
case-study, shedding light on the dynamics of  ethnic cleansing as a liminal process and as a
shared  experience,  involving  both  those  who  were  directly  victimised  –  primarily  the
Muslim population – and the remaining residents, from whom the Muslims were to be
'separated' so as to make Bijeljina a 'Serb' town. The bulk of  the expulsions of  non-Serbs in
territories controlled by Serb forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina was completed in the early stage
of  the war. In a matter of  a few months, most regions under the control of  Serb forces had
been emptied of  most of  its non-Serb population. Most of  the cultural heritage indicating
the historical presence of  Muslims or Croats was also destroyed in this period (Walasek
2015: 23). This was not the case, however, in Bijeljina. In areas where before the war the
Serb population did not constitute an absolute majority, or which were close to frontlines,
the expulsion of  the non-Serb population appears to have been, from the perspective of  the
Bosnian Serb leadership, a strategic imperative, just as much as a consequence of  their
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ideological vision for Republika Srpska. In regions like the Drina Valley (Podrinje) in Eastern
Bosnia  (Bečirević  2014;  Bolzmann  Institute1994)  or  Prijedor,  in  northwestern  Bosnia
(UNSC Prijedor Report 1994; Wesseling and Vaulerin 2005), there was a clear sense of
urgency,  and  significant  human and  logistic  resources  were  mobilised  towards  a  rapid
expulsion of  the non-Serb population. 
This sense of  urgency was not equaly present everywhere, though. Indeed, in places
like Bijeljina, Banja Luka (Galijaš 2009) or Trebinje (HW 1993: 382-390) – municipalities
with a Serb majority and firmly under the control of  the SDS since the 1990 elections – it
was only much later, after the consolidation of  the political structures of  the newly created
Republika  Srpska,  that  the  expulsion  of  non-Serbs  would  become  a  priority.  As  they
deviate  from the  larger  pattern  in what  was  to  become Republika  Srpska,  these  cases
contribute to a finer analysis of  ethnic cleansing, focusing on the prolonged presence of
non-Serbs, to reveal a spectrum of  activities directed against them, ahead of  their eventual
expulsion, and the ways in which people sought to protect themselves and help protect
others.
Focusing  on the  prolonged presence  of  non-Serbs,  mostly  Muslims,  in  Bijeljina
during  the  war,  this  chapter  will  explore  an  aspect  particularly  neglected  by  existing
literature about ethnic cleansing: the development of  coping strategies – the practises many
non-Serbs adopted, when in a position of  disempowerment and vulnerability, to protect
themselves  by  reducing  exposure  to  danger;  and  to  better  endure  the  systematic
discrimination they were faced with. To remain in what was to become  a Serb territory,
non-Serbs were coerced into downplaying their ethnic and religious affiliation. They were
effectively  disposessed  not  only  of  wealth,  livelihoods  and  freedom,  but  also  of  their
identity.  Their  'polluting'  physical  presence  required  their  symbolic  absence.  Making
themselves  symbolically  if  not  physically  invisible  was  one  of  three  main  coping
mechanisms that I identified among non-Serbs, based on my interviews during fieldwork,
complemented by secondary sources. The other two were the display of  loyalty towards the
new  authorities,  and  reliance  on  support  across  ethnic  boundaries.  This  chapter  will
explore each of  these coping strategies and how they evolved, and correlate them with the
evolution of  the  process  of  consolidation  of  Republika  Srpska's  political  structures,  to
understand the dynamics of  ethnic cleansing in wartime Bijeljina, and how it contributed
to transform the town's very identity. 
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I  begin  by  describing  how  the  local  authorities  imposed  a  certain  pattern  of
persecution against the non-Serb, largely Muslim population. This pattern comprised the
imposition of  a night curfew; arbitrary arrests and the creation of  detention facilities; job
dismissals; evictions; the imposition of  work duties amounting to forced labour; and diverse
forms of  extortion and humiliation. The leniency on the part of  the authorities towards the
abuse of  non-Serbs by ordinary citizens was also part of  this pattern. 
The chapter then analyses the different coping mechanisms adopted by non-Serbs,
noting how they coincide with the behaviour adopted by the liminal personae in the liminal
stage of  rites of  passage, as observed by Victor Turner (1967), in which they are stripped of
their previous identity, and seen by the wider society from which they were marginalised as
sources  of  pollution  and  contamination.  The  last  section  will  focus  on  how  the  mass
expulsion of  the Muslim population was organised, executed and sometimes resisted, to
highlight the role of  agency in ethnic cleansing, and the relationship between the central
leadership who set the goals and issued the guidelines, and their local executioners.
5.1: Establishing a pattern of  persecution
The take-over of  Bijeljina and the massacre then perpetrated left the population in a state
of  shock, and triggered an exodus, in which up to 2500 Muslims were estimated to have
fled, of  a pre-war population of  approximately 19.00054. Much of  the Roma population
also fled in this period — some had already left earlier, in anticipation of  an escalation of
tensions  — and only  a  few Roma families  stayed behind55.  The use  of  demonstrative
violence to create panic  so as to motivate the targeted population to leave is  a  typical
mechanism of  ethnic cleansing (Gow 2003: 118), which efficiently brings about a shift in
the  demographic  balance  between  different  groups.  In  the  municipality  of  Bijeljina,
however, Serbs already outnumbered Muslims at a ratio of  two to one, even if  in the town
54 The figure of  2500 was provided originally by Ljubiša Savić 'Mauzer' in an interview with SIM novine 
(15/06/1992, pp. 2-5). In the guilty veredict against the wartime President of  Republika Srpska, 
Radovan Karadžić, the ICTY(2016: par. 630) accepted this figure as a likely estimate (par.630), along 
with the figures provided in the procecution witness statement of  Milorad Davidović, who testified that by
August 1992 there were approximately 17.000 Muslims living in the town of  Bijeljina, as well as 12.000 
in the village of  Janja (ICTY 2016: par. 670). The figures were, Davidović claimed provided to him by the
local authorities. 
55 Interview with members of  the Roma community, January 2015.
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itself  the ratio was reversed, with Muslims as the majority. In the case of  Bijeljina, thus, the
ideological and strategic motivations to induce Muslims to leave were countered by the
opportunity for exploitation and dispossession that their continued presence in Bijeljina
would provide. After this initial exodus during the military take over of  Bijeljina, non-Serbs
faced great obstacles to leave Bijeljina. While many people did manage to leave though
different channels, it was only in the Spring of  1993 that the first wave of  mass expulsions
occurred. Sucessive waves would follow, so that by the end of  the war there was only a
residual number of  non-Serbs living there. 
Remembering  the  environment  of  panic  that  set  in  after  the  take-over,  Lazar
Manojlović, at the time the Headteacher at the Radojka Lakić Primary School (renamed
Saint  Sava),  described the state  of  fear  and disbelief  in  which the population became
immersed.  Those trying to leave seemed to cling to the prospect of  resuming a normal life
elsewhere. Manojlović told me how many parents gathered at his school, trying to obtain
documents allowing for their children to be transferred, so that they were able to resume
their  studies  somewhere  else  as  soon as  possible  and save  the  school  year 56.  For  these
families, school bureaucracy would prove to be the smallest of  their problems. As soon as
they hit the road, those trying to leave were stopped at road blocks erected by Serb forces,
who screened everyone, often making arrests or forcing people to go back.
While  many tried to  escape but  were  unable  to,  others  did  not  really  consider
leaving.  Saša Pazarac described the pervasive sense of  disbelief  that dominated among
Bosnian Muslims in Bijeljina during the war years “a particular state of  mind: a person watches it
all  [happening],  and  thinks  'it  won't  happen  to  me'”57.  Pazarac  to  some  extent  shared  this
“particular state of  mind”; he was amog those who could see, months ahead of  the take-
over, that “things weren't going well”, but he could never imagine – or refused to believe –  that
the war would happen, let alone that it would happen in Bijeljina. Regardless of  sharing
this  pervasive disbelief,  Saša had also more practical  constraints.  He and his  wife  had
elderly, widowed mothers, for whom  leaving was out of  question, and children who they
did not  want  to  expose to  the risk  of  a  dangerous journey.  Evicted from his  flat  in  a
56 This concern with resuming a normal life as soon as possible is also described by Sebina Sivac-Bryant on 
her account of  ethnic cleansing of  the Prijedor municipality in Northwest Bosnia. The author, seventeen 
at the time and herself  a native of  Prijedor, describes how “still keen to get to university in Zagreb, I 
visited my old school to ask for a copy of  my end of  year certificate, but was confronted by one of  my 
former teachers in uniform holding a belt-fed machine gun in the empty school building” (Sivac-Bryant 
2016: 3). 
57 Interview with Saša Pazarac, July 2014
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skyscraper  (neboder)58 close  to  the  centre  by  the  'arkanovci'  during  the  take-over,  on  the
grounds that it had been used as a base for Muslim snipers (see Ch.1), Pazarac was also
dismissed from his job as Serbo-Croatian language and literature teacher. He moved with
his family into his mother's house in the outskirts of  Bijeljina, and spent the war years
there, sitting at home during the day, so as to minimise exposure to the random violence
Muslims became subjected to, and spending the night in different places, so as to avoid
being 'collected' (pokupljen) for forced labour or expulsion. His wife, a renowned seamstress
who owned a boutique in the building where the family used to live, became the family's
breadwinner. They would be among the few non-Serb families to remain in Bijeljina until
the end of  the war59. 
Those who remained in Bijeljina after the take-over were subjected to systematic
discrimination, emotional and physical violence. Many people were arbitrarily detained  for
interrogation, where they were mistreated and often beaten. There were various detention
facilities in Bijeljina, and several people disappeared after being detained, never to be seen
alive again (Trbić 2007; 2007a; 2013a).
In June 1992, a detention camp was formally established in the village of  Batković,
6 km north of  Bijeljina, in the warehouses of  the  Agrosemberija company.  The camp was
under the jurisdiction of  the Army of  Republika Srpska, and remained open until early
1996 (ICTY 2016:256, par.664). The scale of  violence in this camp was not at the level of
places like Omarska and Keraterm in Prijedor, Luka in Brčko, or Sušica in Vlasenica60, but
the detainees were nevertheless systematically abused, deprived of  food, clothing, hygiene,
medical care and basic confort. Detainees routinely performed forced labour of  various
kinds. With conscription into the army, there was an acute shortage of  labour in the region,
58 The 'skyscrappers' were a block of building of between eight and twelve floors close to the northern side 
of the main square. Since most of Bijeljina at the time were two floors houses and a few buildings of no 
more than three or four floors, they stood out in the landscape, and offered a priviledged view over the 
town. 
59 Interview, July 2015. See also Wilkinson (1998)
60 The authorities of  Republika Srpska closed down the other camps mentioned a few months after the 
beginning of  the war, under international pressure. By the time they were closed down, however, the 
camps had already fulfilled the goals for which they had been created, and there were very few Muslims 
or Croats left in the areas where they operated. Most of  the detainees that survived the experience of  
detention were released in prisoners exchanges, or handed to the International Comittee of  the Red 
Cross and sent to exile. Some, however, remained in detention, and were eventually transferred to 
Batković. Throughout the war, Bijeljina functioned as a safe place to keep detainees from other partts of  
Bosnia (see ICTY 2016:312; 397; 407;504;509; etc).
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and  local  farmers  often  came  to  the  camp  and  took  detainees  to  work  in  the  fields,
especially during harvesting season. Detainees were also often taken by the army to the
frontlines, to perform heavy and dangerous tasks, such as digging trenches, cutting wood,
carrying  ammunition,  etc (ICTY  2016:  254,  par.  657). Many  men  were  killed  while
performing such tasks during the Bosnian war, including nineteen Croats from Bijeljina,
whose bodies now lay to rest in the local Catholic Cemetery61, and at least ten Muslims
from Janja (Medžlis IZ 2015).
When my interview respondents mentioned Batković, a name that always came up
spontaneously was that of  Ferid Zečević.  After the take-over of  Bijeljina, Ferid Zečević
participated in a radio broadcast with Arkan at Radio Bijeljina, after which he received
Arkan in his home to celebrate the Muslim holiday of  Bajram (Eid al-fitr), the three day
feast that maked the end of  the Holy month of  Ramadan, (HRW 2000: 14), which in 1992
started  on  4  April.  This  was  a  public  gesture  of  reassurance  towards  the  Muslim
population, which converged with the initial approach the local authorities took, sending
signs of  accomodation to 'moderate' Muslims. But Arkan's exercize of  public relations may
have hidden other motivations. Zečević owned a pizzeria close to the army barracks, which
he continued to operate after the take-over, giving rise to  speculation that perhaps he had
paid Arkan for protection. 
A  few  weeks  after  Arkan  left  Bijeljina,  Pero  Simić,  the  new  director  of  Radio
Semberija  and  the  newspaper  Semberske  novine (now  renamed  SIM  novine),  denounced
Zečević on the air waves, accusing him of  standing behind the Patriotic League (Patriotska
liga)62, which the SDS accused of  leading the alledged attempt by 'Islamic extremists' to
take-over  Bijeljina.  The  Patriotic  League,  in  turn,  was  presented  as  the  contemporary
version of  the  Second World  War  Handžar  Division,  about  which rumours  had been
circulating for over one year (see Ch.2). In June 1992, Ferid Zečević was detained and taken
to Batković,  where, shortly after,  he and Husein Ćurtić  Hapaka, a goldsmith also from
Bijeljina, were killed by guards (ICTY 2016: 254, par. 659). 
According  to  my  informants  who  spontaneously  mentioned  this  case,  news  of
Zečević's death quickly reached town, and were received with shock 63. A secondary school
61 According to information provided by the local Catholic parish and human rights activists.
62 A Bosnian Muslim political organisation affiliated with the SDA, with its own paramilitary forces, the 
Green berets.
63 Zečević's remains, however, were recovered only in 2005, from a mass grave (ICTY 2016:255, par. 659, 
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teacher by profession, Professor Ferid Zečević, as many in Bijeljina respectfully call him to
this day, embodied a system of  values and a way of  life that now belonged to the past. An
educated man, well-known and widely respected, he was fully engaged in the city's cultural
life. Although he was not a powerful man, his public profile, and, probably, his relative
wealth, attracted the wrong kind of  attention. Using clubs (batine, or  motike)  as weapons,
guards beat him to death. My respondents always mentioned the method and the weapons,
as if  to highlight a sadistic motivation in the descent to barbarism, which, some added,
could  not  be  separated  from  the  general  climate  of  ethnic  hatred  fostered  by  the
authorities64. 
Beyond the threat of  violence and severe restrictions to their freedom, including a
night  curfew  (policijiski  čas),  the  authorities  took  a  set  of  measures  that  materially
undermined and morally degraded the Muslim community. These were measures such as
the job dismissal; evictions; obligation to accommodate displaced Serbs; and work duties. 
The practise  of  dismissing  Muslims  from their  jobs  was  first  established in  the
aftermath of  the 1990 elections, when the SDS sought to replace cadres with people of
their confidence. At the time, Ljubiša Savić 'Mauzer' personally vetted all new nominations,
in his role as  President of  the Municipal Commission for Recruitment and Nominations
(predsjednik opštinske komisije za izbor i imenovanje)(Nikolić 1991:9). Later, during the Summer of
1991, many workers lost their jobs because they refused the call for conscription to the
Yugoslav  People's  Army  (JNA),  then  fighting  a  war  in  Croatia.  After  the  take-over,
dismissals became increasingly frequent. 
The systematic dismissals opened up vacancies that newly arrived displaced Serbs
could fill, but in the short term the dismissals generated also an acute shortage of  human
resources locally, given that Muslims comprised the majority of  the urban population at the
start  of  the  war.   In  some cases,  that  shortage  protected  non-Serbs,  allowing them to
continue in their jobs, subject to their 'loyalty' (see infra).  It happened also, however, that
note 2129.
64 Ferid Zečević was killed on 28 June 1992. In 2014 Gligor Begović, a guard at the Batković camp during 
the war, was arrested and put on trial at the Court of  Bosnia-Herzegovina for crimes committed in 
Batković. He was condemned, among other things, for his participation in the beatings that resulted in 
the death of  Ferid Zečević and Husein Ćurtić Hapaka, and sentenced initially  to thirteen years, reduced 
to ten years on appeal in 2016 (Sud Bosne i Hercegovine 2016).
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workers with particular technical skills,  who could not be easily replaced were formally
dismissed only to be immediately reassigned to their positions, but deprived of  any rights,
as part of  their 'work duties' (e.g. Trbić 2007a: 189). 
For people in  'socially  owned'  accomodation65,  losing one's  job entailed also the
eviction from one's home, since in such cases housing was provided by the employer as part
of  the workers' benefits package. Keeping with the narrative of  an agression by Muslim
extremists against the Serb people, in July 1992 Mauzer referred to job dismissals in the
following terms:
“The Presidency of  the SAO of  Semberija and Majevica has two days ago
taken  concrete  decisions  about  the  first  reprisal  measures  to  be  taken  in
Bijeljina. Some of  these measures have already been defined: first, to dismiss all
Muslims from leadership roles. Should the genocide against the Serb people
continue, the second measure will be to dismiss the Muslims from their jobs;
the third is the least popular,   emigration (iseljavanje),  expulsion  (proterivanje)  or
something similar ”(SIM Novine 1992d)
The job dismissals had the effect of  undermining the sustainability of  the Muslim
population by denying them the basic means of  subsistence. The statement, which framed
as reprisals measures that were already de facto  in place,  also reveals how the possibility of
mass expulsions was considered from early on, and evoked as a threat. 
Those self-employed were also affected, because as part of  the war effort the civil
and military authorities  had the power to confiscate moveable goods,  such as cars and
machinery. This hit those working on agriculture particularly hard.  In the village of  Janja,
the  Muslim  population  had  their  lorries,  cars,  tractors,  and  equipment  confiscated,
ostensibly to fulfill the needs of  the police and the military (Paravlić 2011: 248).
65 In Yugoslavia, under the regime of  self-management, workers were often housed by the companies they 
worked for, which were themselves socially owned by the workers. According to Antoine Christian Buyse 
(2007:167) “the tenants had specially protected tenancies also called ‘occupancy rights’ over the 
apartment in question. Under this system they could live in the apartment indefinitely, their rights could 
be terminated only in exceptional circumstances, and the right could be passed on to other household 
members when the occupancy right holder died. (...) Crucially, the Law on Housing Relations provided 
that occupancy rights could be cancelled if  the inhabitant of  an apartment was absent for more than six 
months without justified reasons.”
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The rate  of  evictions  from socially-owned accomodation increased substantially
with the massive arrival  of  internally displaced Serbs to Bijeljina,  from mid-May 1992
onwards. Those who owned their own homes, as many did in Semberija, were not spared
either. On the contrary, their property would become a magnet attracting more unwanted
attention. Home owners were forced to accept displaced Serbs in their homes, according to
the rule of  'surplus living space' (HRW 2000: 24-27). The rule, defined in the Decree on the
Allocation for Temporary Use of  Housing Objects, Business and other Premises66, which entered into
force in 1 August 1992, but which was already being applied in Bijeljina at least since June,
defined the criteria of  'surplus living space' as any space beyond the ratio of  two persons
per room. Since houses in Bijeljina were usually big, the measure potentially affected the
overwhelming majority of  the population. However, according to research carried out by
the organisation Human Rights Watch (2000), “the rule on surplus living space was applied
in a discriminatory fashion”, as “only minorities and those Bosnian Serbs who refused to
take part in the war effort were forced to accommodate displaced Bosnian Serbs in their
homes” (p.  27).  As the Human Rights Watch report concludes,  “this  policy in practice
turned into a  mechanism allowing displaced Bosnian Serbs  to  harrass  and abuse their
Bosniak hosts, and ultimately drive them from their homes by making life unbearable, or
simply throwing them out”, and thus, “although the Bosnian Serb authorities indeed had
difficulty accommodating Bosnian Serb displaced persons,  the rule was also used as an
instrument to force Bosniaks and other minorities to leave”(p.27)67.
The introduction of  work duties was another important aspect of  this process of
disposession and exploitation. The Muslims' loss of  status was openly displayed. Older men
from the most respected families (najuglednije porodice), were summoned to work for the public
utility service (komunalna služba). They were made to sweep the streets, collect rubbish and
perform other menial  jobs,  which some of  my respondents  characterised as  a show of
public humiliation aimed at demeaning them in their dignity. 
Younger men had it even harder.  The story of  Sead Vidinlić68 resonates with the
66 Published on the Official Gazette of  the Serbian People in Bosnia-Herzegovina n. 12/92, 31/07/92, 
cited by HRW (2000: 25, n.62)
67 The Report also acknowledges that there were cases in which Serb residents voluntarily hosted displaced 
people. 
68 Interview, December 2014
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experience of  many others in Bijeljina. He was arrested for the first time in April 1992, in
the street where he lived, on the third day after the takeover of  Bijeljina.
“I made a mistake... When I think about it now, I was so naïve, when I heard on Radio Bijeljina that it
was safe to go out, I believed it. ”(For a moment, he sounded angry at his old self, before ).
Sead was then severely beaten, and remained in detention in the basement of  the electric
distribution company for two days, then transferred to headquarters of  the Crisis Staff,
where a Serb neighbour, whom his mother had asked for help secured his release. It took
him months to recover physically. 
“I was all indigo when I got home. My mother looked after me, but for six months I couldn't leave the
house”. 
His physical condition seems to have been monitored, as during that time he was taken to
the police station several times, for so-called 'informational interviews' (informativni razgovori). 
“In those days – Sead stressed – Bijeljina was like a concentration camp (Bijeljina je bila kao
logor).  We were treated like dogs. I remember, at Beogradska street, I saw it, I was shocked, there
was a house where it was written 'Forbidden entry to dogs and Muslims' (Zabranjen ulaz
psima I muslimanima)”
He was detained again one year after his first arrest, and sent to the Piper 'logor'
(detention camp), to perform 'work duties'. 
“I decided to stay home. I'm not guilty of  anything, I didn't do anything, I have no reason to flee
(biježiti).  My wife,  my  partner  of  twenty  years,  couldn't  take  it,  and  she  left  [Sead also  felt
responsible for his elderly parents, who were not in condition to flee; his wife left for
exile, which determined the breakup of  their relationship]. In the meantime, I was collected
(pokupjen) for the firsts time. A van (kombi) came one night, they had a list, then they took us to a
military lorry, there at the street now called Miloš Obilić – we the old Bijeljinci call it Dašnica – I
was taken to the Pipere logor (detention camp for forced labour). The whole way until the camp, they
were beating us with wooden sticks. Then, June... July... [time went by]... what do I know? The
Summer months...  what  do I know? One couldn't  even keep count  of  time.  The only  thing that
mattered was to get through another night, and to remain alive”.
Sead Vidinlić gave me details of  the harsh regime of  forced labour, physical and emotional
abuse he was subjected to. For more than one year he remained in detention, deprived of
proper food and shelter, digging trenches, carrying munition, cutting wood, and working in
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farms during harvesting season. He was then released, only to be once again detained two
weeks later. 
Eventually, Sead Vidinlić decided he couldn't take it anymore, and began making
plans to flee. After gaining the trust of  an army officer, he was allocated to perform work
duties in the town of  Bijeljina. This allowed him to go back home every night, so that he
was now able to organise himself. It was his sister, already living in Germany, who arranged
everything. She paid 17.000 German Marks to human traffickers to bring Sead, his new
wife and their baby daughter to Germany. They left in July 1995; soon after, his elderly
parents were evicted from the family home, expelled from Bijeljina and abandoned in  no
man's land between frontlines in Mount Majevica.
Leaving Bijeljina was usually possible only after paying hefty fees. Two organisations
operated  openly  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Serb  authorities.  One  was  the  'Agencija
Evropa',  formed and staffed by members of  the police and of  the local branch of  the
Interior Ministry (MUP), but officially a private business ( ICTY 2016: 262, par. 675). The
agency's main task was to facilitate the obtention of  legal documents allowing individuals
who wished to leave the country to do so. In the process, applicants were usually required
to sign documents relinquising their property, which should be transferred to the state. The
agency would then take them across the border with Serbia, and then to Hungary. This was
done  in  cooperation  with  the  Serbian  authorities,  who  were  directly  involved.  The
operations of  the Agencija Evropa were directly coordinated by Pedrag Ješurić, chief  of
Bijeljina's  Department  of  Internal  Affairs  (SUP:  Sekretariat  unutrašnih  poslova),  and  Mile
Puzović, head of  the Department for Border Affairs and Foreigners of  Serbia's Ministry of
Internal Affairs (ICTY 2013: 278, par. 894).
The  other  organisation  was  the  Commission  for  the  Exchange  of  Civilian
Population,  headed  by  Vojkan  Đurković,  which  was  responsible  for  the  transfer  of
populations within Bosnia, across the frontlines towards territory under the control of  the
Bosnian government. While the 'Agencija Evropa' dealt with individuals who applied to
leave, Vojkan's commission primarily focused on enforcing the political decision, taken by
Republika  Srpska's  central  leadership,   to  reduce  the  non-Serb population to  minimal
levels.
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There were also various groups operating clandestinely, smuggling people out of
Semberija across the border to Serbia, and then to the border with Hungary, from where
they  would  be  able  to  reach  Western  Europe.  Sead  Vidinlić  and  his  family  exposed
themselves to great risk, but they were fortunate to reach their destination. That was not
the  case  of  the  Isić  family,  a  family  of  six  originally  from Teslić,  who  tried  to  reach
Germany,  where some of  its  members lived already. In transit  in Bijeljina,  where they
waited for permission to leave the country, they were approached by a young man who
convinced them he was able to take them across the border. The family was murdered by a
gang who lured them with the promise they would take them across the river Drina to
Serbia. The gang was composed by twelve young men from villages in Semberija, members
of  the Army of  Republika Srpska, who during periods of  rest away from the frontlines
engaged in criminal activity. They were arrested when they were caught robbing the house
of  a Serb man in the village of  Suho polje. Once in custody, they confessed to a series of
other crimes,  including the murder of  thirteen people in four separate incidents (Trbi ć
2013: 261).
The case was at the source of  great tension in Bijeljina. In their September 1994
report  about  ethnic  cleansing  in  Bijeljina  the  Humanitarian  Law  Center,  a  non
governmental  organisation from Belgrade,  mentions  an incident  related  to  this  case:  a
bomb placed in the building where the President of  the Municipal Council ( opština) lived.
Their  informants  suggested  that  the  attack  “most  likely  targetted  the  President  of  the
District Court because of  the trial of  twelve young Serbs accused of  killing, in four separate
incidents, (…) twelve Muslims (including three children) and throwing them in the river
Drina”(HLC 1994). The report implies that the bomb was a form of  pressure against the
punishment of  the accused. This kind of  threat seems not to have been unique to this
particular case. According to Trbić (2013:263) six of  the members of  this gang received
prison sentences: forteen years, later increased to twenty, to Branko Đurić Grbo; ten years,
later increased to twelve, to Zoran Pantić  'Pinc',  six years to Željko Lakić  and Vukadin
Karolić; four and a half  years to Nikola Kovačević and three and a half  years to Rade
Novaković-
Some of  my informants described what they saw as a sense of  entitlement among
Bosnian Serbs, fostered by a a certain climate of  impunity, and the glorification of  warlords
like Arkan.  This  sense of  entitlement  amplified the risk  of  violence against  non-Serbs.
177
Ordinary Serbs knew they could treat Muslims, Croats and Roma however they wanted
with virtually  no risk  of  punishment.  This  resulted in  various  forms  of  violence,  from
verbal abuse, to theft, beatings, and even murder, as in the case described above, which was
not unique.  he phenomenon of  'intimate violence', in which perpetrator(s) and victim(s)
knew each other and often had previously had cordial relations was an important feature of
the Bosnian War,  with a  long-term negative effect  in community life  (e.g.  Sivac-Bryant
2016).
This sense of  entitlement drove some people towards extortion. One of  my informants,
Samir69, recalled on such case. An avid fisher, Samir had a cabin in the bank of  the River
Drina, where he kept his equipment. 
“A friend told me [some months before the war] 'Don't go to the Drina!'. I cannot live
without the Drina. I told him, 'Are you joking?' But I stopped going [as many local villagers
had adopted a typical Chetnik iconography, and began to display aggressive behaviours,
something that was not common in the city at the time]. The cabin was looted. I thought,
'Let them, let them have the fridge, let them have everything, I don't need it'. So I never
went there again. What remained, remained. Later, they set the cabin on fire. And sadly I
know who did it. He came to my house, and asked me to use my chainsaw, to cut some
wood. My mother saw him, and told me 'Did you notice he wearing your jacket?' This was
a specialised fishing jacket, just for export. A friend who was a director at Kurijak [a local
garnment factory] gave it to me. Nobody had such type of  jacket. It means he had been in
my cabin. I told him 'I'm sorry, but Mirko A. [a Serb friend] has the chainsaw.'. So I told
him, 'go to Mirko's and get it'. Then I called Mirko, and he said [sarcastically] 'let him
come'. Mirko was ready for him. Out of  vengeance, the man set my cabin on fire (…). I
used to buy him a bear, and give him fish. Look how he paid back”.
The extortion attempt Samir described was on the milder end of  the spectrum of
intimate violence. In his book Majstori mraka (The Masters of  Darkness), Jusuf  Trbić(2007;
2007a) provides several extreme examples of  intimate violence, including that of   Faruk
Bilalić, 20 years old at the time, last seen alive when his former school mate and partner in
basketball  games,  now  a  policeman,  took  him  from  his  house  for  an  'informational
69Interviewed in January 2015
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interview' (informativni razgovor)70, reassuring his mother that this was a mere formality.
His body was recovered in 2003 from an unidentified grave in Sremska Mitrovica, Serbia
(Trbić 2007:229-230). 
Intimate  violence  fulfilled  an important  role  in  relation to  the  strategic  goal  of
'separation of  peoples'.  Whether planned and perpetrated by those in power, or committed
by individuals emboldened by the prevailing sense of  impunity,  in territories  under the
control  of  Serb  forces,  acts  of  intimate  violence  undermined  community  links,  and
simultaneously contributed  to the implementation on the ground of  the goal of  'separation
of  peoples' and to its  justification by the ruling class as necessary for the establishment of
durable peace.  In striking contrast,  people  openly defending victims of  violence would
quickly get in trouble with the authorities. 
The case of  Snježana, a woman displaced from Tuzla, is particularly interesting in
this context.   A mother of  two in her late twenties, she arrived in Bijeljina in May 1992,
and and settled  in the  mahala of  Tombak, Bijeljina's poorest neighbourhood, where her
family was assigned accomodation.She still lived there, in a half-built house, the exterior
still unclad.
I met Snježana through one of  her friends, a, Mirzeta, Bosniak woman in whose
home I lived for a couple of  weeks during my field visit in the Summer of  2015 – I already
knew her daughter and son-in-law, and she had heard a lot  about me, thus creating a
strange sense of  familiarity. The two women visited each other for coffee every evening,
and as we sat outside in my hostess' garden, I was able to witness and participate in some of
their conversations. Usually these consisted mainly in small talk, gossip, and complaints
about small  problems of  everyday life;  but sometimes the chats evolved into something
deeper, and the two friends reminisced about the old days during the war, when they first
met.  One  one  evening,  the  environment  was  much  more  sombre  than  usual.  That
afternoon, one of  their neighbours had been killed by a car whilst crossing the street in the
city centre. All the neighbourhood was in mourning. To highlight the good character of  the
deceased, my hostess recalled how this woman – a resettled Serb – had behaved correctly
70 The expression “Informativni razgovor” is an euphemism widely used by police and security forces in
Yugoslavia and its  sucessor states,  to justify detaining and interrogating individuals in the absence of
concrete  evidence  against  them,  and  often  with  the  purpose  of  exercizing  political  pressure.  An
informational interview involved a spectrum of  approaches towards the intimidation of  the interviewee,
from veiled threats presented as ostensibly friendly advise, to physical violence. 
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towards her during the war:
“ Her brother was killed in combat (ratišta), and I did not dare joining the mourners who gathered at
her house [because she was a Muslim herself]. She sent for me, and later told me, 'why didn't
you come'? You are not guilty that my brother was killed. It wasn't you who killed
him'”. 
This was a tacit acknowledgement that Muslims like herself  were seen the enemy, the 'other
side'. It thus seemed normal, in those days, for Muslims to expect retribution whenever
something bad happened in the frontlines.  Snjžana added, to highlight the good character
of  their deceased neighbour: 
“It wasn't easy in those days. Everybody spoke about Muslims like this: 'balija this, balija
that', when it wasn't worse [ balija is a derrogatory term for Muslims”]. 
There was a strong element of  conscious performance in this conversation. The two friends
were fully  aware of  the nature of  my research,  and Mirzeta  was  keen to impress  her
neighboors by presenting me as someone “who really gets it” (skontati). As I interpreted it,
the two friends wanted, on the one hand, to highlight how transgressive their friendship
was, and how 'their own' co-ethnics criticised them for it, and, on the other hand, to show
how their deceised friend was strong and dignified, as inviting Mirzeta to join the other
mourners would likely be frowned upon by her fellow Serbs.
 “It was like that in those days”, Mirzeta added. “and among Bosniaks, it was ' Chetnik
this, Chetnik that'. 
“It wasn't the same thing”, Snježana replied. “I remember, your daughter went to school with
my son. It wasn' easy for her”. Then, turning to me, she said “But the war didn't change me,
you know!” 
Not  long  after  she  settled  in  Tombak,  Snježana  befriended  some  of  her  Muslim
neighbours, like Mirzeta. “She defended us”, Mirzeta confirmed, and often quarreled (svađala
se) with other displaced Serbs for the way they abused Muslims.  
“  I  was  called  to  the  police  station  many  times,  for  an  'informational  interview'  (informativni
razgovor)”, Snježana said. My hostess nodded.  I asked why. They must have taken it for a
rethorical question, because they did not reply.  71  Snježana's attitude, they implied, was
71 Fieldnotes,  August 2015 (adapted)
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widely seen as subversive, and often censored for alledgedly fostering discord among Serbs. 
The case of  Snježana suggests that the climate of  intolerance and discrimination
against  the ethnic  'others'  also  worked to produce compliant  subjects.  Calling Muslims
'balija' – a derrogatory term – and abusing them reinforced the strategic goal of  'separation
of  peoples',  but  treating  them  in  a  dignified  manner  revealed  the  endurance  of  the
traditions of  'life in common', thus posing a challenge to the newly established order. The
fact that she was a displaced person and therefore poorly integrated into the local society
made  her  vulnerable  in  a  way  that  domicile  Serbs  who  protected  non-Serbs  from
harrasment  and  persecution  were  not,  since  they  could  mobilise  their  network  of
connections within the new nationalist ruling class, and operate discreetely, without openly
challenging the system. It was this open challenge to the new order, rather than the support
to its victims that needed to be repressed. 
 
5.2: Surviving in wartime Bijeljina: Coping strategies among Muslims
In  his  study  of  the  liminal  stage  of  rites  of  passage,  Victor  Turner(1967;  1969)
characterised the experience of  the liminal personae as fundamentally marked by ambiguity,
neutrality, and structural invisibility(1967:99), which constrain their possibilities for agency.
Their ambiguous character stemmed from the fact that they “elude or slip through the
network of  classifications that normally locate states and positions in cultural space(1969:
94); neutrality results from their deprivation of  status, pushing the liminal personae to a
“passive  and  humble”  behaviour  (1969:  94).  As  for  their  structural  invisibility,  it  was
imposed on them because they were perceived as polluting by those outside their liminal
realm, given their position in between and betwixt two different states(1967:98). 
There are striking parallels between the characteristics of  the liminal experience in
rites of  passage as identified by Turner, and these coping strategies developed by non-Serbs
in wartime Bijeljina. Under the precarious and dangerous conditions of  life in wartime
Semberija, non-Serbs developed three types of  coping strategies: reliance on support across
the ethnic divide; display of  loyalty; and structural invisibility. The possibility of  support
across  ethnic  boundaries,  which  in  many  cases  offered  some  relief  to  their  suffering,
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stemmed from the ambiguity created by liminality; the display of  loyalty stemmed from the
acknowledgement of  their particularly vulnerable condition, and initially assumed the form
of  neutrality. As for structural invisibility, the most fundamental characteristic of  the liminal
personae, it offered non-Serbs a way to reduce their exposure to danger, but it  also offered
the ruling class a mechanism to navigate the contradiction between the protracted presence
of  non-Serbs – and Muslims in particular – and the idea of  an ethnically homogenous
society.
We will now explore each of  the three types of  strategies, and how they evolved,
and  correlate  them  with  the  evolution  of  the  process  of  consolidation  of  Republika
Srpska's political structures, to offer a glimpse into the dynamics of  ethnic cleansing in
wartime Bijeljina. 
Reliance on support across ethnic boundaries
In  Bijeljina,  acts  of  intimate  violence  paralleled  with  acts  of  support  across  ethnic
boundaries, which reaffirmed the endurance of  community links. During my fieldwork,  I
came across  many  examples  of  such  acts,  through  the  recollections  of  local  residents.
During  the  take-over,  my  respondents  told  me,  support  was  initially  mutual,  between
Muslims and Serbs.  Neighbours  erected  barricades  together,  and took shelter  together.
Despite the barrage of  propaganda broadcast by the local Radio Bijeljina and by Serbian
television, which presented the events as an attack by Islamic extremists against the Serb
population, it quickly became clear to many that Muslims were the real target. There are
many stories of  how some Serbs took action, moved by the need to protect the lives of
Muslim friends. 
That  was  how  Jusuf  Trbić,  the  former  director  of  Radio  Bijeljina  and  the
newspaper Semberske novine, succeeded in escaping to exile. He was arrested on the second
day  of  the  take-over,  and  severely  beaten  at  the  municipal  Department  of  Urbanism
building, the headquarters of  the Serb take-over operations, usually refered to as the Crisis
Staff  (krizni štab). He was subsquently taken to taken the studio of  Radio Bijeljina, and
coerced to  exhort  Muslims  to  abandon the  fight.  A friend,  Đordje  Krstić,  secured his
182
release. This is a story Trbić has told many times: Krstić took Trbić and his wife to his
brother's house, where he recovered from his wounds under their protection. When Trbi ć
expressed his concern that they were putting their own lives at risk, Đordje Krstić replied:
You will be our guest here, and If  someone has to get killed in this house, first it will be my
brother, and I and only then you”(Trbić 2014: 191). As soon as Trbić recovered, unnamed
friends organised his escape. Jusuf  Trbić obtained political asylum in Germany, where he
remained until his return to Bijeljina in 2002. His books (e.g. Trbić 2007; 2013), where
Trbić has documented hundreds of  cases of  killings, disappearances and other experiences
of  extreme violence, also reveal many cases of  Serbs whose help to fellow citizens across
the ethnic divide made the difference between life and death. As for Krstić, this was not his
only intervention in favour of  non-Serbs; he is known in Bijeljina for the extent of  his
efforts, although he himself  avoids the limelight.
The  story  of  Elvira  offers  an  illustration  of  the  difficulty  in  making  inferences
regarding the motivation behind acts of  support across ethnic boundaries. A secondary
school teacher of  Marxism, Elvira lost her job soon after the November 1990 elections,
when  the  course  was  abolished  from  the  curriculum;  unlike  her  colleagues  of  Serb
nationality,  she  was  not  assigned  any  other  course.  She  was  forced  into  a  precarious
situation,  and  lived  with  her  daughter  in  a  rented  room.  They  were  alone  when  the
violence erupted, and like many others, she decided to look for shelter at the local barracks,
in the belief  that the JNA would provide protection to the civilian population. When she
got there, however, she was sent back, told that the place was full and had no capacity to
accept anyone else. A former student, now member of  a paramilitary unit, saw Elvira and
her daughter, and took them to safety in his own family home, where she remained for a
few days, until the situation was declared safe. A few weeks later, Elvira decided to leave
Bijeljina, and join her brother who lived in Croatia. Aware that it was virtually impossible
to leave, Elvira nevertheless arranged to visit a friend in Serbia. She took the bus as if  she
was going for a day trip, carrying only a small bag and a bunch of  flowers. In Bosanska
Rača, near the bridge over the River Sava that separates the Bosnian region of  Semberija
from the Serbian region of  Vojvodina, all Muslims travelling on the bus were ordered to get
out. A young man in military uniform, also a former student, told her to get back inside,
and thus Elvira left Bosnia with her daugter, having paid only their bus tickets. They were
the only Muslims on that bus who made it past the border. Elvira never saw the two men
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again, and did not know whether they survived the war. 
Twenty-two years later, when she told me this story, Elvira still couldn't quite explain
why she had been so fortunate in those two encounters. These were, after all, volunteers in
paramilitary units, rather than conscripted soldiers. She felt that her students had always
liked her and that somehow that had made a difference, aware however of  other stories in
which  the  reversal  of  the  power  relation  between  teacher  in  student  had  a  different
outcome, one marked by violence. Regardless of  whether those who provided assistance to
Muslims trying to leave Bijeljina were acting motivated by the will to resist nationalism, or
at  least  injustice,  or  whether  they  acted  instinctively  in  a  particular  moment  and  in
contradiction with their own involvement with the violence that people were fleeing, their
acts   revealed  the  endurance  of  community  links.  Reliance  on  support  across  ethnic
boundaries would become a crucial coping strategy in the face of  persecution. 
But solidarity was never expressed publicly, and few dared voice any discontent, let
alone opposition, to the way nationalists were transforming Bijeljina. Dissent was framed as
betrayal, anti-patriotic and anti-Serb, and the price for disloyalty was  high.  The story of
Siniša, a Serb man in his mid-forties when the war began, provides a powerful illustration
of  the fear many Serbs felt:
Q. So at the time people knew what was going on? For instance, the killings, the crimes?
A. We all knew about it (…) but we were powerless (…) We were powerless, because we had
children, we couldn't do anything! Well, we could, but that would put us in danger. 
Q.  How?
A. Well, they would kill us! To avoid getting killed, we must stay quiet because, look, because those
who should have been our conscience, I mean, they were the creators and the executors of  evil. 
I personally, on a personal plan – and that is my satisfaction – on a personal plan I helped many
people (…) And now, I spoke with people, now one Meho Hujdurović – he is here a highly regarded
agriculture specialist, etc, whose son was abducted–  and now he asks me “are there any Serbs...”
and then he reminds me of  1942, during the Second World War, here, when the muftis, members of
the Islamic Community, and those wealthy Muslims, etc, when they signed a petition and sent it to
Pavelić72. He says  “we protected  the Serbs, the Orthodox, so that nobody touches
72 Mujo  Hujdurović,  a  farmer  and  landowner,  was  one  of  the  signatories  of  Bijeljina's  Resolution
(Grabčanović 2006:64). He was arrested in 1994, and executed in Brčko by the Ustasha (Hujdurović
2010: 36). In 1992 his sons, the partisan veterans Idris and Meho Hujdurović,  tried to encourage Serb
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them (...)” And then I say “Čika Meho, there are! There are many Serbs who would...” I tell
him“I am the first among them. But, look” I say “my signature on top is worthless,
because nobody will follow me. And the ants will eat me. My signature is worth if  it
appears there, in twentyeth, thirthyeth, forthyeth place. And the first signature must
be that of  Vladika Vasilije [Kačavenda, the Bishop of  Zvornik-Tuzla], and some
authorities (…). He must be the first, then this one, then that one, then me” because
who am I? I am an ordinary man. But he [Kačavenda] was in fact the heart of  darkness, not only
him personally, but the whole church was the heart of  darkness. So, we couldn't count on them, on
the intellectuals, publicists, etc, and the people [populace] was headless. I, I and people like me, we
didn't have, one must admit, we didn't have courage. But when all of  those who could lead us, they
were on the opposite side, they were all part of  it, an important part of  it.
Describing what happened in Bijeljina, and in Republika Srpska more generally as
“ethnic  cleansing”,  Siniša  went  on  to  recall  how  the  Bosnian  Serb  ruling  elite,  and
Karadžić  himself,  whilst  avoiding  the  term,  openly  embraced  ethnic  cleansing  as  an
imperative for the enduring dominance of  the Serb people in Republika Srpska:
I listened to Mr. Karadžić, and he says, look  [Siniša conveys his perception of  how the
Bosnian Serb leader approached the  problem of  Muslim presence  in Republika
Srpska by paraphrasing Karadžić] “we can grab the whole of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,
but we cannot destroy it all” . And then comes the racist theory “ and they are such – the
Muslims – they will for fourty years do the hardest jobs, walk with their heads doen,
and make children. And one day they will again become a majority. That's why we
need to build up our own territory, that is, to separate ourselves(...)”.  And so the task
here was to reach [to reduce the size of  the Muslim population to], say, 6%, 8%...  
With such a message emanating from the top, many people felt  free to openly express
hostility against the Muslim population:
When the war started in Bijeljina (…) that people, ordinary people, Muslims, Serbs, they shared
the same fears, they hid together in the basements, and protected one another. But, when it was all
past,  and when the Serbs won, that's  when those divisions happened. Then people openly said
“When will this..., when will that...” My neighnour was talking to me, and said “when will those
friends to reproduce the initiative of  1941 Bijeljina Declaration (see Ch.2). They proposed to Serb friends
the idea of  writing an open letter to the local authorities appealing for the persecution of  the Muslim
population to end, but received only negative replies. 
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balije” – that's a demeaning name for the Muslims; he wouldn't even say balije, but balijaši [the
suffix indicates a diminutive form], even more demeaning  – then, he says “when are they
going?”. And I say “Why should they go. Man, we came here from our villages and
built our homes, and they were here already [Siniša was refering to the rural origins
of  many Serb residents, including himself, which he contrasted with the urban roots
of  Bijeljina's Muslims]  so why, why should they go [rather than Serbs]?” But people
are indoctrinated, they don't reflect much...
Expressions of  ethnic hatred worked as statements of  allegiance to the nationalist
regime,  revealing  active  endorsement  as  much  as  conformist  compliance.  In  Siniša's
perspective, ethnic hatred, directed against 'Muslims' in abstract, spread efficiently, thanks
to the climate of  fear in which people lived and the aggressive propaganda they were
subjected to. There was, however, a certain level of  inconsistency between the population's
adherence  to  the  nationalist  order  being  created,  and  attachment  to  pre-existing
community links, so that,  as  Siniša put it “this was how people thought (...): 'maybe I hate
Muslims, as a collective, but when it comes to Enver, Muhamed – specific individuals –  then I
don't hate them', because they went to school together, played toghether...”. It was for that reason that
– Siniša was keen to add – the worst acts of  violence and ethnic cleansing were committed
by “military formations from other regions”73. Or, as another informant, converging with
Siniša,  put it “outsiders were needed for the dirtiest jobs”74.
This inconsistency between  adherence to the nationalist order being created, and
attachment to pre-existing community links allowed some Muslims to preserve their  veze
with,  and obtain some level  of  protection from Serbs  in a  position of  power.  Literally
73 It was the case for instance of  Arkan's unit, which came from Serbia, as well as the Special Unit of  the 
RS police nicknamed 'Patuljice', which is alledgedly implicated in the murder of  twenty two members of  
the Sarajlić, Sejmenović and Magalić families on 25 September 1992 (see infra).
74 Conversely,  there were Bijeljina residents heavily implicated in crimes committed in other  areas.  For
example, the Bassiouni Report, refers to a paramilitary group from Bijeljina named  the “weekenders”
(vikendaši),  who  every  weekend  went  to  the  neighbouring  town  of  Brčko,  “to  plunder  and
vandalise”(UNSC 1994, Annex IIIA, p. 129). My own informants reffered many times to the plunder
going on in Brčko, adding that the never imagined the town was so wealthy; and they often reminded me
that  Goran Jelišić,  who the ICTY sentenced to life in prison for  crimes against  humanity,  including
murder, committed in Brčko, was from Bijeljina and lived there throughout the war. Dražen Erdemović,
who at the ICTY confessed participating in the execution of  hundreds of  men captured after the fall of
the enclave of  Srebrenica, also lived in Bijeljina. 
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translated as connections,  veze were a crucial element in the 'economy of  favours' (Henig
2017:188) generated by, and ran in paralel with, the discriminatory and repressive practices
in place against non-Serbs. In such a context,  veze gave access to individuals with enough
leverage (štela)  to  influence decisions  to  one's  favour.  Often associated with the idea  of
bribery, veze and štela encompass a wider class of  phenomena. According to David Henig,
“Štela  embraces a moral view on the importance and acceptance of  the use of  various
personal  connections  to  obtain  goods,  services,  jobs,  or  information  in  situations  of
shortage or impossibility of  access”. Solidly established during communism, if  not earlier,
veze remain a deeply rooted social institution in Bosnia-Herzegovina, to which the danger
and uncertaintly that marked the wartime experience lent additional strenght. 
The  liminal  condition  in  which  Muslims  were  immersed  entailed  their
disempowerment,  but,  for  some,  veze were  a  crucial  protection  mechanism.  This  was
particularly the case in relation to members of  prestigious Muslim families. Their position
in society functioned like a double-edged sword. On the one hand, due to their high status
in  local  society,  relative  wealth  and  large  houses  that  were  highly  coveted,  they  were
particularly  exposed to humiliation and danger.  The dramatic  reversal  of  their  former
status was publicly exposed by acts of  humilation specifically targeting the most prestigious
members  of  pre-war  society,  such  as  the  already  mentioned  'work  duties',  including
cleaning the streets, collecting rubbish and other menial jobs. On the other hand, however,
some had strong veze with prominent local Serbs now in a position of  power, which they
managed, to some extent, to preserve. In such a context, their štela (leverage) offered some
degree of  security.
In this context, štela often amounted to a form of  protection racket. This is a typical
case of  'difficult memories',  clearly present but seldom articulated. I heard a few stories
related to cases of  štela  as protection racket during my fieldwork,  but never in the first
person, and always whispered rather than clearly expressed.  Whenever I  tried to make
further enquires my interlocutor would back off, in a protective attitude marking the limits
of  my access to other people's wartime experience. But it was not always the case that štela
amounted to material advantage. The local ruling class did sometimes exercise discretion in
favour  of  old  local  Muslim  families,  with  whom  they  shared  a  common  identity  as
'Semberci', to the detriment of  families from a rural background that had immigrated to
Bijeljina in the previous decades (FHL 1993a:). In such cases,  štela  took the form of  an
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exercise of  mercy, resulting in a display of  might. 
The  veteran  partisan  Idris  Hujdurović  described  to  me  how  two  prominent
members of  the SDS  intervened on his behalf, after he was detained after the take-over,
and falsely accused of  being a member of  the SDA. Outraged by the accusations, he told
me, he lost any sense of  fear, and confronted his interrogator, a man he used to know
before the war: “I saw he had a pistol, and I jumped forward. Remember, I was in an Ustasha court, I
had so much fear back then, that I can no longer fear anything”. In 1943 he had been arrested in
Bijeljina, along with his father Mujo, when Ustasha 'Home Guard' members discovered the
secret  shelter  they  had built,  which served as  hiding  and place  for  people  who feared
persecution. They were sent to a prison in Brčko, where Mujo Hujdurović was executed the
following day, while his son Idris was able to escape with the help of  other prisoners, after
which he joined the partisans. Hardened as he was by his experience, Idris Hujdurović's
courage must have taken his interrogators by surprise. They sent him home, summoning
him to present himself  at the police station the following morning. This gave him and his
brother  Meho   –  who  Siniša  mentioned  for  his  efforts  to  mobilise  local  Serbs  into
expressing  their  opposition  to  the  discrimination  and  persecution  against  Bijeljina's
Muslims – precious time to seek help. 
“If  it wasn't for two members of  the SDS  [Čika Idris names them],  if  it wasn't for them
being humane (ljudi) – look, even among them there were some who were humane   –  I would
have been taken, like this man, here [referring to Ferid Zečević, čika Idris points at the
window, in the direction of  Zečević's restaurant down the road], who was accused of
organising the Handžar division, even though that division never existed. I was meant to go to
Batković that very night. If  it wasn't for them, I would have finished in Batkovi ć”.
The next  morning,  Idris  Hujdurović  returned to the police  station.  He was left  in the
waiting  room for  many hours,  until  finally  he was  told he was free to  go.  The police
nevertheless retained his passport and identity documents. Diminished in his position by
the intervention of  people more powerful than himself, his jailer couldn't resist one last
threat. “We will meet again”, he said, refusing to return the passport and identity card he
had confiscated the day before.
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Idris Hujdurović  remained in Bijeljina until  1994, when an old school mate (he
named him) managed to take him and his wife to Belgrade. He lived in exile in Hungary
until 2003.  His older brother Meho was evicted from his house in the centre of  Bijeljina
and expelled to no man's land in the Majevica frontline, after being forced to sign documents
relinquishing his property. The man who arrested Idris Hujdurović, who he also named,
was at the time of  the interview, a political adviser to a high-ranking Serb politician.
Displaying loyalty: from neutrality to engagement in the war effort
After the military take-over of  Bijeljina and the severance of  all links with the Bosnian state
institutions,  its  residents  were  compelled to  display  their  political  loyalty  to  the  newly-
created Republika Srpska. Among non-Serbs, this assumed two distinct forms, one passive,
through  a  position  of  neutrality  over  political  affairs,  and  the  other  active,  through
participation in the war effort.  As a coping strategy,  the display of  loyalty was more a
function of  the duress in which non-Serbs were under, than a choice determined by their
agency. The display of  loyalty by non-Serbs provided a  modus vivendis that, whilst offering
individuals the promise of  fair treatement and protection offered the authorities a way of
managing the continued Muslim presence. 
Neutrality consisted above all in acknowledging (prihvatiti) the reality of  the political
situation, and recognising one's own vulnerability by withdrawing to an apolitical position,
encompassing the refusal to take sides in the war whilst acknowledging the right of  the
local authorities to rule in Semberija. The adoption of  a position of  neutrality reflected the
awareness, based on the events during the take-over, that any resistance would be ruthlessly
punished. It reflected also the fear of  lawlessness, stemming from the rise in crime following
the  outbreak  of  the  war  (Nielsen  2011:77,  par.258;  78,  par.262),  and some degree  of
expectation of  fairness  from the part  of  the authorities  (e.g.  SIM Novine 1992e).  This
expectation would quickly prove to be misplaced, but it was not unfounded. It was based on
the statements of  the authorities as well as on the tone of  propaganda during and in the
immediate aftermath of  the military take-over of  the region. The local autorities framed
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the military take-over as a defensive measure against an alledged Islamic extremist plot,
and drew a  clear  distinction between the enemy,  identified as  'Islamic  extremists',  and
'respectable (pošteni) Muslims'. 
An article signed by Milan Novaković (1992), published on the first edition of  SIM
novine to be issued after the take-over, offers a clear example of  this type of  message. A
psychiatrist by profession, Novaković was the President of  the local SDS, and deputy at the
Assembly of  the Serb People. After describing the nature of  the conflict as  'jihad' led by
“Islamic fanatics and ustashi terrorists [who] kill Serbs to conquer  Serb lands and impose their rule”,
Novaković stresses how, in Bijeljina, Serbs and Muslims wanted to continue living together,
and expected politicians to find “new state structures”. The onus was placed on the Muslim
politicians. He refers to an exchange between a local Muslim man and Fikret Abdić, the
Muslim  member  of  the  Bosnian  collective  Presidency  who,  along  with  Serb  member
Bijljana Plavšić visited Bijeljina in the wake of  the take-over, on 4 April 1992:
“The  words  of  a  Muslim  resident  in  whose  home  Serb  volunteers  [meaning
members of  Arkan's unit] slept were engraved in our minds:  'I want to live  with
Serbs... that's it, I want this to become Serbia... but I want peace!!! And transmit this to Mr. A.
Izetbegović and his provocateurs (uškači (sic))”(Novaković 1992: 15)
The article by the local SDS chief  propagandist, Pero Simić, describing the turn of
events,  offers  a  chilling example of  how,  regarding  the Muslim population,  praise  and
threats came together: 
“It is no secret at all that many Muslims should be grateful to Ražnjatović [Arkan].
Had this fighter (…) not come, undoubtedly there would have been more victims,
more destruction (…). A great number of  villagers from Semberija would have
hurried into town, and that overwhelming mass of  people would know what to
do.This way, Semberija's peasants remained in their surroundings, waiting only for
peace.  The  honourable  (pošteni)  Muslim  people  of  Semberija  did  not  want  to
identify themselves with extremists, did not wish for a fight” (Simić 1992: 7)
It  was  this  ostensible  distinction  between  'Islamic  extremists'  and  'honourable(pošteni)
Muslims'  that  allowed Muslims  to  resort  to  a  position  of  neutrality.,  while  the  threats
implicit in this type of  message functioned as a strong inducement.
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The case of  Janja:
The village of  Janja, six kilometers south of  Bijeljina, represents a particular case in what
regards the display of  loyalty, connected to how the military take-over occurred. As soon as
Arkan's forces entered Bijeljina, Janja was surrounded by a JNA tank battalion from the
Novi  Sad  Corps  (Paravlić  2011:229),  ostensibly  to  protect  the  civilian  population.  Its
commandant then presented the local leaders with an ultimatum to surrender all weapons.
Negotiations  ensued,  also  involving  Arkan  and  Mauzer,  which  resulted  in  about  one
hundred  and  fifthy  pieces  of  weaponry,  mostly  hunting  rifles,  surrended.  Janja's  local
leaders  declared  their  loyalty  to  the  Serb  authorities,  and  Arkan  and  Mauzer  offered
garantees of  protection. Arkan then visited Muslim families to greet them for  Bajram (the
Eid  Islamic festival). As one of  the locals involved in the negotiations, Huso Zečkanović,
president of  Janja's  mjesno zajednica75 would later declare in an interview with the Bijeljina
newspaper SIM Novine, “thanks to mutual understanding, the worst was avoided”, so that
the takeover occurred “without a singe bullet being fired”(SIM Novine 1992a). 
One  of  the  consequences  of  this  'peaceful'  take-over  was  that  the  local  mjesna
zajednica remained in place, and officers of  Muslim ethnicity continued to staff  the local
police station, providing some semblance of  autonomy, in cooperation with Bijeljina's local
authorities. It was to these Muslim policemen that fell the task of  arresting and transferring
to Bijeljina individuals singled out for 'informational conversations' (informativni razgovori)
or suspected 'extremists',  some of  whom ended up dead (Paravlić  2011:242). The Serb
authorities  regularly  tested  the  population's  loyalty,  urging  people  to  make  voluntary
donations in money and in kind, so as to contribute to the war effort. Whatever was not
voluntarily surrended ended up being confiscated or stolen. The confiscation of  equipment
such as tractors, lorries and other machinery had an enduring negative impact in people's
ability to economically sustain themselves, given agriculture was the main activity. 
The  modus  vivendi between  Janja's  Muslim  population  and  the  local  authorities
became increasingly strained with the arrival of  thousands of  displaced Serbs, many of
whom occupied houses in Janja, which they shared with the owners, giving rise to many
75 Literally meaning 'local community', the mjesno zajednica is a neighbourhood-level organisation, providing 
a connection between lresidents and the municipal organs for issues of  local relevance, a structure dating 
back to the communist period (Toal and Dahlman 2011:339, n.20).
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conflicts and episodes of  violence against the local Muslims (see Ch. 4 of  this thesis). Still,
throughout the war, and until the mass evacuation of  July-September 1994, when Janja was
emptied of  its Muslim population (see infra) the authorities of  Republika Srpska were keen
to present the case of  Janja as a model of  peaceful inter-ethnic coexistence between Serbs
and 'loyal'  Muslims, often showcasing the village to foreign journalists and international
observers (HRW 2000: 2).
The shift from neutrality t  o active engagement:
Neutrality  became harder  to  sustain over  time.  This  shift  corresponded to the general
mobilisation of  men of  military age. Following the creation in May of  the Army of  the
Serb Republic of  Bosnia-Herzegovina, later renamed Army of  Republika Srpska ( Vojska
Republike Srpske, VRS), in June 1992 the Official Bulletin of  the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-
Herzegovina published the Decision declaring the general mobilisation of  men of  military
age. As announced in the pages of  SIM novine (15/09/1992, p.10), the sanctions for anyone
refusing to fulfil their military duties (vojne obaveze) would be to lose the right to citizenship;
health  insurance  and  pensions;  and  housing  (stanarska  pravda).  Any  real  estate  such
individuals owned would be used for the needs of  the defence of  the Serbian Republic in
Bosnia-Herzegovina76. In principle, such measures did not discriminate between Serbs and
non-Serbs, and they offer an idea of  the type of  pressure Bosnian Serb men were also
under in order to comply, regardless of  their enthusiasm for the nationalist cause 77. But
they were applied essentially against Muslims.
The Army of  Republika Srpska suffered from a shortage of  manpower from its
onset (CIA 2002), and from its onset its commandant Ratko Mladić saw in the conscription
76 Službeni glasnik Srpske Republike u Bosni I Herzegovini, No. 8, 08/06/1992, transcribed in SIM Novine 
15/09/1992, p.11
77 Bosnian Serbs who fled to Serbia and Montenegro to avoid conscription were relentlessly chased, handed
to the RS military and sent straight to the frontlines (Radončić 2005). Conscious objectors faced prison, 
or might be assigned dangerous work. In our interview (December 2014), Sead Vidinlić, who spent the 
greatest part of  the war performing forced labour, recalled with sadness the case of  a young conscious 
objector who was assigned work duties in support of  the frontline in Mount Majevica. He was killed 
whilst coordinating a team of  wood cutters, when a tree fell over him. Sead remembered him as a kind 
young men, and regretted that the prisoners who worked with him were not allowed to attend his burial 
(which took place on the spot). 
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of  non-Serbs an opportunity and a necessity78. Given such important constraints, the Serb
leadership was keen to retain the distinction between 'extremists' and “the mass of  peaceful
Muslims 'unwilling to fight against the Serbs and their state'” (Donia 2012:175, citing the
17th session  of  the  RS Assembly,  24-26  Jul  1992),  but  would  no  longer  allow a  strict
withdrawal  into  an  apolitical  position.  Instead,  loyalty  should  be  actively  displayed.
Neutrality would no longer suffice. In August 1992, non-Serb men living in Bijeljina were
summoned to sign a loyalty pledge. The pledge was presented in the form of  a question:
“Do you accept to participate in the Serb Army until the final defeat of  the enemy?”79. Many of  those
who answered Yes were then conscripted into the Army of  Republika Srpska.  In Bijeljina,
the  authorities  zealously  enforced  the  above-mentioned  sanctions  against  those  who
answered  No.  Going further, the Municipal Assembly aproved a Decision declaring that
individuals  bound  to  military  duties  who  were  not  present  in  the  municipality  should
return, otherwise “their families will be expelled from the municipality, and their property
will be placed at the disposal [of  the authorities] for defensive needs”(published at  SIM
novine 01/10/1992, cited by Trbić 2007: 18). This Decision would be used to legitimise the
expulsions of  'disloyal' Muslims. Those who refused to sign the loyalty pledge were also
often subjected to forced labour.
It is not known how many men thus joined the Army of  Republika Srpska, but it
was  enough  to  form  a  unit  overwhelmingly  composed  of  Muslim  men,  the  Third
Semberija Brigade, commanded by Major Pašaga Halilović, himself  also a Muslim80. The
brigade  was  deployed to various  combat  situations,  most  notably  in the neighbouring
region of  Posavina, as part of  the 'Operation Corridor' which sought to widen the narrow
strip  of  territory  connecting  Serbia  via  Semberija  in  the  northeast  with  the  Bosnian
Krajina in the Northwest, and throught it also with the para-state of  the Republic of  Serb
Krajina in Croatia. 
An informant, a young man at the time, explained to me how signing the loyalty
pledge was usually a decision taken collectively by the family, rather than simply by each
individual. Already unemployed, and having been evicted from his home along with his
mother at the beginning of  the war, he refused to sign the pledge himself, and ended up
78 As inferred from Mladić inaugural speech at the 18th session of  the Assembly of  the Serb People in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, 12/05/1992
79 Interview with Saša Pazarac, July 2014. 
80 He was previously the director of  the local firm Duvan, and returned to his post after demobilisation. 
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performing digging trenches in the frontlines. His uncle, an experienced carpenter, did sign
the pledge, and was able to rescue his nephew from forced labour, and have lighter work
duties assigned to him. Probably due to his age, the oncle was not drafted, but instead had
to provide the military with carpentry services as part of  his work dutes, and was free to
continue working for other clients as well, with my informant as his assistant, thanks to
which they were able to provide for the family throughout the war years81. 
The memory of  participation of  local Muslim men in the war effort is one of  the
most  'difficult  memories'  surrounding  the  wartime  experience  that  I  came  across  with
during  my fieldwork,  a  memory zealously  preserved from the gaze of  outsiders,  lest  it
expose a more murky side of  that experience. I tried to interview non-Serb veterans of  the
VRS, but my atempts were always frustrated. When I asked an informant with whom I had
a particularly good relationship, if  he could put me in touch with a relative who he told me
had been a member of  the VRS, he simply replied “He wouldn't speak sincerely  (iskreno) to
you”. A Roma woman who told me that her two children had been in the army, added:
“They joined, but not of  their own free will (dobrovoljno)” Her husband interrupted her: “But
does anyone go to war willingly? Nobody wants to go to war”. It was through Elvira82 that I got the
closest to understanding the impact of  such an experience in community life. One of  her
brothers joined the Army of  Republika Srpska, so as to preserve the family home. Her
other brother, who lived in Croatia, was conscripted into the Croatian Army, so that Elvira
had to endure the thought that their respective units might confront each other in the
battlegrounds, and that one brother might kill the other. 
Non-Serbs  who  remained  in  Bijeljina  shared  with  the  Serb  population  the
permanent anxiety caused by the possibility of  losing a loved one in the frontlines. But for
non-Serbs,  and  Muslims  in  particular,  that  anxiety  came  on  top  of  all  the  concerns
stemming from their position of  vulnerability, with the added weight that they might be
killed by “ our own people”. Elvira's brother did succeed in preserving the family house, but
in  many  other  cases  the  protection that  joining  the  army conferred  to  one's  property
proved illusory. As more and more displaced Serbs arrived in Bijeljina, such houses became
incresingly coveted. Informants who themselves had refused to sign the loyalty pledge were
keen to highlight how families of  Muslim members of  the VRS were often evicted, if  not
81 Interviewed in September 2014.
82 Interviewed in November 2014.
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expelled from Bijeljina, while they were fighting in the frontlines, so that, coming home for
a rest, many would find someone else living there. Somehow such happenings vindicated
my informants  own decision  to  refuse  to  fight,  but  it  also  revealed  how divisive  these
memories  were.  Their  motivation,  sharing  these  with  me,  seemed  to  be,  however,  to
highlight how loyalty was betrayed, and any expectation of  fairness futile. 
The display of  loyalty may have allowed 'the worst' to be avoided, but the price to
pay was the prolonged exploitation of  the Muslim residents, who for a while compensated
with their work for the acute lack of  human resources in the region. But in the balance
between the struggle for survival and the preservation of  one's sense of  dignity, the latter
often  had  to  be  sacrificed  in  favour  of  the  first.  For  that  reason,  these  are  'difficult
memories' which tend not to be openly articulated, but kept private instead, emerging only
as fragments, second-hand stories,  and hearsay. 
Structural invisibility and the denial of  identity
The instinct to hide is the most basic strategy to cope with imminent danger in liminal
situations. Hiding was precisely what many of  Bijeljina's residents did when Arkan arrived
to take military control over the city. Those who were able to, took shelter with relatives or
friends in the surrounding villages, while those unable to leave town gathered in basements
and other places deemed safer than their own homes. Recalling those first few days, Saša
Pazarac  described how in  the  'skyscraper'  (neboder)  where  he  lived,  all  the  neighbours,
“regardless of  ethnicty” removed their surnames from door bells and letter boxes. After a
team of  three 'arkanovci' searched his flat on the pretext that there were snipers operating
from the building, Saša was taken door to door at gunpoint, to identify his neighbours (it
later turned out that the person they were looking for,  a worker at the local  electricity
station,  had managed to escape,  never  again to  return).  Hiding would remain,  for the
Muslim  population,  the  primordial  coping  strategy.  The  need  to  hide  revealed  the
perception of  their extreme vulnerability, and their heightened liminal condition. 
Borrowing from Victor Turner's (1964) analysis of  the neophyte experience in the
middle stage of  rites of  passage, I will use the term “structural invisibility” to describe how,
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whilst  physically  present,  Bijeljina's  Muslims were excluded from the local  society,  thus
occupying  an  intersticial,  or  liminal  position,  in  a  society  that  was  itself  engulfed  in
liminality.  The  protracted  presence  of  a  large  number  of  non-Serbs  in  Bijeljina
contradicted the ideal of  ethnic homogeneization that the goal of  'separation of  peoples'
aspired  to.  Making  the  Muslim  population  “structurally  invisible”  resolved,  albeit
temporarily, that contradiction. This structural invisibility involved two variants: physical
and symbolic invisibility. 
To become physically invisible meant, first of  all, not to be seen in public. As Sa ša
Pazarac83 explained me, Muslims avoided leaving their homes: “Right from the beginning of  the
war, nobody went out easily (niko nije lako izlazio) ! ... because of  the killings... because of  plunder...”.
But the greatest fear was that of  being 'collected' (pokupljen) for forced labour or expulsion.
Fear  was  pervasive  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  but  it  became even  more  intense
following the general mobilisation and the summon to sign the loyalty pledge. As stressed in
the previous section, an apolitical position of  neutrality would no longer be tolerated, and
loyalty  had to be actively  displayed.  Men who refused to sign the loyalty  pledge were
therefore particularly at risk, and many felt compelled to go into hiding, moving from one
place to another, often spending the night away from their families. 
Beyond  the  everyday  experience  of  violence,  ranging  from  verbal  assaults  to
disappearances and murders,  two particular events were crucial  in exposing the danger
non-Serbs faced, thus fostering a sense of  extreme vulnerability. These were the murder of
twenty two members of  the Sarajlić, Sejmenović and Magalić families, on 25 September
1992, and the demolition of  the town's mosques on 13 March 1993.
On the night of  24 to 25 September 1992 a special unit of  Republika Srpska police
known as the “Pahuljice” (snowflakes) sealed off  the neighbourhood of  Bukreš, and entered
the houses located on 154 to 160, Ivo of  Semberija street,  detaining all  of  the people
present,  twenty  two  in  total,  of  whom  thirteen  members  of  the  Sarajlić  family,  four
members of  the Sejmenović  family, and five of  the Magalić  family. Among them were
seven children and eight women. They boarded a lorry, which took them to the village of
Balatun, in the bank of  the river Drina, where they were all murdered in the same night.
83 Interviewed in September 2014
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The bodies were later thrown into the river, of  which thirteen were exhumed in 2005 from
unidentified graves at the cemetery of  Sremska Mitrovica, a town in Serbia located on the
bank  of  the  river  Sava.  They  were  buried  the  same year  in  the  Islamic  Cemetery  of
Selimovići, in Bijeljina. The remaining bodies have not yet been recovered. 
The murder of  the Sarajlić, Sejmenović and Magalić families marked, in the most
brutal  manner,  a  shift  in  the  local  authorities'  approach  to  the  presence  of  Bosnian
Muslims. According to Milorad Davidović, a procecution witness in different cases at the
ICTY, in August 1992, the local authorities discussed and approved a plan for the expulsion
of  the Muslim population. A native of  Semberija working as a police inspector in Serbia,
Davidović  had previously been the chief  of  Bijeljina's  police station. He was sent from
Belgrade to Bijeljina to help investigate and curb the wave of  violence there, caused to
some extent by paramilitary groups, which were “undermining the authority of  the local
institutions  by  forming  their  own  parallel  authorities  and  also  attacking  Bosnian
Serbs”(ICTY 2016:242, par.633). The plan, Davidović stated (ICTY 2016: 270, par.671),
consisted of  “three phases”, to be implemented simultaneously, so as to induce the Muslim
population that still remained in Bijeljina to flee, or otherwise to coerce them into joining
the Army of  Republika Srpska. The three phases were:
1. the approval and enactment of  a Municipal Assembly's decision whereby Muslims
refusing conscription should be dismissed from their jobs, and have electricity, water
and phone supplies cut off  (check), and would be available for compulsory work
duties84;
2. the public humiliation of  prominent Muslims through the assignment of  menial
tasks as work duties;
3. the division of  the town of  Bijeljina in two sectors, and the murder of  a Muslim
family in each of  these sectors, in order to create panic.
The ICTY analysed Davidović's claims in the trials of  Momčilo Krajšnik; Mićo Stanišić
and  Stojan  Župljanin;  and  Radovan  Karadžić,  with  the  Tribunal  (ICTY  2016:259,
paragraph 671 [Karadžić veredict]) finding that:
“the three phase plan existed and was discussed by Bosnian Serb authorities in
84 It is important to note that largely similar sanctions were in place also for Serbs refusing conscription, 
such as conscious objectors. 
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Bijeljina,  and  in  accordance  to  this  plan  Duško  Malović's  special  police  unit,
following the lead of  Drago Vuković [the chief  of  the National Security Service
(služba  nacionalne  bezbjednosti)  of  Republika  Srpska,  which  was  based  in
Bijeljina]  who was  a  member  of  the  Bijeljina  Crisis  Staff,  instilled  fear  in  the
Bosnian Muslims who remained in Bijeljina by September 1992” 
On a separate note, the veridict specifies the following: 
“Fear was created by the killing of  Bosnian Muslim families and looting of  their
homes (…). While the Chamber received specific evidence about killings carved
out by Malović's  group, given that these are not scheduled killing incidents, the
Chamber will  not  make  a  finding in  respect  to  those  killings,  but  accepts  this
evidence for the purpose of  concluding that an environment of  fear was being
created”(ICTY2016: 259, note 2166[Karadžić Veredict])
The crime had a devastating impact, and it occupies a prominent place in the collective
memory of  persecution and ethnic cleansing in wartime Bijeljina. The impact was felt not
only  among  Muslims,  but  also  among  Serbs;  one  of  my  informants,  for  instance,
highlighted how in Balatun, a Serb village, there was a reaction of  convulsion (“selo Balatun
se pobunio zbog toga”)85. But the impact of  this crime among Serbs – at least initially –  is best
inferred through the public reactions it generated. 
By the end of  the day, news of  the disappearance of  these families had already
reached their relatives, even if  the truth wasn't precisely known86. Rumours quickly spread,
blaming the local Chetnik Movement led by Mirko Blagojević. It is not clear whether such
rumours  grew  spontaneously;  whether  this  was  a  premeditated  effort  by  the  SDS  to
discredit the Chetniks, at a time when paramilitary formations were being disbanded or
integrated into the Army of  RS; or whether  shifting the blame to a minor political player,
as  the  Chetnik  Movement  were,  was  a  way  of  damage  control,  bearing  in  mind  the
widespread moral revulsion the crime, involving notably the murder of  children as young
as six,  seems to have provoked among Serbs. Be that as it  may, it  was thanks to these
rumours  that  the  truth  about  the  crime was  disclosed.  Two days  after  the  crime,  the
Chetniks placed Radio Bijeljina under siege, and forced the director, Pero Simić, to read, in
85 Interviewed in July 2014
86 Informal conversation with a relative of  one of  the families, August 2015
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four different times, the following statement:
“The Serb Chetniks of  northeastern Bosnia [wish to] express the sharpest protest
regarding the event that took place on the night between 24 and 25 September,
1992. That night, special forces of  the Republika Srpska Ministry of  the Interior,
composed of  people, not from Semberija who, during the police curvew, took away
14  members  of  the  Sarajlić  family  and  8  members  of  the  Sejmenović,  and
liquidated them. The Serb Chetniks of  northeastern Bosnia, in response to this
event, call for an investigation of  the occurrence and that all perpetrators, as well
as their commanders, be brought before justice.  The Serb Chetniks will,  in the
ranks of  the Army of  the Republika Srpska,  truly and honorably fight for the
freedom of  the Republika Srpska and for its international affirmation, but we will
also be prepared to neutralise the actions of  all criminals who may, at this moment,
be  coming  and  going  in  the  region  of  Serb  Semberija  and  Podmajevica”
(cited by Trbić 2017)
The Ministry of  Internal Affairs reacted publicly denying any responsibility, claiming that
the  Pahuljice were actually engaged in combat operations in the frontlines that night, but
adding that “this event may be related to the massacre against Serbs committed the same
day in Milići”, thus implying that it might have been a reprisal. As for the Chetniks, the
Ministry accused them of  disloyalty: 
“Such an ill-considered act of  one political party has caused great damage to the
Serb state and Serb politics. In difficult times when war is being waged among the
peoples,  these and similar acts are of  more use to our enemies than to the Serb
people.” (cited by Trbić 2017)
Among Bosnian Muslims, the meaning of  this crime was clear. These families were not
wealthy for the crime to be rationalised as motivated by plunder (zbog pljačke)  or by old
grudges.  They appeared  to  have  been randomly  targeted,  to  convey  the  message  that
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nobody was safe. The goal of  generating panic was achieved; feeling trapped and in great
danger, many people tried to leave by whatever means possible, either with the help of
friends; hiring human traffickers; or using the services provided by the 'Agencija Evropa'. In
all cases the operation was financially costly, and often involved signing documents stating
that they relinquished their real estate and other property, for the use of  the state. This
represented an efficient process of  material disposession, in what a journalist called a model
of  “commercialised  ethnic  cleansing”  (Hadžić  2003).  Those  staying  behind  were,
increasinly, the poorest, and the oldest.
The demolition of  Bijeljina and Janja's mosques six months later, in March 1993,
represented another milestone, clearly conveying the message that there was no longer any
future for Muslims in Bijeljina. That was how most of  my informants framed their memory
of  this event.  Despite all the Muslims had already endured in almost one year of  war, the
demolitions  took  many people  by  surprise.  Saša Pazarac87 described it  in  these  words:
“Among Bosniaks, it was unbelievable, nobody  expected it, there was fear! Then people decided to leave, but
were unable to”88. I asked him about reactions among the Serb population. Saša always tried
to present me with a diversity of  perspectives. “Honestly, when the mosques were demolished, some
cried, others supported it!89". Those in favour, Saša added, said things like “this is Srpska, we don't
need mosques”, and “we don't need balija”90. Siniša91 was among those  shedding tears: 
“It was very difficult for me. I cried. I cried at my neighbours' house, because I knew that for
them this was a message that they must go. That's the first thing. Second thing, it was really
hard for me because the people (ljudi) who did this were from my own people (narod) who
did it. (…) I'm an atheist, I think of  religion as theater [he elaborates on his atheism],
but I cried regardless, because I knew they [the Muslims] had to go, that it was a point of
no return, that we are the way we are  [meaning we, Serbs], and finally, that it had all
been organised”
87 Interviewed in July 2014
88 “Kod bosnjaka, to je bio nevjerovatno, niko nije to ocekivao, strah je bilo! Onda su ljudi htjeli izaci, a nisu mogli "
89 Iskreno, kad se rusili dzamije, neki (srbi) su osuzivali, neki su podrzavali".
90 “to je Srpska, ne treba nam džamije”, or “ne treba nam balije”
91 Interviewed in January 2015
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Rumors quickly spread of  impending “ethnic cleansing and mass expulsions”(Simić
1993). In his editorial at the SIM novine newspaper “Bijeljina without mosques”(Bijeljina bez
džamija) the director Pero Simić (1993) acknowledged the persistence of  such rumours and
articulated  a  response  to  the  unease  some  may  have  felt.  He  denied  the  rumours  of
impending mass expulsions, which, he argued referring to the peace talks taking place in
the context of  the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, while having “no connection with the truth, made the
position of  the Serb delegation in the conversations in New York harder92. But the rumours were not
unfounded. The first wave of  mass expulsions was to occur wihin weeks. 
Before we describe how the  process  of  mass  expulsions  unfolded,  however,  we
should return to our analysis of  invisibility as a coping strategy. Fully withdrawing from
public space was not a possibility; in order to sustain themselves, non-Serbs needed to at
least minimally expose themselves and engage with others. To reduce the risks associated
with exposure, many adopted a strategy of  symbolic invisibilty. This consisted in hiding or
even  ostensibly  abandoning  their  ethnic  and  religious  identity,  to  adopt  a  new  'Serb'
identity.  This  happened  primarily  through  the  adoption  of  Serb-sounding  names;
acquisition of  false documents or legal request to have one's name changed; as well  as
conversion to Orthodox Christianity, a practice that the Patriarchate eventually forbade,
except for the case of  so-called 'mixed marriages' (mješani brakovi). Their symbolic invisibility
made their  physical  presence tolerable,  but at  the cost  of  denying one's  identity.  In an
article entitled “Muslims try 'name cleansing' to survive in Serb-held Bosnia',  Washington
Post reporter John Pomfret(1993) told the story of  a Muslim businessman who changed his
name from Ferhat to  Filip:
His elbows resting on an intricate lace tablecloth with the crescent moon of  Islam,
Terzić,  in a monologue, justified his decision: “My name was Ferhat. What kind of
name was that? Some Arabian name, maybe Algerian, Egyptian. I don't know why I'm named
Ferhat. So I asked myself, why? You know, for forty years I had difficulty pronouncing it. Now
that there's real democracy, I decided to drop it. Then I asked myself, 'If  they're allowing me to
92 Nije nikakva tajna da je rušenje džamije izazvalo znatan nespokoj muslimana u Semberiji, nakon toga su 
se počele širiti I glasile o narodnom etničkom ćičšenju I masovnom useljavanju. Sve te priče, koje 
nemanju veze sa istinom, otežale su poziciju srpske pregovaračke ekipe u njujorku”
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change my name, why not my whole family? So we all changed, and now we feel a lot better.
Anyway, we've got to be loyal. And besides, every living being must do what it takes to live.
Right?” (…) In town, the family owns two pie shops where they churn out dozens of
cheese and meet delicacies daily, “I worked for all this”, Terzić said (…) “With a new
name, I can go to Serbia, right next door, and do business. I can buy stuff  there and sell it here.
With my old name, I'm stuck.” (Pomfret 1993)
While some may have embraced the opportunity to adopt a 'Serb' identity of  their
own initiative, workers who had somehow preserved their jobs were under great pressure to
change their names. It was the case of  Fatima S93. She was dismissed from her job in July
1992, but was exceptionally fortunate to find a new job in a private company set up by the
husband of  an old friend, which allowed her to financially support her family throughout
the war years. Her new employer, however, registered her under a false name. She accepted
it as a necessary fiction, but was keen to add she would never do it of  her own initiative: 
“And now,  my boss  calls  me: 'Fatima! What Fatima? We have christened you'  She
laughs. I ask her: “So they changed your name?” “Yes! I didn't [want it], but I could say
nothing, just keep quiet.”
As with the case of  men who fought in the Army of  Republika Srpska, the issue of
name changes  and  conversions  is  an  unconfortable  one  in  Bijeljina,  especially  among
Bosniaks. Practically all of  my informants referred to it, often spontaneosly, but only one, a
woman in a so-called 'mixed marriage', ie, a woman of  Muslim background married to a
Serb  man  openly,  assumed  to  have  adopted  a  'Serb'  identity;  she  purchased  false
documents, for which she paid 800 German Marks. She was keen to add, however, that she
never actually adopted the name in her personal relations, but instead used the documents
to be able to circulate unhindered between Semberija and Serbia.
The practice of  adopting a 'Serb' identity seems to have been widerspread. Pomfret
(1993) mentions 380 cases sucessfully processed and one hundred further formal requests
93 Interviewed in January 2015.
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pending before the end of  199394. It is likely that the purchase of  false documents, and the
informal adoption of  a Serb-sounding name were much more common than the resort to a
formal process.  The auhorities  and the Serb population more generally were obviously
aware of  it, which raises the question of  how such a practise was framed at the time. It
wouldn't be possible for non-Serbs to engage in such a coping strategy without at least
some level of  acquiescence or tacit consent. In his 1993 article, Pomfret claims that “in
Bijeljina, the Terzić's name change belongs to a quiet but growing conspiracy among Serb townspeople to
protect some of  their Muslim neighbours from peasant Serb refugees and the gangsters who use them” The
essentialisation of  displaced Serbs as peasants so as to fit into a narrative of  a “war here
between  the  people  from  towns  and  those  from  the  countryside”  is  overblown  and  one-sided,
representing the perspective of  domicile  Serbs  interested in scapegoating  the displaced
population and avoiding questions about their own responsibilities (see Ch.4). But the claim
also  points  to  the  importance  of  solidarity  across  ethnic  boundaries,  as  well  as  the
endurance of  a transethnic local identity among Bijeljina's residents, and to the anxiety felt
by many domicile Serbs with the dynamics introduced by the arrival of  massive numbers
of  displaced Serbs to the transformation of  Bijeljina. The effectiveness of  such a coping
strategy required that a lot of  people turn a blind eye.
Symbolic invisibility was adopted generally under duress. As Fatima's experience
suggests, this was something people tended to be actively induced, if  not coerced, into. The
proto Nedeljko Pajić,  St.  George's  church parish priest,  seems to have been particularly
active in this regard, although he denied, in an article he wrote for SIM Novine  in reaction
to  numerous  reports  in  the  international  media,  having  ever  engaged  in  forced
conversions(Pajić  1994).  Pajić  acknowledged,  nevertheless,  that  many  Muslims  were
applying with the Ministry of  Internal Affairs to have their name changed, a process from
which  he  tried  to  distance  himself.  Interviewed  by  Pomfret,  however,  Pajić  reportedly
mentioned having turned away eleven families who came to him to get baptized, to add
that “they say they want to return to their roots”. Alluding to the 'mythico-historical' narrative
(Mallki 1995) of  Bosnian Muslims as the descendants of  converted Serbs, Pajić therefore
94 After the war, those who went through the legal process to have their name changed, had to repeat the 
same procedure to reclaim their original name, with significant financial costs. There is no data on how 
many people were affected, but I received anecdotical evidence of  cases not yet settled, and individuals 
who gave up on getting their name back because of  the bureaucracy and costs involved. 
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presented this phenomenon as the renewal of  their true identity, a process thar paralleled
with  Serb  nationalists'  commitment  towards  the  regeneration  of  Serb  identity  through
retraditionalisation.
The two processes – retraditionalisation of  Serb identity, and (imposed) renewal of
the  Serb  'roots'  among  Muslims  –  converged  in  the  school  system,  where  religious
education had become compulsory. Muslim students were bound to attend Serb Orthodox
religion classes, and to join in the daily rituals, such as praying at school, going to church,
and even making the sign of  the Cross when passing near churches or hearing church bells,
and other occasions. Symbolically invisible in this way, the pupils joined their Serb class
mates in learning how to be proper 'Serbs', a task in which the Serbian Orthodox Church
in general,  and Nedeljko  Pajić  in  particular,  were heavily  invested.  Forcing  children to
embrace a religion that is not theirs is a form of  violence perpetrated against them. On the
other  hand,  symbolic  invisibility  was  the  necessary  condition  alllowing  the  children  to
participate in the school  life.  My informants  who were in school during the war years
highlighted that generally the teachers made a great effort  to leave the war out of  the
classroom, and provide the children with some resemblance of  normality. It seems, thus,
that  the  attitude  of  Primary  School  Headteacher  Lazar  Manojlović,  who  protected
non-Serb students, teachers and other workers, on the grounds that in his school “there
were only two nations: students and teachers” was not unique. Manojlović himself  always
maintained that most people did remain honorable (pošteni),  but the pressure he had to
sustain for publicly refusing to pander to  nationalism must  have had a deterrent  effect
among  others,  thus  inducing  compliance  among  those  who  did  not  convert  to
nationalism95.
There was a significant a gender dimension with regard to the adoption of  coping
strategies. Regarding the display of  loyalty, it  was easier for women to withdraw into a
position  of  neutrality,  while  men were  forced to  assert  their  loyalty,  or  refuse  it.  This
inequality spilled over to determining how structural invisibility was implemented. Men
were also more severely targeted by discriminatory measures, and more at risk of  both
random violence and detention. For that reason, they tended to withdraw into physical
95 Interview with Lazar Manojlović, November 2014; Manojlović often repeated this point, in numerous 
interviews and media appearances. 
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invisibility,   and  it  was  on  women's  shoulders  that,  to  a  great  extent,  the  burden  of
providing the family's subsistence fell. Embracing a strategy of  symbolic invisibility, many
women adopted Serb-sounding names as a way of  hiding their real identity, which allowed
them to more freely move around town, and engage in the activities of  everyday survival.
This is not to say that women were not at risk of  violence. Although the issue of  wartime
sexual violence emerged only seldom in my interviews, such a risk was always in people's
minds. Indeed, in Karadžić verdict, the ICTY refers to “an incident in June 1992 when
paramilitaries raped two Bosnian Muslim women and paraded them naked hrough town
before they took them away by car and raped them again”(ICTY 2016: 241-2, par. 631). As
an act of  demonstrative violence (Gow 2003:118), such a crime undoubtedly instilled fear. 
Despite  the fear,  however,  the ability  to  circulate  that  their  symbolic  invisibility
conveyed them also allowed some women to engage in  an activity  that  was  crucial  to
survival in wartime Bijeljina: gathering information about evictions, arrests, disappearances
and other crimes. Very early on during my fieldwork, the question of  how information
circulated became a puzzle. Phone lines were unreliable and were often out of  order, and in
any  case  many  homes  had  their  phones  cut,  or  had  no  phone  at  all.  But  it  seemed
increasingly clear that information about what was going on in town, in particular about
crimes, circulated fast.  It emerged from the interviews that people knew about different
incidents of  violence relatively quickly. When inquired about the flow of  information my
respondents confirmed that yes,  information about evictions,  disappearances,  and other
acts of  violence circulated widely, with some people adding that the flow of  information,
much of  it in the form of  rumours, contributed to spread fear and convince many to leave.
But  nobody seemed able to  explain to  me quite how this  flow was generated,  beyond
hearsay  or  the  usualy  dynamics  of  rumours,  and  my  question  often  seemed  to  my
informants out of  purpose, as most were more interested in sharing the substance of  their
own experience. It was Saša Pazarac who eventually disclosed to me one particular way
through which information circulated in wartime Bijeljina,  one which involved actively
gathering and checking it, rather than merely reproducing it. I was about to leave the field
when I openly asked him about the issue.  That day, Saša had arranged for me to meet a
man who was interested in sharing his story with me. His friend wanted to learn about my
research first, before committing himself, and this offered an opportunity for me to seek
validation regarding some of  the themes that seemed to be emerging, after almost one year
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of  fieldwork. It was in this context that it occurred to me to ask them about the circulation
of  information. Saša said it was the Mossad. “I am not joking”, he added, with a smile on
his  face.  Mossad,  he  explained  me,  was  the  acronym  of  “Mahalska  obavještenja  služba”
(neighbourhood information service): 
“Every  morning  a  certain  number  of  women  went  through  town,  from  one
neighbourhood to another, to obtain and share information about the activities
that  occurred  the  previous  night,  during  the  curfew,  with  regard  to  evictions,
expulsions  and  disappearances.  The  women  often  used  their  bicycles,  so  that
information circulated very fast, on the basis of  eyewitness accounts. They would
quicky learn about who was missing, and under which circunstances” (fieldnotes,
27  january  2015,  on  the  basis  of  Saša  Pazarac's  description  on  an  informal
conversation)96
Visiting friends or relatives living in different  mahale for a coffee (ići na kafu) was a
morning routine many women in Bosnia-Herzegovina traditionally engaged in between
domestic  chores  (see  Bringa  1995;  Sorabiji  2008;  Henig  2012).  This  routine  was  an
important part of  the institution of  komšiluk, through which communities were closely knit,
and through which some level social control was  also exercised, in a delicate balance. The
women involved with  the  'Mossad'  used  these  coffee  visiting  routines  as  an  important
resource in the individual and collective efforts to endure and survive ( opstati) in wartime
Bijeljina,  effectively  becoming under cover Human Rights  investigators 97.  The speed in
which they gathered information was crucial in allowing for the prompt mobilisation of
connections (veze) and networks of  support across the ethnic divide.
96 Fieldnotes, 27 January 2015, on the basis of  Saša Pazarac's description on an informal conversation.
97 Wary of  interrupting the flow of  the conversation, I failed to ask how the name 'Mossad' came to 
designate these activities, and whether the name was used at the time or only retrospectively. The Israeli 
intelligence service Mossad has an almost mythical status in the Balkans, given the popularity of  
conspiracy theories about the 'new world order' in the region. Such conspiracy theories became 
particularly popular among Serb nationalists (Byford 2006), keen to place themselves in an imagined 
tradition of  resistance against foreign oppression. I interpreted the acronym as a humourous, 
sophisticated critique of  such mindset. 
206
Although the coping strategies described above did grant individuals some relief  in
the face of  extreme adversity, they could not counter the drive to make Bijeljina a 'Serb'
town. The acceptance by international negotiators of  the principle of  territorial division on
an ethnic basis as a necessary condition to bring the war to an end represented an early
victory to the Bosnian Serb leadership (Glaurdić 2011: 290-291), which emboldened them
in their pursuit for the ideal of  an ethnically homogenous society. The continued presence
of  a large Muslim population in Bijeljina contradicted this ideal. Ultimately, as a group,
Bijeljina's  Muslims  had  no  way  of  resisting  the  enforcement  of  the  'strategic  goal'  of
'separation of  peoples'.
5.3: The process of  mass expulsion
The forced displacement of  Semberija's Muslim population occurred mainly through two
methods,  voluntary  departure  under  coercion,  and  outright  expulsion.  There  was  no
freedom of  movement, and anyone wishing to leave had to seek permission, pay significant
fees and alienate his property, which was to be placed at the disposal of  the state. During
the  first  year  since  the  beginning  of  the  war,  the  Agencija  Evropa  was  the  organisation
primarily  responsible  for  this  process.  The  agency  regularly  organised  busloads  to  the
border between Hungary and Serbia, in cooperation with the Serbian authorities. As the
relations between Belgrade and Pale soured due to the Bosnian Serb leadership rejection,
against Slobodan Milošević's  will, of  the Vance-Owen and subsequent Peace Plans, this
cooperation seems to have eventually come to halt (HLF 1993)98. Tuzla, the closest city
under  control  of  the  Bosnian  government,  became then  the  main  destination  for  the
removal  of  the  undesired  population,  who  were  abandoned  in  no  man's  land between
frontlines in the Mount Majevica. 
In an investigation carried out in 1993, the Fund for Humanitarian Law reported
that “according to the Bijeljina officials, this decision stipulates that in the area of  Bijeljina
should remain only 5% of  the total population of  22,000 Muslims” (FHL 1993a).  If  the
decision of  how many should stay was taken centrally, the decision of  who should go was
98 In their May 1993 report, the Humanitarian Law Fund stated that the Serbian government refused entry
to individuals of  Muslim ethnicity, and highlighted how the Serbian government had ceased to emit even 
transit visas for Muslims leaving areas under the control of  Bosnian Serbs. 
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taken locally.  According to information the Fund for Humanitarian Law obtained from
local leaders, the local authorities compiled lists defining who should be removed in each
operation, following three criteria (HLC 1993a), offering considerable leverage: 
1. “Muslims who in the previous decades moved from Srebrenica, Vlasenica, Kalesija
or from other places in the former Yugoslavia” – this referred primarily to the so-
called 'muhazeri' inhabitants of  villages in the Drina Valley that were dislocated
due to the construction of  dams in the river, and their descendants. They were
widely  seen  by  the  domicile  population  as  responsible  for  the  ruralisation  of
Bijeljina  in  the  1960s  and the  growth of  crime  rates  in  the  1980s,  with  SDS
members pointing out that it  was  from their  ranks that  the SDA recruited the
'extremists' from whom Bijeljina was 'liberated';
2. “Those who had any relation with the Muslim 'armed rebellion' in Bijeljina in the
end of  March and April 1992”
3. “Muslims who belong to the category of  disloyal and politically suspicious, and
figuring in the data bases an of  the state organs responsible for such cases”
On the basis of   lists of  individuals provided by the local authorities, the expulsions
were  organised  and  carried  out  by  the  Commission  for  the  Exchange  of  Civilian
Population. A member of  Arkan's  Serbian Volunteer Guard99,  Major Vojkan Djurković
'Puškar', was the leader of  the Commission, which had an official character, and its own
paramilitary force, which operated independently of  the local police (Amnesty 1994: 6).
Vojkan and his force were also actively involved in the ressetlement of  displaced Serbs in
Bijeljina  and Janja.  They routinely  evicted non-Serbs,  reassigning  their  homes  to  Serb
families, who usually paid for the right to occupy them. 
'Vojkan's men' regularly visited the homes of  non-Serbs, ostensibly to make a survey
or an inventory of  the house. Under such pressure, the individuals visited often signed up
for 'voluntary' departure from Bijeljina, a service for which Vojkan's Commission charged
about 150 German Marks per person, or up to 2.000 German Marks in the case of  men in
military age.  During big expulsion operations their  modus operandi was more extreme. A
99 According to Cvijetin Simić, the President of  the Municipal Assembly between 1990 and June 1992, 
Vojkan worked for Arkan, providing logistics, and remained connected to Arkan until the latter was 
murdered in 2000. Simić described Vojkan before the war as a “small criminal” (interview, January 2015)
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black van (crni kombi)100 would circulate around town at night, during the curfew, 'collecting'
people from their homes whose names figured in the list, without prior warning. Once the
kombi was full,  it  would drive to a central location – usually the Agricultural Technical
School  (Poljoprivedna škola) or the car park in front of  the heaquarters of  the Red Cross –
unload and go 'collect' more people, until it filled a bus or a lorry. The  individuals thus
detained were then taken to a second location in the countryside, where Vojkan himself
was often waiting for them. Those who had signed off  for 'voluntary departure' were also
brought there. Victims of  forced displacement were then thouroughly searched and robbed
of  any money or valuables. Men of  military age were separated, regardless of  whether or
not they had already paid to leave, and sent to Batković, or to detention camps near the
frontlines, to perform forced labour, until their families were able to pay for their release.
The others  were eventually  driven to the frontlines  in Mount Majevica and left  there.
(Amnesty International 1994:5; HRW 2000:36 ; UNSG 1994: Annex IIIA, p. 137, par.359)
The  first  wave  of  mass  expulsions  occurred  throughout  the  Summer  of  1993,
following a decision taken centrally by the Bosnian Serb leadership, to drastically reduce
the presence of  Bosnian Muslims still remaining in Republika Srpska. This wave of  mass
expulsions followed a similar process that took place in the other towns where there was still
a significant presence of  non-Serbs. It was the case of  Trebinje in January 1993 (HW 1993;
FHL 1993),  and  Banja  Luka  from March  1993  onwards  (FHL 1993).  The  first  wave
targetted the Muslim population in the town of  Bijeljina, and seems to have been designed
to  have  an  essentially  demonstrative  effect,  pushing  potential  targets  to  sign  up  to
'voluntary'  departure,  or  to  leave clandestinely  with the help of  human traffikers.  The
second wave, in the Summer of  1994 consisted primarily in the evacuation of  the village of
Janja. Between July and September 1994 the quasi totality of  the Muslim population of
Janja, was expelled, in an operation requiring a significant logistic effort. In the process, the
victims were not only forced to abandon their property, but often had all their personal
documents  confiscated  and  destroyed101.  According  to  the  local  Association  of  Camp
detainees, up to 700 hundred men of  military age from Janja were detained in Batković,
100 It is likely that there was more than one van operating, but the image of  this particular black van 
circulating through the streets of  Bijeljina at night remains nevertheless the symbol of  the mass 
expulsions. Both the method and the memory find their parallel in Banja Luka's experience, with the 
colour of  the van as the sole difference. In Banja Luka the van was red (Galijaš 2009: 256). 
101 Interview with Mehmed Đezić, President of  the Association of  Camp detainees of  Bijeljina and Janja 
(Udruženje logoraša), November 2014
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and subjected to a  regime of  forced labour in agriculture and in the frontlines.  Some
remained there until  the camp was closed in January 1996.  Others  were released and
expelled to Tuzla after their families were able to pay for their liberation. Between both
waves the Commission remained active albeit with a slower pace. By the end of  Summer
1994 there were probably no more than two thousand Muslims left in Semberija, out of  a
pre-war population of  around thirty thousand (Tableau 2009:741, Table 2M).
Sometimes, in their eagerness, Vojkan's men happened to 'collect'  and expell the
wrong people, individuals not on the list or on good terms with the local ruling elite. In
such cases the authorities usually intervened to bring the individuals back, thus exposing
their leverage in the process (HLC 1993a). In one such case, they went as far as pressing
criminal charges against Vojkan, having him arrested, “after he expelled a Bosnian Muslim
who was on good terms with SDS members who had established a military unit of  Bosnian
Muslims in the Army of  Republika Srpska [the Third semberija Brigade]”(ICTY 2016:
263, par.676) Such 'mistakes' happened more and more often as the Muslim population
dwindled.  The few Muslims  still  remaining,  and especially  those who had suceeded in
preserving their homes, became targets, as displaced Serbs screened the town in search for
accomodation they could occupy.
Fatima S. was the victim of  one such 'mistake'.  A member of  one of  Bijeljina's
oldest and most respected families, she was able, thanks to her ability to navigate through
connections, to preserve the family house in the town centre. For years she sustained the
pressure exercised by displaced Serbs, who coveted the house and regularly showed up to
threaten the family,  in an attempt to induce them to leave. Then, in the night of  12-13 July
1995, at 2.30 am, she woke up to the noise of  someone trying to open the gate to the
courtyard. Fatima recalled it in the most vivid way.  An old property, the family home was
composed of  three  separate  houses  around a  courtyard.  Fatima  lived  with  her  elderly
mother in one of  the houses. One of  sisters lived in the second house, and in the third there
was her brother and young niece. When Fatima got to the courtyard, there were two men
there,  who had jumped through the high walls.  There were  other  men outside;   they
ordered her to open the gate. 
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“I recognize some of  them, although they are wearing balaclavas, I can still see their eyes. I
recognize them (…) It was a little weird. Despite everything, I never hid, I always moved around;
these were people with whom I talked, with whom I sat for coffee, just the before… So I ask
'What's going on?' 'You are going to Tuzla' [someone replies]".
Fatima  recalls  the  stream  of  thought  in  her  mind  as  the  incident  unfoleded.  Her
extraordinary presence of  mind would prove crucial for the outcome of  this experience.
Her sister had taken sedatives, and locked herself  in her house, so that Vojkan's men had to
tear the door down. She was in shock, but Fatima managed to get her dressed and out of
the house. As for their mother, a woman in her late 70s, she refused to leave, defiantly
saying she would rather get killed. “Mamma, you don't know who you are dealing with, they will kill
you!”.  As the old woman resisted,  one of  the men punched her,  while another  showed
Fatima his pistol. She managed eventually to dress her mother a coat on top of  her night
dress, and get her out. As they were leaving, the men noticed the third house, and asked
who lived there. “I came up with something, I said 'there is a man from Tuzla living there  [meaning a
displaced Serb], he is old, let him be – because my niece was there, a young, attractive girl, I didn't know
what they might do to her, and I was afraid for her. So I said 'Come on, when the morning comes you'll deal
with him' ” The operation seems to have taken no more than fifteen minutes. The infamous
black  kombi was waiting for them outside. They were driven to the outskirts of  Bijeljina,
where they were put in a military lorry, already so crowded that there was hardly any space
left, and taken to a detention site in the countryside.
In the morning, as her niece was leaving for school, there were people already in the
courtyard, ready to occupy the houses. After they told her that the women had been taken
to Tuzla, she rushed to see her relatives in another part of  town. In the meantime, her
father was able to escape unnoticed and go into hiding. The family immediately sought
help with their connections (veze) to bring the three women back. It was the intervention of
Fatima's employer that prevented their expulsion. Around 4 pm, at the detention camp,
Fatima was finally told they were to be taken back to Bijeljina. Before getting into the same
lorry that had taken them there, they were throroughly searched and robbed. When they
got home, they found it already occupied, but the police intervened to force the occupiers
out the following morning. The family continued to regularly receive threats by people who
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coveted their house well after the Dayton Peace Agreement came into force.
Fatima's experience was exceptional, as she highlighted herself. Bijeljina's remaining
Muslims continued to be evicted, expelled, and in some cases murdered 102 until the eve of
the peace negotiations at Dayton in October 1995. Despite the fortunate end to the family's
wartime ordeals, the experience left indeleble marks. Fatima's sister never fully recovered
from the shock she suffered. “Since that night – her sister told me – I have never again been able to
smile”. As for Fatima, in the end of  our interview she told me how she tries to forget, but
cannot, even though she managed to carry on with her life and preserve a positive attitude.
She added that during the war she had kept a diary, which someone took away when they
were 'collected', and after that she never went back to her writing, because she wanted to
forget. The man she recognised in his balaclava, a displaced Serb from Central Bosnia,
now  lives  in  the  United  States,  Fatima  told  me.  He  obtained  political  asylum on  the
grounds of  the persecution he suffered in Central Bosnia, where he originally lived. She
sees the others regularly in Bijeljina. They sometimes exchange greetings, as if  nothing ever
happened.
The  sense  that  the  crimes  committed  against  non-Serbs  during  the  war  went
unpunished is an outstanding feature of  my informants' recollections of  this period, with
Vojkan as the most conspicuous of  all  the characters that integrate the narrative(s) that
emerged from these recollections. One of  my informants recalled Vojkan's candour and his
sense of  impunity, as she told me that he was known to tell his victims that “ it's  better that
people pay me to take them away rather than to end up in mass graves”, as if  they should be grateful
that he was saving their lives103. More than anyone else, Vojkan now personifies the terror
Bijeljina's lived under during the war years, even though he is not connected to any of  the
murders that happened there. Arkan and Mauzer – undoubtely more powerful than Vojkan
– were both murdered after the war, while Vojkan lives undisturbed in Bijeljina. A colourful
character, who in an extensive interview for  SIM novine in 1994 presented himself  as  a
“humanist” (Simić 1994: 23), Vojkan somehow overshadows those who stood behind him,
who emerge from my informants' recollections as a mass of  unnamed individuals, who now
102 The murder of  five members of  the Hadžić family, including one child, on 11 September 1995, was the 
last in a series of  multiple murders that punctuated Bijeljina's wartime experience (Trbić 2013a: 276)
103 Informal conversation, January 2015
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seem to pretend they had nothing to do with the mass  expulsions.  They haven't  been
forgotten,  though.  One of  my informants offered me the following reflexion about the
protracted process of  ethnic cleansing that took place in Bijeljina104:  
“And those who did not think that they were doing evil, they intentionally thought and did us
harm. Because it was enough for one of  them —how ugly that sounds, "one of  them"! But,
that is how it was—to say "tonight round up that street", and you know that it is your street.
And what kind of  feeling do you have when you come home, say, me personally, and they have
taken your parents (...) So that, intentionally or not, they were fomenting terror (...). People
were  disappearing  without  a  trace,  from  Bijeljina!  We  heard,  "they  disappeared,  those
disappeared, these disappeared..." And now, every night we hope, "maybe it won't be me
tonight"! And every night that you survive, that is good. I remember, in the morning when I
would get up, I had a secret knock, for my parents, because my house was next to theirs in the
same courtyard, I had a special way to knock on the door. Imagine how it was for me every
morning when I would find them, sitting with plastic bags, in their pajamas? They had not
slept all night, sitting in their pajamas, waiting! And when I come, my mother says, "Oh,
thank God, they didn't take us away last night". And then, you would live that way until the
next night. It lasted this way for four years. It is amazing that we remained normal, that we
didn't go crazy from fear!”
Concluding remarks:
Marginalised, if  not ignored, by an official narrative which they largely contradict,
most of  the memories explored in this chapter nevertheless form part of  an archive of
knowledge shared across ethnic boundaries. Going beyond the conventional 'perpetrators-
victims-bystanders'  narrative,  the exploration of  these 'difficult  memories'  highlights  the
everyday experience of  getting through (doživjeti) and surviving (preživjeti) in an environment
marked by pervasive fear and uncertainty; and the role of  agency and contingency in the
particular context of  liminality. What makes these memories 'difficult' is not only that these
are memories painful to recall, of  suffering and injustice,  but, above all, that they are at
104 Interviewed in January 2015
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odds with the official narrative of  the wartime experience in Bijeljina, on the one hand,
but also, on the other hand, that they dissent to some extent from the  narratives about
Bosniak victimhood during the Bosnian war favoured by Bosniak nationalists. 
Serbs in Bijeljina feel a sustained pressure not to question, let alone contradict the
official  version  of  the  wartime  experience.  That  pressure  is  insidious,  and  somehow
reminiscent of  the pressure to conform they felt  during the war,  when chauvinism was
tolerated, but expressions of  compassion were acively if  tacitly repressed, and gestures of
solidarity were usually performed discreetly if  not secretly. That such gestures did happen
suggests  that  the  process  of  radical  othering  that  preceded  the  war  and continued  to
develop throughout, did not totally destroy a pre-existing attachment to the principle of  'life
in common' (zajednički život) based on a shared, trans-ethnic identity as Bosnians and as
Semberians. 
As  for  Bosniaks  –  the  ethnic  group  previously  named  Bosnian  Muslims  –  the
ambiguity entailed by the coping strategies is at the source of  a particular type of  'difficult
memories'. The coping mechanisms  sustained their prolonged presence, allowing them to
survive in a period of  great duress, but they also made it easier for the autorities to manage
that  very  presence,  and  more  efficiently  exploit  them.  This  ambiguity  is  absent  from
dominant narratives of  victimhood, which tend to eliminate nuance and disregard agency
in favour of  the archetipal image of  victims as passive, “innocent” and “morally pure”
(Helms 2013: 4).  Forced to interact with these dominant public representations, victims
often feel compelled to silence the full extent of  their experience in order to meet dominant
expectations, and preserve the legitimacy of  their claim to victimhood. In other words, as a
survivor of  the Srebrenica genocide once put it to me, “we the victims are expected to behave
almost like saints”, so as to deserve their status, and preempt accusations that they either
'brought it upon themselves', or have profited from their past victimhood. Hence the need
to protect their 'difficult memories' from the gaze of  outsiders reveals the sense of  enduring
vulnerability of  the victims of  ethnic cleansing, as a community of  experience.
The liminal stage of  transformation which engulfed society during wartime affected
the whole of  the population, but in different ways, such that we can say there were different
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levels of  liminality within the wider liminal process that the war represented. They were
not all exposed to the same kind of  dangers, and to the same levels of  uncertainty. Marked
as  the  undesired  'others',  those  with  a  Muslim  ethnic  background  became  the  most
vulnerable and disempowered. More than anyone else, they represented the rejected future
–  a unitary Bosnia-Herzegovina – against which the Serb 'defensive-liberation war' was
fought; and they embodied the past of  life in common (zajednički život) that needed to be
abandoned, if  not forgotten, to leave room for a renewed 'Serb' identity in the safety of  an
ethnically homogenous society.
On the ground in Bijeljina, the process of  ethnic cleansing developed along specific
lines,  determined  by  the  evolving  balance  between  the  ideological  goal  of  ethnic
homogeneisation through the 'separation of  peoples', which was defined by the SDS central
leadership,  but  was  consensually  shared  by  the  local  leaders;  and  the  particular
opportunities opened by the possibility to disposess and exploit the local non-Serbs. This
balance  resulted  in  the  prolonged  presence  of  Muslim  residents,  allowing  for  their
exploitation both as  labourers  through the imposition of  work duties  to face the acute
workforce shortages due to the war effort; and through racket, namely in exchange of  the
'right' to voluntarily leave for exile.  The contradiction between this prolonged presence and
the ideal of  'separation of  peoples' was temporarily managed by disposessing the Muslims
of  any markers of  their national identity, from the (im)possibility to practice their religion
to the pressure to adopt 'Serb' names. This disposession of  identity made them structuraly
invisible, and thus made their presence tolerable, until the urgency of  completing the task
of  separating peoples trumped any other calculations. As new political structures and social
values emerged throughout the liminal stage and the consolidation of  Republika Srpska
gained  pace,  overcoming  the  contradiction  between  the  physical  presence  of  a  large
Muslim  community  and  the  ideal  of  an  ethnically  homogenous  society  required  the
enforcement of  the 'separation of  peoples' through their mass expulsion. The prospect of  a
peace treaty to end the war made that an urgent need. This would, in principle mean no
stage of  reintegration after liminality for Bijeljina's Muslims. 
But in liminal situations the outcome is never garanteed, and so it  was that the
Dayton Peace Agreement which put an end to the war recognised the right to return of
displaced people  to  their  pre-war homes,  and the right  to  property,  entailing  the legal
nullity of  evictons and expropriations. Dayton, thus, opened the possibility of  return and
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offered the potental to reverse ethnic cleansing, and with it the promise of  reintegration,
even though – people were aware – nothing would ever be the same. The liminality of
peace building followed the liminality of  war making, and again the equation of  danger
and  possibility,  which  determined  their  vulnerability,  would  define  the  agency  of  the
Muslim population in the face of  the deep transformation of  their hometown. This time,
however, this equation followed a more balanced formula. The political system created by
Dayton  involved  the  fundamental  contradiction  between  the  acceptance  of  nationalist
principles entailing the confirmation of  a de facto territorial division along ethnic lines and
an institutional architecture favouring ethnic politics; and the liberal values inherent to the
right to return, the right to property, and the preservation of  cultural and religious heritage.
It imposed daunting constraints but it also fostered numerous possibilities. The process of
'normalisation' of  inter-ethnic relations during the liminal stage of  reaggregation, which we
will  discuss on Chapter 6,  developed in the context of  this  fundamental  contradiction.
Before we get there, however, we should first focus our attention in the process that twinned
the Muslims' persecution and expulsion, and which deeply shaped the transformation of
Bijeljina, from a multi-ethnic town organised under the principle of  zajednički život, to a
'Serb' town according to a nationalist vision. The following chapter will the resettlement of
displaced Serbs in Bijeljina. 
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Chapter 6
Reinforcing the 'separation of  peoples':
Memories of  displacement and resettlement
among Bosnian Serbs
The resettlement of  a massive number of  Bosnian Serbs was one of  the processes leading
to the transformation of  Bijeljina, pushing it away from its tradition of  life in common
(zajednički život) in a multiethnic setting, to turn it into a homogenised 'Serb' town. Located
far  from the  front  lines  and close  to  the  border  with  Serbia,  during  the war  Bijeljina
became an important destination for Serbs displaced from areas of  Bosnia-Herzegovina
beyond the control of  the Army of  Republika Srpska.  More than twenty years after the
war, many of  those who resettled there do see Bijeljina as a 'Serb' town, but fail nevertheless
to see it as 'theirs', and many harbour feelings of  nostalgia for the lives they were compelled
to leave behind. The 'difficult memories' of  displacement and resettlement, as shared with
me in formal interviews and informal conversations, suggest a dissonance between a strong
allegiance to Republika Srpska and subtle but pervasive feelings of  alienation stemming
from the concrete experience of  everyday life in Bijeljina. This chapter will explore this
dissonance.
Up to 2.2 million people, of  a pre-war population of  4.3 million,  are estimated to
have  been victims  of  forced displacement  during  the  war,  of  whom one million  were
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internally displaced (BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2005:45). After the war,
there was a significant movement of  return of  refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but, despite
the priority assigned to return to the pre-war homes by international stakeholders (Čapo
2015:22) only a minority of  refugees and internally displaced persons returned to their pre-
war homes (BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2010). The strongest trend was,
instead, that of  resettlement in areas where one's national group constituted a majority
(Valenta and Strabac 2013:129). This was especially the case with Bosnian Serbs, of  whom,
in 2000, only 16% wished to return to their pre-war homes, while 60% refused such a
possibility, with 24% unsure (Petrović 2007:172). Indeed, a significant number of  displaced
Serbs left their homes only when the Dayton Peace Agreement was implemented, as was
the case of  thousands of  residents in areas of  Sarajevo which during the war were under
the control of  the Army of  Republika Srpska, but which Dayton assigned, not to Republika
Srpska, but to the other Bosnian 'entity', the 'Federation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina' (Hoare
2007:401; Donia 2006:338-9; see also infra). 
The impact of  the resettlement of  displaced Serbs in Bijeljina cannot be overstated.
According to the UNHCR(1998) in the immediate post-war period there were 37 thousand
displaced persons living in the municipality; by 2005, the number of  displaced persons
registered had dropped to 7.318 (BiH Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees 2005:124)
and is  now residual.  The decrease means that in the meantime much of  the displaced
population was able to solve their housing problems and acquire enough means of  survival
so as to no longer qualify for the legal status of  'displaced persons'. 
Most  of  those who arrived in Bijeljina as  displaced persons  eventually  resettled
there, so that the municipality of  Bijeljina has had the second highest population growth
(after Banja Luka) since 1991, in what is now Republika Srpska, increasing from 97.796 in
the 1991 Census to 107.715 inhabitants in the following Census, which took place in 2013
(BiH Agency for Statistics 2016) – even though the Muslim/Bosniak population went from
approximately thirty five thousand to thirteen thousand in the same period(BiH Agency for
Statistics 2016) Of  Bijeljina's residents in 2013, 57% were not born in the municipality, and
46.9% were not  born in a  municipality  located in the territory that  is  now Republika
Srpska (BiH Agency for Statistics 2016). It is therefore safe to infer that individuals resettled
in the municipality of  Bijeljina and their descendants comprise a significant proportion of
the local population. 
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The  figures  become  more  meaningful  when  we  contrast  them  with   with  the
negative  population  growth  that  affects  Bosnia-Herzegovina  overall,  and  which
disproportionately  affects  the  Serb  population.  Between  1991  and  2013,  Bosnia's
population decreased by 457 thousand, from 4.377 millions to  3.920 millions  (BiH Agency
for Statistics 2016). Regarding Bosnia's 'constituent peoples', Serbs, Bosniaks and Croats, it
was among the Serbs that the population decreased the most, by about 280 thousand, from
1366.000 to 1085.000 (BiH Agency for Statistics 2016)105. This is due, to a great extent, to
the massive level  of  forced displacement during the war;  but also to emigration and a
negative natural growth, with the number of  deaths higher than the number of  births.
Along with the process of  ethnic cleansing, explored in the previous chapter, the
displacement of  Bosnian Serbs and their resettlement in what was to become Republika
Srpska reveal the centrality of  the political goal of  'separation of  peoples'. Such a goal,
which  represented  a  departure  from  their  leadership's  earlier  goal  of  keeping
Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole in a common state with Serbia, required sacrificing the
traditional nationalist view of  Bosnia-Herzegovina as a Serb land, and abandoning part of
the territory to the other constituent nations, the Croats and the Muslims(Hoare 2007: 27).
For the Bosnian Serb leadership, the resettlement of  the Serb populations was a necessary
consequence  of  the  partition  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  a  sacrifice  for  the  sake  of  an
ethnically homogenous homeland. The leadership  assumed the responsibility to provide
for the Serb population residing in areas beyond the control of  the Army of  Republika
Srpska. In the Assembly discussions following the presentation of  the 'Six Strategic Goals
of  the Serb People',  of  which the 'separation of  peoples'  was the most primordial  (see
Ch.1), Momčilo Krajšnik, the Assembly speaker, was keen to convey clarity: “We shall, in an
organised manner, provide our people with a roof  over their heads. Resettle them if  need be, we shall not put them in a
genocidal position”. , He urged deputies to put national interest above their own personal sense
of  belonging  to  particular  places,  highlighting  that  his  own  home  in  the  suburbs  of
Sarajevo would probably become part of  “Muslimania”: “But I have no regrets. We must not put
105 The number of  individuals declaring themselves Croats diminished by 217 thousand, from 760.000 to 
543.000; those declaring themselves Bosniaks diminished by 142 thousand, from 1902.000 to 1760.000; 
and those who declared themselves as 'Other'(the residual category for national minorities, comprising 
also those who refuse ethnic identification) diminished by 219.000 from 347.000 to 129.000 (BiH Agency 
for Statistics 2016)
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our individual goals before this goal”  (16th  Session of  the Assembly of  the Serb people in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, 12 May 1992, p.50).
Forced displacement has long been “a tool of  state formation”(Walters 2002: 271).
In Europe, the expulsion of  the Jews and Muslims from the Iberian peninsula in the end of
the 15th century,  religious  persecution after  the Reformation,  the slave trade,  and land
clearances during the agricultural revolution are but a few examples. Drawing from these
earlier practises of  forced displacement of  discrete categories of  people, policies favouring
population  exchanges  and  the  permanent  resettlement  of  populations  in  territories
dominated by their co-nationals were a corollary of  the emergence of  the nation-state as
the ideal model for the organisation of  states.
Once resettled in a new location, forcefully displaced persons face many challenges.
They have not only to cope with their feelings of  loss for the lives and livelihoods they had
to leave behind, but have also to adapt to new, often harsher, life conditions in places where
they sometimes feel unwelcome by local populations. What makes the case of  resettlement
among one's  ethnic  kin particular  lies  in  the challenges  of  integration.  For refugees  in
general, integration is the hopeful outcome of  a slow learning process through which the
newcomers  will  become  familiar  with  the  language,  culture,  social  organisation  and
political institutions of  the host society (UNHCR 2013:13-15). They are not necessarily
expected to integrate, and the status of  the host country is unambiguously that of  a land of
exile. Indeed in many countries refugees are offered only temporary shelter, and effectively
prevented from integrating, by being denied by the authorities of  the host state the right to
work and to obtain citizenship or permanent residency status. 
Co-nationals, however, are assumed to already possess the knowledge necessary for
successful integration, and are expected to assimilate into their new location. This requires
their local identities to be played down in favour of  their common national identity. On the
level of  everyday life, they were also expected to emulate the habits and manners of  the
domicile population, with marginalisation as the price to pay for a continual salience of
local identities. These expectations create a sense of  double loss among the resettled, who,
having lost their homes and livelihoods, face also the pressure to abandon also their cultural
habits and old attachments, so as to become equals, without as a reward experiencing the
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benefits of  equality, and often facing an enduring hostility on the part  of  the domicile
population (Clark 2006; Čapo-Žmegač 2007[2002]; Petrović 2007).
Cases like the compulsory population transfers between Greece and Turkey in 1922;
Poland and Germany in 1945; the expulsion of  the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia
between 1945 and 1948; or the transfer of  ethnic Italians from Yugoslavia to Italy in 1947
have much in common with each other and with the case of  the resettled Serbs. Even if  the
historical circumstances of  each case may be different, there are many similarities in the
difficulty that populations permanently resettled as a result of  conflict felt to overcome their
feelings  of  loss  and  create  a  new  sense  of  attachment.  In  cases  such  as  Germany
(Svašek:2002)  or  Italy  (Ballinger:2003;Thomassen:2006)  the  presence  of  resettled  co-
nationals reminded the domicile population of  a past that the nation's official memory did
not celebrate. To be accepted by the domicile population in their new homeland, resettled
citizens felt compelled to make the local dimension of  their identity invisible to the eyes of
the majority. Due to the historical circumstances of  their displacement, in the aftermath of
the Second World War, those who openly continued to cultivate their ties with their places
of  origin were often associated, rightly or wrongly, with fascism in the case of  resettled
Italians or Nazi sympathies in the case of  resettled Germans, ideologies that society now
overall rejected. Italian 'esuli' (exiles)106 –  as they became known – and Sudete Germans,
perceived their local and national identities as mutually reinforcing, so that abandoning
their local identities implied the weakening of  the national identity they shared with their
ethnic kin. The pressure to downplay their local identities was the source of  a deep sense of
resentment against the domicile populations, which seemed not to appreciate their personal
sacrifice or to share their sense of  grief  for the nation's loss of  territory. On the other hand,
in both cases the state was sufficiently well-established, and national identity was sufficiently
stable to offer the possibility of  assimilation, in contrast with Republika Srpska, where the
very idea of  assimilation became meaningless, given that its identity was still uncertain, and
the changes triggered by the war and the 'separation of  peoples' deeply disruptive both to
the domicile and the resettled population.
106 Italians from Yugoslavia who resettled in Italy after the Second World War are known as 'esuli'. The term 
first appeared to differentiate them from the 'rimasti', who chose to remain in Yugoslavia, for which they 
had to give up their Italian citizenship. The term continued to define them in Italy after resettlement (see 
Ballinger 2003; Thomassen 2006). 
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While many resettled Serbs share this feeling of  grief  that stems both from personal
loss  and  from  the  loss  of  national  territory,  the  impact  of  their  displacement  and
resettlement in the politics of  memory in Republika Srpska bears more similarities with the
case of  the exchange of  populations between Greece and Turkey as agreed in the 1992
Lausanne Treaty (Hirschon: 2003a). The displacement of  about half  a million Muslims
from Greece and 1.5 million Greeks from Anatolia marked the rejection of  a multiethnic
model of  social and political organisation and the definitive adoption of  the nation-state
model, perceived as dominated by one particular ethnic group, itself  defined by religious
affiliation. In both countries, official memories of  the population exchange subordinated
the lived experience of  those who were 'exchanged'  to  the demands of  the nationalist
narrative of  the Greco-Turkish war of  1919-1922 and the wider character of  the historical
relationship between Greeks and Turks. 
In Turkey, where the newcomers represented a small proportion of  the population,
their suffering was minimised as an acceptable price to pay for what was overall a clear
victory for the Turkish state in war (Hirschon 2003a), while in Greece what became known
as the 'Asia Minor Catastrophe' became, in the words of  Onur Yildirim, “the backbone of
political rhetoric of  the past, present and future of  the Greek nation-state, not to mention
Greek  national  identity”  (Yildirim:2006,17-18). The  experience  of  resettled  Greeks
mattered  to  official  memory  only  insofar  as  it  corresponded  to  stereotypes  of  Greek
victimisation under Turkish rule. More than the personal losses of  the Anatolian Greeks,
what  was  mourned  was  the  defeat  of  Greece's  territorial  ambitions  in  Asia  Minor
(Yildirim:2006,18).  For  a  long  time  the  traumatic  experience  of  victims  of  forced
displacement and resettlement found expression only in the realm of  the family, where they
were transmitted across generations (Clark: 2006), until in recent decades oral historians
and anthropologists began to show interest in creating a record before the last generations
of  people who experienced it became extinct (e.g. Neyzi 2008). 
The case of  Bosnian Serbs' displacement and resettlement has much in common
with the cases mentioned above, but there are also crucial differences. The character of  the
Bosnian war was such that their  experience is  commemorated, somehow paradoxically,
both as territorial loss to be mourned and as an acceptable price to pay for territorial gain
and the consolidation of  a Serb ethnic majority. But, unlike Germany, Italy, Greece or
Turkey, Republika Srpska did not exist at all before the conflict in which context the forced
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displacement  happened.  Secondly,  while  in  the  above  mentioned  cases  the  resettled
populations comprised only a small proportion of  the total population of  their kin states, in
Republika Srpska the resettled population constituted a significant proportion of  the total
population;  data  from  2000,  when  the  first  census  of  the  displaced  population  was
conducted, indicates there were in Republika Srpska 556.214 displaced persons (Ministry
for  Human Rights  and Refugees  2005:81),  of  whom only 15.5% declared the wish to
return to their pre-war homes, while 58.3% did not want to return, with 26.2% unsure
(Ministry 2005:119). It is to a great extent thanks to their presence that the political goal of
ethnic homogenisation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serb dominance in Republika Srpska
were achieved. The impact of  this population becomes more meaningful if  we bear in
mind that the total population of  Republika Srpska was, in 2013 of  1228.423 (BiH Agency
for Statistics 2016).
This meant that, collectively, resettled Serbs had the potential to shape Republika
Srpska's identity in ways that were beyond the possibilities of  resettled populations in other
cases. In this sense, Republika Srpska appeared as a promised land offering the possibility
of  a  new beginning,  with  displaced Serbs  benefiting  from the support  of  the political
institutions towards their incorporation in their new locations. This, however, made them
an object of  resentment and hostility for domicile populations themselves struggling to give
meaning to the deep transformation their lives suffered since the dissolution of  Yugoslavia;
for  their  massive presence in  their  new locations  was  seen as  the trigger  for  pervasive
changes in the experience of  place, which created a sense of  displacement also among the
domicile  populations107.  Regardless  of  their  numbers,  however,  resettled  Serbs  were
disempowered,  dependent  on  the  political  class  but  lacking  the  established network  of
support that the domicile population could rely on, thus more vulnerable to manipulation
(Petrović  2007;  Jansen 2010)108.  For  many,  the  promises  of  a  new beginning  remained
unfulfilled, if  they were not betrayed. However, due to their numbers, resettled Serbs could
not simply be ignored. Instead, by their very presence, they forced the local communities to
somehow adapt to them, but they were part of  a dynamics in which they had little power to
107 Scholars of  globalisation (e.g. Gupta and Fergusson 1992:10) have long highlighted how its dynamics 
disrupts the connection between place and culture, not only among migrants but also among the 
populations that remain in their home regions, creating the type of  feeling of  displacement that I have 
identified among the domicile population of  Bijeljina, regardless of  ethnicity.
108 Stef  Jansen(2010) highlighted the powerlessness and potential for manipulation of  refugees by exploring 
the metaphor of  refugees as pawns in a chess game, a metaphor that he found in a poster produced in 
Sarajevo during the siege, whose title was 'refuchess'.
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control (Jansen 2010), although they influenced it greatly. 
Whilst  there  is  a  significant  body  of  academic  literature  focusing  on  forced
displacement and return to Bosnia (e.g. Halilovich 2013; Jansen 2007, 2010; Sivac-Bryant
2016; Steffanson 2006, 2007), scholars have systematically neglected the specific problems
involved in the  resettlement of  Serbs in Republika Srpska (see Armakolas 2007 for an
exception). We are fortunate, however, that the case of  Bijeljina constitutes an important
exception  to  this  neglect.  In  her  2007  comparative  study  of  returnees  and  displaced
persons in Bijeljina, sociologist Jagoda Petrović offers a comprehensive characterisation of
the  life  conditions  of  both  categories  of  the  population.  She  highlights  the  difficulties
displaced persons faced in the process of  integration. Strikingly and counter-intuitively,
"especially  when  viewed  from  the  dominant  perspective  of  ethnicised  explanations  of
refugee solutions in the former Yugoslav space” (Čapo 2015: 24), Petrović claims that the
Bosniaks returnees were better integrated, more satisfied and had a much more positive
outlook than resettled Serbs. Based on a survey with a representative sample of  both the
returnee  and  resettled  population,  Petrović  identified  as  the  major  problems  displaced
persons faced in Bijeljina were:
1. Deficient access to adequate housing: only 53% of  resettled families surveyed owned their
own home, in comparison with 95% in the case of  returnees; beyond the issue of
ownership, Petrović  also identifies patterns of  inadequacy, such as infrastructure,
size and equipment (pp.194-197).
2. Economic problems, with two thirds of  the sample living under the poverty line (p.247).
Work prospects were low, and only 30% of  those surveyed had any form of  regular
employment; lack of  work prospects. Families were therefore heavily dependent on
pensions and other subventions for their survival.
3. Inadequate support from social networks, as their original networks collapsed when they
were displaced; extended families often resettled in different locations; and, among
nuclear families, conflicts were frequent (p.248). 
Petrović criticised both the international community for neglecting this category of
the population due to their policies favouring return (in a similar vein see Čapo 2015), and
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the authorities of  Republika Srpska, both at entity level and locally, for the lack of  sufficient
support; coordination among agencies and, crucially, lack of  consultation with the users of
their services, adding that much of  the activities of  such agencies were consumed merely
writing reports (p.257).
The study exposed the lack of  integration of  resettled Serbs in Bijeljina. As Petrović
remarks, “the absence of  significant support and understanding in the local environment,
and sometimes hostility from the domicile population hinders the construction of  social
networks. Thus it is not surprising that resettled persons build new friendships mostly with
people who were displaced together or resettled in the same place”. They also revealed a
great pessimism regarding the future, as “most [thought] that in the coming period nothing
[would] significantly change or that they [would] be even worse” (p.249). 
Regardless of  their legal status and socio-economic condition in the present, two
decades  after  they  were  displaced,  my  informants  continued  to  define  themselves  as
'refugees'  (izbjeglice),  on  the  basis  of  their  past  experience,  and  regardless  of  the  legal
distinction between the category of  internally displaced persons and refugees, which they
were keenly aware of. While 'displaced person' represented for them no more than a legal
term, there was a clear emotional value attached to the  word izbjeglica (refugee), which is
worth exploring. Unlike in English, in which the word 'refugee' is connected to the idea of
receiving shelter, in Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, the word stems from the act of  fleeing.
The 'refugee identity' was salient to the point of  having already transcended the generation
barrier, so that even children of  families that experienced displacement, born many years
after their resettlement in Bijeljina still defined themselves in such terms, as I could witness
in a few occasions. The prolonged liminality which they experienced as displaced persons
found  expression  in  the  self-identification  as  'refugees'.  They  remain  'refugees',  not
necessarily because they don't feel they have resettled, but as members of  a mnemonic
community  based  on  the  liminal  experience  of  displacement.  That  so  many  people
continued to use the present tense when referring to their status as 'refugees' suggested the
absence of  closure in what regarded their experience of  displacement. Even those who
were able to rebuild their lives and overcome their condition as displaced persons seemed
not to have yet fully recovered from some of  its consequences, especially with regard to
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their  loss  of  status  and  connections  (veze).  This  loss  fostered   a  pervasive  sense  of
vulnerability and dependence among this category of  the population. This enduring sense
of  vulnerability, exploited by the political class to command loyalty and allegiance, in turn,
made it harder to nurture new feelings of  attachment which might help overcome this
liminal condition.
Sadness,  disillusion,  dissatisfaction,  and  alienation  were  the  dominant  feelings
expressed by my informants as they remembered their experience of  forced displacement,
resettlement and integration in Bijeljina. Emerging in the context of  the intersubjective
encounter with myself  as a listener and as an observer, such memories were sometimes the
object  of  conscious  reflexion  in  the  context  of  formal  interviews  and  informal
conversations; they emerged most often as spontaneous reminiscing, marked by nostalgia
and to some extent escaping articulation, to silently find expression in the individuals' body
language. There is a striking dissonance between the tone and content of  their recollections
and the  dominant messages conveyed public representations promoted or endorsed by the
authorities of  Republika Srpska, which explore the theme of  sacrifice for the nation, and
exhort the resettled population not only to pledge their allegiance to Republika Srpska as
their fatherland (otadžbina), but also, and most importantly, to see it as their zavičaj, the term
that defines a person's place of  birth or ancestral homeland, thus projecting the existence
of  Republika Srpska to the past. 
This chapter explores the dissonance between public representations and privately
expressed memories. In the following section we will describe the three commemorations
that specifically focus on the displacement of  the Bosnian Serb population, before engaging
with my informants' personal memories. 
6.1:  The representation of  Serb displacement in official memory
In the context of  liminality, commemorations can function as rites of  reaggregation
marking the closing of  the liminal stage and the beginning of  a new period of  normality.
In  recent  years,  the  memory  of  Serb  displacement  during  the  war  has  become  an
important element in official memory, both at entity level in Republika Srpska, and locally
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in  Bijeljina.  Official  memory  frames  the  Serbs'  experience  of  displacement  through  a
narrative  of  victimhood  and  sacrifice,  in  which  Serbs  are  reminded  of  their  past
vulnerability and persecution, and exhorted to give meaning to the sacrifice they made by
embracing Republika Srpska as their new homeland. In Bijeljina, official commemorations
focus on two main events, the 'Tuzlanska kolona (Tuzla convoy) massacre' on 15 May 1992,
and the Serb 'exodus from Sarajevo' in January-March 1996.
When the Republic of  Bosnia-Herzegovina obtained international recognition as an
independent state in April  1992, the Yugoslav army (JNA) effectively became a foreign
army under the control of  Serbia and Montenegro, which meanwhile formed the 'Federal
Republic of  Yugoslavia'.  Whilst ostensibly the JNA's intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina
had  the  goal  of  interposition  between  the  local  warring  parties,  i.e.,  Serb  rebels  and
Bosniak and Croat forces, it  quickly became involved in fighting on the Serb side (Hoare
2004:32). Under international pressure, Belgrade decided to recall the military of  Serbian
and Montenegrin nationality and by the 20 th May the JNA had formally withdrawn from
Bosnia-Herzegovina. In reality, however, most of  its units remained in the country, staffed
by  Bosnian  Serbs,  to  become the  backbone of  the  newly-created  Army of  Republika
Srpska (Hoare 2004: 61). 
Between the beginning of  the Bosnian war and the formal withdrawal of  the JNA,
forces  loyal  to  the Bosnian government besieged several  of  JNA's  barracks  (CIA 2002,
Vol.1:  137;  Hoare  2004:73).  It  was  in  this  broader  context  that  two  serious  incidents
happened, in which forces loyal to the Bosnian government attacked JNA convoys leaving
their premises, which resulted in the death of  several soldiers and civilians. Both incidents,
the Dobrovoljačka Street massacre in Sarajevo,  and the the  Tuzlanska kolona incident in
Tuzla,  have now become prominent in the official commemorative calendar of  Republika
Srpska.  Whilst  only  the  Tuzlanska  kolona commemorations  directly  relate  to  the
commemoration  of  Serb  displacement,  it  is  important  to  focus  on  both,  as  they  are
interconnected  and bear important  similarities.  Along with the case  of  the decision at
Dayton to unify the city of  Sarajevo by assigning its totality to the Bosniak-Croat coalition,
leading to the 1996 Serb 'exodus from Sarajevo',  these incidents represented important
defeats for the Bosnian Serb rebellion, which only in recent years began to be officially
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commemorated.
The case of  the Dobrovoljačka Street incident:
On the 2nd of  May 1992, the JNA and Bosnian Serb paramilitary forces launched an
offensive aimed at dividing Sarajevo in two sectors. The offensive was successfully resisted
by a small number of  forces loyal to the Bosnian government, not yet fully organised as an
army (Andreas 2008:28). Serb forces, which already controlled all access to Sarajevo and
the  hills  that  surround  the  city,  were  nevertheless  able  to  gain  control  of  some
neighbourhoods  in  the  periphery,  including  Grbavica,  Nedžarići  and  Mojmilo.  In  the
following  weeks,  the  newly-created  Army  of  Republika  Srpska  completely  besieged
Sarajevo. This offensive set off  a chain of  events that included the arrest by the JNA of  the
Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegović, at the Sarajevo airport, when he was returning from
negotiations  held in Lisbon with  the international  mediators,  and,  subsequently,  to  the
agreement to allow for the withdrawal of  some of  the JNA forces in exchange for the
President.  With  the  President  already  safely  with  UN  peacekeeping  forces,  a  serious
incident occurred as a military convoy was leaving the headquarters of  the JNA in the
Bistrik area of  Sarajevo.  Forces loyal to the Bosnian government shot at the convoy; six
soldiers and one civilian were killed and others wounded, in what became known as the
Dobrovoljačka Street massacre (Silber and Little 1997: 231-243). Serb authorities, however,
claim that the death toll was as high as forty two, using as evidence a list of  names that
includes the casualties the JNA incurred during the fighting that took place in the previous
days during the frustrated attempt to divide the city (Radovanović 2012).
The  War  Crimes  Prosecutor's Office  of  the  Republic of  Serbia  decided  to
investigate the Dobrovoljačka Street massacre and, in  2009 launched international arrest
warrants agains a number of  wartime Bosnian political and military leaders it accused of
complicity with murder (Reuters 2009). This led to the arrest of  one of  the members of  the
wartime Bosnian collective Presidency, Ejup Ganić, in March 2010 in the United Kingdom
(RFE 2010). One year later, the same international arrest warrant resulted in the arrest in
Austria of  retired General Jovan Divjak (Sense 2011). An ethnic Serb who chose to desert
the  JNA  and  offer  his  services  to  the  Bosnian  government,  Divjak  is  much  loved  in
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Sarajevo,  where  his  arrest  caused  profound  outrage  (see  Huseinović  2011).  Divjak  is,
however, portrayed by Serb nationalists as a traitor to the Serb nation, and a 'sell-out', often
referred to as one of   'Alija's Serbs'109 (Judah 1997:195; Glas javnosti 2005; Klix 2017).
Ganić and Divjak were eventually released upon legal appeal as the judicial authorities of
the UK and Austria came to the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence, and, in the
case of  the UK, that the indictment was politically motivated (McElroy 2011). 
Shortly after Ganić's arrest in 2010, the government of  Republika Srpska organised
a commemoration of  the Dobrovoljačka Street  massacre,  including a procession to the
location where it occurred, which created great anger among Sarajevans (Musi 2015:342-5)
This commemoration was repeated every year until 2016, but suspended since, allegedly
for lack of  security reasons (BIRN 2018). The Dobrovoljačka commemoration followed the
example set  in  2009 by the first  commemoration held to  mark the anniversary of  the
'Tuzlanska kolona' incident, on the 15th of  May. 
The 'Tuzlanska kolona' incident:
After the failed offensive in Sarajevo, and with international pressure mounting , Belgrade
decided to formally withdraw the JNA from Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In fact,  however, this
withdrawal corresponded in essence to a change of  hat, as most of  the JNA units stationed
in the country became units of  the newly-created Army of  Republika Srpska (Hoare 2004).
In Tuzla, the defence forces loyal to the Bosnian government reached an agreement with
the JNA, whose barraks were besieged, to withdraw from the city. There is no consensus
over what happened, but as the JNA convoy left the 'Husinska buna' barracks in Tuzla, it
appeared to  diverge  from the  established route  for  the  withdrawal,  and was  promptly
attacked. This resulted in a minimum of  fifthly JNA soldiers killed, a figure that, as in the
case  of  the  Dobrovoljačka  Street  massacre,  Serb  sources  consider  to  be  an
underestimation110. The attack generated a wave of  panic that led thousands of  Serbs to
109 The expression Alija's Serbs, referring to the wartime President Alija Izetbegović, is applied by Serb 
nationalists to the Serbs that refused to support the rebellion led by the SDS and leave government-
controlled territory. Jovan Divjak and Mirko Pejanović, who served as member of  the Bosnian Presidency,
are among the most prominent figures in this category (see Pejanović 2004).
110 Regarding the number of  deaths, it  is interesting to note that whilst the original indictment of  Ilija Jurišić
by the Serbian War Crimes Prosecutor in 2007 listed 92 members of  the JNA killed, and 33 wounded 
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flee towards Bijeljina (Armakolas 2011:239; 2016:94).
In 2007, a member of  the Bosnian Ministry of  the Interior (MUP) who had been
involved in the incident, Ilija Jurišić, was indicted and eventually arrested in Belgrade and
put on trial for war crimes committed in the context of  the attack to the JNA convoy; in
September 2009 he was condemned to 12 years  in prison.  This  generated a  wave of
outrage in Tuzla (see Fond. Istina, pravda, pomirenje 2009), where Jurišić, an ethnic Croat,
was a well-respected figure, known for his commitment to 'life in common'(zajednički život)'
(Nikolić  2010) and where the events of  15 th May 1992, known locally as the 'Brčanska
malta  Battle',  after  the  name  of  the  neighbourhood  where  it  happened,  are  officially
commemorated  as  'the  defence  of  Tuzla'  (see  RTVTK  2017).  In  2010,  however,  the
sentence was quashed and the Court of  Appeal ordered a retrial. Juri šić was released and
received as a hero in Tuzla, only to be arrested again in 2013; the retrial resulted in a new
12 years conviction. Jurišić was finally absolved of  all crimes by the Court of  Appeal in
2015, which brought to  an end the effort  of  the Serbian judiciary to  pursue  this  case
(Apelacioni sud u Beogradu 2015).
Jurišić's initial condemnation in 2009 provided an opportunity to open a new stage
in Republika Srpska's official policy towards the memory of  the war. Unlike in the earlier
post-war years, the authorities no longer sought to open glorify of  the achievements of  the
Army of  Republika Srpska (Correia  2013),  but chose instead to focus on sacrifice and
victimhood. All major commemorations became the competence of  a special government
department,  the  Board  for  Preserving  the  Tradition  of  Liberation  Wars (Odbor  Vlade
Republike Srpske za njegovanje tradicije oslobodilačkih ratova), part of  the Ministry for Veterans'
Affairs.  The  commemorations  follow  the  usual  template,  consisting  of  one  religious
component, with a parastos, a Serbian Orthodox religious ceremony for the dead, and one
political  component,  with  laying  of  flower  wreaths  by  official  dignitaries,  followed  by
speeches about the occasion, and sometimes cultural events. 
The commemoration of  the attack to the  Tuzlanska kolona explores the themes of
disloyalty and treachery, in the form of  the violation of  a withdrawal agreement, which is
evoked so as to show that life in common became impossible for Tuzla Serbs, and that they
had no choice but to leave to protect their lives. In Tuzla, by contrast, this commemoration
(Tužilastvo za ratne zloćine Rep. Srbija 2007:3), the Court of  Appeal's final decision in 2015, which 
cleared Jurišić, listed 50 members of  the JNA killed and 51 wounded (Apelacioni sud u Beogradu 2015:3)
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is widely seen as an insult, and on the same day local activists commemorate 'the liberation
of  Tuzla', in which the attack to the convoy is remembered as an act of  resistance that
preserved Tuzla's territorial integrity and political identity (see Klix 2018). There is great
resentment in Tuzla against the Serbs who left then, and their flight is seen by many as a
political statement in favour of  Greater Serb nationalism and the division of  Bosnia, rather
than a decision driven by fear in a difficult moment. 
The 'Tuzlanska kolona' massacre commemoration starts with a visit to the site of  the
incident in Tuzla by family members of  the soldiers killed and representatives of  the RS
government, the municipality of  Bijeljina, the Veterans' Association or Republika Srpska
(BORS), associations of  displaced Serbs, missing people and fallen soldiers' families, etc.
There, they  lay  flowers  and  light  candles  in  a  brief  but  emotional  ceremony,  before
returning to Bijeljina,  where the second part  of  the commemoration takes  place.  This
consists of  a 'parastos' in the Bijeljina cemetery – where twenty nine of  the soldiers killed
were  laid  to  rest  –  followed  by  speeches  by  political  leaders  and  activists.  Direct
participation in these commemorations is low, involving only politicians, activists and a few
family members of  those killed. 
Every year, however, the commemoration is given ample coverage by all the media,
with local television stations also broadcasting documentaries and organising live debates
about the massacre and its significance for the Serb people. During my fieldwork in   2014,
one of  the most watched tv stations in Republika Srpska – BN, which is based in Bijeljina –
broadcasted a live programme exclusively dedicated to the 'Tuzlanska kolona', with guests
in studio and viewers'  telephone calls. The programme had been scheduled to coincide
with the anniversary, but was delayed for a few days because on the day of  the anniversary
Bijeljina suffered severe flooding, including the street where the station was located. That
the programme went ahead three days later despite the fact that at that moment Bijeljina
was so severely affected by floods and in state of  emergency is indicative of  the importance
attributed to the subject by opinion makers. 
The  case  of  the  Tuzlanska  kolona is  portrayed  by  politicians  and  the  media  in
Republika Srpska as a case of  double-standards by the international community, and, since
Jurišić's acquittal, also as 'a crime for which nobody has yet answered' (niko nije odgovarao)
(e.g.  Mitrić  2017;  Arena  TV 2017).  The  phrase  'niko  nije  odgovarao'  –  literally  meaning
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'nobody has answered' in the sense of  being held criminally responsible – is systematically
uttered  in  war-related  commemorations  in  Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Among  Bosnian  Serb
activists and politicians, this phrase is often used to imply that a crime was committed even
in cases where there are no grounds for believing that was the case,  such as deaths in
combat situations. The framing of  military casualties as if  these were civilian deaths or
unlawful executions of  military personnel outside combat situations was something that I
also systematically noticed on television and newspaper reports  during my fieldwork in
Republika Srpska.
The 'exodus' from Sarajevo
In what regards the exploration of  the plight of  displaced Serbs, whilst the ' Tuzlanska kolona'
commemorations have a local focus around Bijeljina, the commemoration that has been
given the highest degree of  importance on a 'national' level, i.e. at the level of  Republika
Srpska as a whole, was the one organised in March 2016 to mark the 20 th anniversary of
the exodus of  Serbs from Sarajevo at the end of  the war. The division of  Sarajevo into a
Muslim sector and a Serb sector was one of  the Serb leadership's 'strategic goals'. At the
peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, Slobodan Milošević decided nevertheless to hand the
neighbourhoods of  Sarajevo which were under control of  Serb forces to the Bosniak-Croat
coalition, to become part of  the Federation of  Bosnia-Herzegovina. Just before the city was
reunified in January-March 1996,  the Serb authorities  organised the evacuation of  the
areas concerned, including urban areas as well as villages and hamlets (Hoare 2007:401).
Many people left willingly, refusing to live 'under Muslim rule' , but there was also a great
degree  of  coercion.  Those  reluctant  to  leave  were  intimidated by  gangs  of  thugs,  the
content of  people's flats was often thrown out from the windows and many houses were
even set on fire (Donia 2006:338-9). Many who left carried with them the coffins of  their
dead relatives, especially in the case of  fallen soldiers (Elčić 2016). 
The commemorative ceremony marking the 20th anniversary of  the 'Exodus' took
place  in  Bijeljina,  in  the  presence  of  the  highest  members  of  the  Serbian  Orthodox
Church, and of  all the Serb political class, in a rare show of  unity between bitterly divided
political  opponents  (see Ch.5).  The event,  organised at  Bijeljina's  Cultural  Centre as  a
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'svečana akademija' – i.e., as a cultural soirée – included the projection of  a film, singing by
choirs and artists, speeches by high-profile politicians and prestigious individuals, and was
broadcasted live. During the ceremony, mourning the loss of  what had been 'the second
largest Serb city', by number of  inhabitants, after Belgrade, never anyone mentioned that
Serb forces had besieged Sarajevo, or the wartime goal of  'separation of  peoples'.  The
commemoration described the 'exodus' as part of  a long historical experience of  injustice
the Serb people has endured. The documentary film 'Sarajevski egzodus”, by Dragan Elčić,
evoked historical memories of  persecution and displacement that went back to the 17 th
Century, when the Patriarch of  the Serb Orthodox Church led a column of  thousands out
of  Kosovo to escape persecution by the Ottomans; and continued with the evacuation to
Corfu in the First World War; the persecution of  the Serb people by the Croatian fascist
state and the nazis; and the extermination of  Serbs in the concentration camp of  Jasenovac
in Croatia during the Second World War; the evacuation of  the Republika Srpska Krajina
in August 1995; to end with the flight of  thousands of  Serbs from Kosovo in 1999, after the
Kosovo war.
In the political speeches, displaced Serbs were exhorted to make Republika Srpska
their new home. Significantly, the word used was not 'otadžbina'  (literally fatherland) but
'zavičaj'. According to Hariz Halilovich (2013: xvi), the term zavičaj' refers to the “emotional
or intimate home,  local  homeland,  place where we grew up,  place of  belonging,  one's
native region, local community”. Lazar Manojlović, the head teacher who during and after
the  war  confronted  nationalism  in  Bijeljina,  explained  the  concept  to  me  in  more
primordial terms, as “the place where my mother changed my nappies” ( tamo gdje te majka
zavila),  before  adding  that  “one  can  have  only  one  zavičaj”.  The  connection  to  the
birthplace,  endowed  with  feelings  of  intimacy,  corresponds  to  the  generally  accepted
meaning  of  the  words.  The  choice  of  'zavičaj'  over  'otadžbina' thus  implied  a  tacit
acknowledgement of  the deep sense of  loss displacement involves, but it  also places an
unrealistic burden on the shoulders of  the resettled population, that of  recreating that same
emotional attachment in their new homes, as if  the sense of  protection that the mother's
care could be reproduced. This primordial longing for comfort and safety that the native
home represents was  explored in this commemoration not only with words, but also with
sounds and images. Placed in contrast with  Bosnia-Herzegovina, portrayed as hostile to the
Serb people, Republika Srpska appeared as a safe haven, but also as a possessive mother
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towards whom her children's are compelled to display their love.
In official commemorations, resettled Serbs are praised for the sacrifice they made
for the creation and consolidation of  Republika Srpska, both through the contribution of
their families as fighters in the Army of  Republika Srpska, for the statement of  loyalty they
made by refusing to remain under the rule of  the Federation, and for repopulating the
territory of  RS.  But for resettled Serbs in Bijeljina, their new place of  residence often
seems to be felt as a land of  exile. The traumatic experience of  displacement is invoked and
its context framed in such a way that this exile is one from which there is no possibility of
return. But the exhortation to make RS their new homeland betrays an awareness of  the
alienation  many  resettled  Serbs  feel  towards  their  new  places  of  residence.  The
commemoration  of  the  exodus  from Sarajevo  is  not  only  a  reminder  that  they  have
nowhere else to go, but also of  the transiency of  the state in this region. In the course of
one hundred years, Bosnia was Ottoman, then Austrian, then it was the Kingdom of  Serbs
Croats and Slovenes,  then the Socialist  Federative Republic  of  Yugoslavia  and now an
independent country with two largely autonomous 'entities'. Bosnia-Herzegovina is in such
a situation that its population live their everyday life in a climate of  uncertainty about the
future, and often in the expectation that sooner or later there may be another conflict. Such
a climate serves the nationalist elites, as it maintains and reinforces the divisions created by
the war. But such a climate also inhibits people from nurturing a sense of  belonging, as it
highlights their vulnerability, not only in the past, but also in the present.
6.2: Bijeljina as 'kasaba': Nostalgia, alienation and spontaneous  reminiscing
The dominant  discourse  of  sacrifice and loyalty  exercises  significant  constraints  to  the
articulation of  personal memories of  displacement and resettlement. This is, nevertheless,
an experience that remains very present in people's minds, since its effects are so enduring.
Memories of  displacement and resettlement often emerged spontaneously in my everyday
interactions during fieldwork. The case of  Jelena, who moved from Tuzla to Bijeljina in
1992, when she was 16, provides an illustration both of  the pervasiveness of  the presence
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of  such  memories  and  of  the  elusiveness  towards  their  articulation.  In  spontaneous
reminiscing, the dominant tone was nostalgia, which was often associated with feelings of
alienation  towards  Bijeljina  and what  the  town represented,  when  compared  with  the
places they had left behind. 
The first time Jelena, 38 years old at the time, invited me over to her home for
coffee, she served me 'refugee cake' (izbijeglička torta), left over from a family reunion the day
before. Made with waffle biscuits and walnut-based spread covered with a thin layer of
chocolate, its preparation making does not require the use of  an oven. For that reason, it
was one of  the few desserts that her mother was able to prepare during the years the family
lived in temporary accommodation, after they left Tuzla in 1992, and before they could
afford  to  build  their  own house.  Jelena's  mother  was  an  excellent  cook;  she  prepared
elaborate recipes in comparison to which 'refugee cake', albeit very tasty, contrasted for its
modesty.  And  yet,  this  was  her  children's  favourite  cake,  always  present  in  important
celebrations, such as Christmas, birthdays and the family's 'krsna slava'  (patron saint). On
that  day,  over  coffee,  'refugee  cake'  was for  Jelena  like  Marcel  Proust's  madeleines,
momentarily transporting her to the golden days. Unlike In the Search for Lost Time, Proust's
novel, however, the memories spontaneously triggered by the 'refugee cake' were 'difficult
memories', of  hardship and uncertainty during the war, at a time when the family – Jelena,
her parents and brother – shared one room in the outskirts of  Bijeljina . There was no self-
indulgence in this exercise of  reminiscing, but recalling how much the family had had to
endure also reminded her of  their resilience, and of  how much they had achieved in the
meantime. She didn't spend much time in this exercise, and quickly moved back to the
present, to discuss other things. 
Jelena showed great interest in the 'culture of  memory' (kultura sjećanja) theme, and
in my research. She was a key person during my fieldwork, who helped me cope with the
isolation that prolonged fieldwork always involves, and eventually became a voice I sought
for validation, someone with whom I could share some of  my impressions of  everyday life
in  Bijeljina,  and discuss  political  issues  openly.  We quickly  came to  a  tacit  agreement
regarding my research, to discuss certain things in general terms only, so as to preserve both
her privacy and my own autonomy as a researcher. For those reasons, I never sought to
interview her formally, or anyone from her family, and we usually avoided entering into the
realm  of  her  family's  particular  experience  of  displacement  and  resettlement.  Such
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memories, however, often emerged spontaneously, and Jelena would usually let them flow,
allowing herself  to share them with me, but only for a moment. 
Jelena and her family were prosperous by local standards, and owned their own
home, where Jelena still lived, in a self-contained flat. Her father had a small business; her
mother  was  a  housewife;  and  Jelena  had  a  good  job,  which  she  loved.  Although  she
acknowledged living better than most, Jelena felt oppressed in Bijeljina, which she saw as
parochial and hostile to people like herself, as someone with a cosmopolitan outlook. In
Bijeljina, she felt constrained to keep a low profile. Her own family often reminded her that
the right attitude was not to complain, but to 'shut up and bear it' ( šuti I trpi), because that
was what everyone else did anyway, and because and it was never a good idea to attract
unwanted attention, especially since the family business relied to some extent on public
contracts. Jelena wasn't entirely negative about Bijeljina, and she appreciated that it did
offer a good quality of  life for the middle class, but, she stressed, only “as long as people
engaged superficially”, so as to avoid seeing the “ugliness that was barely hidden”, and
which she connected with the enduring legacy of  the war,  and the system of  values it
imposed.  She  dreamed of  leaving  the country  and starting  a  new life  in  elsewhere  in
Europe, where she expected she could finally be herself. She rejected nationalism with its
narrow-minded conservatism and what she saw as a morbid exploitation of  victimhood
and  sacrifice;  and  placed  herself  within  the  Partisan  tradition,  openly  asserting  her
admiration  for  the  achievements  of  the  communist  regime.  Sixteen  years  old  at  the
beginning of  the war, she had found memories of  her life in Tuzla, and made it a point of
honour to state that her family, whilst comfortable with their own ethnic identity as Serbs,
had always felt integrated in the multiethnic environment that Tuzla offered. That past,
however, was beyond recovery, because the Tuzla she grew up in no longer existed.
Spontaneous  reminiscing,  as  the  exercise  Jelena  engaged  in  while  we  ate  her
mother's  refugee  cake,  did not  necessarily  require  much intimacy.  The fact  that  I  was
foreigner but spoke Bosnian/Serbian well, and the presence of  my daughter,  two years old
at the time, made me an object of  other people's curiosity in the spaces where I circulated.
My continuous presence in town progressively allowed me to be in a position in which
spontaneous conversations happened, in which where we had come from, myself  as well as
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my interlocutors,  was  an unavoidable topic  and often a  trigger for reminiscing.   I  was
observed much more than I could observe, and was often  asked the classical question
'Where are you from?' (odakle ste?) – especially by women –  in the shops, in the market, in
the children's playground. This was usually followed by some explanation of  where my
interlocutor was from, which over time exposed me to a reasonably broad array of  stories
and experiences.
Nostalgia was the dominant tone of  these memories, focused on details of  everyday
life, the natural beauty, or the cultural environment of  displaced persons' native regions.
These recollections were articulated avoiding politics or mentions of  any details about the
war, but they always conveyed a sense of  loss and sacrifice. People who came from larger
cities, especially Tuzla and Sarajevo, often engaged in brief  moments of  nostalgia for life in
an urban, dynamic, and cosmopolitan environment.  There seemed to be nothing positive
about this passive nostalgia, that only reinforced a pervasive feeling of  irretrievable loss,
and rather than indulging themselves, my interlocutors only briefly allowed it to arise. I
sometimes felt that people who expressed this sort of  nostalgia experienced their life in
Bijeljina as a form of  exile from which there was no possible return.
Associated with this  nostalgia  for a cosmopolitan life  were the memories of  the
shock  they  had  felt  when  they  arrived  to  Bijeljina.  They  perceived  it  as  small  and
unbearably parochial; a 'kasaba', as many called it. The term kasaba literally refers to a type
of  urban settlement in the Ottoman Empire, corresponding to a settlement with at least
one mosque. Receiving the legal status of  kasaba was, in those times, a recognition of  the
settlement's urban character, and encompassed important privileges which would reinforce
the process of  urbanisation. Bijeljina received such a status in the 16 th Century, after the
construction of  the Atik Mosque (Grabčanović 2006:29). Metaphorically, however, labelling
a town as a kasaba highlighted its backwardness, by contrast to modern cities. Implicitly,
and  perhaps  unconsciously  it  referred  to  its  Ottoman  matrix,  but  in  an  ethnocentric
perspective  typical of  Serbian imaginary of  the ottoman period as a dark period. From the
perspective of  resettled Serbs, and in stark contrast with that of  domicile residents, it was
thanks to the influx of  displaced Serbs that the city acquired a new potential and developed
as an urban centre.
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 Jagoda F. , a medical doctor from Sarajevo who arrived in Bijeljina in mid 1993,
after some months living in Belgrade, was more open than most in expressing the shock she
felt when she arrived. Her tone and facial expression, more than the words themselves,
revealed how at  the time she saw Bijeljina as  a  town devoid of  the dignity  she
expected from an urban centre.
“You can hardly imagine how it was. The main square, for instance, where the monument (spomenik)
[to the fallen soldiers] now stands, was a car park, and in the Summer months there was a 'luna park'
there [located where the Atik Mosque used to stand]. It was terrible (užasno)!”
Having established a private practice after the war, Dr. F. quickly became widely
respected for her competence,  and thus acquired a social and financial position much
above what most resettled Serbs could aspire to. She was, nevertheless, proud to state that
her children, who grew up in Bijeljina, were now settled abroad, where they were building
successful careers. It was as if  they had retrieved the status that was rightfully theirs, and
which  their  mother  had  lost  due  to  her  displacement  from  Sarajevo,  and  eventual
resettlement in Bijeljina. 
Memories  of  wartime  Bijeljina,  such  as  those  described  by  Jagoda,  and  their
appraisal of  the town's provincial character, stand in stark contrast with the memories pre-
war residents nurture of  Bijeljina as a multicultural town with a strong urban character,
where it was pleasant to live (see Ch.1). The divergence in the appraisal of  the character of
the town caused resentment among the domicile population, and immediately became a
source of  disagreement that contributed to keep domicile and resettled residents separated.
That wartime Bijeljina had changed so much that it no longer felt like the town domicile
residents  cherished  was  a  detail  that  seemed  to  be  lost  in  the  confrontation  between
opposing perspectives. The fundamental transformation in the experience of  urban life
that the war brought about happened very quickly, and the sudden influx of  thousands of
displaced  Serbs  was  a  contributing  factor,  but,  as  I  described  on  Chapter  3,  the
transformation was already ongoing, a consequence of  nationalistic policy of  erasure and
reinscription of  the urban landscape. 
Among  the  domicile  population of  Bijeljina,  some people  speak  of  ruralisation
(seljacizacija  grada).  Seljak means  literally  peasant,  but  metaphorically  it  refers  to  people
lacking in civility and manners, which are seen, conversely, as intrinsic virtues of  the urban
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culture.  Now, as  one informant explained to me,  Bijeljina “is  a  city  only  in  name” (samo
deklarativno). Another, whom I asked how different Bijeljina is now, said that “only the streets
have remained”. Informants belonging to local families pointed out to the fact that since 1990,
Bijeljina has been ruled by people who mostly come from a rural background, and have in
their  villages  their  core  of  supporters,  thus  correlating  nationalism  with  the  village
mentality. But they also tended to associate the influx of  displaced people as a crucial factor
in what they say as the loss of  Bijeljina's urban character. 
My  informants  who  resettled  in  Bijeljina  agree  that  the  dominance  of  rural
Semberija,  which comprises  the majority of  the voters  in the municipality,  hinders  the
development of  the city, and often criticised the ruling class as “peasants” ( seljaci), but they
see their own presence as having added an element of  urbanity that wasn't there before,
and notice little  difference between urban and rural  Semberians.  Indeed, as the urban
centre of  an agricultural region, Bijeljina and the surrounding villages have always been
deeply integrated, and domicile families often have close ties to those villages, especially in
the case of  domicile Serbs. The war accelerated the urbanisation process, in which forced
displacement  and  resettlement  had  a  crucial  role,  but,  most  importantly,  the  recent
urbanisation was marked by the push towards the retraditionalisation of  Serb national
identity, which reflected the 'renewal nationalism' of  the SDS (see Ch. 2), in stark contrast
with the modernising ideology of  the communist regime. The issue of  Bijeljina's urban
character,  and the  'peasant'  label,  which  in  Bosnia  usually  carries  a  demeaning  sense,
reflects the uneasiness with which this retraditionalisation is acknowledged. 
More than merely reflecting the dominant values and the dominant taste of  the
ruling class (Bourdieu 1984), it was as if  this 'seljacizacija', had also the useful function of
keeping  those  attracted by  the cosmopolitan model  isolated and thus  marginalised.  As
Jelena once told me, when we were discussing this issue, “in Bijeljina, there is a public for theatre,
but there is no theatre”. She was not aware, however, that before the war there was a theatre
and an amateur theatre company, called 'Scena', that performed regularly both in Bijeljina
and in festivals throughout Yugoslavia and abroad (Grabčanović 2006:274). The company
entered a period of  crisis after the 1990 elections, probably, an informant explained to me,
because it lost financial support. During the war, the theatre – a temporary, prefabricated
building located at Jovan Dučić Street (renamed Patriarch Pavle Street in 2008),  that was
never by a permanent construction –  was demolished. In the place where it used to stand,
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there  is  now a  five-floor  block  of  flats  with  a  bank on  the  ground floor.  The theatre
company  was  never  reactivated.  Other  cultural  institutions  in  Bijeljina,  namely,  the
Museum of  Semberija,  the  Filip  Visnjić  library,  and  the  Cultural  Centre,  are  strictly
controlled by political parties, while the 'Prosvjeta' cultural society, where the town's only
cinema is located, and which publishes his own literary journal, Srpska vila, is close to the
Serbian Orthodox Church. These institutions are managed in such a way that leaves little
space for expressions of  culture that dissent from Serb nationalism. 
Throughout  the  countries  that  were  once  part  of  socialist  Yugoslavia,  shared
memories of  the communist regime have given rise to the phenomenon of  'yugonostalgia',
the cultivation in popular culture of  the socialist past. But while, as Mitja Velikonja(2009;
2013) has persuasively suggested, yugonostalgia may have an emancipatory character, the
same is not the case with a particular type of  nostalgia that I detected during my fieldwork,
and which was for the most time expressed in spontaneous interactions. 
Nostalgia for the cosmopolitan past of  cities such as Tuzla or Sarajevo involved a
sense of  inexorable loss due to the perception, actively cultivated by the media and the
political class, that the war has transformed these cities so much that their cosmopolitan
character has been lost, and that as Serbs, their former residents would no longer find a
place  for  themselves  there.  Should  they  wish  to  return,  they  would  find  those  cities
transformed beyond recognition. 
6.3: 'Difficult memories' of  forced displacement and resettlement in Bijeljina
Whilst  spontaneous  reminiscing  –  and the  feeling  of  nostalgia  that  it  produced –  was
pervasive, it proved very difficult to get access to individuals willing to speak to me about
their personal experience of  displacement and resettlement in formal interviews. There was
an environment in Bijeljina that did not foster freedom of  expression, even more so with
regard to such a sensitive theme as 'kultura sjećanja' (the culture of  memory). Indeed, most of
the  individuals  I  formally  interviewed,  regardless  of  ethnicity,  sought  guarantees  of
confidentiality, made sure we met in a discreet place, and subsequently avoided showing
they knew me if  they happened to meet me in a public place. Constraints to freedom of
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expression and mistrust of  foreigners were not an exclusive concern of  resettled Serbs, but
affected the population more generally, and yet resettled Serbs were much more protective
of  their privacy. Among the different 'communities of  experience' on whose memories I
relied for my research, resettled Serbs were was the most elusive, when it came to openly
speaking about their wartime experiences. 
Among  Serbs,  reluctance  to  speak  to  foreigners  seemed  to  be  fostered  by  the
widespread belief  that foreigners tended to be biased against and have prejudiced views of
'the Serbs', if  they weren't openly 'anti-Serb'. Expecting no sympathy, let alone redress for
the personal sacrifices they were compelled to make, and used to have see their experiences
filtered through the hierarchy of  suffering that dominates the politics of  memory in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, including Republika Srpska, resettled Serbs seemed to feel they had little or
nothing  to  gain  from  exposing  their  lives  in  such  a  way.  In  a  few  cases,  prospective
interviewees explicitly framed their refusal  in such terms,  as was the case,  for instance,
when  Jelena  tried  to  recruit  respondents  among  her  acquaintances.  I  had  promised
discretion and anonymity, but that was not the problem, she said. My presumed bias was
the problem; one of  her contacts went as far as stating that there was no point in speaking
to me because “she already knew the answers anyway”. I discussed with the staff  at the Helsinki
Committee how this presumption of  bias was making it hard to recruit respondents; from
their perspective such presumptions were not unreasonable. They often noticed that same
bias,  which  they  felt  objectified  'the  Serbs',  and  themselves  'good  Serbs'  providing  an
exception to the dominance of  the discourse of  denial about the nature of  the war and the
scale of  war crimes perpetrated by Serb forces. They saw such bias as the reason behind
what they felt was a general lack of  interest for the cases in which Serbs were victimised. 
Eventually, I managed to pass through the right gatekeepers, and found individuals
who were comfortable enough to concede me an interview. What emerged was a set of
'difficult  memories',  recollections  that  are  usually  kept  private,  not  so  much  because
recalling them was emotionally demanding, if  not painful, which it often was, but because
they did not fit easily into the larger narrative that the remembering person to some extent
shared, and which she did not wish to undermine. Through the life stories of  Dragan, a 28
year old native of  Tuzla, who came to Bijeljina as a child in 1992; and Djordje, a war
veteran from Central Bosnia, and an activist for the rights of  displaced persons, we will
now analyse some of  these  'difficult memories', with a specific focus on the experience of
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displacement.
Memories of  displacement
Immediately before the war and in its early stage, many people left their hometowns and
villages, or took measures to send their children to safety elsewhere. One of  my informants,
Dragan, 28, who lived in Tuzla before the war, remembered how his father drove him to
relatives in Serbia, ostensibly for a holiday, as the beginning of  the war coincided with the
Spring school closure. Dragan, who was six at the time, recalled that along with him went a
Muslim  boy,  the  son  of  family  friends.  Dragan  was  keen  to  highlight  that,  despite  a
common belief  that only Serbs were leaving Muslim-majority areas in the phase just before
the war started,  Muslims  too  were taking  similar  measures.  He eventually  rejoined his
parents,  who,  in  the  meantime,  had  come  to  Bijeljina,  along  with  thousands  more,
following  the  attack  to  the  JNA  convoy  leaving  Tuzla,  known  as  the  Tuzlanska  kolona
incident. 
Dragan's grandparents decided to remain in Tuzla; his grandfather, a communist,
rejected the logic of  ethnic conflict and separation of  peoples, and refused to be moved by
fear. The industrial city of  Tuzla has been singled out by journalists and scholars as a city
where, countering the nationalistic wave, the multicultural fabric and the attachment to the
partisan legacy of  Yugoslavia was preserved  throughout the war and beyond (Armakolas
2011). This is a source of  great pride for its population. Part of  the Serb population did
chose to remain in Tuzla, as was the case of  Dragan's grandparents.  According to Dragan,
however, his grandfather soon regretted his decision, as he began to experience previously
unknown prejudice and discrimination; by then, however, it was no longer possible to safely
leave and cross the front lines in the Mount Majevica, that separated the Tuzla region from
Semberija, and the family remained separated until the end of  the war. After the war the
family returned to Tuzla, but in a couple of  years they sold their house there and resettled
permanently in Bijeljina. The reason was, Dragan told me, the unbearable discrimination
he suffered at school in Tuzla, where other children called him a Chetnik, and the teacher,
himself  a war veteran often humiliated him for being a Serb. 
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The story of  Serb children suddenly missing school, and neighbours disappearing
from their homes was one which I often heard, during the time I lived in Sarajevo in 2010.
These stories form part of  the dominant narrative among Bosniaks, framing the 1992-1995
as  a  war  of  aggression  against  Bosnia-Herzegovina  by  the  Serbian  government  of
Slobodan  Milošević  (Moll  2013).  Such  stories  imply  that  the  evacuation  of  the  Serb
population from areas where they were a  minority was  systematically  organised by the
SDS, and that “all Serbs knew what was going on” (Jansen2007: 201)111. Most importantly,
the belief  that “all Serbs knew what was going on” was matched by the resentment that
whilst knowing what was going on, they remained silent instead of  warning their friends of
other ethnic background. It was to this widespread belief  that Jelena's acquaintance alluded
when he said that “she[I] already knows the answers anyway”.  But Jelena's parents did not leave
because they wanted to – she stressed as she tried to explain to me what she felt was behind
her friends' refusal to accept her suggestion to give me interviews – but because at that
particular moment when they had to take a decision, they felt compelled to leave. In Tuzla,
however, Selma, a Bosniak woman married to a Serb man, whom I visited while I was
living in Bijeljina, was categorical in her opinion that Serbs who fled to Bijeljina left “because
they wanted to”, her own husband standing as an example that “they didn't have to”112. This
judgemental gaze was something that Bijeljina's resettled Serbs were keenly aware of, and
felt necessary to protect themselves from. 
The question of  whether the evacuation of  areas that the Serb forces could not
control was organised or spontaneous, seemed to be a taboo among displaced Serbs. They
were aware that many non-Serbs considered that the fact that Serb forces organised the
displacement of  Serb residents meant that it was voluntary, rather than forced. This taboo
functioned against the backdrop of  a hierarchy of  suffering that results from a nationalistic
competition over victimhood (Miller 2006; Moll 2013), which downplays agency, and in
111 Stef  Jansen (2007) explores the resentment among Tuzla's population against those who decided to leave, 
illustrating it with a dialogue between three old friends who meet again for the first time after the war, in 
which one of  them, a Serb, is confronted by a Bosniak, and compelled to justify why he left in early May 
1992. The citation is taken from the transcript of  that dialogue, and is part of  the Serb man's refutation 
that he had any sort of  privileged information. 
112 Armakolas (2011) describes the pressure and discrimination non-Bosniaks faced in wartime Tuzla, and 
analyses the political struggle between Bosniak nationalists and anti-nationalists, and how the local 
authorities were eventually compelled to step up to defend the city's multicultural tradition and protect 
non-Bosniaks. See especially pp. 245-246 regarding the intimidation of  Serbs and Croats by radical 
Bosniak nationalists. 
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which one could be truly a victim only if  passive and defenceless. Whilst the Bosnian Serb
leadership  do  seem  happy  to  assume  their  role  in  organising  and  supporting  the
displacement of  Serb populations to areas under Serb control – as we saw in the previous
section with regard to the commemoration of  the evacuation of  Sarajevo – what made
these 'difficult memories' was, above all, the awareness that these were framed by many
non-Serbs,  and  especially  by  former  neighbours  who  were  left  behind,  as  acts  of
abandonment and even betrayal.
Activists  for  the  rights  of  displaced  Serbs  often  present  themselves  publicly  as
victims of  forced displacement, avoiding however to discuss whether their displacement
resulted from acts of  evacuation or expulsion. In December 2014 I attended an event at the
Town Hall (vijećnica) that offered me a valuable insight of  the performative dimension of
such claims of  victimhood. This was a 'javna tribina'(public discussion) about reconciliation
in Bijeljina, organised in the context of  the publication of an academic study undertaken by
a consortium of  regional and European universities113. Based on a survey in thirteen cities
and towns across Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Bijeljina, the study suggested that there
was  “[strong]  support  for  reconciliation  and  trust-building  across  the  population,  and
particularly  amongst  more  religious  citizens”(Wilkes  et  al  2013:  5).  The  Helsinki
Committee organised the event, which was part of  the project's dissemination activities.
Among  the  guests  to  the  event  were  representatives  of  many  non-governmental
organisations active in Bijeljina, including the Veterans' Association of  Republika Srpska
(BORS);  associations  of  displaced  Serbs;  (non-Serb)  returnees  to  Bijeljina;  and  former
concentration camp detainees. 
After the researchers presented their conclusions, the audience was invited to ask
questions and offer comments. It was at that point that an activist stood up and spoke in a
heated  tone  that  translated  some  nervousness.  For  him,  the  greatest  obstacle  to
reconciliation  was  the  absence  of  public  acknowledgement  among  non-Serbs  of  the
persecution endured during the war by Serbs in areas outside the control of  the Serb army.
113 University of  Edinburgh/Project on Religion and Ethics in the Making of  War and Peace, and the 
Center for Empirical Research on Religion in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Factors in Reconciliation: Religion, 
Local Conditions, People and Trust. Results From A Survey Conducted in 13 Cities Across Bosnia and Herzegovina in 
May 2013
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He spoke about how he had been expelled (protjeran) from Central Bosnia by the HVO114,
and how they had also burned down his home and destroyed the Orthodox church in his
village, and that more than twenty years after he was expelled from his home, Serbs still
lacked the conditions to return to Central Bosnia. Another man then took the word, to
stress, in a conciliatory tone, that personally he had no problem to condemn the expulsion
of  Serbs  and the destructions  of  their  property  and churches,  and believed that  most
Bosniaks  in  Bijeljina  thought  likewise. A  member  of  the  local  association  of  former
detainees (logoraši) at the Batković concentration camp, the man added, however, that what
mattered, in the context of  Bijeljina, was to focus in what happened in Bijeljina proper,
rather than elsewhere in Bosnia. The discussion moved on, but the coverage of  the event in
the locally-based  television stations focused only on the first man's statements, which he
repeated to  the  pool  of  journalists  present,  stressing  that  nobody  had ever  been  held
responsible (niko nije odgovarao) for the crimes committed against Serbs in Central Bosnia.
His  suggestion that  the refusal  to  recognise  Serb suffering was the greatest  obstacle  to
reconciliation, was presented as if  it stemmed from the research's findings, which resulted
in the distortion of  the study's conclusions as well as the discussion itself.
A couple of  weeks later, I had the chance to interview this man, whom I will call
Djordje. He did not remember me from the Town Hall event, but was happy to speak to
me, after an Orthodox priest whom I had interviewed introduced us. My interviews were
usually unstructured, so that once I explained what my research was about and why I was
interested to speak to him, I simply let the conversation flow. I wanted to know especially
about his personal experience of  displacement and resettlement in Bijeljina as well as his
activism in Bijeljina's  public  life;  instead, our interview began with a  long introduction
about  the  History  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  in  which Djordje  focused essentially  on the
ethnogenesis of  the Bosniak nationality. 
Djordje held strongly nationalistic views. He went far into the past to explain that
Bosniaks were essentially Serbs whose ancestors converted to Islam, some under duress
(prisilno), while others converted primarily as a way of  accessing power or preserving their
privileges. He believed that Serbs were the oldest nationality present in Bosnian lands, and
conveyed the idea that the construction of  the Bosniaks as a national group – rather than
114 Hrvatsko vijeće odbrane: Croatian Defence Council, the Bosnian Croat army, controlled by Croatian 
nationalist party HDZ
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strictly  as  a  religious  category  –  was  based on the  appropriation of  the Serb people's
historical  heritage.  Although  he  did  not  use  the  expression  'appropriation',  he  cited  a
number of  examples to illustrate his point: King Tvrtko Kotromanić, the first king of  the
medieval kingdom of  Bosnia –a statue of  whom,  Djordje pointed out, had recently been
installed in the centre of  Tuzla –  was in fact a Serb. The fact that the Kotromanić dynasty
was Roman Catholic, rather than Orthodox mattered less than the fact that he was not a
Muslim;  the  lily  flower,  symbol  of  the  the  Kotromanić  dynasty  –  which  the  Bosnian
government adopted in 1992 for the flag of  the Republic of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and
which many Bosniaks to this day see as their national flag – was, “obviously a Christian
symbol”; Bijeljina's Atik mosque was originally an Orthodox church, and the same was the
case all over the Balkans after the Ottoman Empire took over. I had heard similar claims
before. They are part of  a common repertoire about Serb and Muslim identity among
Bosnian Serbs ideologically inclined to nationalism, but which include beliefs more widely
shared (Jansen 2003). For Djordje, Bosnia was essentially a Serb land, which Bosnian Serbs
had renounce to, once Yugoslavia disintegrated, so as to preserve their political autonomy.
What was striking about him was that although he was a vocal supporter of  the creation of
Republika Srpska, he clearly mourned the loss of  Bosnia as the homeland of  the Bosnian
Serbs, as much as the loss of  his own home and his native region, to which he remained
emotionally attached.
Moving  beyond  grand  narratives,  Djordje  revealed  himself  burdened  by  the
sacrifices that the war imposed on people like himself, who abandoned their homes and
fought on the front lines, only to find themselves impoverished and dependent, now “ third
rate  citizens”(gradjani  3.reda).  He  made  a  direct  correlation  between  the  war  and  the
dispossession  of  the  population,  and  condemned  the  ruling  class  as  a  band  of  war
profiteers. Presenting himself  as a working class man, he defined the war, not as an ethnic
war, but as a “class war”, motivated by greed (pohlepa), so as to offer an opportunity for
plunder (pljačka). While in public he had directed his criticisms towards the political class in
the Federation, whom he had accused of  failing to create the conditions for the return of
displaced Serbs  to  their  pre-war  places  of  residence,  in  our  interview and subsequent
conversations  he  directed  his  anger  specifically  against  the  political  class  in  Republika
Srpska,  and  Bijeljina's  branch  of  the  SDS  in  particular.  The  contrast  between  the
enrichment of  the political class and the poverty in which he was forced to live was a cause
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for deep resentment. 
Djordje  had  brought  some  documents  to  give  me,  and  started  by  showing  me
photos of  houses destroyed in Central Bosnia and of  the Orthodox church in his native
village, severely damaged during the war and still waiting to be restored. There was also a
map documenting  the  destruction of  villages  in  the same area.  Despite  being  used to
speaking in public, Djordje did not have a clearly articulated narrative prepared, but rather
allowed himself  to speak freely, from the heart, shifting from one temporal dimension to
another to draw parallels establishing the contrast between the experience of  Serbs from
Central Bosnia and Bosniaks from Semberija. While in his native region, he said, as much
as  two  hundred  Serb  villages  had  been  destroyed,  in  the  village  of  Janja,  the  only
predominantly  Muslim settlement  in Semberija  outside Bijeljina,  no more than two or
three houses had been destroyed. “Had we not left in 1992, it would have been, for us, worse than
Srebrenica”, he stated, promptly adding, by the way, that the case of  Srebrenica was actually
“a great manipulation”. Then, returning to the evacuation of  his home region, he told me how
he had personally organised its evacuation, implying that having done so had potentially
avoided  a  “catastrophe”,  meaning  a  massacre.  This  came  up  in  the  context  of  his
accusation that the current political class were all war profiteers, who during the war as in
the present, were motivated only by greed. He didn't seem concerned that this statement
contradicted the one made at the public event at the town hall a few weeks earlier, in which
he had accused Bosnian Croat nationalists of  expelling him. What mattered was that they
had to leave, not who drove them out, but he had nevertheless felt the need to publicly
protect Serb claims to victimhood. 
A factory worker in Central Bosnia before the war, Djordje has been unemployed
since he was demobilised from the Army of  Republika Srpska. Now in his early fifties, he
survived on his  wife's  modest  salary,  and the  occasional  sale  of  artwork  he  produced.
Despite his deep attachment to his native region in Central Bosnia, for Djordje the idea of
returning to live there was out of  question. He had not yet been able to sell his land there,
neither did he obtain any compensation for his destroyed property, as all efforts in that
sense  had  been  met  with  obstruction  by  the  local  authorities.  Returning  was  not  a
possibility. Rather than assuming that he would not want to live as a minority returnee 115,
115 In the Bosnian context, minority return means the return to pre-war homes in areas now dominated 
demographically as well as politically by another ethnic group.
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but instead wanted to live under Serb rule, he justified the impossibility of  return on the
grounds of  the lack of  political conditions and guarantees of  security. This he placed in
contrast with the successful experience of  return of  Bosniaks to Bijeljina and other parts of
Republika Srpska, in a way that  implied the moral superiority of  the Serb people. Leaving
aside why and how Bosniaks had been displaced from Bijeljina, his rationale was that they
had returned because Serbs chose to allow them to, and that stood as evidence of  their
character as a tolerant people. 
He surely knew, but did not mention, that in fact there had been great resistance in
Bijeljina against the implementation of  the right to return, with displaced Serbs resettled in
Bijeljina at the forefront of  that resistance. The burnt-down houses in Janja which Djordje
mentioned, for instance, were not set on fire during the war, but only when the original
Bosniak population made clear their intention to return after the war. Janja, from which
tnearly all of  the non-Serb population had been expelled in the summer of  1994 ( Amnesty
1994:11-15; HRW 2000:37),  housed a significant proportion of  the 37.000 displaced Serbs
estimated by the UNHCR to be living in the municipality of  Bijeljina in 1997 (HRW 2000:
37). When, escorted by NATO troops, a delegation of  displaced Bosniaks came for the first
time to visit their homes in the Summer of  2000, they were received with violence by the
new residents, who attacked them with stones and Molotov cocktails, and in the process
seriously damaged some houses (Jansen2010:146). 
Post-war Bijeljina was one of  the focal points of  an intra-Serb struggle between
those who accepted the Dayton Agreement and defended a pragmatic accommodation of
the constraints it imposed, and those that wanted to actively resist it. The first six years after
Dayton were marked by great tension, and violent protests –often orchestrated rather than
spontaneous  –  against  return  as  well  as  against  the  international  presence  were  not
uncommon in Bijeljina municipality (e.g. US Dep. of  State 2000:6,16; 2001:4). 
With the victory of  the faction pragmatically accepting the reality of  Dayton, the
dynamics of  nationalist politics in Bijeljina changed, leading to the adoption of  a moderate
tone  (see  Ch.  6),  and  Djordje  found  himself  reduced  to  a  marginal  position.  Having
remained what he had always been, he had become 'too nationalistic', in comparison with a
ruling elite which had reinvented themselves as 'moderates'. After giving so much for the
creation of  Republika Srpska – first as a founding member of  the SDS in his home town,
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then, as a soldier – he felt betrayed, but nevertheless continued to display his loyalty to
Republika Srpska. Despite this loyalty, the  association of  displaced persons he had founded
no longer received public funding, and now a competing organisation had been effectively
elevated to the position of  exclusive representative of  displaced Serbs in Bijeljina. Because
of  his outspoken denunciation of  the discrimination displaced Serbs suffer and of  abuses
of  the political class, he had become an outcast, and now saw himself  as a dissident. Well-
known in Semberija and beyond for his artistic skills and his knowledge of  folklore and
cultural  traditions  of  the  Serbs  from  Central  Bosnia,  even  the  cultural  activities  he
organised became object of  obstruction, he claimed, through the refusal of  sponsorship, as
well as by the imposition of  prohibitive fees when he tried to rent a venue for an event.
Unique in the way he used any opportunity to voice his dissent, Djordje's situation is
nevertheless  illustrative of  a wider sense of  disempowerment and disillusion, shared by
many war veterans and displaced Serbs more generally. Questioning his own nationalist
ideology  would  have  been a  step  too  far  in  a  man's  reckoning  with  the  past,  and he
separated himself  from the nationalist elite that came to rule by framing the war as a class
war from which only war profiteers took benefit. Only his nationalistic political convictions
could provide any sense of  meaning to a life whose best years were consumed without
reward, and so his personal recollections were publicly articulated so as not to challenge the
officially-sanctioned narratives, or risk in any way undermining the strength of  Serb claims
for victimhood. 
Memories of  resettlement and integration
We now turn our focus to the 'difficult  memories'  more specifically associated with the
experience of  resettlement and integration in Bijeljina, through the stories of  Sladjana, 35;
Denis, 36; and Ana, 23 at the time of  my fieldwork in 2014-2015. They reveal different
facets  of  this  experience,  but  converge  in  their  conflicted  feelings  towards  Bijeljina,
stemming from their condition as young adults faced with poor prospects for the future. 
As the case of  Janja to which Djordje made allusion illustrates, the experience of
resettlement is at the core of  a particular  set of  'difficult memories'. Once displaced, Serb
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refugees often occupied the homes that belonged to non-Serbs, some of  which had been
left vacant when their occupiers fled or were deported, while in other cases the occupants
were forced to cede part of  their space to make room for the refugees (HRW 2000:24). The
housing stock in Bijeljina and Janja provided accommodation for  tens  of  thousands of
displaced Serbs.  Semberija being a prosperous region, the houses were usually big and
solid,  and they  were  in  good condition,  as  the  region  did  not  experience  any  sort  of
property destruction during the war.  
These are difficult memories because they are based on a shared experience with
the legitimate owners of  these homes, an experience in which displaced Serbs, willingly or
out of  necessity, benefited from the misfortune of  non-Serbs. This puts displaced Serbs in a
position in which they became entangled in a web of  complicity with nationalist leaders
and war profiteers. Whilst those with the best connections to the SDS or relevant functions
within the war effort were assigned housing, in other cases displaced Serbs were at the
mercy of  local war profiteers, whom they had to pay for the 'right' to occupy those homes .
The  Dayton  Agreement  guaranteed  the  right  to  property  owned  before  the  war,  and
despite great obstruction during the first post-war years, this right was eventually enforced,
which meant  that  resettled  Serbs  were  eventually  evicted  from these  homes.  To  avoid
homelessness, displaced Serbs depended on local networks of  patronage so as to receive
assistance in the form of  re-housing or plots  of  land for construction. Later on, many
people managed to sell  the properties  they owned in what is  now the Federation, with
which they obtained enough money to solve their housing problem, but many others either
had nothing to sell, or have been unable to find buyers and continue to live in very poor
conditions, while domicile residents of  Bijeljina, regardless of  ethnicity, who owned land or
houses  in  areas  earmarked for  development,  benefited from the  boom in  construction
triggered by the influx of  displaced Serbs116. 
Sladjana's family settled in Janja in 1993, when she was eleven. They shared the
house of  a Muslim family for more than one year, until their hosts were deported to Tuzla
in the summer of  1994. Sladjana was the only person among resettled Serbs to openly
116 A common practice was to make a deal with a property developer towards the construction of  building 
blocks, in which the owner of  the land received 18% to 25% of  the new housing or commercial units 
built. A number of  modern four to five-floor buildings were built in Bijeljina following this scheme. 
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speak to me about this experience without avoiding the reality of  the climate of  fear in
which Muslims lived. When I interviewed her, in February 2015, we had known each other
for almost one year. Sladjana had studied in Belgrade, and our common passion for the city
was the ground on which we built a relationship. Albeit critical of  the local leadership, who
she though had already spent too much time in power, she told me she enjoyed living in
Bijeljina  because  “there  was  always  something  new  going  on”,  and  she  felt  she  was
somehow part of  the town's transformation. 
Sladjana was glad that the displaced Bosniaks were able to return and thus restore
to some extent the town's pre-war ethnic diversity. Unlike Djordje, she did not see that as
evidence of  the tolerant character of  the Serb people, but saw their wartime persecution
and expulsion as acts of  injustice that required redress. She recognised her own family's
plight in theirs, and refused to be drawn into the competition over victimhood that was the
main trait of  dominant public narratives. It saddened her, however, that the legitimate fears
and the actual persecution Serbs also suffered during the war was something that the public
in the Federation seemed generally unwilling to recognise. The interview was emotionally
demanding for her, as she remembered what her family went through:  
“Those were crazy times, I don't like to remember them, I make an effort to forget, I seldom speak about
them... those were crazy times because things happened that I would never have said they could happen,
that people could change so much”
Until the beginning of  the war, Sladjana's family lived in Visoko, a small town with
a  Muslim majority, located between the cities of  Sarajevo and Zenica. In May 1992, with
tensions mounting in her hometown, her mother left for Serbia with her and her sister,
while her father stayed behind. They stayed with relatives, first in the countryside, then in
Belgrade, but with money running short and the new school year approaching, Sladjana's
mother decided to return to Bosnia with the children, having heard that across the river
Drina in Zvornik there were homes available. They settled in the village of  Kozluk, near
Zvornik. Kozluk's original population had been expelled in April 1992, when Arkan took
over. As in the case of  Janja, the residents had decided not to resist the Serb take-over, but
to negotiate their surrender. After the population was transferred across the front-lines to
Tuzla, the houses were looted, but since there had been no combats or shelling, they were
in sufficiently  good condition to provide shelter  for  displaced Serbs.  The experience of
occupying such a house mirrored their previous experience of  leaving their own home in
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haste.  Sladjana  told  me  how  among  the  things  left  behind,  her  mother  found  some
photographs scattered in a rubbish dump, which she collected and stored in the hope that
she might one day return them. Some months later, indeed, a woman came looking for
things, and her mother gave her the photos. Years later, when Sladjana's family  finally
visited their home town after the war, they saw that their house too had been looted, and
they found that some of  their possessions, like her father's tools,  now belonged to their
former neighbours, who ostensibly had kept them to avoid them being stolen, but did not
give them back. 
Life in Kozluk was hard. The village was overcrowded with displaced Serbs, and
there wasn't enough food. Due to its proximity to the front-lines, the area also had to be
frequently evacuated. Every now and then, buses would arrive and take everybody away,
for a few hours or a few days. School attendance was irregular, and the children were
lagging  behind,  and  for  many  months  they  had  no  way  of  knowing  of  their  father's
whereabouts, or even whether he was alive. It was he who found out where they were and
joined them. In the meantime he had joined the Army of  Republika Srpska,  and was
assigned a post with the border guard. Once reunited, the family pulled some connections
with the Commission for Housing117, and were assigned a house in Janja, where life was
much safer than in Kozluk. There, they shared a house with the owner, a Muslim woman,
and her two children, while the woman's husband had previously fled to Tuzla. Sladjana
was keen to stress that they had a respectful relationship based on a mutual understanding
of  each family's situation:
“My father was a specific person, and my mother, they were specific persons, so that  while we lived in
Janja, never did he offended anyone, he always made an effort (trudio se), as much as he was able to, to
respect people, regardless of  how much evil there was around, and of  the times he was living through, to
remain humane (da budi čovjek).”
According  to  Sladjana,  the  fact  that  her  father  was  a  border  guard  somehow
protected her hosts. The Muslim family lived in great fear, and there were rumours that the
family's  eldest  daughter,  still  a  teenager,  might  have  been  sexually  assaulted  by  men
associated with Vojkan Djurković, the man who was in charge of  the business of  so-called
'voluntary transfer' of  non-Serbs across the front-lines, and who eventually organised the
117 The Commission was created following the Decree on the Allocation for Temporary Use of  Housing Objects, 
Business and other Premises, which came into force on 1 August 1992 (published in the Official Gazette of  
Serbian People in Bosnia-Hercegovina, no. 12/92, July 31, 1992, cited in HRW 2000:25,n.62) (see also Ch.3)
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mass deportation of  Janja's Muslim population. Sladjana's father arranged for the Muslim
family  to  be  smuggled  across  the  border  to  Serbia,  from where  they  went  to  exile  in
Western Europe. Her family lived in that house until December 2002, when, as part of  the
international effort to enforce the right to return, all employees of  public agencies received
notice  that  they  had  to  abandon  the  houses  they  occupied  if  they  belonged  to  other
displaced people. The legitimate owners had filed a process to recover their property, and
Sladjana's family had to leave in short notice, but they had nowhere else to go, so her father
spoke to the Muslim woman to ask her to stay a bit longer. “Strange how people have short
memory”,  Sladjana commented with contained outrage,  as she told me that the Muslim
family seemed to have forgotten what her father had done for them during the war, as they
refused his request, and thus forced them to leave in the middle of  winter, with snow and
extremely cold temperatures outside. After moving about five times since they left their
home in 1992, the family eventually obtained a plot of  land in another village close to
Bijeljina, and in 2005 they finally moved into their own home.
Sladjana moved to Belgrade in 2000, to study at the university. Having arrived just
one month before the overthrow of  Slobodan Milošević, she was able to engage with the
dynamics of  the political change that was taking place. Those were exciting times,  which
she remembered fondly.  The contrast  between this  set  of  memories  and those difficult
memories  of  displacement  and  resettlement  was  clear,  and  engaging  with  this  period
lightened up the interview to the satisfaction of  both of  us. Given her love for Belgrade, I
was curious to know what brought her back to Bijeljina. She never imagined she would
settle permanently in Bijeljina, but once she graduated, she was able to benefit from the
economic boom that Bosnia-Herzegovina experienced in the early 2000s, and obtained a
job through the local job centre (Zavod za zapošljavanje). She was proud to state that she did
not  need  connections  to  find  work,  and  praised  her  boss,  who  only  employed  people
through the job centre. She seemed better integrated in Bijeljina than any other person in
the 'resettled' category that I knew, thanks especially to her job and professional status. 
When I  met  her  again during  my field visit  in  the Summer of  2015,  however,
Sladjana sounded rather unhappy with life in Bijeljina, and told me she was considering
emigrating to the United States,  where her sister already lived. She was taking English
classes and researching online what kind of  jobs she might apply to in the US, preparing to
leave the country altogether. She didn't see a future for herself  in her country, a feeling she
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shared with much of  the Bosnian youth, who in recent years have been massively leaving
the country, constrained only by the immigration restrictions in the countries they aspire to
leave to. Still single at 35, her sister was the only family she had, as both her parents had
prematurely died a few years before. She hadn't mentioned this during the interview, in
which she always used the present tense when she spoke about her parents. It was only
some time afterwards that I found out through a common acquaintance, and we never
talked about  it,  although she seemed to assume that  I  knew.  I  came to  see Sladjana's
interview as the fulfilment of  a duty of  memory towards her parents. She was motivated to
speak to me as  an act  of  generosity,  to  help me with my research, but,  without being
explicit about it, she also wanted to counter outsiders' prejudiced views about 'the Serbs',
which she felt led to an unfair portrayal of  the wartime experience in Bosnia-Herzegovina
that devalued the suffering people like her parents had gone through, and ignored their
efforts to remain moral. 
Sladjana's wish to leave and build herself  a new life abroad was shared by many.
When I visited Bijeljina in the summer of  2015, almost everyone I met who was younger
than 40, and some older than that, expressed a similar desire, if  not a firm intention. It is
hard to know whether this desire is stronger among those who share the 'refugee identity'
than  among  the  domicile  population.  What  seemed  to  be  particular  to  the  resettled
population was  an enduring  feeling  of  vulnerability,  which I  had observed before,  but
which emerged more clearly under the particular climate created by the convergence of  a
number of  situations, such as the consequences of  the catastrophic floods earlier in spring;
the  European  'refugee  crisis';  and  political  tensions  stemming  from  the  twentieth
anniversary of  the Srebrenica massacre118. 
At one point during our interview some months earlier, Sladjana had observed how
every time they moved they got closer to the border with Serbia. At the time, I inferred
from her comment that  this proximity to the border provided her, not only in the past, but
also in the present, with some reassurance. When I analysed the interview in the light of
118 These included the Russian veto to a British proposal of  a UN Security Council condemning Srebrenica 
as genocide (BBC 2015), and an incident during the commemorations in the Memorial Cemetery in 
Potočari, where participants attacked the Serbian Prime-Minister Aleksandar Vučić with stones and other
objects, forcing his security guards to remove him from the premises, thus putting an end to what had 
ostensibly been a gesture towards reconciliation on Vučić's part  (BIRN 2015)
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the new plans she was drawing for her life, however, it seemed instead that this observation
betrayed a sense of  enduring vulnerability, as it implied an admission of  the possibility that
she might not  have settled for good.  I  came across with this  same sense of  enduring
vulnerability in other interviews as well as in informal conversations. According to Jelena,
with whom I eventually tried to make sense of  it, this feeling was particularly pervasive
among resettled Serbs.  
Denis, 36119, shared this feeling of  vulnerability, and similarly expressed the relative
sense  of  reassurance  that  the  proximity  to  the  border  with  Serbia  provided.  Born  in
Zavidovići, in Central Bosnia, his family was first displaced after the 1990 elections, when
the SDS decided to create parallel political institutions in the areas where they failed to
obtain a majority. The family moved to the area under the control of  the newly formed
parallel municipality, but when the war started, they were forced to flee that area, and in
1994 they settled in Novi Sad, Serbia, where they lived until 2004. When they were able to
sell  their property in Zavidovići,  they decided to move to Bijeljina, where property was
cheaper than in Novi Sad. Denis' first impressions of  life in Bijeljina were very different
from those of  displaced Serbs who arrived during or in the immediate aftermath of  the
war. He had experienced discrimination in Novi Sad, where, he said “ the word refugee is a very
harsh word” and Bosnian Serbs were often unfairly blamed for all sorts of  problems, from
unemployment to petty crime. Permanently settling in Bijeljina was thus an improvement
in his condition. At the time, he said, “Bijeljina was the centre of  the refugee community”, and the
concentration of   “people from Central Bosnia, sharing the same mentality and traditions” gave it a
sense  of  homecoming.  Like  Sladjana,  Denis  appreciated  the  transformation  that  the
overwhelming presence of  resettled Serbs induced in Bijeljina. Unlike Sladjana, he had no
desire to leave, but he was similarly conflicted between the sense of  being part of  that
ongoing transformation and the lack of  prospects for a sustainable future. 
The problem, in his view, was that Republika Srpska faced security threats against
which  the  privileged  location  of  Bijeljina  offered  no  reassurance.  He  mentioned  in
particular the participation of  a significant number of  Bosniaks in the war in Syria on the
side of  the so-called Islamic State, to elaborate on the possibility of  an Islamic terrorist plot
in  Bijeljina,  a  possibility  which,  after  the  murder  of  a  Serb  policeman  by  a  Bosniak
returnee in the town of  Zvornik in April 2015 (Radio  Slobodna Evropa 2015), he argued,
119 Interviewed in August 2015
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could  no  longer  be  dismissed.  Denis  was  a  member  of  the  Serbian  Radical  Party  in
Bijeljina,  who  believed  that  sooner  or  later  there  would  be  another  war  in  Bosnia-
Herzegovina; others, with more moderate political views, as was the case with Dragan,
somehow shared the same fear, a fear that the media and the political class exploited, and
which resonated also with the 1990s nationalistic propaganda against Bosnian Muslims. 
For Denis, however, demography posed a bigger threat to the survival of  Republika
Srpska, since there were “no conditions for young couples to get married and have children”. On the
one  hand,  unemployment  was  high,  and  work  conditions  precarious  and  exploitative.
Sitting next to his girlfriend, he pointed to his own case. Both still lived with their parents,
and could not marry because he couldn't find steady work, surviving instead on small jobs
in the informal economy, despite having a diploma in Economics. On the other hand, he
asserted, the health system was so corrupt that “women who wanted children knew they
would have to pay”, alluding to the common belief  that to receive adequate medical care,
patients  had to bribe the staff.  His  girlfriend nodded.  These were the reasons  why,  he
believed, 80% of  the youth wished to leave.
Ana,  a student at the local extension of  the University of  Eastern Sarajevo, grew
up in Bijeljina, but was never able to overcome the division between the resettled and the
domicile population. She summed it up to me in simple terms: “I grew up with my parents
listening to Pink Floyd, not  to popular (narodna)  music”.  She witnessed and shared her
parents sense of  oppression. The major factor of  division, though, were not the differences
in  cultural  preferences,  but  the  feeling  of  being  disadvantaged  in  terms  of  access  to
resources. Ana worked for me as a child minder for a few months, until my daughter was
old enough to go to nursery. I was worried, however, that the job might affect her studies.
Rather than reassuring me, Ana dismissed my concerns by explaining that whatever effort
she might put in her academic achievement would make little difference in her life, because
because she was “a refugee” (izbjeglica),  and that meant that her family didn't have the
connections  (veze)  necessary  to  provide  her  access  to  jobs  once  she  graduated.  In  the
present, however, her mother was unemployed and the family needed the extra revenue
even if  that came at the cost of  her academic performance. She eventually shared her
childminding duties with her mother, so that things worked out for everyone, and she was
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able to have enough time to study, but what was clear was that she felt the odds were
against her, and had little faith in the future. As I was to find out, Ana was far from unique
in her generation in how she felt alienated from the society in which she lived, and the way
she identified herself  as a “refugee”. Other young adults presented themselves to me in a
similar  way,  and  similarly  expressed  the  feeling  that  they  were  treated  as  second  rate
citizens,  and  discriminated  against  due  to  their  condition  as  'refugees'  and  lack  of
connections (veze), whilst watching the children of  the locals grab the few jobs available. 
Concluding remarks:
The  endurance  of  this  self-identification  as  'refugees',  which,  twenty  years  after  the
experience  of  displacement,  already  transcended  the  generation  barrier,  revealed  a
category of  the population still caught in a state of  prolonged liminality. Having cut their
connection to the places they used to belong to, they felt far from integrated in the society
they now lived in, and still waiting to reap the benefits of  the sacrifice they made, through
their  displacement  and  resettlement,  to  the  existence  and  consolidation  of  Republika
Srpska. 
Whilst all my informants revealed a strong attachment to Republika Srpska, none
of  them seemed to  feel  fully  integrated  in  Bijeljina,  and some,  like  Denis,  had in  the
prospect  of  a  new war the only  way they  could imagine to  come out  of  the political
deadlock in which Bosnia-Herzegovina; this was, however, a solution that nobody wished
for. With their focus on the sacrifices displaced Serbs made for Republika Srpska, and the
praise they receive for their loyalty, the rituals of  reaggregation marking the closing of  a
liminal  stage,  the  commemorations  of  events  such  as  the  'Tuzlanska  kolona'  massacre
seemed to resonate amongst this population in a way that was probably not intended.  In
the  name of  the  sacrifices  made  up  to  now,  sacrifices  continue  to  be  demanded  and
accepted. The evocation of  the traumatic past adds to the climate of  concrete fear that
many feel in RS, by elevating it into it a level of  existential fear. But this climate of  fear is
also  what  alienates  people,  and  undermines  the  potential  for  attachment  to  the  new
homeland, since it prevents them from positively imagining a shared future. 
257
Chapter 7
Official memory at the stage of  reaggregation
The second largest town in Republika Srpska, Bijeljina was known in the immediate post-
war as a hotbed of  violence, organised crime, and extreme nationalism. In more recent
years, however, the town has been through a process of  'normalisation'. As violence was
largely curbed, the discourse of  hatred that was dominant in the 1990s has now been
replaced by a resolutely moderate tone, in which tolerance appears as the highest value;
and behaviour in the public realm is policed so as to strictly enforce the image of  a more
moderate,  tolerant  form  of  nationalism.  The  analysis  of  this  'normalisation'  process
provides  us  with  a  case-study of  the  transformation of  Serb  nationalism in  Republika
Srpska since the end of  the war.
In the context of  Bijeljina, 'normalisation' appears as a concept vague enough to
comprise an array of  meanings.  In the strictest  sense,  the term refers  primarily  to the
achievement of  a situation in which social relations occur in a manner that is predictable
and stable, thanks to the curbing of  violence, and in particular of  politically motivated
violence against the Bosniak community. In the widest sense, 'normalisation' appears as an
alternative  to  the  idea  of  'reconciliation',  in  which  reconciliation  itself  appears  as
redundant,  and unnecessary.  Now a  minority  in  a  town where  they  used to  form the
majority of  the population, Bosniaks are tolerated, but the urban landscape is saturated
with references to Serb nationalism, national and religious identity. But 'normalisation' does
not refer only to inter-ethnic relations. Its literal meaning of  “returning something into a
normal state” encompassed the definition and adoption of  a set of  social norms setting the
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standards of  social behaviour. The new, post-liminal normalality essentially consecrated the
values imposed by the war, stemming from nationalism, albeit accomodating, not without
uneasiness, the enduring presence of  legacies pointing to different sets of  values, such as
the  Partisan  tradition,  and  the  tradition  of  'life  in  common'  (zajednički  život).  Resilient
enough to endure and modify the nationalist standards, these tradition were, in the process,
also modified, in a way that highlighted the influence of  ethnicity to the detriment of  other
forms of  belonging. 
Applying  the  framework  of  liminality,  this  chapter  analyses  the  process  of
'normalisation'  as  a  post-liminal  process  of  consolidation  of  the  political  and  social-
economic structures created by the war, through rituals “reaggregation”, in which, after a
period of  great flux and deep uncertitude, more stable forms of  identity are negotiated
under a new set of  norms, and projected into the future, reframing the different historical
and cultural legacies brough over from the past. 
This chapter explores some of  the rituals marking passage from a liminal condition
to  the  new  normality  (generated  during  the  liminal  stage),  through  the  stage  of
reaggregation, during which a set of  discrete processes converged into a wider process of
“normalisation”.  The  chapter  starts  by  describing  the  official  commemoration  of  the
takeover  of  Bijeljina  in  1992,  before  focusing  on  two  particular  processes  which  have
functioned as rites of  passage away from liminality and into a new normality, as reflected in
inter-ethnic  relations,  so  as  to  explore  different  meanings  assigned  to  the  idea  of
normalisation. These processes were the reconstruction of  the Bijeljina's mosques, between
2002 and 2014;  and the creation,  activities  and collapse of  Bijeljina's  local  Truth and
Reconciliation Commission in 2008.
Reaggregation wider than mere normalisation, and requires also, in the case of  a
conflictual rupture with the past, forms of  redress to bring people together and avoid a
schism.  The traditional  set  of  mechanisms  Transitional  Justice  advocates  perscribe  has
failed to deliver.  The failure of  the TRC exposed the virtual absence of, and indeed the
lack of  political will towards  redressive measures, as did the fact that very few judicial cases
involving violent crimes committed in Bijeljina during the war have been fully investigating,
procecuted, brought to trial and concluded, none of  which in Bijeljina district court. As for
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official commemorations and monuments, they exclude the experience of  persecution lived
by those classified as 'non-Serbs',  Muslims/Bosniaks in particular, whilst placing emphasys
on the need for 'Serbs' to offer themselves, as individuals, in sacrifice, in the past as in the
present, for the sake of  the collective, leading to the question of  when, if  ever, will the fruits
of  such sacrifices become available to enjoy.
But away from the limelight, small scale acts of  redress have also been taking place,
at  a  more  grasstoots  leve,  through  acts  performed  by  ordinary  citizens  towards  the
restoration of  trust across the ethnic divide, countering the salience of  ethnic identification
and involving alternative forms of  solidarity beyond those offered by belonging to ethnic
categories.I will thus balance the (mostly) top-down dynamics at play in the construction of
the mosques and the creation of  the TRC, with a few  illustrative examples of  grassroots
forms of  redress and organic reconciliation. 
I will then conclude with a reflexion of  how the new normality is experienced, and
how that  experience  influences  feelings  of  belonging  or,  otherwise,  alienation,  both  to
Bijeljina and to Republika Srpska.
Twenty years since the end of  the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the environment in
which I immersed myself  during one year of  fieldwork in the town of  Bijeljina (2014-2015)
was  an environment  no longer  marked by  the  everyday experience of  violence,  but  a
“normalised” environment marked, on the one hand, by an ostensible tolerance for the
presence of  non-Serbs, and, on the other hand, by the saturation of  the physical space with
visible references to Serb national identity. In a radical departure (or perhaps not so radical)
from the dominant framing of  the 'other' as a threat, the discourse of  tolerance seems to
have replaced the discourse of  hatred that marked the war and immediate post-war years.
The  following  session  will  describe  how  the  enduring  commitment  to  nationalism  is
reconciled with a more recently adopted discourse of  tolerance.
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7.1 The official narrative of  Bijeljina's wartime experience 
 The cornerstone of  Bijeljina's official narrative concerning the wartime experience is the
military take-over of  Bijeljina by the Serbian Volunteer Guard (Srpska dobrovoljačka garda), a
special unit from Serbia led by the notorious Zeljko Ražnatović 'Arkan'. Framed as an act
of  liberation  againts  Islamic  extremists,  this  event  implicitly  justifies  the  subsequent
persecution of  Bosnian Muslims,  the  closure and demolition of  the mosques,  and the
eventual deportation of  the quasi totality of  the Muslim population. 
The narrative  of  the  liberation of  Bijeljina  was  forged by  the  local  authorities
through their propaganda machine, the local radio station,  Radio Bijeljina,  and the local
newspaper Semberske novine (renamed SIM novine during the war).The main features of  the
narrative then crafted remain. Accordingly, Muslim extremists had allegedly launched a
violent assault to take over power, erected barricades and installed snipers in the minarets
and  skyscrapers,  and  the  Serbian  Volunteer  Guard  intervened  in  extremis and  intense
fighting took place in the days following their arrival until they succeeded in completely
controlling the town. Bijeljina then became a safe haven, attracting displaced Serbs from
Eastern  and  Central  Bosnia,  and  a  bridgehead  for  the  expansion  of  Serb-controlled
territory southwards along the River Drina, and westwards towards the Posavina region. It
also provided manpower and material resources for the war effort, which resulted in the
ultimate sacrifice of  thousands of  fighters. 
A significant difference between wartime and the post-war narratives lies, however,
in  the  place  assigned  to  individuals.  During  the  war,  the  propaganda  machine
systematically portrayed Arkan,  alongside the leader of  the local  paramilitary unit,  the
'Panthers', Ljubiša Savić 'Mauzer', as heroes, but after the war they quickly ceased to be
cult figures120. Arkan and Mauzer have now acquired a new role in the official narrative
120 One of  the challenges that the SDS central leadership faced once the war began was to assert its 
dominance by subduing or eliminating potential political rivals, who competed for the products of  
plunder and war-profiteering. This was done basically by forcing the integration of  the different 
paramilitary units operating in Bosnia in the Army of  Republika Srpska, but commanders like Mauzer 
retained a great level of  power and autonomy, thanks to the loyalty of  his subordinates and their quality 
as soldiers. After the  war, Mauzer left the SDS and founded a new political party, the Democratic Party 
of  Republika Srpska. He was deeply involved in the intra-Serb power struggle over the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. Whilst the SDS pursued a hardline approach advocating for resistance to its implementation,
Mauzer allied himself  with the rising pragmatic line, led by Biljana Plavsić and Milorad Dodik, and when
Dodik became Prime-minister in 1998, Mauzer became the head of  the Directorate for police of  the 
Republika Srpska's Ministry of  Interior (nacelnik uprave policije MUP-a RS) directly responsible for the 
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about the war. Instead of  heroes, they became scapegoats for everything that was wrong
with the Serb takeover and the Serb rule over Bijeljina. While insisting on the narrative that
Serb forces liberated Bijeljina, in the face of  an attempted takeover by Muslim extremists,
Serb politicians whom I interviewed, who had been active during the take-over of  Bijeljina
in 1992121,  exclusively blamed Arkan's  forces for the murders that occurred during and
immediately after the take-over, thus omitting the role of  local fighters, who guided Arkan's
men through town, and participated in numerous detentions. Mauzer was held responsible
for the climate of  permanent fear that non-Serbs who remained in town felt, as well as for
much of  the racketeering that went on. Specific crimes whose perpetrators were known,
and thus could not be assigned to Mauzer, were justified as exclusively motivated by the
greed of  the  individuals  involved,  thus  giving  credit  to  an  alternative,  ostensibly  non-
nationalist, narrative of  the war that presents it as a 'war of  plunder' (pljačkaški rat).
As  players  whose actions  escaped the control  of  the SDS, even if  their  actions
converged towards the same goals, Arkan and Mauzer were, from the perspective of  the
SDS  local  leadership,  rivals  as  much  as  they  were  allies.  In  Bijeljina,  the  civilian
administration had to find forms of  accommodation, while attending also to the constraints
imposed by the SDS's central leadership. Paying tribute to people like Arkan and Mauzer
as heroes would bring no benefit to the post-war ruling elite, which gained much more by
dissociating themselves from such figures. Instead, the commemoration of  the 'liberation of
Bijeljina' focuses on 'fallen soldiers' in general, with the 'Serb Volunteer Guard' and the
'Panthers'  respective  veterans  organisations  represented  alongside  organisations  of  the
families of  missing soldiers and civilian victims, thus blending together the sacrifice of  the
fallen soldiers and the victimhood of  civilians. 
The  shift  from  individual  heroism  to  collective  sacrifice,  however,  cannot  be
explained solely by the ruling elite's tactical interests, but also by the collectivist nature of
nationalism,  resulting  in  the  submission  of  the  individual  to  the  nation.  Rather  than
individual heroes, it is the nation itself  that is object of  commemoration, and this is clearly
expressed in the features of  Bijeljina's  monument, with its faceless,  anonymous mass of
investigations of  organised crime, which was then closely associated with the SDS. After surviving a first 
attempt against his life he was murdered in 2000 in Bijeljina, through the explosion of  a bomb placed in 
his car. Arkan was also murdered in 2000 in Belgrade in an unrelated crime. 
121 Mirko Blagojević from the Serbian Radical Party (SRS), interviewed in October 2014;  and Cvijetin 
Simić from SDS, interviewed in January 2015.
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male figures. 
Fig. 5: The parastos in commemoration of  the liberation of  Bijeljina (31/03/2014)
A few days after my arrival for fieldwork in 2014, I  attended the annual
commemoration of  the 'liberation of  Bijeljina'. The commemoration, which took place in
front of  the Monument to the Fallen Soldiers and Civilian Victims, followed a template
common to most  war-related commemorations  organised by Bosnian Serbs.  The main
element was a parastos, a Serbian Orthodox religious service for the dead, regardless of  the
fact  that  no  Serb  fighters  were  killed  during  the  Serb  take-over  of  Bijeljina  and  the
surrounding region. The  parastos  was attended mostly by members of  the local political
institutions, activists from war veterans' and fallen soldiers' organisations, and a few family
members of  soldiers killed during the war, no more than a hundred people in total.  It
struck me, at the time, how few participants the commemoration attracted. The event had
been  advertised,  and,  for  more  than  one  hour  before  it  started,  loudspeakers  played
patriotic songs like 'Tamo daleko' and 'Marš na Drinu', but the population ignored the event,
except for the stares of  passers-by, who detained themselves only briefly to  observe it,
before carrying on.
After  the  parastos,  local  notables  laid  flower  wreaths  on  the  base  of  the
monument,  and then the participants were invited for the inauguration of  an exhibition, in
the nearby cultural centre. The exhibition consisted on a series of  photographs displaying
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the images of  mutilated bodies and mass graves of  Serb victims. These victims were not,
however, related to any wartime events that took place locally, but depicted human remains
found in other regions of  Bosnia.In the anniversary of  an event that directly led to the
murder of  dozens of  Bijeljina's non-Serb citizens, a representative of  the municipality, on
behalf  of  the organising committee, justified the exclusive focus on Serb victims saying: 
“All have the right to pay tribute to their victims, and we pay tribute to ours”. 
Non-Serb victims of  wartime persecution in Bijeljina were excluded from official
memory,  and thus  also symbolically  excluded from full  membership in the community.
Since Bijeljina became a Serb town, only Serb victims were 'ours' to commemorate. Official
representations of  the past are acts of  communication that carry an intentionality; while
official representations may seek to raise questions and invite reflection 122, very often they
seek to provide answers meant to reduce the population's uncertainties over identity, by
offering a script that articulates the authorities's preferred interpretation of  the past. The
'difficult  memories'  of  ethnic  cleansing  are  not  represented  in  an  official  memory
characterised, as often happens with war-related officially-sponsored representations, by the
pervasiveness of  the themes of  victimhood, sacrifice and heroism of  the dominant group.
The pervasiveness of  official memory places significant constraints on any expression of
remembrance that diverges from the official script, but the 'difficult memories' of  violence
against  non-Serbs,  albeit  absent from official representation, are nevertheless  present in
Bijeljina, as they stem from the shared experience of  its inhabitants. It is to these 'difficult
memories', constrained in their public expression but not entirely silenced, that we will now
turn our attention.
122 This is the case, for instance, of  the memorial to the fallen soldiers of  the Vietnam war in Washington 
DC, USA (Mosse 1990:224), and of  the monument to the Holocaust Memorial to the Murdered jews of  
Europe, in Berlin (Knischewski and Spittler 2006).
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7.2 The reconstruction of  Bijeljina's Atik Mosque
The ostensive exclusion of  the victims of  the 1992 takeover contrasted with another event
that took place in the same square a few months later, and which revealed the commitment
of  the local authorities to enforce tolerance and present Bijeljina as a moderate society: this
was the public ceremony marking the official reopening of  the Atik Mosque, which  Serb
forces had destroyed in March 1993 (see Ch 3; 4). The city mayor (gradonačelnik), Mićo
Mićić  was the guest  of  honour in the ceremony presided by the Reis-ul-ulema Husein
Kavazović, leader of  the Islamic Community of  Bosnia-Herzegovina. In his speech, the
Reis-ul-ulema K made the warmest reference to his role in securing a tolerant environment
in Bijeljina, and Mićić himself  declared that opening of  the renovated mosque represented
“an example of  democracy, respect for human rights and equality between all who live in Bijeljina”123 124.
The following day, the local branch of  SNSD, locally in opposition (but in government at
entity  level)  denounced the  Mayor's  presence  at  the  Mosque on  the  grounds  that  the
organisers did not display a flag of  Republika Srpska in the premises, but only a flag of
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The  Mayor  was  criticised  for  being  'pro-bosnian',  but  the  SNSD
statement was careful to state that it nevertheless welcomed the Mosque's opening event,
thus reinforcing the Mayor's  point that its  renovation stood as evidence of  the tolerant
character of  the Serb people. 
Some of  my informants – activists involved with the Islamic community, but also
ordinary individuals who attended the ceremony – reported on how acquaintances as well
as  strangers  in  the  street,  presumably  Serbs,  expressed  their  satisfaction  for  this
achievement,  stressing that  the renewed presence of  the mosque had brought  a  better
'spirit'  ('duh')  to  the  square.  The  event  occurred  peacefully,  albeit  subject  to  security
measures,  allowing, for instance,  to a prompt but discreet intervention to detail  a man
wearing  a  shirt  with  the photo of  Ratko Mladič  who tried to  walk past  the crowd of
worshippers and guests, which spread beyond the walls of  the mosque and into the square
itself125. 
123 Preporod Bijeljina: “Otvorena obnavljena Atik džamija u Bijeljini”, 16/09/2014, at 
http://preporodbn.com/otvorena-obnovljena-atik-dzamija-u-bijeljini/ (last accessed 13/06/2016)
124 Original: “primjer demokratije, poštivanja ljudskih prava i ravnopravnosti svih koji žive u Bijeljini”
125 Some months later, when an unknown person painted a graffiti on the wall of  the local sports centre with 
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A few weeks later, on the official commemoration of  the day of  the municipality, 25
September, the Mayor reinforced his message of  tolerance, inviting representatives of  the
Islamic Community to the commemorative event, and presenting them with a Declaration
of  Gratefulness  for  the  IZ's  active  participation  in  aid  and  rescue  efforts  during  the
catastrophic floods that in May had engulfed Semberija and other parts of  Bosnia. Whilst
acknowledging the significance of  such a gesture, one of  the participants in the ceremony
on behalf  of  the IZ, when describing it to me, was keen to highlight how the delegation
were assigned places somewhere on the edge of  the room, while representatives of  the
Serbian orthodox Church sat on the front row. Such a graphic image offered an allegory
for  the  meaning  of  tolerance,  reinforcing,  one  the  one  hand,  the  salience  of  ethnic
difference, and, on the other hand, assigning a position of  marginality to the ethnic other,
praised  but  kept  in  its  place.  Another  participant,  present  during  this  conversation,
countered such a perspective, highlighting instead the importance of  perserverance, and
saying “what matters is that we are here, and that we are here means two things: first, that
we are not afraid, and second, that we have no hatred”. 
The  process  of  reconstruction  of  Bijeljina's  mosques  is,  indeed  a  tale  of
perseverance.  A  few  years  after  the  end  of  the  war,  once  the  Islamic  Community  in
Bijeljina reorganised, it declared to the local authorities and the international organisations
present, their intention to rebuild the five mosques that had been demolished during the
war. Behind this initiative were not only the religious authorities, but a small core of  local
residents and activists in favour of  the return process. Their idea was that rebuilding the
mosques would incentivise the return, offering to  the forcefully displaced a message of
hope and encouragement. They were met with opposition first and foremost from the local
representative of  the Office of  the High-Representative of  the international Community,
who is said to have suggested that only one mosque be built, and that this should be located
in the outskirts, as it might otherwise be seen as a provocation by Serb nationalists and lead
to violent reactions.
racist, violent slurs against Bosnian Muslims, it was painted over on the same day, no more than two 
hours after it was discovered. On another occasion, a member of  the fan club of  the local football team, 
FC Radnik, as arrested when he was caught gluing posters in praise of  General Ratko Mladic, on the eve
of  the anniversary of  the Srebrenica massacre.  The incidents, and they way they were dealt with  are 
illustrative of  the way the local authorities manage dissent, now that they have adopted a moderate line, 
but it also exposed the endurance of  ethnic prejudice and hatred, regularly expressed through small 
incidents like this one, some of  which remain unreported or unknown to the wider population. 
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Such fear was not without a basis. After the war Bijeljina became one of  the centres
of  a  power struggle among Republika Srpska's  political  class  over how to react to  the
Dayton  Peace  Agreement  and  the  international  military  presence  in  the  country.
Simultaneously,  other  important  struggles  were  taking  place.  Bijeljina's  population had
doubled with the influx of  Serbs displaced from other regions, most of  whom were housed
in  the  homes  formerly  occupied  by  non-Serbs,  mostly  Bosniaks.  They  had  been
dispossessed and in many cases deported, but were now returning and reclaiming their
property, under the provisions of  the Dayton Peace Accords. A number of  violent incidents
took place there in this period, including violent criminal activities for profit, and politically
motivated violence, like mob attacks on NATO (SFOR) forces, bomb attacks to politicians,
and ethnically-motivated crimes such as attacks to Bosniak returnees and their property. 
The  local  authorities  refused  permission  to  the  reconstruction  of  the  mosques,
which was granted only after a sucessful complaint to the Human Rights Commission, a
state  organ  created  by  Dayton.  Eventually  forced  to  grant  permission,  the  authorities
resorted to different forms of  administrative obstruction, including, according to the IZ, the
erasure of  the property registers from the cadastres. The Islamic Community persevered
and eventually the reconstruction began. For Bosniaks, the reconstruction was a form of
reasserting their presence, symbolic as well as physical, in Bijeljina and other areas of  what
became Republika Srspka. The reconstruction of  the mosques was seen as a necessary step
to ensure conditions for the community to return and thrive under the new circumstances. 
As with the reconstruction of  the mosques, the return of  populations to areas where
they would be minorities as a result of  the war, was seen by the international agencies as a
potential threat to the fragile peace, rather than something to promote and facilitate. Both
processes  were  essentially  self-driven;  their  relative  success  reveals  the  importance  of
collective agency and individual leadership, willing to explore the opportunities opened up
by the peace settlement, in particular regarding the right to property and the right to return
to  one's  pre-war  home.  It  was  only  after  these  processes  kickstarted  that  international
agencies provided the support that they were in principle committed to.
The reconstruction of  the main mosque, the Atik Mosque, began in 2002. One year
earlier,  a ceremony in Banja Luka marking the launching of  the reconstruction of  the
Ferhadija  Mosque was  violently  disrupted by  Serb  nationalists.  The incident,  probably
orchestrated rather than spontaneous, resulted in one man dead. In Bijeljina nothing of  the
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kind happened, but the Islamic Community also chose to keep a low profile so as to avoid
unwanted attention. 
In terms of  popular reactions to the launching of  the reconstruction of  Bijeljina's
five mosques, two types of  reaction stand in contrast. On the one hand, the construction
sites were regularly targetted, usually under the dead of  night, by individuals who painted
racist and hateful words on the sites' walls; and once someone even placed a pig's head on
the gate of  one of  the construction sites. Rather than reporting these incidents, the Islamic
community simply removed the messages of  hatred. Publicising these incidents might, the
activists reasoned, discourage Bosniak return, while ignoring them would deny the  authors
any publicity that would reward their actions. 
On the other hand, many Serbs offered donations, ranging from a few convertible
marks  to  tens  of  thousands.  Others  privately  expressed  to  the  Bosniak  activists  their
appreciation about the initiative, which they saw as restoring some of  the town's old urban
spirit.  Such  acts  reveal  the  endurance  locally  of  the  urban  traditions  of  peaceful
coexistence of  ethnic/religious groups, pointing out that it was common since the late 19 th
century for people of  different faiths to contribute with money, materials or work, to the
construction of  other faiths' temples, and that tradition was often invoked by those now
offering donations. 
Importantly, though, these donations were performed as private acts. Rather than
acts  of  resistance  to  the  national  order,  the  donations  represented  an  attempt  to
accommodate these traditions of  zajednički život to the new circumstances. Some of  the
donors, especially businessmen, had important ties to the nationalist regime operating in
RS and/or to the local political class. Consistently with their donations, some also had a
policy of  providing employment for non-Serbs, in a town that was now highly segregated. 
Hence, contering the grim prediction of  some “internationals”, rather than stirring
the  flames  of  ethnic  hatred,  the  reconstruction  of  Bijeljina's  mosques  significantly
contributed to a more positive environment with regard to inter-ethnic relations. Not long
after the reconstruction began, a more moderate leadership emerged within the local ruling
party, the SDS, which has ininterruptedly ruled Bijeljina since 1990 up to the present day.
This was the result of  the power struggles among Serb nationalists after Dayton (no time to
delve  on  it  here).  This  new leadership,  with  Mićo Mićić  at  the  helm,  abandoned the
hardline nationalism that had characterised the SDS until  them, to adopt a  pragmatic
268
approach both in relation to the international actors in Bosnia and to the now small but not
insignificant Bosniak community in Bijeljina. Mićić had began his political career after the
war as the municipality official responsible for relations with the war veterans of  the Army
of  Republika  Srpska,  and,  as  such,  committed  himself  towards  the  creation  of  a
monument to the fallen soldiers, which now stands in the central square, in front of  the
disctrict court, and within some 50 metres of  the Atik Mosque. Counting on such a strong
base of  supporters, Mićić's skill was in the realisation that a more accomodating approach
towards non-Serbs would not undermine its power basis, but, instead, expanded. He for the
first time nominated a Bosniak vice-mayor (who had no effective power but merely the
capacity  to  plead  for  the  interests  of  the  Bosniak  community);  began  to  engage  in  a
dialogue  with  Bosniak  activists  and the  Islamic  community;  sidelined more vocal  Serb
nationalists who operated in the ngo sector; and stopped tolerating acts of  vandalism or
open intimidation against Bosniaks, which resulted in an important improvement of  their
life conditions. Since then, he has counted on the political support of  the SDA, crucial to
tilt the balance in favour to the SDS led coalition and against its arch-rival the SNSD. 
One thing I found striking, regardless of  the positive vibe produced, was how the
official reopening of  the Atik Mosque, was framed by Serb politicians, the local media and
subsquenly  some of  my  informants  of  Serb  nationality,  highlighting  the  fact  that  the
mosque is now renovated and open for cult as evidence of  the tolerant character of  the
Serb people, sometimes contrasting this with the way damaged Serb orthodox churches
remain abandoned in areas of   from which Serbs fled during the war. Such observations
completely bypassed the question of  why was there the need to reconstruct the mosque in
the first place. One woman I knew even commented with me, during a cigarette break
outside her office overlooking the square, how the mosque looked much better now than it
did  twenty  two  years  earlier,  as  if  this  was  a  banal  refurbishment.  Although  such
perspectives do not speak for the various ways the Serb population in Bijeljina experience
the renewed presence of  the city mosques, they do translate a certain level of  acceptance of
the dominant   discourses about ethnic  relations locally,  marked by the absence of  any
significant public reflection about the experience of  persecution by non-Serbs, especially
Bosnian Muslims, during the war. 
The  creation,  in  2008,  by  Bijeljina's  municipal  assembly,  of  a  local  Truth  and
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Reconciliation Commission held the potential to open up the space for such reflection, but
its potential never materialised, and instead, the Commission itself  collapsed after less than
one year. We now turn our attention to it.
7.3 Bijeljina's Truth and Reconciliation Commission: 
The proposal  to  create a  Commission for Truth and Reconciliation was first  made by
Christian  Schwarz-Schilling  in  December  2004  in  his  “Final  Report  to  the  BiH
government” at the end of  his ten-year mission as international mediator. At this time,
Bijeljina was, along with a few other municipalities in Republika Srpska, subjected by the
USA  and  other  donor  countries  to  a  regime  of  political  and  economic  sanctions,  in
response  to  the  seriousness  of  violent  incidents  and  the  systematic  resistance  to  the
enforcement of  the Dayton Peace Accords. That deprived Bijeljina from important sources
of  funding, such as projects sponsored by USAid and other american organisations. It was,
effectively,  a  way to indirectly  intervene on the power struggles  that  were taking place
within the Bosnian Serbs political class, among political parties, but also within the SDS. 
It was also in 2004 that the party was shaken by the Srebrenica Report, to which
the President of  Republika Srpska, Dragan Čavić, who was also the leader of  the SDS,
reacted in a Declaration broadcast live in which he stated that Srebrenica was a mass crime
in which more than 7.000 men had been unlawfully killed by Serb forces, and apologised to
the victims. Even though Čavić did no recognise the massacre of  Srebrenica as an act of
genocide, this Declaration created a shock in the party, already thorn by internal conflicts
since the signing of  the Dayton Peace Accords.  Čavić led the reformist faction, but was
eventually defeated, and in 2008 he left the party, to form a new, more moderate party. The
internal conflict did allow, however, for a new generation of  politicians to emerge, who
were less tainted by the war, and more pragmatic in what regarded both dealing with the
International  Community  and with  the  Bosnian Muslims.  It  was  the case  of  Mićić,  a
former physical education teacher who rose in the party ranks after the war, to become
entity Minister for Veterans's question, before being elected Mayor of  Bijeljina in 2004. It
was, thus, a recently enthroned Mayor who received  Schwarz-Schilling's recommendations
Mićić  was  the  first  mayor  to  receive  a  delegation  of  return  activists  and
representatives of  the Bosniak community. To accommodate their demands he started by
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nominating a Muslim vice-Mayor, a resident of  Janja, a Muslim village close to Bijeljina,
and then reinstated a few Muslims to jobs in the municipal administration, which they had
been dismissed from in the beginning of  the war. Albeit largely symbolic, such measures
revealed a change of  direction and the beginning of  a change in the dynamics of  ethnic
relations. It was also around this time that the process of  return of  property occupied or
confiscated during the war gained pace. The question of  property return was an important
source of  conflict. During the war, the homes belonging to non-Serbs were used to rehouse
displaced Serbs. Many of  them were left vacant after their owners fled, but in many cases
non-Serbs were evicted from their homes, or otherwise forced to share them with displaced
Serbs, who often proved to be abusive. As the Dayton Peace Accords granted individuals
the right to return to their pre-war homes, as well as the right to their property. Up to
15.000 Bosnian Muslims returned to the municipality of  Bijeljina after the war, and many
more filed processes to reclaim their pre-war property. These homes had become inhabited
by Serbs –  usually displaced, but also, in many cases, local Serbs who profited from the
persecution of  the Muslims – who in many cases resisted and contested eviction, through
legal means, but often also through intimidation and violence. But once a number of  cases
were solved with the return of  property to their legitimate owners, it became less and less a
source of  tension, which favoured Mićić moderate approach.
It took years, however, for the idea of  creating a local Commission for Truth and
Reconciliation to be put in practice. By 2007, the USA were sending messages that they
might  revise  their  decision  over  the  imposition  of  sanctions  in  accordance  with  new
circumstances. It was also in 2007 that the former international mediator, who had first
proposed the idea, returned to Bosnia in a new role, now as High Representative of  the
International Community. Mićić seized the moment, launched the idea, and, in early 2008
Bijeljina's Truth and Reconciliation Commission was finally created. 
In what concerns the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the municipal council
(opstinsko vijece) decided that its composition should reflect the ethnic distribution of  the
pre-war population of  the municipality, which was roughly two third Serbs, and one third
Muslims, although in the city itself  the proportion was inverted. The Municipal Assembly
then appointed six Serbs, but decided to appoint only one Bosniak, Fatima Mustafić,  a
woman from Janja,  nominated  in  her  quality  of  member  of  the  SDA (main  Bosnian
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Muslim nationalist party, and the only one with significant expression in Bijeljina).  Such a
decision  revealed  already  a  certain  lack  of  commitment  towards  the  success  of  the
Commission.  (Fatima Mustafić refused the nomination, and, under pressure, the Council
decided to nominate two other Bosniaks as members, thus enforcing its own decision to
have a membership proportional to the pre-war ethnic distribution of  the population. One
of  the new members was Mehmed Đezić, also from Janja, and secretary of  the Association
of  former detainees in the  concentration camp of  Batković (udruženje logorasa). The other
was  Emir  Musli,  from Bijeljina,  a  free-lance  journalist  actively  involved  in  the  return
process, the reorganisation of  the Islamic community and the reconstruction of  Bijeljina's
Atik mosque. Musli was one of  the few Bosniaks who remained in Bijeljina throughout the
whole war period. 
The other members included Dušan Stevanović, a displaced Serb, in representation
of  the organisation of  veterans of  the Army of  Republika Srpska (BORS); Smilja Mitrović 
 head of  the Association of  disappeared persons from the municipality of  Bijeljina, Djojo
Pajic,  in  representation  of  the  Association  for  detained  soldiers  and  civilians.  Two
representatives  of  political  parties,  Dragoslav  Perić,  from  the  SNSD,  and  Cvijetin
Ristanović, from the PDP, and two lawyers involved in humanitarian and charitable work,
Blagoje  Josipović,  from  the  “Srpske  narodne  obnove”(Serbian  national  renewal)
organisation, and Duško Tomić, from the Djećija Ambasada Medaši (Children's Embassy
of  Medaši). Tomić, a controversial individual, but also one of  the few public figures who
was able to build bridges between Serbs and Bosniaks, was also nominated President of  the
Commission. 
Tomić immediately entered in conflict with Emir Musli, when the later expressed
reservations about one of  Tomić's ideas for a public event of  reconciliation. Tomić  wanted
to organise a public event in which a perpetrator and a victim would come together and
speak.  Although there had been, up to that date,  no trials  or prosecutions focusing on
crimes committed in Bijeljina during the war, as politically motivated crimes, the case of
the murder of  the Isić family was a rare case that resulted in a prison sentence although the
tribunal considered that the crime was the product not of  ethnic hatred, but si mply of
greed (see Ch. 4). The Isić family, composed of  six members, was travelling in September
1992 from Teslić on their way to exile in Germany, where their father was already. They
stopped in Bijeljina to arrange with the Red Cross to proceed, and were placed in a local
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hotel waiting for the documents to be validated. While waiting, they were approached by a
group of  men who promised to take them across the border, but instead murdered the
whole family.
Tomić wanted to bring Rahman Isić, who, the father and husband of  the victims,
from Germany for that event, in which one of  the men condemned by the murder, Željko
Lakić would publicly apologise. Emir Musli expressed his reservations, considering that the
Commission should focus on truth first, and reconciliation later, and opposed the idea as
insensible. Tomić reacted, accusing Musli of  having a hidden agenda leading Musli  to
resigne with immediate effect. The Commission was reduced to two Bosniak members ,
only one of  whom,  Mehmed Đezić,  would participate actively in the Commission. The
other active members, besides Tomić, were Blagoje Josipović and Dušan Stevanović. The
remaining four were either passive or obstructive. It was the case in particular of  Smilja
Mitrović and Đoko Pajić. Pajić had been a director of  the concentration camp of  Batković
between 1993-1994, and in 2014 was procecuted, accused of  responsibility for beatings and
abuse of  prisoners in Batković under his command, and in 2015 he was arrested within the
same process (trial ongoing)126.
Tomić also decided, controversially, to include in the work of  the commission, the
'Tuzlanska kolona' incident, which had taken place in May 1992 in Tuzla, when the JNA
military convoy withdrawing from the city came under attack by local forces, resulted in the
dead of  52 soldiers  who were travelling in the convoy. He justified his  decision by the
presence of  a  large number of  Serbs  displaced from Tuzla  in Bijeljina.  This  decision,
however went beyond the mandate of  the Commission, which was meant to focus solely on
events that took place in the municipality. This decision, combined with the conflict with
Musli, largely alienated other Bosniak activists, most of  whom distanced themselves. But
Tomić also alienated Serbs, when he decided to cooperate with a Tuzla ngo, to investigate
the event. The Fondacija istina, pravda pomirenje, was viewed with suspicion by displaced Serbs
from Tuzla, who tended to believe it had been set up to whitewash the crime rather than to
uncover the truth.
As  for  the  reconciliation  event,  the  victims'  family  declined  to  participate,  so
Mehmed Đezić  accepted Tomić's  proposal  to  take their  place in the event.  Đezić  was
willing  to  make  significant  efforts  towards  the  success  of  the  Commission,  but  found
126 For this research, I was able to interview Emir Musli;  Dušan Stevanović; Smilja Mitrović; and Mehmed 
Đezić
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himself  in a position that he felt was very uncomfortable, solely because he did not want to
undermine it. The event had virtually no impact, because it took place, not in the city of
Bijeljina, but in the village of  Medaši, from which both Željko Lakić and Duško Tomić
were natives and residents. The location was justified by the fact that the perpetrator was a
local, the victims were murdered in the area, and their bodies thrown in the River Drina
nearby. At the time, Tomić's intention was to organise further events throughout the region
and in Bijeljina itself, but that was not to happen. 
Instead, the Commission's work soon came to a halt, after the Assembly rejected its
first report. Tomić eventually tendered his resignation in protest, but was never replaced.
The Commission never met again, although it was never formally disbanded either. The
materials  collected  by   Tomić  during  his  tenure,  including  interviews  to  victims  and
witnesses  of  crimes,  was  never  made public,  but  instead  became part  of  his  personal
archive,  an important  resource for his  work as  a  lawyer,  and since the collapse of  the
Commission he has been hired by a few victims' families to represent them and push for a
formal investigation and a prosecution of  their cases. His success has been limited so far, as
none of  the cases have reached trial stage. 
By the time the Commission collapsed, however, the US had already decided to lift
sanctions,  the  creation of  the  Commission having  been one  important  element  in  the
decision, as evidence of  the will of  the local administration to 'face the past' and promote
reconciliation.  The importance of  the commission goes beyond the lifting of  american
sanctions. It allowed the local authorities to gain prestige among the representatives of  the
international community, without effectively committing the resources and providing the
support necessary for such an endeavour On the contrary, the very choice of  members, and
the disruptive behaviour of  some suggests that  failure was the expected outcome. 
Such a suggestion is reinforced if  we bear in mind the decisions taken by another
commission set up by the Municipal Assembly in the same period, the Commission for the
revision of  toponymy.  There  was  only  one Bosniak  member  in this  commission,  Jusuf
Trbić, who was, at the time, a member of  the Assembly. In consultation with other Bosniak
activists,  Trbić carefully drafted a proposal for new street names that in his view better
reflected Bijeljina's multicultural history, including not only names that were meaningful to
the Bosniak community, but also other names could foster a better sense of  inclusion across
the ethnic divide, most notably the name of  Rodoljub Čolaković, a popular figure among
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residents with an affiliation to the partisan tradition. All his proposals were rejected, and
rather than mitigating the symbolic dominance of  Serb nationalist names in the toponymy,
the commission reinforced it, namely by conferring the name of  Patriarch Pavle to one of
the remaining streets in the city centre which had remained unchanged; the street in the
old Atik mahala where the Orthodox Monastery of  Saint Vasilije Ostroški was built, and
which until 2014 served as the siege of  the Zvornik-Tuzla episcopate until 2013.
The creation,  activity  and collapse of  the Commission,  a  classic  mechanism of
transitional justice, can be interpreted, borrowing from van Gennep and Victor Turner's
frame  of  analysis, as  a  ritual  or  reagregation,  marking  the  end  of  a  long  period  of
liminality and the beginning of  a new 'normality'. Emptied of  its transformative potential,
the  Commission  had  nevertheless  a  useful  role,  marking the  foreclosure  of  a  unique
opportunity for public reflexion over the question of  the persecution of  non-Serbs during
the war.  The odds were against its success, as much of  the local ruling class had no interest
in supporting it, and the general population was not motivated to participate, but instead
showed alienation from, if  not resistance to the process. The challenges were high, but the
strategy to confront them was weak. Its failure was caused, in the first place, by the agency
of  its membership, and the inability of  those more genuinely committed in its activities in
capitalising on the external pressure exercised by the International community so as to
somehow force the ostensibly moderate Serb nationalist forces to offer more support. 
The Commission's collapse symbolically marked the end of  a period of  liminality in
which, through the convergence of  external pressures; intra-Serb power-struggles; and the
agency  of  both  Serb  leaders  and  non-Serb,  mostly  Bosniak  activists,  much  had  been
achieved, including the curbing of  violence, the successful return of  up to one third of  the
pre-war non-Serb population, and the process of  reconstruction of  the mosques (as well as
the reorganisation of  the small  Roman Catholic community of  believers).  It conversely
marked also the beginning of  a new era of  'normality', in which the political structures,
formal  and informal,  became entrenched,  a  new set  of  values  was  imposed,  and new
unwritten  rules  for  social  relations  were  clearly  understood  and  usually  adopted,  and
agency  became  much  harder  to  exercise,  unless  it  conformed  to  the  order  in  force.
Although the decade that preceded the creation of  the Commission were marked by a level
275
of  violence  that  have  since  been  curbed,  it  was  also  a  decade  that  was  prodigal  in
possibilities for change. That sense of  possibility was closed, and further progress in the
improvement of  ethnic relations was the result of  trends that had been established precisely
in that period. 
The  genuinely  grassroots  activism  of  some  of  the  Bosniak  informal  leaders,
gathered around the returnees association 'Povratak I opstanak', who were, as in the case of
Salem Čorbo, strongly connected to Bijeljina's pre-war traditions of  zajednički život, and
committed towards the affirmation of  other forms of  belonging other than ethnicity, lost
momentum, never to recover. The space left empty was taken over by the SDA, which
already dominated the village of  Janja, effectively a Bosniak ethnic enclave. Since then, the
Opština is widely perceived as favouring the Bosniaks of  Janja, especially in terms of  access
to public jobs, but also to jobs in the private sector, thus generating mistrust within an
already fragmented Bosniak community, and  fomenting a cynical view, among the wider
population, of  politics. 
Comparing the two processes, the reconstruction of  the mosques and the creation
and subsquent collapse of  the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is clear that in both
there were three different factors in interaction:
• international pressures in the context of  post-conflict intervention;
• intra-serb power struggles for the control of  the municipality;
• and the agency of  the Bosniak (formal and informal) leadership.
If  the reconstruction of  the mosques revealed the potential for reconciliation, the
TLC exposed its limits, largely emptying of  meaning any efforts to pursue it. In both cases
the  expectations  of  engaged  international  actors  failed  to  materialise,  suggesting  the
importance of  local ownership of  such processes. The creation of  the TLC, in particular,
had only detrimental effects, allowing the municipal leadership to wash their hands and
disengage themselves, whilst benefiting from the credibility they acquired by 'ticking the TJ
box'. 
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Concluding remarks
The  adoption  by  the  local  SDS  of  a  more  pragmatic  approach  favouring
moderation and tolerance, in which both processes played a role, proved to be an inteligent
reading of  the mood of  the population. Indeed, I came up with a number of  examples of
spontaneous, grassroots acts of  organic reconciliation and restoration of  social trust beyond
ethnic  boundaries,  and  learned  about  who  were  some  of  the  businessmen  providing
employment to non-Serbs, offering donations to the reconstruction of  the mosques. That
this kind of  acts remain stricktly private, however, is revealing of  the enduring dominance
of  nationalism. 
The process of  normalisation reinforced Bijeljina's powerholders by making their
policies  more acceptable among international  actors,  and capturing the support  of  the
Bosniak nationalist party, but did not address most of  the negative consequences of  the war
experience.  Questions  of  justice,  both  criminal  justice  and  social  justice  have  been
systematically sidelined.
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Conclusions
An ethnography of  memory, this thesis delved into the meaning making processes of  the
population of  Bijeljina, as they remember their wartime experience, and make sense of  the
war's impact in their lives.  The 1992-1992 war that ravaged Bosnia-Herzegovina left an
enduring legacy, which Bosnians still struggle to cope with. This thesis offers an insight into
that legacy, by studying how the war and nationalist politics have transformated the city of
Bijeljina, from a multi-ethnic town with a Muslim majority, where social relations were
organised under the principle of  'life  in common'  (zajednički  život),  into a  'Serb'  town
organised under the principle of  'separation of  peoples', and where a narrow interpretation
of  Serb national identity dominates the public space. 
Resorting to the idea of  liminality as an heuristic device to frame the changes that
took place in Bijeljina since the disintegration of  Yugoslavia, this thesis has analysed four
distinctive processes through which the transformation of  Bijeljina occurred: 
• the  transformation  of  public  space  through  a  dual  process  of  erasure  and
reinscription of  the mnemonic elements present in the urbanscape;
• the wartime persecution of  Muslims in a protracted process of  ethnic cleansing,
leading to the eventual expulsion of  the quasi totality of  the Muslim population;
• the resettlement of  Serbs forcefully displaced from other regions of  Bosnia;
• and finally a set of  initiatives that converged towards the 'normalisation' of  inter-
ethnic relations, through which the aggressive rathorics that marked the war years
and the immediate post-war gave way to an environment ostensibly tolerant, which
promotes a  more 'moderate'  form of  nationalism, but nevertheless  relies  on the
primacy of  ethnic identity. 
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Ethnic cleansing was central to this transformation. The thesis explores the diverse
set of  memories associated with wartime violence and forced displacement, to understand
how individuals and categories of  the population remember this historical transformation,
how they frame their own experience, and how they relate to the (perceived) experience of
others who did not share their own positions of  power or otherwise vulnerability. Given
that the wartime goal  of  ethnic homogeneisation was not fully achieved, thanks to the
provisions of  the Dayton Agreement, which allowed for freedom of  movement and the
return of  property to their pre-war owners, how different experiences coexist, and how
those who experienced them interact in a shared space was the puzzle that led to this
research  project.  In  a  political  context  characterised  by  enduring  uncertainty;  deep
divisions  created  or  enhanced  by  conflict;  and  the  dominance  of  nationalistic  public
representations, how are memories that stem from the experience of  mass violence given
meaning, and thus influence the dynamics of  identification processes? This was my overall
research question. I sought to explore in particular: 
• how social memories produced by different 'communities of  experience' interplay
within the post-war process of  reconstruction of  identity; 
• the role played by memories of  earlier historical experiences of  violence, but also
the memories of  'life in common' (zajednički život) and peaceful coexistence among
ethnic groups under communism; on how people remember the recent war
• and finally, I sought to understand how the boundaries between public and private
dimensions of  social memories are defined, maintained and challenged, given the
public prominence of  nationalist representations of  the past 
The four empirical chapters (ch. 4 to 7) that form the bulk of  this thesis are framed
according  to the different  stages  in  the liminal  process  of  transformation that  Bijeljina
experienced since the end of  communist rule. Chapter 4 is set on the context of  the stage
of  separation within the stage of  liminality itself, and it provides an analysis of  the spatial
dimension of  the process of  construction of  an official memory in what was to become
Republika Srpska. It focuses on how the physical space changed in Bijeljina during and in
the  immediate  aftermath  of  the  Bosnian  war,  through  a  dual  process  of  erasure  and
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reinscription of  public memory. 
Chapters  5  and 6  focus  on private  aspects  of  social  and collective  memory,  to
explore  how  people  reacted  to  and  coped  with  violence,  and  in  particular  with  the
profound transformations defined by the strategic goal of  'separation of  peoples' that was
the cornerstone of  the Bosnian Serb nationalist project. The chapters are located in the
context of  the period of  liminality proper, and in both chapters I essentially explore the
population's lived experience, as reflected in personal recollections through my interviews
and informal conversations, but also as perceived through my observation of  everyday life. 
Chapter  5  focuses  on  the  non-Serbs'  (mostly  Bosniaks,  previously  known  as
Muslims) experience of  persecution, and how it is remembered through privately shared
memories. It explores coping mechanisms, the flow of  information, and cases of  support
beyond the ethnic divide. Chapter 6 focuses on the resettlement of  Serbs displaced from
other regions of  Bosnia. Their experience is represented in official memory in such a way
that it instrumentalises this experience for the sake of  nation-building, of  which resettled
Serbs become hostages, whilst perceiving the position they are assigned as a second-rate
status. The chapter explores the contradictions and dilemmas that people feel, trapped as
they are by hegemonic narratives framing their  suffering as a sacrifice for the nation.  
Chapter 7 closes the circle, with the idea of  normalisation, bringing the thesis to the
present time, and exploring an array of  rituals of  reaggregation and a few acts of  redress
after ethnic cleansing. Here I explore the process of  return of  Bosniaks (and also Roma);
the reconstruction of  the mosques; initiatives towards 'reconciliation' including the failure
of  the local Truth and Reconciliation commission; and the continuation of  the process of
erasure  and  reinscription,  fulfilling,  in  this  period,  a  different  function,  not  one  of
separation, but one of  reagreggration. 
This thesis contributes to the production of  knowledge at three different levels:
• At the empirical level, the thesis offers a yet unexplored case-study of  how violence
and forced displacement have contributed to radically transform society in Bosnia-
Herzegovina; of  the connections between the ideas of  'life in common', 'separation
of  peoples', and the experience of  violence in the construction of  national identity
in  Republika  Srpska;  and  of  the  interactions  in  one  shared  space,  between
280
individuals and categories of  the population with divergent experiences, and how
these  interactions  somehow  shape  the  boundaries  between  their  privately-kept
memories and public representations;
• at the theoretical level, the thesis seeks to refine our understanding of  the dynamics
of  social  memory  in  post-conflict  societies,  and  proposes  the  idea  of  'difficult
memories' as a conceptual tool;
• at the level of  methodology, without seeking to inovate, this thesis has followed a
rigorous ethnographic engagement, with a prolonged presence in the field, and a
sustained effort to learn about how people remember through their own frames.
Difficult memories: 
Thanks  to  one  year  of  immersion  in  the  community,  and  an  ethnographic
engagement that pushed me to transcend available representations of  the past to focus also
on what was left unsaid, tacit, and 'in the air', the key theoretical finding that emerged from
my  observations  and  interactions  was  a  set  of  memories  that  I  have  called  'difficult
memories'. 
These were memories which a given community of  experience seeks to preserve
from the  gaze  of  outsiders,  and keep within  the  intimacy of  the  group,  not  so  much
because recalling them is emotionally demanding, if  not painful – which it often was, since
these  were  memories  associated  with  the  experience  of  ethnicised  violence,  political
persecution and forced displacement – but because they did not fit  easily  into a  larger
public narrative that the rememberers, to some extent shared, and which they did not wish
to  undermine.  These  memories  are  'difficult'  because  they  contradict  dominant
representations under which umbrella these communities  somehow find shelter in their
quest to transcend the deep uncertainty over identity. 
The idea of  'difficult memories' problematises the prevalent approaches in memory studies
about societies divided by violent conflict, whether 'ethnic' or of  otherwise defined. Usually
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focused on official  commemorations and other publicly available representations of  the
past, such studies broadly speak of  'divided memories',  'conflicting memories',  'memory
wars', etc. Such approaches offer a static vision, in which societies that experienced conflict
become prisoners of  the past, and memory a continuation of  war by other means; they also
overlook the diversity of  experiences and perspectives within each contending group. This
approaches  also  place  excessive  value,  and  excessive  expectations  on  the  agency  of
'memory entrepreneurs', somehow identified as having leadership abilities, cultural capital
or charisma – recent trends seem to be focusing on the healing power of  art as a vehicle
towards reconciliation. Such approaches have had deep policy implications, notably in the
field of  Transitional Justice, of  which the idea of  'facing the past' has been elevated to an
essential pillar of  post-conflict reconciliation, with a  standardised approach being lectured,
if  not effectively imposed across the globe in societies experiencing transitions from war to
peace, and autoritarianism to democracy, without too much concern for local context and
the meaning-making strategies of  those that are supposed to be reconciled.  
Avenues for future research:
Whilst I am committed to further refine the idea of  'difficult memories',  the thesis also
identifies how the liberal discourse of  reconciliation has been appropriated by nationalists
seeking to reframe themselves as 'moderate' and 'tolerant', by accomodating some of  the
memories of  subordinate groups and clashing historical legacies, to create a new sense of
normality. This thesis argues for the necessity to go beyond representations and publicly
available explicit narratives, and explore a wealth of  memories that remain largely hidden
from public scrutiny, if  not unarticulated. This requires a long-term commitment to the
research setting, which, in the particular case of  this study, I hope to be able to preserve and
further develop through a longitudinal approach. 
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